#4
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 1999
From: helmer@glasnet.ru (John Helmer)
>From The Moscow Tribune, July 9
THE BIG AMERICAN DIFFERENCE
>From John Helmer in Moscow
"I never did understand the difference between a cannon and a
culverin," Russia's Empress Catherine the Great once said to one of her
generals.
"There is a big difference," he replied, "which I will now explain to
Your Majesty. The cannon, you see, is one thing, while the culverin is quite
another."
"Ah," said Catherine. "Now I get it."
When President Bill Clinton is replaced next year -- as more certainly than
President Boris Yeltsin he will be -- there may be a profound change in United
States policy towards Russia. But then again there may be no difference but
the words.
George Bush Jr. has signalled what may happen by retaining Condoleeza Rice,
an academic and former National Security Council expert on Russia,
as his advisor. She recently announced what amounts to a cautious
but strong departure from Clinton policy towards Moscow.
For the first time in American politics, there is an acknowledgement that
corruption inside the Kremlin is the single most important problem facing
Russia. Regarding the Russian presidential election, Rice said: "I would
just like to see the Russians find someone who is not corrupt, who is not on
the take personally."
The evidence of Russian presidential straw-polls -- most notably, ex-prime
minister Yevgeny Primakov's continuing popularity as a presidential
candidate in the election scheduled for June 2000 -- has become a buzzword
in American electioneering. Of course, it's too late to save Primakov
from the Clinton Administration's encouragement of his overthrow, though
perhaps not too late to encourage his return to politics.
What was wrong with Clinton's policy in Russia, according to Rice,
was that it was "too involved in Russian internal politics, trying to prop up
Yeltsin."
It remains to be seen how much candidate Bush makes of Clinton's
and his successor, Vice President Albert Gore's vulnerability to several
charges Rice suggests she has the evidence to sustain:
-- That Clinton and Gore conspired to corrupt the Russian presidency
by secret funding arrangements that personally and collectively
benefitted the President, his close aides, and officials. It is now known
this corruption extended to stealing International Monetary Fund
loans. It is also suspected that Clinton, Gore, and their
subordinates suppressed or ignored warnings and evidence of this corruption
from U.S. intelligence and other sources.
-- That Clinton and Gore, on the particular advice of Strobe Talbott,
conspired to topple the Russian parliament in March and again in
September of 1993; and the Russian government between September
1998 and May 1999.
-- That Clinton and Gore intend to further threaten Russia
by expanding Albania in the direction of Greece, Serbia, Macedonia, and
Bulgaria; by toppling the Milosevic regime in Serbia; and by intensifying
the pressure on Russia's borders from NATO-associated neighbors, and
within Russia's borders from covertly financed, pseudo-Islamic
"liberation" organizations.
Despite the hints from Rice, Governor Bush isn't likely to go as far as
to blame Clinton and Gore for criminalizing the Russian state. But
Rice's advice so far is for Bush to attack the Clinton-Gore strategy
of further NATO expansion that intensifies Russia's isolation.
Rice is already acknowledging that the Clinton-Gore policy has directly
caused a sharp rise in anti-Americanism among Russians. Perhaps candidate
Bush will publicly see in the new assertiveness of Russia's military
leadership the same cause.
Rice has also hinted that the Clinton-Gore policy of backing corruption
in the name of reform will end, if Bush wins the U.S. election.
"Real economic reform," according to Rice, might take "a generation. It
seems to me that things are so broken now, the ability to do anything for the
long term of the economy looks to be lacking."
That's a real slap in the face of those erstwhile reformers, the young
Russian courtiers of Washington, like former chief ministers Yegor Gaidar,
Anatoly Chubais, Boris Nemtsov, Boris Fyodorov, and Sergei Kirienko. When an
influential voice in the entourage of a popular American candidate starts
his presidential campaign off with an attack on every asset the Clinton
Administration thought it had created in Moscow, a serious political change
could be in the wind.
And even if presidential campaign talk in the U.S. can never be quite so
serious, the threat from Rice and the Bush candidacy is that Kremlin
fundraisers may not be able to count on American or I.M.F. money for their
presidential race, as they did in 1996.
