#1
Moscow Times
July 2, 1999 
EDITORIAL: Fly-Bys Just A Little Bit Of Payback 

In the wee hours of Friday, June 26, U.S. Air National Guard jets stationed
at Keflavik, Iceland, were scrambled to intercept two Russian Tu-95 Bear
bombers that had flown within 100 kilometers of Iceland, a NATO member. 

It was a scene right out of the Cold War. For the first time in 11 years,
long-range Russian bombers, capable of carrying nuclear missiles that can
hit the continental United States, had to be escorted away from NATO
airspace. 

The reaction by U.S. officials, according to an account of the incident in
The Washington Post, has been puzzlement f why would Russia act in ways
reminiscent of NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation? In a further strange twist,
the U.S. government says there is no political overtone to the incident,
and so it has not brought the matter up with the Russian government f this
was purely a "military" affair, whatever that means. 

But this was an intentional, political message, and those in Washington who
claim to be puzzled by Russia's growing truculence have their heads in the
sand. The bombers that appeared near Iceland were simply the fruits of
misguided NATO and U.S. policy toward Russia. 

No doubt the Russians were puzzled, too, when they saw Washington claiming
to see Russia as a partner in world affairs, even as it kept its
anti-Soviet European military alliance, then aggressively expanded its
reach f absorbing former Warsaw Pact members like Hungary, and flirting
with former Soviet republics like Estonia and Ukraine. 

No doubt the Russians were downright frightened when NATO, without even the
pretense of a legal justification, further expanded its mandate to include
imposing new political arrangements by war in the Balkans. After all,
Moscow had been sold on NATO expansion as something benign and purely
defensive, which was aimed at including all in a common European security
structure. 

Russia and Boris Yeltsin aren't going to go away f no matter how much Bill
Clinton and Al Gore wish they would. Presidential elections loom in
America, and Clinton and Gore don't want to talk about Russia. Clinton's
plan seems to be to roll over a few billion in IMF debts in return for
Russia leaving him alone. 

Washington, however, needs to get "engaged" again in Russia. The Iceland
incident is more evidence, if any were needed, of how urgently relations
with Russia need to take a more realistic and sober direction. 

After World War I, Britain and France pursued humiliating policies toward a
defeated Germany f then recoiled at the triumph of anti-democratic forces.
It's a lesson that the Western powers would do well to absorb and heed. 

#4
Moscow Tribune
June 30, 1999 
Media Prepares For Elections 
By Dmitry Polikarpov 

As the elections to the Duma and the presidential polls slated for the year 
2000 draw nearer, the embattled Russian media prepares to take an active part 
in the campaigning in hopes of solving some of its financial problems.

The upcoming elections added special meaning to the first congress of the 
Russian press celebrated earlier this week in Moscow. The event resembled a 
political fair where prospective contenders promoted themselves before the 
journalists.

Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin, Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, former premier 
Sergei Kiriyenko and other political celebrities addressed the delegates with 
extracts from their political programs.

President Boris Yeltsin's hosting of journalists in the Kremlin was a sign of 
the growing interest in the printed media ahead of the polls.

For many publications, the upcoming campaign may be the last chance to stay 
afloat until next year. Even the most seemingly prosperous publishers, like 
the well-known " Days, which publishes the Segodnya daily, the Itogi 
newsmagazine and other periodicals, have financial problems which resulted in 
serious reductions of production expenses.

In 1996, the press played an important role in Yeltsin's presidential 
re-election. Income from the presidential campaign allowed publishers to 
increase their staff's salaries to European levels. For example, journalists 
at the Ne dai Bog newspaper, launched specifically to support Yeltsin's 
re-election, earned as much as $2,000-$3,000 per month.

Analysts believe that investments in the elections will be considerably more 
modest this time. But the media may still receive an additional $1 billion 
from political advertising. Despite the apparent advantage that television 
and radio have over the press regarding the size of their audience, analysts 
believe that consumers of print media are more consistent.

"Those who buy a newspaper will not change their views in one day. This 
audience is considerably smaller than that of television, but it's rather 
more predictable," said Gleb Pavlovsky, president of the Effective Policy 
Foundation.

Campaigners will also have to consider that there are currently 2 million 
readers of Russian press on the Internet. And this number increases by 15 per 
cent each month. In many cases, websites offer additional and more current 
information, as well as more advanced design than the print version of the 
paper.

