Dear David,

I interviewed Rob concerning the Chechen election over the weekend for UPI. UPI will publish it shortly, but a shortened version. Thus, please find attached the complete interview for the JRL. best and thanks,

Peter

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Interview: A step forward in Chechnya?

Peter Lavelle interviews Robert Bruce Ware, noted expert on Chechnya and the North Caucasus, on Sunday’s parliamentary election in the troubled Russian republic.

UPI: Chechnya has held its first parliamentary election since 1997. How important is this election to legitimize the rule of Ramzan Kadyrov, 29 years of age and son of former president Akhmad Kadyrov, and the Kremlin’s “normalization” of the troubled republic?

Robert Bruce Ware: It would be premature to discuss Ramzan Kadyrov’s rule. Chechnya’s president is Alu Alkhanov. Kadyrov has acknowledged that the Chechen constitution prevents him from ruling Chechnya until at least next October, when he turns 30 years old.

Having said that there is no question that Kadyrov is the most powerful man in Chechnya, that he views this election as a prerequisite for his presidency, and that he has therefore exercised influence in seating his supporters. The Chechen legislative election is a presidential prerequisite because legislative support would add legitimacy to Kadyrov’s power struggle with administrators, such as Alkhanov, and with elites, such as the Yamadaev family. The Chechen legislature also must approve the Kremlin’s appointment of Chechnya’s next ruler.

However, the Kremlin will make that appointment at its pleasure, and there is no reason to suppose that this will be soon. Alkhanov is generally recognized as doing a reasonably good job. The situation is slowly improving for many of Chechnya’s residents, and the republic is gradually stabilizing. Alkhanov’s support in Chechnya is widespread, if also rather dispassionate. The Kremlin will have recognized that in Chechnya, where passions have run too high for too long, dispassionate support is the best kind.

Conversely, Kadyrov’s appointment would be directly provocative, and as he grew into administrative power, Kadyrov would probably become more difficult for Moscow to manage. If Kadyrov were appointed in 2007, and if this was perceived as leading to greater instability in Chechnya, then that would further complicate the difficult transition in Russian presidential power that is set for 2008. Alkhanov’s term expires in 2008, and between now and then President Putin has a strong interest in keeping things as steady as possible in the North Caucasus. Hence, so long as Alkhanov is generally viewed as doing a good job, the Kremlin may consider it counterproductive to install Kadyrov anytime soon. They may judge it better to maintain something like the current division of power in Chechnya, retaining Alkhanov as chief administrator, and running Kadyrov as the chief enforcer.

Though Kadyrov is undoubtedly the most powerful man in Chechnya, the division of power in the republic has been unappreciated by some observers. Kadyrov controls a few thousand gunmen and could quickly muster a few thousand more if he were pressed. Yet there are at least three other loyalist commanders with enough men to oblige Kadyrov to coordinate with them. In fact, Mr. Kadyrov has not always found it east to coordinate with the Yamadaevs, who lead the Vostok battalion, which is based in Gudermes and controls eastern Chechnya.

In addition, there are the federal authorities themselves who exercise power in Chechnya, but they do this fairly loosely through numerous local military and security officers. Many of these are self-interested, and most of them have armed men under their command, through which they constitute themselves as distinct, if not entirely autonomous, loci of power.

Furthermore, there is President Alkhanov and the Grozny administration, and there is the militant network, which is also an assortment of loosely connected groups. Finally, there are a host of clan and criminal groups, which overlap in constantly shifting patterns with many of the groups previously enumerated.

Ramzan Kadyrov has to cope with all of these centers of power, and each of them serves to limit his own power. The situation in Chechnya is, in fact, highly pluralistic. Kadyrov is well aware of the limits of his power, and that is why he has sought to reinforce and extend his power through this election.

Hence, this election served not as a coronation of Ramzan, but as a legitimation of the methodical and lengthy process though which the Russian Federation has reestablished control of Chechnya. This process began on June 12, 2000, when President Putin installed Ramzan Kadyrov’s father, Akhmad, as head of the Chechen administration. In March 2003, a referendum approved a constitution for Chechnya, followed by Akhmad Kadyrov’s election to the newly-created presidency that autumn. Akhmad was assassinated on May 9, 2004, and Alkhanov was elected the following September. Each of these electoral exercises was preceded by complex maneuvers in Moscow and Grozny, and trailed by evidence of electoral fraud.