No Washington payoffs -- now that would be a revolution in Russian politics!
#5
Newsday
7 July 1999
[for personal use only]
House Is Wrong on Russian Weapons
By Laura Beers. Laura Beers is a research assistant at the Center
for Defense Information. (lbeers@cdi.org)
WHILE PRESIDENTS Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin are striving to
heal the growing rift between their two nations and to move forward on
the crucial issue of nuclear disarmament, members of the House of
Representatives are bent on undermining U.S.-Russian cooperation on
chemical weapons disarmament.
The House has sent a message to the Russians by cutting funding to
the joint U.S.-Russian program to destroy Russia's stockpile.
The intended message was that the United States will not continue to
shoulder the bulk of the expenses for Russia's chemical-weapons
destruction program while the Russians increase their defense budget,
pursue diplomatic policies hostile to the United States and continue
plans to build a new tactical nuclear missil e system.
The actual message sent to the world by such a decision is that some
members of the House are so intent on punishing the Russians that they
would endanger national security and risk the environmental and
proliferation threat of leaving a 44,000-ton chemical weapons stockpile
to decay on Russian soil. Or, worse, such a stockpile could make its way
out of Russia into the hands of terrorist groups and rogue nations.
Without continued U.S. funding, the Russians will likely be forced
to withdraw from the Chemical Weapons Convention, the international
agreement that binds the Russians to destroy their chemical weapons
stockpile. Opposition to chemical weapons destruction in the Russian
parliament runs high. Without an international mandate to destroy their
stockpile, the Russians will probably rest content to let their chemical
weapons linger untended in poorly guarded, minimum security facilities.
Opportunities for Russian organized crime or former Soviet
scientists to smuggle such weapons out of the country abound. The only
way to ensure that these weapons do not cross Russian borders is to
guarantee the demilitarization and destruction of the Russian stockpile.
Realistically, the only way to make that guarantee is through an
infusion of American dollars into the Russian destruction program.
By singling out U.S. funding to the Russian program, the House is
not teaching the Russians a lesson, but endangering U.S. and
international security. If funding for the destruction program is not
restored to the defense budget when the House and Senate go into
conference next month, it will mark the end of a four-year history of
cooperation between the United States and Russia in chemical-weapons
destruction.
Since the United States began working with the Russians to combat
the proliferation threat, the United States has committed nearly $200
million towards the creation of destruction facilities on Russian soil.
Last fall, a joint American-Russian committee officially chose
Shchuchye, Siberia, as the site of a future facility that, when
completed, would be capable of destroying stockpiles of sarin nerve gas.
This year, the Defense Department requested more than $130 million
through the Chemical Weapons Destruction Support Program to fund
security enhancements at chemical-warfare storage sites in Russia and to
begin construction of the facility in Siberia. While the Senate
authorized and then appropriated the full Pentagon request, the House
authorized less than $25 million for the support program.
In addition to cutting funding, the House legislation provided that
no funds were to used for the planning, design or construction of a
chemical- weapons destruction facility in Russia. The House bill would
halt one of the most successful U.S.-Russian threat reduction programs.
Admittedly, U.S.-led initiatives to curb Russian weapons proliferation
and the brain drain of former Soviet scientists have not all been
successful.
A recent General Accounting Office audit of the Department of
Energy's initiative to engage former Soviet weapons scientists in
peaceful commercial research demonstrated the importance of close
management and oversight in administering bilateral programs. However,
no such claims of mismanagement have been laid against the chemical
weapons destruction program.
#6
NTV Says Presence of Russians in FRY 'Speaks Volumes'
NTV
July 7, 1999
[translation for personal use only]
Correspondent Sergey Gaponov, reporting from
Pristina] Cell phones have not been working in Pristina for two days now.
The reason is simple: Russian air force military transport planes are
landing on the Slatina runway and the air has been cleansed of interference.
This is a disaster for foreign journalists working in the province. They
can't phone their editors or families to say they are alive and well. It
is not clear if the situation will remain this way for as long as
military planes are landing at Slatina.
Today Russian group commander Gen Yevtukhovich conducted a reconnaissance
of the area and settlements where paratroops are supposed to be based. It
is not known when Airborne Troops subunits will move out to (?Srebica),
(?Metrovica) and (?Orekhovac). Officers say no earlier than the start of
next week.