As a result of the Internet boom, Russian has become the second most frequent 
language on the Internet, according to Modest Kolerov, general director of 
the Russica-Izvestia company, which offers English language readers a 
complete view of Russia's current affairs through the Internet.

"The Internet audience in Russia is more selective than in the United States.

Russians use the Internet not to order pizza, but to become informed on what 
is really going on in this country. Only the Internet allows the Moscow press 
to leave the limits of the Garden Ring," Kolerov said earlier this week.

In September, Izvestiya will launch its new server containing several new 
sites, such as Russian regions, Russian oil, and Russian telecommunications.

"We intend to offer our clients a complete service which will allow them to 
be informed about the latest news in any sphere of Russian life immediately, 
and not on the next day as it happens with those who read the papers in the 
traditional format," Kolerov said.

The cost of producing an Internet edition is about ten times less than the 
cost of producing a traditional paper periodical. The cost of maintaining an 
average national daily is approximately $100,000 a month while the Internet 
version of the same paper may cost only $10,000. Currently, the main problem 
is adapting the traditional commercial ads to electronic standards.

Political sites have become a daily source of information for many Russians. 
For example, an average of 12,000 people a day visit the popular polit.ru 
site. Political surveys through the Internet are also becoming more and more 
popular among leading think-tanks. 

#5
MOSCOW LIKELY TO RESUME MILITARY-TECHNICAL COOPERATION WITH YUGOSLAVIA

MOSCOW. July  1 (Interfax)  - Russian  Ambassador to  Belgrade Yuri
Kotov said  that "a legal foundation will be laid soon for arms supplies
to Yugoslavia" on which an international arms embargo has been imposed.
     
 Even before  the beginning of NATO air strikes, Moscow "insistently
urged Belgrade  to upgrade  its  air-defense  and  other  systems.  This
recommendation was  not heeded,"  he  said  in  an  interview  with  the
newspaper Kommersant published Thursday.
      
 According to  Kotov, "the Yugoslav leadership was looking for other
variants. Now they admit they were wrong," he said.
      
 In regard  to Russia's  possible involvement  in the restoration of
Yugoslavia,  he   said  that   "Russia  might  be  useful  in  restoring
Yugoslavia's power  plants," the  more so  since "about  80% of Yugoslav
thermal and hydro-power plants have been built with Russian assistance."
      
 He said  that Moscow  and Belgrade  "have ready-made programmes for
cooperation in  this area, since before all these events Russia supplied
Yugoslavia with  $50 million  worth of  machines for power plants in the
form of a commodity credit.
      
 Yugoslavs are  also interested  in buying  Russian  gas.  Fuel  and
lubricants -  ready made  products, not  oil - might also be supplied to
Yugoslavia, as oil refineries were among NATO's main targets.
      
 In regard  to the  form of  settlements for Russian products, Kotov
said, "Russian-Yugoslav economic cooperation will most probably be based
on commodity credits and barter exchanges."

#6
The East: Economic Reforms Exhibit Successes And Failures
By Michael Lelyveld

Boston, 1 July 1999 (RFE/RL) -- Nearly a decade since the fall of the
Berlin Wall, economists are still struggling with the reasons for success
or failure of reform in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. 

An economic analysis of the region by the Financial Times on Wednesday
examines the issues following a conference sponsored by the Croatian
National Bank in Dubrovnik last week. Clearly, Eastern Europe and the
Baltics have outperformed the members of the Commonwealth of Independent
States. The question is why. 

A comparison of gross domestic products in 25 countries since 1989 offers a
stark and provocative contrast. According to World Bank figures, only
countries such as Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic have
recovered to the level of a decade ago. 

While Poland's economy this year is expected to rise to 121 percent of its
performance in 1989, Russia's economy is projected to sink to just 53
percent of its level in Soviet days. Nearly all of the former Soviet
republics have suffered similar declines. 

Johannes Linn, a World Bank vice president, sees a relatively simple
explanation for the difference. A combination of market reforms, social
reforms and institutional strengthening create the conditions for growth.
In other words, those countries that have followed the advice of the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have benefited, while others
have not. 

But such a conclusion may fall short of proof as to what steps actually
work for former Marxist economies. Part of the reason is that multilateral
lenders often delay aid to those countries that do not strictly follow
their programs, affecting the outcome. 

