From: "Vladimir Shlapentokh" <shlapent@msu.edu>
Subject: Are Today's Authoritarian Leaders Doomed to be Indicted When They Leave Office? The Russian and Other Post-Soviet Cases
Date: Mon, 10 Oct 2005
Are Today's Authoritarian Leaders Doomed to be
Indicted When They Leave Office?
The Russian and Other Post-Soviet Cases
By Vladimir Shlapentokh
Professor of Sociology, Michigan State University
Anybody who tries to understand the politics of an authoritarian leader, and all the more predict his or her behavior in domestic and international affairs, should reflect on the leader's perceptions of his or her short and long term future, particularly after leaving office. The attitudes of a leader toward their personal future are very important to international politics.
The leaders of democratic societies also contemplate their "next morning" with some concern. Chirac, for instance, could be sued after leaving the presidential office for his misdeeds as the mayor of Paris. However, the potential for democratic leaders to commit unusual deeds before they leave office is limited. The "Watergate case," when Nixon's people tried to tape conversations at the headquarters of his opponents on the eve of the presidential election in 1972, was an example of the effectiveness of democratic institutions in stopping the illegal activities of the president. In comparison with the developments in authoritarian or semi-authoritarian societies, in which the leader openly controls election campaigns and even rigs the elections, "Watergate" is an unpleasant but minor episode of illegality.
The Ideal Scenario for Authoritarian Leaders: Stay in Power Forever
Today, eight scenarios are on the minds of the leaders of post-Soviet and communist countries. Whatever the leaders' assessments of the probability of each of the scenarios, they cannot remove any of them from their minds, just as most people cannot eliminate thoughts of various diseases, even rare ones.
One of the scenarios-I will label it the "clean" scenario-supposes that the incumbent leader conducts an honest election. In Lithuania, there were three more or less honest presidential elections. The same smooth transition of power took place after 1991 in two other Baltic nations, Estonia and Latvia. Close to them is Mongolia, a democratic miracle among post-Soviet Asian states. The rulers of most post-Soviet and communist states ignore this scenario, preferring one that is more ideal, which I will refer to as the "forever scenario." This scenario supposes that the leader will follow the fate of the Soviet leaders, almost all of whom died in office.
One post-Soviet leader indeed followed this scenario. Geydar Aliev dominated the political life of Azerbaijan for more than 30 years. From 1993 to 2003, he ruled the country as the president and resigned only when his son was "elected" as president. Only a few months later, he died as the great leader of the nation, which was supposedly bemoaned by the people. The example of Castro, who will, by all accounts, die as the Commandant, also inspires the current authoritarian leaders' belief that the "president-for life" option is still possible.
The leaders believe, as we can judge from their behavior in office, that two very effective instruments in their possession can perpetuate their power as long as they are alive. One of them is an army and police force that can crush any opposition. Another is the leader's legitimacy in the eyes of the population as the guarantor of order and national independence, even if this legitimacy is not based on honest elections or any election at all. The recent Russian movie "Brezhnev" (2005) shows very eloquently how the frail general secretary, who would indulge publicly in a childish game with pigeons, was nevertheless protected from his rivals by the iron wall of legitimacy. The case of Roman Emperor Diocletian's voluntary retirement in 305 after 21 years of unrestrained rule as Dominus and Deus (Lord and God)-his well-known reason for retirement was to take up his beloved hobby of growing cabbages-has been considered almost implausible throughout history. In the early 1980s, when Brezhnev rejected the idea of leaving office, a Soviet filmmaker made the famous movie, "Moscow does not believe in tears" (1980), which showed high respect for Diocletian, as a suggestion to the ailing general secretary to take the emperor as an example.
The seemingly indomitable desire of authoritarian leaders to stay in power as long as possible cannot be ascribed only to their willingness to protract their power ad infinitum, with all the pleasures and perks associated with this power. In fact, their attempts to hold on to power as long as possible have more compelling reasons.
