| JRL Home | Subscribe | Support | Search | Topics | Archives | RAS | RW |
  Johnson's Russia List Home Images of St. Petersburg E-mail David Johnson, davidjohnson@starpower.net
Excerpts from the JRL E-Mail Newsletter   Headlines: Assassinations :: JRL RAS #41 ~ January 2008: POLITICS: media control ~ power agencies ~ Chechnya, police; ECONOMICS: economic prospects, ownership concentration; LAW: Arbitration; STALIN’S CHILD VICTIMS; PSYCHOLOGY :: Support Johnson's Russia List :: U.S.-Russian Relations :: Chechnya :: Ukraine :: YUKOS :: Economy & Business
  Topics: Security/International :: Domestic :: JRL :: Firefox-optimal :: site feedback
#28 - JRL 9295 - JRL Home
From: "Mike Averko" <mikeaverko@msn.com>
Subject: BREWING A RUSSIAN BACKLASH
Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2005

Mistreating a perennial power when it's down and out has resulted in a negative after effect as recent history shows.

Upon its defeat in World War I, Germany faced harsh sanctions which served to unite a broad cross section of Germans into accepting an extreme movement that later threatened the world. This sharply contrasts with how post World War II West Germany and Japan were treated by the West. A firm but helpful occupation nurtured formerly militaristic nations into becoming democratic beacons of non-violent success driven economies.

The post Cold War treatment of Russia by the West (notably the U.S.) hasn't shown the same results. The imperfect Western economic advice of the last decade caused great misery for Russians and others within the Commonwealth of Independent States (some top Russian officials at the time share much blame for this as well). Many Russians who were previously ready to embrace Western advice now cringe at such a process. In turn, a core group of once influential American advisers to Russia feel rejected in being left out of a Putin era Russian economic growth. An unholy alliance of anti-Putin oligarchs and those once influential American advisers is a well documented reality as detailed by some well entrenched analysts (see Eric Kraus' "Carnegie - For Peace?" http://english.intelligent.ru/articles/politics.htm).

Besides the internal economic factor, one can find a litany of diplomatic follies which are brewing a Russian backlash as Russia slowly rebounds from decades of Communist mismanagement. Perhaps efforts are being made to circumvent this path. One can't be so sure, which is why it's important for an overview of the diplomatic mishaps.

Almost immediately after the failed coup against then Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, the Russian government of Boris Yeltsin openly inquired about Russia joining NATO. This was met with astonished bemusement in the West and no serious follow-up occurred.

Shortly afterwards, the Polish, Hungarian, Baltic and other non-Russian inquiries on joining NATO were well received throughout the American foreign policy establishment. During the first wave of post Soviet NATO expansion, a caricaturing of an historically evil Russia was utilized to justify the process. Some went further by saying that Russia should never be allowed into NATO as "punishment" for Russia's brutal legacy of subjugating others in addition to being an inherent threat. But just how threatening has Russia been and to whom?

Russia favored the American colonists during the American Revolution and supported the Union during the American Civil War. In those two major American conflicts, the British took the opposite side. Note how many Americans now consider Britain as America's best ally.

On the European continent, Russia played the lead role in an alliance with other European powers (Prussia, Austria and Britain) in defeating Napoleon (who some historians have likened as an early day Hitler of sorts). For decades thereafter, Russia was the undisputed land power in Europe. Yet, it didn't behave so aggressively. It withdrew from Paris and sought diplomatic unity with the other European powers.

Anti-Russian analysts in opposition to this perspective will note the Russian crushing of national rebellions in Hungary (1848) and Poland (1863). The former would never have happened without the invitation of the power which occupied Hungary (Austria). In retrospect, Russia very much regrets supporting the Hapsburgs as Vienna did nothing to support Russia's later skirmish with Britain, France and Turkey during the Crimean War (a conflict in which the U.S. sympathized with Russia). The matter of Poland shouldn't be confused with Britain's subjugation of Ireland. Up until 1863, Poland had previously attacked Russia and continued to maintain a menacing stance towards it (refer to the 16th and 17th centuries as well as the up to 100,000 Poles who joined Napoleon in his attack on Russia).

Running contrary to a historically overbearing Russia, the 19th century Russian rule over Finland was arguably the most benevolent for any nation under the occupation of a European power. Given this, there's no reason to assume that Poland could have had a similar experience if it wasn't so hostile towards Russia.

An often overlooked facet pertains to the way Russia is favorably viewed in Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro. The flags of those three bear similarity to the Russian tricolor. These flags were intentionally designed to honor the Russian liberation of those national entities.

When faced with this, anti-Russian analysts will counter that Russia wasn't acting for altruistic reasons. Does any country act out of true altruism on such matter? Just how altruistic was it for the American led NATO to intervene in Kosovo when it didn't show similar resolve to protect a brutally suppressed Kurdish population in NATO member Turkey (refer to Kevin McKiernan http://www.kevinmckiernancom/doc.html)?

The Cold War era reveals that the USSR and USA never came to direct blows with each other. It also has another aspect upon close review. Soviet successes and failures alike could never have been achieved without the large contribution made by non-Soviet Russians and non-Soviet Communists alike.

Form the "realist school" of foreign policy, here's some food for thought: Putin's advocacy of gradually managed liberal reform isn't likely to leave the scene at anytime in the near future (the next Russian president will probably govern in much the same manner). Likewise, the influential neo-conservative and George Soros funded neo-liberal elites opposed to Putin and Russia (as most Russians support his core policies) aren't likely to significantly deflate. For damage control purposes, it's not too late for the latter mentioned grouping to reinvent itself into a Russia friendly direction in whichever way it sees fit. If this happens, the Russian side should graciously welcome the change, with the two countries moving forward. The remaining alternative of an ongoing cold peace significantly raises the specter of an eventual breaking point that could have grave consequences down the line.

| Top | JRL Home | Subscribe | Support | Search | Topics | RAS | RW |