Beyond that, there lies a host of complexities. Martin Wolf of the
Financial Times points out the influence of geography on political will.
The farther a country is from Berlin, the less likely it is to take steps
like privatization, price liberalization and banking reform, Wolf says. 

In many cases, distance from the Bundesbank does seem to make a difference
in the commitment of economic leadership. But there have been notable
exceptions. Russian President Boris Yeltsin was among the first to free
prices and privatize, for example. Over time, the results have ranged from
mixed to disastrous. Although it has been largely forgotten since the ruble
collapse of last August 17, Yeltsin also led the region's fight for
monetary stabilization and inflation control. 

The issue of failure to the east and success in the west is related to
Moscow, just as much as Berlin. The CIS nations still depend on Russia for
much of their trade, supplies and infrastructure access. By contrast, the
leading nations of Eastern Europe had already largely reoriented their
trade toward the West by 1994. 

The debate about economic contrast is also very similar to the comparisons
of Poland and Russia, which are now also a decade old. Some economists
argued that reform prescriptions for Poland could not simply be applied to
Russia. Poland's past experiences with capitalism and a mixed economy were

simply not to be found in Russia. In light of the outcome, it is hard to
prove any of the predictions wrong. 

But the political variables complicate any conclusions. While Yeltsin has
clung to power, nearly all the successful economies of Eastern Europe
ousted their original reform governments to experiment with more leftist
leaders, only to return to the reformers again. In some cases, the leftists
also turned out to be surprisingly market-oriented. Yeltsin's grip on
government has meant that the public's tendency to blame the party in power
has been turned against the Russian reformers, frustrating implementation.
By contrast, Poland's finance minister, Leszek Balcerowicz, has been able
to benefit from his mistakes after his initial ouster in the early days of
reform. 

Poland's unique advantage is that it was the only country to rely on the
creation of an IMF currency stabilization fund, a benefit that was long
sought for Russia but always denied. 

No single theory seems able to explain the pattern of successes and
failures. Countries like Poland stalled on privatization for years, yet
continued to progress toward economic growth. Slovakia, with 101 percent of
its 1989 economic performance this year, was dominated by the autocratic
Vladimir Meciar. Yet, it outperformed the reformist governments of the
Czech Republic, which remains stuck in recession. The record is filled with
contradictions. 

But at least one major difference between east and west is natural
resources. As in Soviet days, Russia has relied on oil and gas as its major
products and exports. Plentiful energy has allowed Russia to resist
rational pricing of inputs, leaving much of industry mired in the past of
direct or hidden subsidies. 

By contrast, an energy-dependent Eastern Europe was forced to face the
problem when Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev suddenly demanded payment
for oil in dollars at world prices a decade ago. That shock was a wake-up
call to the region which is still being heard. But farther east, supplies
of petroleum still remain more available than the resolve to reform.

#8
Izvestia
July 1, 1999
Unique AIDS Medicine Developed In Russia 
By Tatyana Bateneva 

A unique AIDS medicine has been developed in Russia by a group of
researchers headed by Alexandr Krayevsky, deputy director of the Molecular
Biology Institute at the Russian Academy of Sciences. 

The new preparation, phosphasid, is the only competitive medicine in the
field which is as good as relevant U.S.-developed drugs. The drug is
significantly less toxic and unlike its primary rival preparation,
Azidothymidin, does not cause anemia. On top of that, the new drug is only
half as expensive as similar western preparations. Phosphasid has no
analogues in the world. It has been patented in all major countries of the
world. 

Clinical tests of the new drug are underway in a western country with
Russia expected to be able to eventually export the drug provided the tests
have been successful. The demand of Russia's AIDS patients and HIV infected
patients for the drug can be met before the year is out. 

Another effort currently underway iinvolves the development of a
next-generation medicinal preparation aimed at hampering the penetration of
HIV to the cell's hereditary instrument. Experiments will take another two
years to accomplish. 

It took 12 years from patenting the chemical substance involved to
registering the medicinal preparation, phosphasid, versus an average of 5-6
years recorded by foreign manufacturers involved in AIDS drug development
projects. The lag is attributed to the actual lack of government financing
of both AIDS drug development effort and the treatment of AIDS and
HIV-infected patients alike.

#9
Russia Today press summaries
Segodnya
1 July 1999
This Suspicious Subject
KREMLIN FEARS THAT AFTER THE UNION TREATY WITH BELARUS IS CONCLUDED,
LUKASHENKO WILL NOT NEED YELTSIN ANY LONGER

Summary

On the eve of the Belarussian president's visit to Moscow, various projects
of unification between Belarus and Russia saw coverage.