The Domain of the Authoritarian Leaders: Corruption on their Records
First of all, most authoritarian leaders in the contemporary world tend to exploit their office for gaining control over a big chunk of the nation's assets, as well as over big businesses. In the Middle Ages, the personal property of the feudal king (called the "royal domain") was completely separated from the nation's assets. The leader's domain, which can be detected in most post-Soviet states, as well as in many developing countries, is created by various illegal means, and can easily be made the basis of future indictments. The concept of domain links the concept of feudalism to Russia, an observation mentioned many times in the last years in Russian media. However, the idea of "domain" is almost irrelevant to a totalitarian state in both ancient and modern times. The Soviet leaders did not have a "domain," that is, they did not possess any property. This was true even about Brezhnev, whose interest in personal cars was well known. Apparently, contemporary Chinese leaders also do not have a personal domain. Meanwhile, post-Soviet leaders, from the moment they found themselves in the highest office in the country, began creating and expanding their domain, which is totally out of the public's control. They joined the cohort of leaders of many developing countries known for their illegal enrichment. Even Pinochet did not escape this rule without amassing money illegally on his accounts in the United States. The presidential domain usually includes the property that is formally run by the presidential administration.
The domain also includes the state or private property that is grabbed by members of "the family," as well as the regular donations from private businesses. The domain serves three main purposes: one, to guarantee the wealth of "the family" and the leader himself after leaving office, whatever the circumstances; two, to provide the president with the necessary resources for reelection when it is necessary; three, to "feed" or simply suborn officials and legislators with various privileges, such as apartments, hospitals and vacations, and make them loyal servants to the leader. In fact, the domain of the leader makes the country's democratic institutions almost totally fictitious, even if elections are not directly rigged.
Among the heads of the post-Soviet states, Nazarbayev, Akaeyv, Shevarnadze, Niazov and Aliev were the most renown for their blatant corruption. The case of Yeltsin has special importance. During his tenure, the enrichment of his family and the maintenance of his power were his major goals. He not only did not fight corruption, but intentionally bolstered it as a necessary condition for the expansion of his domain, which was crucial for his reelection in 1996. Yeltsin almost openly bribed the deputies of the Duma on the eve of the impeachment vote in 1996.
Putin's domain was, from the very beginning, mostly based on the gigantic property of the presidential administration. The role of Putin's family property in his domain is much lower than that of Yeltsin's. Still, Yulia Latynina, a prominent economic analyst, discussing the mysterious circumstances of the auction of the oil company "Yuganskneftegaz" (a big part of Yukos) in mid December, could not help but allude to the president's participation in this semi-criminal business deal and his use of KGB techniques. Garry Kasparov, the world chess champion and liberal activist, in his Wall Street Journal article, ascribed the government's recent attack on the mobile telephone firm "Vympelkom" to the intrigues of the rival company "Megaphon," which is "closely connected with Mr. Putin." Many Russians are sure that Putin has money in foreign accounts.
Unlike Yeltsin, Putin seemingly expands his domain not so much through his family, but through his proxies, that is, people from Petersburg, mostly Chekists, who are now the members of the board of directors of leading monopolies in oil, gas, electricity, and railway transportation. While the major actors in the expansion of Yeltsin's domain and in the Kremlin's games were his two daughters and their husbands, Putin's daughters are still teenagers and remain far from politics.
Indeed, as the economics department of a respected Russian newspaper suggests, eight persons (seven Kremlin officials and the president) control "the assets of these companies, which are equal to three Russian national budgets, while the owners of the companies are so loyal that they are ready to give almost everything to the Kremlin." Dmitry Medvedev, the head of the Kremlin administration, is the chairman of the board of directors at "Gazprom" (valued at $30.1 billion); Igor Sechin, his deputy, is the head of "Rosneft" (5.4 billion); and Vladislav Surkov, another deputy, is the head of the board of directors at "Transneftproduct" ($400 million). Three aides to the president - Igor Shuvalov, Viktor Ivanov and Sergei Prikhodko - took control of companies worth $2.29 billion, $2.19 billion and $1.2 billion, respectively. Evgenii Shkolov, an aide to Medvedev, is in charge of a company valued at $4.1 billion.
In the last year, Putin has been increasingly accused by his critics for gradually expanding the property of the Kremlin administration, which tends to grow with unclear borders between this property and the personal property of the president.
The case of the mega yacht, "Olympia," which formally belongs to the Kremlin administration, illustrates the problem. The real owner of this luxurious yacht, which is valued at $50 million, is the subject of various speculations. Most of them gravitate toward the theory that this ship was a gift from the oligarch Abramovich to his friend, the Russian president. There are quite reliable data on the commercial activity of the presidential administration, which uses its numerous estates for business transactions, such as the sale of state land. The revenues from these transactions are outside of the control of the Duma. Putin's presidential administration is practically responsible for the well being of the deputies of the Duma; it often provides them with various perks.
