#31 - JRL 9323 - JRL Home
Russia/Belarus: Where Do We Go From Here?
By Jan Maksymiuk
Copyright (c) 2005. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.
www.rferl.org
It has been nearly 10 years since Russia and Belarus declared their will to
form a common state. In September, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka
promised "landmark" decisions to be taken by the end of this year regarding
Belarus's integration with Russia. However, his meeting with Russian President
Vladimir Putin last week did not provide any clue as to what those decisions
might be.
Prague, 19 December 2005 (RFE/RL) -- It was long expected that Lukashenka and
Putin would meet in Moscow, in mid-November or mid-December, within the
framework of the Higher Council of the Russia-Belarus Union State. That forum
also includes the prime ministers and foreign ministers of both countries.
Back in September, Lukashenka suggested that this upcoming meeting would be
"significant, momentous, and landmark, particularly in furthering our unity."
But Lukashenka's meeting with Putin in the Russian sea resort of Sochi on 15
December was held at very short notice. And, contrary to expectations, it was
devoted to economic matters, not political. At least this transpires from what
Putin told reporters after the meeting.
"I want to confirm our agreements regarding relations between our financial
agencies. You will recall our talks about the need to support our Belarusian
partners and achieve balanced decisions with respect to energy supplies," Putin
said. "The Russian government has prepared the necessary documents and I hope
they will be adopted by the end of this year."
Primacy Of Politics
Did Lukashenka really want to meet Putin just to confirm that Belarus will
receive Russian gas in 2006 at the same price as this year, that is, at $46.68
per 1,000 cubic meters? Putin promised not to increase this price for Belarus as
early as in April, and Gazprom officials have reconfirmed this pledge on more
than one occasion.
It was indirectly confirmed that Lukashenka may have discussed political
issues with Putin when, the following day, Belarus's lower house of parliament
hastily and unexpectedly announced that next year's presidential election will
take place on 19 March. The election will take place four months ahead of the
latest date allowed for the vote by the country's constitution.
Many Belarusian and Russian commentators have said that Lukashenka met with
Putin primarily to communicate his decision to hold the presidential election at
an earlier date and seek the Kremlin's approval for his anticipated third term.
Whatever answer he might have received from Putin, Lukashenka looked rather
pleased when thanking the Russian president for continuing gas and oil supplies
at discount prices.
"I want to thank you, Vladimir Vladimirovich [Putin], because your government
and your energy companies have carried out your order and we have practically
finalized our contract for gas and oil supplies to Belarus. We have learned to
save, and to save well. This year we may have not even imported the agreed
volumes of gas and oil in full because our supplies have been sufficient for our
economy," Lukashenka said.
Colored Revolutions
It is likely that, once again, Putin will back Lukashenka's bid for the
presidency. After the Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003 and the Orange
Revolution in Ukraine in 2004, Moscow seems to have developed an allergy for any
other "colored revolution" in the post-Soviet area. Therefore, Lukashenka, a
loyal political ally of Russia since his inauguration in 1994, could count on
the Kremlin's political and economic support for his reelection this time as
well.
It is not clear, however, what Lukashenka had to promise to Putin in exchange
for such support.
Last year, Moscow unambiguously indicated that it wants control over
Beltranshaz, the state-run operator of Belarus's gas pipeline network.
Lukashenka, who promised in 2002 to set up a Belarusian-Russian venture to run
Belarusian gas pipelines, backed down on his decision in 2004. That provoked an
angry response from Gazprom, which even cut off Belarus's gas flow for one day.
Earlier this month in Moscow, Belarusian Deputy Prime Minister Uladzimir
Syamashka said the talks about the purchase of a stake in Beltranshaz by Gazprom
have been reopened.
The most recent Lukashenka-Putin meeting also appears to signal that Moscow
has shifted its attention from political to economic issues in its relations
with Minsk even further than before.
Earlier this month, Russia-Belarus Union State Secretary Pavel Borodin
divulged to journalists that both sides are currently working on no fewer than
nine versions of the Constitutional Act of both states, that is, a common-state
constitution. However, neither Lukashenka nor Putin found it necessary to say a
word about this issue after their talks in Sochi.
This may not be so surprising when one recalls that Russia's clearest stance
so far on integration with Belarus was formulated by Putin in August 2002. Putin
then proposed an "ultimate unification" of both states by incorporating Belarus
into the Russian Federation as a whole or dividing it into seven new federal
regions. Arguably, such a form of integration hardly needs any additional
constitution at all.
At that time Lukashenka indignantly rejected this incorporation proposal. But
will he be able to withstand such an integration scenario during his anticipated
third term, when economic considerations might force the Kremlin to increase gas
prices for Russia's staunchest post-Soviet ally as well?
|