President Lukashenko will bring his own draft treaty, which is considered
to be easily adopted since it does not require amendments to the Russian
Constitution. According to the treaty, a super-state union would be
created, and each state would pass part of its functions and powers to the
union power. This treaty only requires the signatures of the two presidents
and ratification by the two parliaments.

On the contrary, the Russian variant would require changes in the its own
constitution, because Belarus would become a subject of the federation or
even enter the Federation as six different subjects (thus the number of
Belarus regions). The latter variant is the least favored by Belarus
powers, because it does not leave space for the office of the President of
Belarus.

In the Kremlin there is fear that in the case of unification Lukashenko may
become an influential politician in Russia. His rating in Belarus rural
areas is growing, and the same could occur in Russia. Thus, the Kremlin
will try to neutralize Lukashenko, before the union is concluded.

#10
The Globe and Mail (Canada)
29 June 1999
Russia, Belarus intensify efforts to create confederation
Some fear Yeltsin will use new entity to extend his rule,
but others reckon reluctance to surrender autonomy will
make union largely symbolic
GEOFFREY YORK
Moscow Bureau

Moscow -- Russia and Belarus are intensifying their work to create a
confederation of the two former Soviet republics, sparking fears that Boris
Yeltsin will use the new entity to extend his rule.

Russian and Belarussian officials are to meet in Moscow today to discuss
details of the proposed confederation. According to the leader of a
pro-Russian group in Minsk, the countries could sign a confederation treaty
next month to create the Union of Sovereign Republics -- a name
deliberately chosen for its echoes of the Soviet Union.

There is mounting speculation that Mr. Yeltsin will use the confederation
to prolong his rule in the Kremlin, despite a constitutional two-term limit
that obliges him to leave office next year.

Although he would cease to be Russia's President next summer, Mr. Yeltsin
could become the leader of the new Russia-Belarus entity. He could then
transfer most of his powers to the new post.

A similar tactic was followed by Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic, who
retained all of his powers by becoming President of Yugoslavia at the end
of his Serbian term.

The Kremlin has denied that Mr. Yeltsin is planning such a move. But
several leading Russian politicians and analysts have warned that the
Kremlin is almost certainly considering the idea.

"The Milosevic variant is a very attractive model for the Russian
President, since it possesses that extremely vague legal grey area that
Boris Yeltsin is so fond of," political analyst Sergei Markov told a
Russian news agency last week.

A union of the two countries would be popular among most Russians and
Belarussians, who often feel nostalgia for the glory days of the Soviet
empire. Polls show that 80 per cent of Russians support a merger with Belarus.

The parliaments of the two countries have already agreed to adopt the tune
of the Soviet Union's national anthem, with new lyrics, as the anthem of
their confederation.

In an interview with a German magazine this month, Mr. Yeltsin said the two
ex-Soviet republics share a "historical fate and friendship" and have
"common strategic interests."

But many liberals in Moscow are worried about a confederation because it
could allow Mr. Yeltsin and his Belarussian counterpart, Alexander
Lukashenko, to extend their powers without elections.

Mr. Lukashenko, an authoritarian who has crushed almost all democratic
opposition in Belarus, is a charismatic speaker and popular in the Russian
heartland. He has relentlessly toured the Russian provinces, giving
speeches and building a political network. If a confederation is created,
he could seek the top post and use it as a vehicle to expand his power into
Russia.

Belarus, a country of 10 million people on the edge of central Europe, has
become an anti-Western stronghold. Mr. Lukashenko calls for a revival of
the Soviet Union, and regularly launches verbal attacks on the West.

He has complained that Russia should have never removed its nuclear
missiles from Belarussian territory. "As soon as we shipped out our nuclear
weapons, practically everyone stopped talking to us," he said last December.

He has called for other Slavic countries such as Yugoslavia and Ukraine to
join the confederation with Russia and Belarus, creating a so-called Slavic
Union.

Activity to promote the Russia-Belarus confederation has accelerated in
recent days. The new Russian Prime Minister, Sergei Stepashin, travelled to
Belarus in early June to meet Mr. Lukashenko and discuss plans for a
confederation treaty. It was his first trip outside Russia since becoming
Prime Minister.