Yet it appears that the results in all three cases were consistent with the preferences of most people in Chechnya. Most Chechens have reservations about their constitution, but most Chechens are glad to have any constitution that might provide a framework for improved stability. Despite their reservations, most Chechens supported Akhmad Kadyrov and support Alu Alkhanov because both have managed to make improvements in the security situation, and to take the first tentative steps toward economic recovery. With this legislative election, Moscow can claim that this process has been brought to its conclusion with at least partial success, and that Chechnya has been reintegrated into the Russian Federation. Alkhanov’s overture to Ichkerian leaders in Brussels is a further indication that they think it’s all over, and they are offering to bring some of the remaining rebel leaders in from the cold.

Q: Would those claims be true?

They have some elements of truth, though fewer than Moscow would like, and fewer than there would have been had Moscow provided greater support for human rights and genuinely democratic procedures. Or if the Grozny administration had offered to bring rebel leaders in from the cold by permitting some of them to run in this election.

Q: If this election is about legitimacy, then can Moscow now claim that Chechnya’s reintegration is legitimate?

Chechnya’s reintegration in the Russian Federation was achieved by force and brutality that sometimes reached horrific levels. That was illegitimate, to put it mildly, and of course it is not something that ever should be put mildly.

Yet Chechnya’s separation from Russia was also illegitimate, in the sense that most Chechens did not wish to separate from the Russian Federation in the first place. That is why, in March 1993, then Chechen President Djokhar Dudayev vetoed a resolution by the Chechen parliament to hold a referendum on Chechen sovereignty. Dudayev realized that his separatist agenda would be defeated in a referendum, so he had the Chechen legislature violently disbanded, causing injury and death to some members. Dudayev then ignored impeachment proceedings by the remnants of the legislature; he ignored efforts by the Chechen Constitutional Court to deny his sovereignty; and he ignored demands for his resignation by coalitions of Chechen citizens. There was no legitimacy in any of that. Today, at least 70 per cent of the people in Chechnya wish to belong to the Russian Federation because they are exhausted with radicalism, instability, and suffering; because they recognize that Chechnya cannot make it alone; and because there is simply nowhere else for Chechnya to go. There is some legitimacy in all of that, but Chechnya’s reintegration will not be fully legitimate until all Chechens enjoy the full rights and benefits of Russian citizenship. In order to achieve that officials in Moscow and Grozny must do much more than hold an election.

Q.: How democratic was the election in terms of parties being able to run candidates and the vote count? Kadyrov may be aiming to legitimize his rule in an institutional sense, but do Chechens see their political institutions as legitimate.

A: Legitimacy is a political luxury that most Chechens know they cannot afford. Most are so exhausted that they care only about efficacy. They want a government, any government, that will bring them stability, security, and a modicum of prosperity. Whoever gives them that will be legitimate. Because Chechnya has tended slowly toward these objectives over the last three years, the Kadyrov’s and Alkhanov have each gained a measure of legitimacy.

It is not undemocratic that Ramzan Kadyrov and other elites maneuvered to position their supporters to be elected. On the contrary, this is precisely what happens in all democracies, and even in developed democracies this sometimes involves questionable practices. Such practices are always deplorable, but before western critics pillory Chechen officials, they might visit Texas and help the majority leader of the U. S. Congress sort out some of the difficulties that he is currently having there as a consequence of similarly questionable practices.

However, it is certainly undemocratic that no truly separatist candidates were tolerated. It is marginally undemocratic that the Liberal Republican Party was disqualified on a technicality.

Otherwise, there is at least some reason to hypothesize that about 10% of the United Russia vote was fraudulent. You’ve asked for this analysis barely 24 hours after the polls closed, so information is incomplete.

If this hypothesis were confirmed, then it would hardly diminish United Russia’s victory. However, the consequences might be significant for Eurasian Union and even Yabloko. Though the count is not yet complete, Eurasian Union is showing just over 4%, and Yabloko is running at just under 4%. If the voter turnout were falsely inflated by 10,000 or 15,000, and if most of these “votes” benefited United Russia, then it may turn out that this (perhaps inadvertently) prevented Eurasian Union from qualifying with 5%.