Political Crimes: Another Part of the Record
The negative record of authoritarian leaders comprises not only corruption but many political crimes as well. Yeltsin's record includes the illegal dismantling of the parliament and the bloodshed in September-October 1993, the rigged voting in the referendum on the Constitution in December 1993, the arranged presidential elections in 1996 and 2000, and the start of the war against Chechnia in 1994. The Russian parliament tried on a few occasions to impeach the president, but failed, even though the absolute majority of the population (about 85 percent in 1999) favored it.
Putin's political record, after six years in power, is not much better. The elimination of the division of power, the unfair presidential campaign in 2000 and 2004, the curbing of the freedom of television stations, and the political trial of Mikhail Khodorkovsky represent impressive reasons, in the opinion of his political enemies on both the right and the left, to prosecute the current Russian president inside the country. The atrocities in Chechnia represent a special part of Putin's (as well as Yeltsin's) record. Recently the chairman of the pro Moscow State Council of Chechnia declared that 150 to 160 thousand people died during the war in Chechnia.
Castro's political record also pushes him to stay in power until his last breath. In July 2005, some Cubans were brave enough to commemorate the death of 41 of their compatriots killed in 1995 at Castro's order when they tried to flee the country.
The issue of the leader's record is extremely important to Kim Jong Il. In fact, putting aside his father Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, who has ruled the country since 1994, is responsible for several heinous crimes, both inside and outside the country. With his bad personal record, and the good chances of being put on trial in Seoul or the Hague, Kim Jong Il can hardly abandon his nuclear shield (if he possess it, or if the world believes that he has it). This position is strongly supported by Russians who dislike America, and therefore see nuclear weapons as the crucial condition for sovereignty of any country in the contemporary world, and North Korea specifically.
The Milieu of a Leader who Wants to Stay in Power: The Family and Courtiers
The leaders are not only concerned about their personal interests. They are also influenced by various other fears when developing their choice of scenarios. Of course, an important role belongs to the leader's family, the members of which are also afraid of losing their privileges or being prosecuted "the next morning." The members of Yeltsin's family were crucial actors in the planning of his reelection campaign in 1996, as well as his departure from power, with the guarantees from his appointed heir that the members of the family would not be prosecuted and their wealth would remain intact. Thus far, Putin has kept his promises. Neither Yeltsin's daughters, nor his son-in-law (all of them were enmeshed in corruption) have been prosecuted. Less lucky were the family members of former heads of the post-Soviet states in Georgia, Kirghizia, and Ukraine who, if not arrested, lost much of their property.
Some other recent developments also remind the authoritarian leaders that the fate of their family is frail once they depart from power. Milosevic's wife, Mira Marcovic, after the arrest of her husband, fled to Russia to avoid being incarcerated. Pinochet's wife and his son were detained in August 2005 as accomplices in the general's tax fraud. Recently, Lukashenko lamented on Russian TV (on station TVZ) that he is almost a "beggar," and that his sons rebuked him that "now we all live encircled by barbed wire, but what will happen to us, dad, when you stop being president?"
In some ways, the gloomy fate of the children of the Soviet leaders also reminds the heads of contemporary authoritarian states about what may happen to their own children. Stalin's son spent some time in prison. Khrushchev's son-in-law was immediately fired from his job as the editor of a leading newspaper. Brezhnev's daughter ended her life as a poor drunkard.
No less involved in the future plans of the leader is his or her circle of collaborators, particularly if they are personal friends. Most of them have tendencies, similar to the family members, to exploit their position of power for personal enrichment and nepotism. The removal of their boss from the main office not only moved them down from the apex of power, but also put them in serious danger of being prosecuted. It is these people who create, based on their own interests, an ideology around their boss that views him or her as the savior of the nation and as a person whose disappearance from the political scene would bring a complete disaster for the country. Many Russian politicians and experts are sure that Putin's "narrow circle" yearns for the continuity of his power more than the president himself.
However, the closest elites are rarely homogeneous in their attitudes toward the future of the leader. There are always those who preach the use of "any means necessary" to stay in power, as well as those who are afraid of the consequences and advocate mild measures for prolonging power.
The Importance of the Leaders' Record in the West
Relations with the West play a very important role in the decisions of an authoritarian leader with regard to his future.