Last week, Mr. Stepashin spoke by telephone to Mr. Lukashenko to continue
their plans for a confederation. And on the weekend, Russian Deputy Prime
Minister Nikolai Aksyonenko travelled to Minsk to meet the Belarussian
strongman.

The two countries are also co-ordinating their military policies. Russian
and Belarussian troops held a joint military exercise last week to rehearse
their defences against a simulated Western attack like the recent bombing
campaign against Yugoslavia.

During the exercises, Russian military officers said they want to work with
Belarus to develop a single air-defence system and a joint command system.

According to the Itar-Tass news agency, Mr. Yeltsin yesterday praised the
joint military exercises as a step toward the unification of the armed
forces of the two countries.

Despite the popularity of the confederation proposal in both countries,
most analysts believe that it is largely a symbolic gesture. The two
countries have vastly different economic policies, and neither government
seems willing to surrender power to an integrated entity.

The Belarussian economy is much more state-controlled and impoverished than
the Russian economy. After the financial collapse of last year, Russia
cannot afford to prop up the declining Belarussian economy and its
fast-sinking currency, analysts say.

Russian officials have acknowledged that a genuine union of the two
countries is unlikely. On the weekend, Mr. Aksyonenko conceded that it will
take "several years" to create a confederation.

Even a simple step such as a common currency could take a long time to
introduce, he said. He also emphasized that the confederation would not
limit the sovereignty of either country or the authority of either president.

#11
USIA
29 June 1999 
TEXT: WORLDNET - DOD'S WARNER ON U.S.-RUSSIA MILITARY COOPERATION 
(June 28: Assistant Secretary of Defense Edward Warner) (7790)

Washington -- The United States and Russia should re-engage and regain
the momentum on cooperative political, economic and defense
initiatives that were put on hold during the conflict in Kosovo,
according to Edward Warner, assistant secretary of defense for
strategy and threat reduction.

"I think in the wake of the agreement in Helsinki about Russian
participation in the Kosovo peace implementation force (KFOR), we have
an excellent opportunity to get back on track with our relationship,"
Warner said June 28 on a U.S. Information Agency WORLDNET program.

He outlined the terms of the agreement reached on the participation of
up to 3,600 Russian troops in KFOR. The troops will be situated in the
American, French and German sectors, he said. While they will have a
"control relationship to individual sector commanders," ultimately the
Russian troops will be under Kremlin control. There will be Russian
liaison officers at all levels of KFOR's command chain.

Warner said it is time for the two countries to resume joint efforts
to stem the flow of weapons of mass destruction and to implement
international non-proliferation regimes and treaties.

He touched on other areas of potential cooperation suspended by
tensions over Kosovo, including tackling computer challenges related
to the year 2000 (Y2K) and sharing early-warning data from Cold War
space-based sensors and radar stations. Warner said dialogue on Y2K
would resume "on a rather urgent basis."

The United States recently decided to extend the cooperative threat
reduction program -- which provides Russia funding for eliminating
nuclear weapons -- for seven more years, Warner noted.

He called for the United States and Russia to work together to adapt
to the changing geopolitics of the 21st century. The threat of missile
attacks from rogue states is prompting the United States to consider a
limited national missile defense program, which would require
modification of the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) treaty negotiated with
Russia in 1972, said Warner.

"We need to work with Russia to...possibly modify the treaty in a way
that would permit the deployment of this limited defense capability,
but a defense capability that would not threaten Russia's nuclear
strategic retaliatory deterrent," he said.

#12
Russia to Ease Arms Trade Rules.

MOSCOW, July 1 (Itar-Tass) - Russia is going to ease arms trade rules for
its defense enterprises, according to Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov
who is responsible for the military-industrial complex. 

He told journalists after a half-hour meeting with President Boris Yeltsin
on Thursday that a presidential decree was being drafted "to simplify for
enterprises the system of receiving permissions for export of military
hardware". 

According to Klebanov, such permissions have to be granted in 20 days and
violators of the deadline will be punished. 

Klebanov said "the situation in the military-industrial complex is not that
difficult as many like to portray". 

However, Yeltsin assessed the tasks of Klebanov as "the most difficult" and
promised a state decoration if he copes with them. 

"One has to be courageous" to take such a job. "He has to hope for the
order of Valour", the president told journalists before meeting Klebanov. 