If this occurred, then the pattern would be very close to that which I have seen in party list elections in Dagestan. There I have found some evidence that United Russia (and the Communists, in the case of Dagestan, though not in Chechnya) have benefited from ballot stuffing on a similarly limited scale. Yet it would be naïve to assume that this occurs on orders from Moscow, or even necessarily from Makhachkala or Tsenteroy. It appears that some local leaders stuff some ballot boxes with the hope that they will ingratiate themselves to more powerful elites by delivering the district solidly for the party of power. So a limited number of ballots may have been stuffed, and they may have been stuffed by the order of Ramzan, or they may have been stuffed on the initiative of local electoral officials who wanted to ensure that Ramzan would see them as friends.

Incidentally, the predominance of United Russia, followed by the Communists and SPS is also the pattern in Dagestan. SPS does not do as well throughout Dagestan as it did in Chechnya. Yet SPS and Yabloko do well in the Chechen-Akkin districts of Dagestan because these two parties have often defended the rights of Chechens. So one would expect them also to do relatively well in Chechnya. Also in Dagestan, there has been little or no evidence of fraud in single member district elections; so it will be interesting to see the single member district results in Chechnya.

The fact that United Russia received much less than the 82% that it recorded in the 2003 Duma election is an indication that the election was relatively straight-forward. In both Dagestan and Chechnya, some people support United Russia because they are following local leaders, who support United Russia because they see it as being in their political interest to do so. Other people support United Russia because they see it as the best hope for a strong government that will bring order to unruly societies. Still others support it because it is the party of power and they simply want to be on the winning side. In 2004, there were plenty of Americans who voted Republican for all of the same reasons.

So all in all Chechnya’s legislative election looked to be about as democratic or undemocratic as other elections in the region. We can imagine better elections being held in Dagestan, or Chechnya, or Florida, but given the local cultures, this is probably the way that it will be for some years.

Q.: How will the election outcome change the delicate balance of power between the Chechen leadership and Moscow?

A: Again, Ramzan Kadyrov hopes that the legislature will add legitimacy to his struggle for power, and this is one indication that his power is still limited. Additionally, strong legislative support could be a chip that any Chechen administrator might play in the inevitable power struggles with Moscow, concerning, for example, the administration of Chechnya’s natural resources. Moreover, Chechnya’s ancient traditions of egalitarianism, self-determination are likely to support legislative power. Still Chechnya’s current institutional framework, combined with its immediate security issues, tends toward a strong executive. So unless a charismatic legislative leader were to emerge, it is unlikely that Chechnya’s parliament will contribute substantially to the balance of powers in the near term.

However, Alkhanov is not a strong executive, so the longer he remains in power the more opportunities there will be for the development of legislative power. It is possible, though not probable, that some in the legislature will recognize this opportunity and attempt to support Alkhanov against Kadyrov.

Q.: Will this election and its outcome in any way lower the violence in the republic? A number of human rights groups claim most the violence committed is “state supported.”

A: The level of violence in Chechnya has been gradually decreasing, even while it increases in neighboring republics. Akhmad Kadyrov and Alu Alkhanov each deserve some credit for this. Yet, paradoxically, it is also true that much of the violence is perpetrated by forces who act, at least part of the time, under auspices of Grozny and Moscow. It is a paradox that was explored by Machiavelli, who argued that when a nation has lost what he described as its “virtú”, then it requires a strong man to impose his personal virtú upon it. Many people in Chechnya would agree with Machiavelli on this point, and that is why they have supported the Kadyrov’s and the United Russia Party.

Additionally, legislative representation will make some Chechens feel that they have a forum for airing their grievances and addressing their problems. That is likely to help in avoiding some of the frustration and despair that sometimes culminates in acts of violence. So the legislature will probably contribute to the broader trend of gradually diminishing violence. Yet the problems are so numerous and severe that it is unlikely that the legislature in and of itself will soon make a large contribution in this regard. Moreover, it is also likely that the Chechen legislature will give rise to factionalism and controversy, which may, at times, exacerbate existing problems.

