#28 - JRL 9295 - JRL Home
From: "Mike Averko" <mikeaverko@msn.com>
Subject: BREWING A RUSSIAN BACKLASH
Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2005
Mistreating a perennial power when it's down and out has resulted in a
negative after effect as recent history shows.
Upon its defeat in World War I, Germany faced harsh sanctions which served to
unite a broad cross section of Germans into accepting an extreme movement that
later threatened the world. This sharply contrasts with how post World War II
West Germany and Japan were treated by the West. A firm but helpful occupation
nurtured formerly militaristic nations into becoming democratic beacons of
non-violent success driven economies.
The post Cold War treatment of Russia by the West (notably the U.S.) hasn't
shown the same results. The imperfect Western economic advice of the last decade
caused great misery for Russians and others within the Commonwealth of
Independent States (some top Russian officials at the time share much blame for
this as well). Many Russians who were previously ready to embrace Western advice
now cringe at such a process. In turn, a core group of once influential American
advisers to Russia feel rejected in being left out of a Putin era Russian
economic growth. An unholy alliance of anti-Putin oligarchs and those once
influential American advisers is a well documented reality as detailed by some
well entrenched analysts (see Eric Kraus' "Carnegie - For Peace?" http://english.intelligent.ru/articles/politics.htm).
Besides the internal economic factor, one can find a litany of diplomatic
follies which are brewing a Russian backlash as Russia slowly rebounds from
decades of Communist mismanagement. Perhaps efforts are being made to circumvent
this path. One can't be so sure, which is why it's important for an overview of
the diplomatic mishaps.
Almost immediately after the failed coup against then Soviet leader Mikhail
Gorbachev, the Russian government of Boris Yeltsin openly inquired about Russia
joining NATO. This was met with astonished bemusement in the West and no serious
follow-up occurred.
Shortly afterwards, the Polish, Hungarian, Baltic and other non-Russian
inquiries on joining NATO were well received throughout the American foreign
policy establishment. During the first wave of post Soviet NATO expansion, a
caricaturing of an historically evil Russia was utilized to justify the process.
Some went further by saying that Russia should never be allowed into NATO as
"punishment" for Russia's brutal legacy of subjugating others in addition to
being an inherent threat. But just how threatening has Russia been and to whom?
Russia favored the American colonists during the American Revolution and
supported the Union during the American Civil War. In those two major American
conflicts, the British took the opposite side. Note how many Americans now
consider Britain as America's best ally.
On the European continent, Russia played the lead role in an alliance with
other European powers (Prussia, Austria and Britain) in defeating Napoleon (who
some historians have likened as an early day Hitler of sorts). For decades
thereafter, Russia was the undisputed land power in Europe. Yet, it didn't
behave so aggressively. It withdrew from Paris and sought diplomatic unity with
the other European powers.
Anti-Russian analysts in opposition to this perspective will note the Russian
crushing of national rebellions in Hungary (1848) and Poland (1863). The former
would never have happened without the invitation of the power which occupied
Hungary (Austria). In retrospect, Russia very much regrets supporting the
Hapsburgs as Vienna did nothing to support Russia's later skirmish with Britain,
France and Turkey during the Crimean War (a conflict in which the U.S.
sympathized with Russia). The matter of Poland shouldn't be confused with
Britain's subjugation of Ireland. Up until 1863, Poland had previously attacked
Russia and continued to maintain a menacing stance towards it (refer to the 16th
and 17th centuries as well as the up to 100,000 Poles who joined Napoleon in his
attack on Russia).
Running contrary to a historically overbearing Russia, the 19th century
Russian rule over Finland was arguably the most benevolent for any nation under
the occupation of a European power. Given this, there's no reason to assume that
Poland could have had a similar experience if it wasn't so hostile towards
Russia.
An often overlooked facet pertains to the way Russia is favorably viewed in
Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro. The flags of those three bear similarity to the
Russian tricolor. These flags were intentionally designed to honor the Russian
liberation of those national entities.
When faced with this, anti-Russian analysts will counter that Russia wasn't
acting for altruistic reasons. Does any country act out of true altruism on such
matter? Just how altruistic was it for the American led NATO to intervene in
Kosovo when it didn't show similar resolve to protect a brutally suppressed
Kurdish population in NATO member Turkey (refer to Kevin McKiernan http://www.kevinmckiernancom/doc.html)?
The Cold War era reveals that the USSR and USA never came to direct blows
with each other. It also has another aspect upon close review. Soviet successes
and failures alike could never have been achieved without the large contribution
made by non-Soviet Russians and non-Soviet Communists alike.
Form the "realist school" of foreign policy, here's some food for thought:
Putin's advocacy of gradually managed liberal reform isn't likely to leave the
scene at anytime in the near future (the next Russian president will probably
govern in much the same manner). Likewise, the influential neo-conservative and
George Soros funded neo-liberal elites opposed to Putin and Russia (as most
Russians support his core policies) aren't likely to significantly deflate. For
damage control purposes, it's not too late for the latter mentioned grouping to
reinvent itself into a Russia friendly direction in whichever way it sees fit.
If this happens, the Russian side should graciously welcome the change, with the
two countries moving forward. The remaining alternative of an ongoing cold peace
significantly raises the specter of an eventual breaking point that could have
grave consequences down the line.
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