Yeltsin said he would regularly meet Klebanov as there is a lot of problems
to be solved in the military-industrial complex. "Some issues have not been
even raised yet", the president said. 

#13
Moscow Times
June 30, 1999 
INSIDE RUSSIA: Russia Keeps Putting Guns Before Butter 
By Yulia Latynina 

And so it has been accomplished: Russia's senators officially voted for
sending Russian peacekeepers to Kosovo. This mission will cost Russia not
$65 million, as the official figures say, but a minimum of $150 million, as
the experts say. This is what it costs to build a factory to produce
insulin, which Russian officials spend $1.5 billion a year to purchase. 

But it is clear even to a hedgehog that a military contingent is something
much more profitable than an insulin factory. A military contingent means
the possibility to get rich on military deliveries. The construction of a
factory, on the contrary, means the impossibility of receiving bribes in
return for raising prices on imported insulin. 

True, it is not altogether clear where our destitute budget will find this
$150 million. The government maintains that the Russian generals' Kosovo
tour will be financed from "extra-budgetary sources." How is this to be
understood? Will they create an "Aid to Kosovo" extra-budgetary fund and
force every enterprise to contribute to it? Russia is constantly giving its
unique twist to the concepts of finance. We already have bandits who pay
off back wages to miners, and mayors of closed nuclear cities who use
municipal funds to finance the construction of nuclear weapons. Now we have
peacekeepers financed from "extra-budgetary" funds. 

But, there is one small hitch. The generals and army being sent to Kosovo
are the same ones which turned Chechnya into a desert where the only
growing sector of the economy is kidnapping. And against the backdrop of
our Chechen shame, the longing to make the Serbs happy looks rather
strange. It is as if your garden plot was overgrown with weeds and you
invited yourself to your neighbor's house to consult on how to build the
Alps. 

The author of these lines is not only not unpatriotic, but is ashamed that
only the Americans will profit as a result of Russia's participation in the
peacekeeping mission. Because the Americans, having endured a series of
strategic setbacks in Kosovo, will now be able to blame all of the
inevitable chaos in Kosovo on the presence of Russian troops. 

The main reason for Russia's defeat in the Cold War was the desire to win
no matter what, not taking the economy, logic and geography into account.
The Russian gross domestic product, having shrunk two times since the
Soviet period, is today 40 times smaller than the American GDP. In the
1960s, the gap was also huge, but despite such a monstrous difference,
Russia tried to maintain military parity, spending 20 to 50 percent of its
GDP on the military. All of Russia's factories produced military equipment;
some also produced civilian goods at the same time. Russia sold the West
oil and used the money to supply weapons to Angola, Cuba and Nicaragua f
just as it is now trying to borrow money from the West and simultaneously
spend money for a war with the West. It is impossible to have a budget like
Nigeria's and an appetite like Genghis Khan's. 

If someone who is malnourished really wants to participate in an
international athletic contest, with the goal of becoming a world champion,
he should not simply get out on the field and start running. He should
first start eating well. 

Yulia Latynina is a staff writer for Segodnya. 

#14
Chinese on Russia, US Repair Post-Kosovo Relations  

Beijing's Renmin Ribao in Chinese
29 June 1999
[translation for personal use only]
"International forum" article by Xu Hongzhi 
"United States and Russia Mend their Relations" 

After the United States and Russia reached 
agreement in Helsinki on Russian participation in the Kosovo peacekeeping 
force, President Yeltsin flew to Cologne in Germany to attend the G8 
summit, where he also met Clinton. The US and Russian presidents both 
held that this meeting actually opened an important new stage in 
US-Russian relations: The two sides have started to mend their relations 
which had fallen into a trough on account of the Kosovo crisis, and 
Russia returned to its "partnership" pattern with the United States and 
the west. 

Earlier this year, US-led NATO wantonly used force against the Yugoslav 
Federation [FRY]. This NATO action was not authorized by the UN Security 
Council and also circumvented the NATO-Russia consultation mechanism; 
NATO not only ignored Russia's views but also directly infringed on 
Russia's interests. This hurt the self-respect of Russia, which had 
wanted to revive its great power status. Russia was extremely anger at 
this NATO action, and Russian-US relations fell to their lowest point 
since the cold war. 