The cost-benefit paradigm
The attitude of an authoritarian leader toward the West can be explained by a simple cost-benefit analysis. Clearly all leaders want to uphold a good standing in the public eye in foreign countries. All Soviet leaders, whatever their attitudes toward capitalism and imperialism, enjoyed any sign, real or invented by their aides, that people in the West respected or even loved them.
The authoritarian leader enjoys the West's respect not only for reasons of vanity. They are well aware that their records in the West play an influential role in shaping the status of their country in the world, as well as their current life and the future of their family.
The major factor that determines the image of a leader in the contemporary world is his or her devotion to democratic institutions. In many cases, these leaders (from Stalin to Nazarbaiev) are ready to pay some tribute to these demands and undertake several demonstrations of their loyalty to democracy. However, the leaders mostly refused to go ahead with real democratization, if it could jeopardize their power. On this point, the costs exceeded the benefits of looking good to the West. This reasoning clearly occurred in the minds of Lukashenko or Karimov.
Flight to the West
Among the major benefits of being on a good standing with the West and with neighboring countries for authoritarian leaders of all times has been the possibility to find a refuge in the case of an emergency. In the past, the West has been somewhat tolerant toward the records of leaders who fled their countries. Indeed, Jean Bedel Bokassa, "emperor" of the Central African Republic, who had been accused of torturing people, murder and even cannibalism, was accepted by France after the coup in 1979. "Baby Doc" Duvalier, the Haitian president who was no less cruel than his father, "Papa Doc," was also able to flee in 1977 directly to France.
Of course, a flight to a neighboring country with the same type of regime has remained an option for some leaders after World War II. After the coup against him in 1955, Peron fled to Paraguay while the former Communist dictator of Ethiopia Haile Menghuistu saved his life by fleeing in 1991 to Mugabe's Zimbabwe. In September 2005, President of Ecuador Lucio Gutiérrez fled the country in the wake of antigovernment protests and found political asylum in Columbia. We can easily imagine that in the case of a coup in Venezuela, its current president could flee to Communist Cuba or to a few other Latin American countries with leftist regimes. Alberto Fujimori, Peru's former president, had a great advantage over his Latin American colleagues, because instead of begging his neighbors for refuge in 2000, he was able to find it in Japan since he could claim to be a Japanese citizen.
However, since the 1980s, the world's climate for deposed leaders has changed radically, mostly because of the transformation of human rights into an international issue and the rise of the importance of democracy in the world. This change could also be attributed to the growing role of the United States, and the absence of its old rival, the Soviet Union. Politicians today who feel completely immune to prosecution in their own country are more vulnerable in the West. Even Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, an ally of the United States, had many difficulties in his search for a place of exile. Several countries, including the U.S., refused to accept him. Hissène Habré, the former dictator of Chad, faced a very different fate. In September 2005, under the surveillance of the local police in Senegal, he was charged by a Belgian judge for large-scale human rights violations, and an international warrant was issued for his arrest.
Meanwhile, the list of politicians from post-Soviet countries who were arrested in the West is already quite long. It contains Pavlo Lazorenko, the former Ukrainian prime minister, Pavel Borodin, a member of Putin's government and the former Kremlin property manager, and Evgenii Adamov, the former atomic energy minister. All of them were accused by the U.S. of laundering money in 2000-2005. For instance, Kazakh president Nazarbaiev, with his reputation of being highly corrupt (a French journalist compared him to Suharto, the former Indonesian president, while a Russian newspaper talked about "Kazakhgate"), may run into very serious problems if he decides in the case of necessity to go live in the West.
The massacre in Andijan in May 2005 deprived the Uzbek President Karimov of the option of fleeing his country to the West in the case of an emergency. In September 2005, the European Union and the United States decided to declare the leading Uzbek officials, including the president, as undesirable guests in the West. The Russian website that reported this decision used the telling title for the story, "Good buy, America."
Kim Jong Il, with his record as a bloody dictator, has probably never considered the West as a place to spend his last years of life. China and probably Russia are the single countries that would accept him if he had to flee from Pyongyang, an unpleasant perspective for a man known, as described by a Russian journalist (in an article entitled "Kim during the plague," an allusion to the expression "Feast during the plague"), for his idolization of food, his special taste for lavish feasts prepared by a cook from Italy, his love of dancing girls, his world class collection of wine and his fleet of Mercedes Benz cars. In China or Russia, he would have to forget about his status as "the sun of the 21st century."