Q.: Akhmed Zakayev, rebel envoy living in London, stated on the eve of the election: "The upcoming elections have nothing in common with a real political process. All it does is push further away the day when there will be a real political solution, and lead to the expansion of the theater of war." How much does his statement reflect the views and attitudes of the average Chechen? One could make the claim that Zakayev directed his statement to his Western supporters and backers.

A.: Akhmed Zakayev has become a fixture of the West, and everything that he does is offered for western. It has little to do with the realities in Chechnya. His statement plays upon an ambiguity that results from the conflation of two differing senses of the phrase: “real political process”.

First, what Mr. Zakayev means by “real political process” is a process of political negotiations between Russian Federal authorities and Chechen militants that hypothetically might eventually extricate the former from the latter. However, this has nothing to do with reality, and for reasons that are far more basic than the fact that Russian authorities refuse to consider it.

The first of the reasons why Mr. Zakayev’s vision has nothing to do with reality is that if all federal forces left Chechnya today, it would change nothing for the militants. They would still be fighting with all of the forces of the Grozny administration, by whom they are substantially outnumbered. The conflict in Chechnya is a civil war that has been waged in fits and starts since 1993, and that will continue to its end, either with or without Moscow. When he invaded Chechnya in 1994, Boris Yeltsin was foolish enough to convert it from a Chechen civil war into a Russian civil war, that is, war between Russia and Chechnya. After Russian forces departed, from 1997 to 1999, Islamists like Shamil Basayev were foolish enough to convert it back into a Chechen civil war, in which they squared off against Muslim traditionalists like the Kadyrovs. Through his policy of Chechenization, Vladimir Putin has ensured that it will remain an intra-Chechen conflict. The departure of federal forces from Chechnya would only increase the level of violence.

The second reason why Mr. Zakayev’s vision has nothing to do with reality is that less than 15 per cent of the people in Chechnya have any interest in Mr. Zakayev and the militants whom he claims to represent. At least 70 per cent of Chechen residents wish to be part of the Russian Federation and despise Zakayev and the militants. Since they do not support Mr. Zakayev’s agenda, that which Mr. Zakayev would describe as a “real political process” has no relevance to their situation. It is completely unreal. A real political process in Chechnya is closer to what is now occurring, as an authoritative political structure gradually emerges.

Yet there are important qualifications, and here is where the alternative sense of Mr. Zakayev’s “real political process” genuinely applies: A real election would have included candidates of Mr. Zakayev’s separatist persuasion, and would have seated them if they had won, as a few of them probably would. That would have provided more of a real legislative forum for Chechnya in the sense that all viewpoints would have found representation. And that, in turn, would have revealed just how weak the separatist position really is in Chechnya today. So it would have been much better for everyone in Chechnya, and everywhere else in Russia, if the election had been completely open, free, and fair to candidates of all stripes. For many reasons, it would have been unrealistic to hope for such an election, but the result would have been more real than what we have today.

Q.: Ramzan Kadyrov certainly has demonstrated that he knows something about applying force to root out rebels in the field, but does it have what it takes to rebuild Chechnya?

A.: I don’t think that the rule of Ramzan Kadyrov would be good for either Chechnya or Russia right now, and I’m not sure that it ever will be. I suspect that Ramzan might agree with the first part of that proposition. I expect that he would dissent from the second. Whether he is right will depend on what he does next.

Eventually, I think that both Kadyrov’s will be seen as transitional figures. They are figures who, in true Machiavellian fashion, have employed the wickedest of means to achieve a necessary end, namely the imposition of order and stability upon their nation. I think that like his father, Akhmad, and like Machiavelli’s hero, Cesare Borgia, Ramzan Kadyrov will not achieve all of his ambitions, for those who employ the wickedest of means never do. Like Cesare Borgia, Ramzan Kadyrov is likely, in some subtle way, to undermine himself.

Yet his future is in his hands. If he were able to undergo the personal transformation that will be necessary to evade Borgia’s fate, then he might yet make a good governor for Chechnya. If he fails to do so, then he will probably not survive. Ramzan wants to learn; so it is really a question of what he chooses to study.

Robert Bruce Ware is an associate professor at Southern Illinois University Edwardsville.

Peter Lavelle is a Moscow-based analyst and writes for RIA Novosti.