However, although Russia firmly opposed NATO's use of force against the FRY, 
it did not provide Yugoslavia with any substantive support and still less 
did it become involved in the war; nor did it want to completely fall out 
with US-led NATO. Not long after it issued its initial strong words, 
Russia started to adopt measures to ease relations with the United States 
and other western countries. President Yeltsin sent Chernomyrdin, who was 
relatively welcome to the west, as his special envoy to actively engage 
in diplomatic mediation and urge the FRY to accept the pace plan jointly 
proposed by Russia and the G7, based on the west's plan. Following that, 
on the question of Kosovo peacekeeping, Russia again made major 
concessions on issues such as a unique peacekeeping sector for Russia, 
and so on. The attainment of the Russian-US Helsinki agreement showed 
that Russia actually approves the European security pattern in which NATO 
is the pillar and Russia is a participant. 

The main reason why Russia has repeatedly made major concessions to the 
west over the Kosovo crisis is that Russia's economic strength is weak; 
it is not only unable to match the west but is continually seeking favors 
from or bring constrained by the west. Apart from that, Russia is 
extremely concerned that the European Union and NATO will exclude Russia 
when making decisions that directly affect Russian interests, thus making 
Russia sink into an "inferior role" on the European and world stage. 

Russia believes therefore that it is in its fundamental interest to 
maintain ties with Europe in the economic and security fields, and that 
to fall out with the west is obviously of no benefit for Russia. On the 
other hand, the United States also believes that the important mediation 
role played by Russia in the Kosovo crisis proves that it is impossible 
to achieve security and stability in the Balkans and in Europe as a whole 
without Russia. Hence, the United States and other western countries have 
no alternative but to acknowledge Russia's special status. It can be said 
that both Russia and the United States need to repair their relations. 

On the Kosovo peacekeeping issue, the trial of strength between Russia 
and the United States is very similar to the question of NATO's eastward 
expansion. In both cases the United States puts pressure on Russia, 
causing Russian unhappiness; after Russia says "no," the United States 
makes some slight concessions and placates Russia a little; and Russia 
can only accept the reality and make bigger concessions, so the two sides 
reach a compromise. In the future there will still be struggles between 
Russia and the United States on many important issues, but if there is no 
great change of prospects in Russia's economic and political situation, 
and its actual strength remains weak, it is estimated that the process 
and the results will still conform to this pattern. 

#15
Russia's Response To US Missile Defense Project 

Moskovskiy Komsomolets
25 June 1999
[translation for personal use only]
Article by Olga Ruban: "Defense From Glyukov" 

The defense of our Serb brothers and peacekeeping 
in Yugoslavia will cost the Russian budget 150 million dollars a year. 
One more unforeseen rift takes shape in our treasury. 

America has taken to putting up an ABM system. And Russia, whether you want 
it or not, is forced to react, to improve its nuclear weapons, and this 
will cost us such a pretty penny that peacekeeping will seem a trifling 
expense. At the end of the 20th century, the greatest power in the world
under the stars and stripes has suddenly discovered that it is defenseless. 
And all around are "irresponsible countries" and "criminal regimes" with 
nuclear missiles at the ready. So the superpower has decided that there 
is only one salvation from an attack by "evilly intentioned state" of the 
likes of North Korea, Iran and Iraq--to cover the entire country with a 
cap which they called antimissile defense. And everything would be fine 
were it not for one obstacle. In 1972 Washington signed an ABM treaty 
with Moscow which forbid covering the country under an anti-missile "basin." 

However, this was the past. In the middle of the 1960s the two great powers, 
the USSR and the US, looked at each other with caution, and each raised a 
shelter of sorts from the opponent's nuclear missiles. But having 
experienced the rudiments of their construction, both countries 
understood that ABM defense was a bottomless barrel for money and time. 
They decided that it was necessary to head this off economically. Thus 
the ABM Treaty was born. 

ABM defense is not simply a defensive system. It is defense with a 
challenge. In case of an exchange of nuclear "compliments", it can 
neutralize part of the enemy's missiles and by that weaken his strike. An 
ABM system forces the other side to provide himself with extra thousands 
of nuclear missiles, taking into consideration their being "consumed" by 
interceptors. The treaty, which forbids such a defense, permitted 
stopping these new thousands of missiles from coming to fruition at the 
beginning, and then to begin eliminating them. 

In March 1997 at a meeting in Helsinki, Yeltsin and Clinton called the 
ABM Treaty "the cornerstone of strategic stability in the world." Today's 
body movements of our partners across the ocean indicate that they have 
decided to move this "stone of stability" out of their way. 