This is shown indirectly by how thoroughly the soldiers are developing
their barracks in Slatina. By the way, many of those who flew into Kosovo
yesterday were warned that conditions here are almost as bad as in
Chechnya, so the paratroops were surprised when they were brought into an
almost-undamaged three-storey barracks left by the Serb army and were
told they were going to live there.
Planes yesterday delivered to Slatina food that is supposed to last several
weeks. The medical and sanitary unit is being gradually equipped, and these
women will work in it. Those who came here with the first column from
Bosnia remember home more often when they look at them, but say they will
follow orders. They will stay here as long as they have to, and help
everyone who needs help.
[Begin recording of uncaptioned Russian soldiers] Well really we are not
for the Serbs or the Albanians, if you want to look at it that way. In
spirit we are for the Serbs of course, but if Albanians are in trouble we
will go and find out is to blame, who is right. [end recording]
[Correspondent] But the paratroops say they are upset that they have to
give up the position they worked so hard to win. The soldiers say the British
are in charge at the airport today.
However, despite everything, the soldiers and officers think the very
presence of the Russian peacekeeping contingent speaks volumes - even if
just that Russia remains a country without which no important issue of
world politics can be solved.
[Video shows troops in barracks and on the base, the female medical
personnel, vehicles]
#8
Moscow Times
July 9, 1999
President Soothes, Warns His Generals
Even as he congratulated the general who led the dash to the Pristina
airport, President Boris Yeltsin reminded top military leaders Thursday to
avoid confrontation with NATO and the United States.
Yeltsin told a gathering of generals and other military commanders at the
Kremlin that relations with NATO and the United States "are a very sensitive,
delicate and difficult issue'' but that he would not allow Russia to isolate
itself from the West.
"Each one of you must pursue one policy, the policy of the president. We
won't have any outright quarrels with NATO but we won't flirt either. We will
be following what NATO is doing and will be working out our tactics
together,'' he said.
The president's remarks amounted to a stern reminder to the more hard-line
military commanders, who favor a tougher line against the West, to follow
civilian leadership. Yeltsin has strongly criticized NATO for attacking
Yugoslavia, but he insists that Moscow must retain reasonable relations with
the West without becoming subservient.
But Yeltsin mixed his message by singling out for special attention General
Viktor Zavarzin, who led 200 paratroopers from Bosnia to seize the airport in
the Kosovo capital. The move, wildly popular in nationalist circles, caused
consternation in NATO and raised concerns about a more aggressive Russian
stance.
Shaking Zavarzin's hand, Yeltsin said that "we must decorate Russian soldiers
for Kosovo." Yeltsin has scrupulously courted the generals, including handing
out more generals' stars f Zavarzin got one in Pristina f and promises of
more money for the cash-strapped military.
The Pristina airport incident raised questions about the extent of the
lame-duck president's control over the military.
Some political and military leaders claim that Russia is under threat of NATO
attack as the alliance expands into Eastern Europe. The NATO offensive
against Yugoslavia prompted calls from some commanders for Russian aid to
Belgrade.
More recently, Russian commanders have argued with NATO over the terms under
which Russian troops will operate as peacekeepers in Kosovo. The latest
dispute last week centered on demands for a larger Russian area of operations
in Kosovo. The speech Thursday was a reminder to the military that they
cannot pursue different policies from the president's.
Yeltsin said that the military's
recent West-'99 exercises, which practiced repelling an attack from the West,
proved that Russia's armed forces have nothing to fear.
"In spite of present difficulties, the armed forces are able to ensure the
security of Russia and let this be known to all the world,'' Yeltsin said.
"They always say that our army has decayed þ that's simply a lie.''
The maneuvers were seen as an attempt by Russia's struggling military to flex
its muscle after several years of decline and its loss of face when Moscow
failed to deter the NATO airstrikes. Officials denied the maneuvers were
directly connected to the NATO campaign.
As part of the exercises, Russian long-range bombers flirted with NATO
airspace near Norway and Iceland in the first such incidents in more than a
decade.
Yeltsin also spoke publicly for the first time about Russia's recent strikes
on the Chechen border, in which Interior Ministry troops backed by helicopter
gunships and artillery have battled gunmen. Both sides have reported
casualties, though exact figures are still not known.
"Bandits terrorizing people have started to receive a proper rebuff, but
don't let this turn into war,'' he said. "As of late, the law enforcement
bodies have significantly boosted their activities, acting more decisively
and cooperating better in the North Caucasus.''
The Defense Ministry announced Thursday that the North Caucasus would be the
scene of yet another set of what it called defensive maneuvers. Airborne
troops, ships from the Black Sea Fleet and units from the North Caucasus
military district will take part in the exercises, which will run from
Tuesday to Friday, a ministry spokesman said.
The spokesman, who asked not to be identified, said the exercises were geared
toward practicing defensive operations in the Black Sea region and improving
the efficiency of regional headquarters.
Moscow also wants to show its might in the Caucasus, where it has had little
success in deterring guerrilla attacks.
Russia lost control over Chechnya after a 1994-96 war in which rebels
humiliated the Russian army and drove it from the small, mostly-Moslem
republic. Moscow has also been unable to stop a wave of kidnappings, bombings
and other violence in the Caucasus.
#9
UN IS ONLY ENTITLED TO PLAY LEADING ROLE DURING CRISES - Foreign Minister
MOSCOW, July 8 (Itar-Tass) - The U.N. is only entitled to act during
crises on behalf of the whole international community, Russian Foreign
Minister Igor Ivanov said.
Addressing the participants in the conference of the World Council of
Ex-Foreign Ministers on Thursday, Ivanov said that "if we want to avoid
anarchy in international relations, we should be interested in
maintaining and strengthening the U.N. role in world affairs."
"Russia calls for consolidating the U.N. and its Security Council as
the body which assumes major responsibility for maintaining peace and
security and has priority to impose sanctions on behalf of the
international community," Ivanov said.
The world needs unity, stability and prosperity and thus it will be
able to resist any threats and challenges, the Russian minister said.
He pointed to Russian initiatives put forth by Russian President Boris
Yeltsin at the G-8 summit in Cologne. These initiatives are aimed at
working out a joint concept of world security in the 21st century.
Ivanov believes that "we will be able to create a reliable system of
law and order in compliance with principles of cooperation."
The Yugoslav crisis confirmed the need to take into account legal
aspects of the use of force in international relations, the minister
said, adding that Russia should join efforts to "return the situation
in a legal aspect".
On European topics, the minister noted that now "there is one question:
our continent should be united or the policy of disintegration and
confrontation wins."
Russia's position remains unchanged -- "the European architecture
should be strong when it is build on the European basis," Ivanov
pointed out.
#10
Russia Insists on Accelerating UN Reform
MOSCOW. July 2 (Interfax) - The Kosovo crisis will
accelerate the reform of the United Nations. Foreign Ministry spokesman
Vladimir Rakhmanin told Interfax, "The United Nations' active role in
international affairs must be strengthened. A reform will enhance its
efficiency."
Upon the end of the "hot phase" of the Kosovo crisis, Russia
faced a dilemma of whether to join NATO or reform the United Nations. On
the one hand, Russia's pride was hurt. NATO made the decision to start
the bombing campaign without consulting Russia and by skirting
established cooperation mechanisms. On the other hand, the dignity of the
United Nations was also wounded. NATO did not try to obtain a U.N.
Security Council resolution because Russia and China, its permanent
members, would have blocked any use of force against Yugoslavia. The
other three permanent members of the council, the United States, Britain
and France would have been left with nothing despite outnumbering the
opposition. Germany, a locomotive for European integration, is not a
member of the council. Germany has no say in the council, despite its
economic power. This is the essence of the post-war world order: to bar
Germany, Italy, Japan and their allies from making crucially important
international decisions.
Russia does not doubt the need for reforming the
United Nations and "the Potsdam scheme." Before Kosovo, this necessity
did not go beyond declarations, which implied that it would take a long
time. U.N. bureaucrats fell in step with Russia here. They did not want
changes, fearing for their positions, salaries, and privileges. The
Kosovo crisis demonstrated that either the United Nations will reform or
NATO will assume its functions. NATO proved that it can translate words
into actions, regardless as to whether they are liked them or not. U.N.