It is unimportant what the Americans call what they intend to sculpt. 
"Limited" or "full-scale" "sparse" or "dense" ABM defense. The main thing 
is that the States plan to create a key link for any type of "breach:" a 
powerful system capable of detecting the launch of foreign missiles, 
tracking their flight and transmitting the coordinates of the targets to 
an interceptor. American military specialists are already laboring over 
the creation of space satellites with such missions. When the gun-layers 
are ready, transforming the "limited" ABM defense into an "unlimited" 
defense is a question of money, which the state can allow itself to spend 
on the proliferation of interceptor missiles. 

Meanwhile, the most important position in the treaty states "Each side shall 
not deploy an ABM system in the territory of its country and shall not 
create the basis for such a defense." 

 From the open erecting of an ABM shield, the United States is only 
holding to the necessity of creating the appearance of observing the most 
important interstate agreement in the nuclear weapons era. The Americans 
very much do not want to be known in the world as the grave-diggers of 
the "rock of stability." Therefore, since January of this year they 
persistently hint to Russia that it would not be bad to modernize the 
treaty in accordance with their, American, desires. And the U.S. 
Congress, not waiting to arrange all the "empty formalities," approved a 
draft law requiring the White House to deploy a national ABM system. 
Earlier the States knew that at the time when they raised their own ABM 
defense system, the USSR would grab a bunch of new missiles, bringing to 
nothing all the advantages of their "cover." Today Russian cannot force 
the United States to refrain from creating a national ABM system and does 
not have the strength to participate in a new arms race equally with 
Washington. They know this perfectly well across the ocean. They are 
counting on getting such concessions from Moscow in the near future that 
their cap-new construction will be inserted into a modernized ABM Treaty. 

So, for what should Moscow sell its agreement to shake up the Treaty? 
Logically, for the right to stop emptying and start filling its nuclear 
powder magazine. For the most reliable medicine against an ABM system is 
a large supply of warheads. To counter the American ABM system, Russian 
must preserve several dozen of its relatively new SS-20 missiles with ten 
warheads (which the START-2 Treaty requires to be destroyed), develop a 
new missile for submarines, and load its Topol with three warheads 
instead of one. And as much as possible, perfect its nuclear sword in 
order to pierce Uncle Sam's nuclear shield. In a word, give a green light 
to a competition of defensive and offensive weapons and a funeral march 
for the destructive agreements of recent years--the much suffering 
START-2 and the unborn START-3. 

The main thing in a trade is don't undervalue. The more so, since we 
already made one ABM concession to the States. When in 1997 in Helsinki 
Yeltsin and Clinton argued over when tactical anti-missile defense (the 
little "thimble") ends and strategic (the big "basin") begins, the 
Russian president agreed with the American proposal for a delimited 
plank, although it, in the opinion of experts, was strongly expanded for 
the inoffensive "thimble." 

In the United States up to this time there has not been even the least 
effective defense from foreign missiles. It is enough to recall the SDI 
(Strategic Defense Initiative), America's horror story for the 1980s. For 
15 years the States shook their space ABM system like a bugbear. 

Ultimately, "star wars" turned out to be only a grandiose bluff. In the 
estimate of specialists, 80 percent of tactical antimissile system tests 
("Made in the Pentagon") turned out unsuccessful. And if you consider 
that there exists a mass of simple and cheap methods for punching holes 
in an ABM system, then in the end the dream of a more or less reliable 
intercept system turns out to be totally unachievable. 

A new, large ABM cap will cost America from 25 (the simplest option) 
to 60 billion dollars. Moreover, there is no guarantee that in 10 years 
it will be able to counteract a single flying missile. Yes, and those 
"malicious" countries, you see, will not spend billions and a decade in 
order to get their own intercontinental nuclear missiles, but will find a 
much less troublesome method for "salting" the Yankees. For example, 
exploding a nuclear bomb off the shores of America brought in the hold of 
a plain old cargo ship. 

Judging from all, not even the most piled up ABM system will save the States 
from nuclear blackmail by "terrorist countries." However, having kicked 
aside the "cornerstone of stability," America will remove an important 
dam which restrained the nuclear arms race for two decades. In light of 
new initiatives by the United States, we are already planning a 
reexamination, and despite the impoverished defense budget, to provide 
more money for multiplying nuclear weapons.