Secretary General Kofi Annan's visit to Moscow was not incidental. U.N.
reform was a second-important topic after Kosovo at the meetings of Annan
with Russian President Boris Yeltsin, Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin and
Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov.
The Russian Foreign Ministry emphasized the
need to determine if Germany, Japan, India, Asian and South American
countries must be included in the Security Council; if the veto right
should be abandoned; or if a majority principle should be introduced.
Liberal Democratic Party leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky had an astounding
idea. He said that Russia should join NATO and influence decisions, which
are made by consensus, from inside. However, NATO will not welcome
Russia. NATO officials have repeatedly said that the alliance cannot
guarantee the security of a country as huge as Russia. This is probably
an excuse. The truth is that NATO may consider Russia's membership if its
public supports the idea. However, Russian society does not support the
idea and is unlikely to do so in future. "The proposal for applying for
NATO membership is not a working one.
While talking about our membership
in the alliance, NATO will expand to the east. Accession to NATO of the
former USSR republics, including the Baltic states, is unacceptable for
Russia," a top-level source told Interfax. A third option envisions that
the G-8 would assume the functions of the U.N. Security Council. At first
glance, it seems logical. The G-7, made up of the United States, Britain,
Germany, France, Canada, Italy and Japan, became the G-8 upon Russia's
assumption of the status of a full- scale partner. The G-8 unites leading
industrialized countries, as of the late 20th century, instead of its
middle. The G-8 may competently replace the U.N. Security Council if it
adds China and becomes the G-9. The question is whether China and the G-8
would accept such an option. However, Russia's position remains
unchanged: the dominant role of the U.N. Security Council must be
preserved, the Foreign Ministry said.
#11
The Russia Journal
http://www.russiajournal.com
July 5-11, 1999
Russian military to get armed with more funds
Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin promises to spend billions of rubles on
national defense.
Vladislav Komarov/The Russia Journal
Russia's disarmament following the demise of the Soviet Union appears to be
coming to an end.
NATO's enlargement and bombing of Yugoslavia have prompted Russia's
leadership - despite the economic and political crises plaguing the country
- to address the problem of strengthening the country's defense potential
in earnest.
Reviving the country's military industrial complex has become a priority.
A government ad hoc commission on the matter is being formed and Deputy
Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov has been assigned to complete the formation of
special agencies for the complex. By late June, in addition to the existing
Aerospace Agency, another four sub-sector agencies for the MIC are to be
established: for ammunitions, conventional arms, communications and
management systems and shipbuilding.
Russia's authorities are making no secret of the fact that the MIC will be
developed along guidelines based on NATO's operation in Yugoslavia and that
the ultimate goal is to provide Russia's armed forces with modern,
high-precision weapons.
Plans to reinitiate a number of research projects in this particular field
are in the works. High-precision weapons constitute a broad class of arms,
including cruise missiles of various basing (ground, sea or air),
self-aiming bombs and special electronic and communication systems to
handle and manage them. Under a Security Council resolution of late April,
financing has also been made available for a program to develop tactical
nuclear arms and the Topol-M strategic nuclear ICBM program.
The task of reviving and developing Russia's military industrial complex
will be a costly affair. Does Russia have the money? Definitely not.
The country is in severe financial crisis. According to official data, the
government owes the military at least 50 billion rubles, nearly 50 percent
of this year's military spending plan of 104 billion rubles. State debts to
the military industrial complex total 23 billion rubles, and the first
quarter 1999 MIC financing plan was fulfilled by only 15 percent.
Nevertheless, Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin promises to spend 164 billion
rubles this year on national defense, state security and law enforcement.
He also promises funding for Russia's peacekeeping efforts in Kosovo, which
amounts to about four billion rubles ($150 million). These expenses are not
provided for in the 1999 military budget.
President Boris Yeltsin has set late June as the deadline for Stepashin and
Defense Minister Igor Sergeev to prepare proposals concerning additional
sources of financing for the country's military budget.
There is no doubt that the proposals will be submitted in due course. The
question is to what extent they will be realistic.
Judging by Stepashin's words, the government plans to boost arms trade and
develop joint ventures with foreign companies in the defense sector. But
these are long-term programs, and cash is needed immediately. To get quick
cash, the Russian leadership may decide to sell weapons from military
warehouses and arsenals, probably for token prices.
#12
Jamestown Foundation Monitor
8 July 1999
YELTSIN SETS UP PRESS MINISTRY. President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree on
July 6 dissolving Russia's State Press Committee and the Federal Service for
Television and Radio Broadcasting, and replacing them with a Ministry for
Press, Television, Radio Broadcasting and Mass Communications. Commenting on
the measure, Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin said at a cabinet meeting held
that day: "I would not say that we want to create a propaganda ministry. But
we are starting to create a federal strategy which would consolidate all of
the state's capabilities in--pardon the old-fashioned word--ideological
work" (Associated Press, July 6). Apparently fearing that Stepashin's words
might be misconstrued, Aleksandr Mikhailov, head of the government
information department, later said the creating of the press ministry "does
not mean the introduction of censorship in Russia" (Vremya MN, July 7).
The new ministry will compile a registration list of all Russian mass media
organizations, regulate "the production and distribution of audio and video
products, develop a state policy on advertising and organize national
tenders for various licenses which will be required in order to carry out
mass media and communications activities (Moscow Times, July 7). It will be
headed by Mikhail Lesin, who until July 6 was first deputy chairman of the
All-Russian State Television and Radio Company (VGTRK), which controls RTR
television and Radio Russia, among others. While Lesin was officially number
two in VGTRK, he was widely viewed as being the real power at RTR. In 1996,
Lesin, then head of Video International, one of Russia's main advertising
agencies, reportedly played a key role in Yeltsin's re-election campaign. He
is seen as a key Kremlin insider and believed to be responsible for the RTR
broadcast earlier this year of a video allegedly showing suspended
Prosecutor General Yuri Skuratov with two call girls.
Yeltsin recently tasked Stepashin with formulating the government's policy
and practice regarding the parliamentary elections, which are set for
December of this year. There can be little doubt, therefore, that the
creation of the new ministry is yet another in a series of Kremlin steps to
make sure that it extends and tightens its control over the main levers of
power and influence in the walk-up to the parliamentary vote and next year's
presidential contest. The Press Ministry might use various levers, including
licensing, against media seen as disloyal--such as Vladimir Gusinsky's NTV
television and the Moscow city government's TV-Center, which are seen as
being in the camp of Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov.
Last week a group of pro-Kremlin blocs--Russia is Our Home, Right Cause, New
Force and Voice of Russia--made an agreement in principle to merge into a
right-wing coalition ahead of December's parliamentary vote, a move which
Stepashin greeted with approval. The Press Ministry could be seen as a way
to ensure media support for such a coalition.
In creating the ministry, Yeltsin seems to have returned to past practice.
In 1992, he made one of his long-time associates, Mikhail Poltoranin, deputy
prime minister in charge of information. Poltoranin was said to have been
behind an abortive 1994 attempt to merge all state television media into one
company.
#13
The Independent (UK)
July 8, 1999
[for personal use only]
RUSSIANS WANT PART OF ALASKA RETURNED
ONE HUNDRED and thirty-two years after selling the vast and mineral- rich
land of Alaska to the United States for $7.2m - a mere two cents an acre - in
one of history's least lucrative land deals, Russia wants some of it back.
To the annoyance of the Alaskans, Moscow has been pressing the US government
to part with 40,000 square miles of the seas and fishing grounds that
separate East from West along the International Dateline.
The issue is part of a broader territorial issue in the far north that
centres on a barren island well inside the Arctic Circle, just below the
point at which the polar ice never melts. Aptly, this patch of 1,700 square
miles is known by the Alaskans as Wrangel Island.
The island, which is usually frozen and populated by polar bears, is one of
eight rocks and islands in the Arctic Ocean and Bering Sea which, with their
large and rich seabeds, ended up in Russian territory under an agreement
struck between what was the Soviet Union and the United States in 1990.
Notwithstanding its own vast and rich 548,400 square miles of land - in which
there is an average of less than one person per square mile - Alaska was
infuriated by the deal, not least because state representatives believe there
may be oil and other important natural resources in the region.
The state's MPs contend that Alaska was denied the right to participate in
the negotiations with the Soviet Union by the US government. The talks were
held in secret. Alaska is also pressing for the agreement to be declared null
and void, as the Soviet Union collapsed before it could be ratified by
Moscow. Despite that, Russia and the US have since agreed to abide by the
deal.
State rights are a particularly sensitive issue in Alaska, which until 1959
was denominated as a territory under an unelected governor chosen by the US
president. Equally, Alaska - which was under Russian control for 126 years,
after its trappers poured across the Bering Straits in search of sea otters
and fur seals - has long been jealously eyed by Moscow, which has yet to
forget how it gave the place away for a song in the mid- 19th century.
The issue of the so-called 1990 US-USSR Maritime Boundary Agreement has been
simmering away for several years, but disagreements took an abrupt step
forward a week ago when Alaska's governor, Tony Knowles, signed a resolution
from both houses of the state legislature, strongly urging the US government
to renegotiate it.
Although non-binding legally, the resolution heightens the pressure on the US
federal government. The state is threatening to follow it up with a series of
hearings on the issue. It argues that if it loses its 40,000 square miles of
water to the Russians, then with it will go a potential annual catch of some
300 million pounds of fish, with nothing in return.
Wrangel is the jewel in the crown of the disputed territories. Alaska has
long seen it as its own partly because it had a fur-trapping company on the
island until 1924, when the Soviet Union occupied it. Quite apart from its
possible mineral riches, it is rich in history: several years ago Russian
scientists found the remains of 23 dwarf woolly mammoths on Wrangel, which
they believed survived the Ice Age by 6,000 years, before finally being
eradicated by early man.
#14
St. Petersburg Times
July 6, 1999
EDITORIAL
Boris Yeltsin's Step Down Is a Job for All
BORIS Yeltsin says he is ready to leave office, ready to hand power over to
a successor elected by the people in elections he hopes will be free and
fair. He says he doesn't even care if he likes his successor: "Personal
likes and dislikes aren't the point," he said. "This will be a new head of
state who comes to power in a legal way. The people will choose him."
We should thank him for saying so - and hold him to it.
Yeltsin is a complicated man. He has a glutton's appetite for power and has
at times defined democracy as himself. But he has also, as a rule, appealed
to the better natures of his people - in word if not always in deed. And he
has for years professed a genuine desire to hand power over democratically
and legally. He seems to understand that doing so is almost the only step
he can take to cement his historical legacy, and freedom in Russia.
But there is more to it. Yeltsin has ruled over a corrupt regime. The
Communists have indicated - through impeachment, and through their
unwillingness to entertain the forgiving presidential retirement packages
the Kremlin has on occasion floated - that they will hound Yeltsin
mercilessly. And those around him - "the family," as the Russian media have
dubbed the cabal of advisers, many of them implicated in various criminal
machinations - are vulnerable and helpless without "Papa" in the Kremlin.
What is more, Yeltsin has often insisted blithely that something is so when
he knows it is not. How many times did President Yeltsin go on television
to tell us that the bombing of Chechnya had stopped? How many top Cabinet
officials over the years - from Anatoly Chubais to Boris Nemtsov to Yevgeny
Primakov - have shuddered to hear Yeltsin proclaim loudly that they have
his guarantee, they will be in office until 2000 and beyond?
In all likelihood, Yeltsin sincerely wants to leave office just as the
Constitution requires. But he is also surely ambivalent. And he is -
whatever he may say about never folding to outside pressure - surrounded
entirely by courtiers who are looking out for their own best interests in
telling him the nation needs him to stay.
Yeltsin could surprise those courtiers. He could surprise us all. (It
certainly wouldn't be the first time he had pulled a political rabbit out
of his hat). But he needs help.
And anyone and everyone who has even theoretical access to Yeltsin - from
the IMF to the U.S. White House to CNN to NTV - should be helping him do
the right thing. He has at times appealed to our better natures; let us
appeal to his.