As a matter of fact, the life of the former leaders in countries that agree to be their hosts is hardly enviable judging by their current standards. Aiaz Mutalibov, the former Azerbaijani president, did not receive an official identity as a refugee for seven years. Once he was kept in a Moscow police station for 30 days before the police officers "found out" who he was.
Scenarios that Leaders Can Chose
Of all the scenarios that can be used to predict the future of an authoritarian leader, four are under his full control. That is, the leader can accept or reject them. As mentioned before, after 1991, the "clean scenario" was rejected by almost all the authoritarian leaders.
Rejecting clean elections or any election at all, the authoritarian leaders have three scenarios at their disposal. The first one in this group is labeled the "forever scenario." It supposes that the leader does not even conduct a rigged election and simply holds onto power, eliminating through direct coercion any sign of an opposition. The Cuban and the North Korean leaders follow this pattern of behavior.
The second scenario in this group, labeled "the continuity scenario," supposes the revision of the constitution, a rigged election or the maintenance of power with dubious legitimacy and an uncertain future. Indeed, in 1996, using the referendum, Lukashenko extended his first term, which started in 1994, by two years and then, after being reelected again in 2001, used another referendum in October 2004 to eliminate presidential term limits. Niiazov behaved the same way and his term in office was extended indefinitely on December 28, 1999, during a session of the People's Assembly. Karimov dealt with the law in a similar fashion. A new version of the law governing the presidential elections in the Republic of Uzbekistan was adopted in 1997. This new version did not prohibit the election of the president for more than two terms. In 2000, Karimov was elected as president in an evidently dishonest election. The presidential election in Kazakhstan in December 2005 is secure for the current president. It is not surprising that all three countries were declared by Freedom House in 2004 as "not free."
The third scenario, labeled the "heir scenario," supposes a transfer of power via the election of a chosen successor who promises to guarantee the security of the resigned leader, and preserve all his perks, including a state villa, body guards, free medical services, and the protection of the personal wealth of the family and even the retaining (at least for the time being) of the major officials that had been appointed by the departing president. This scenario, unlike the previous one, should look as though it observes democratic procedures and therefore supposes a well-planned election campaign. The outgoing president exploits his power to eliminate from the presidential election all rivals deemed even remotely dangerous, and to mobilize television stations to support only the heir.
Yeltsin's monarchic scenario has certainly encouraged Geydar Aliev, who appointed his son as heir. There are many evidences to show that Kirghiz president Akayev, before "the tulip revolution," considered making either his wife Mairam or his daughter Bermet president of the country. Several sources ascribe a similar motive to Nazarbayev who wants to make his daughter Dariga or her husband Rakhat Aliev his successor. Almost everybody is confident that the heir of Kim Jong Il (also appointed by his father) will be one of his two sons.
Scenarios Imposed on the Leader
While the previous scenarios include options that the leaders can choose, another group of four scenarios describe events that are imposed on the leader against his or her will. None of the leaders can exclude from their minds the dreary scenarios (you cannot deny historical facts), even if, as normal people, they probably tend to avoid unpleasant thoughts and believe that tragic events generated by revolution, rebellion or riots will not occur.
The first among these scenarios-let us call it the "assassination scenario" after the Romanian dictator executed on December 22, 1989-supposes the murder of the leader by the rebels on the spot. Askar Akayev was, as one of the opposition figures suggested even before the "tulip revolution," very close to the fate of the Romanian president.
The second scenario-labeled here as the "court scenario"-supposes the arrest and appearance of a leader in a court in their own country (as was the case with two South Korean presidents Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo in the 1990s), or in the Hague (as was the case with Milosevic).
The arrest of Augusto Pinochet, which was greeted across the world in 1998, impressed many authoritarian leaders. A Russian newspaper, Kommersant Daily, in the days when Yeltsin was accused by the left opposition as a criminal, said that "Pinochet's arrest is a warning to all who think that the borders of their countries will make them immune against justice." The newspaper, with its liberal reputation, also noted not without sarcasm and satisfaction that Castro, whose hatred of Pinochet was well known, not only did not praise the arrest, but was rather upset by the news, because he could face the same fate.
Now the "court scenario" is included in the arsenal of the weapons used by the opposition in non-democratic countries, as did recently the opposition in Uzbekistan, which demanded that Karimov, after Andizhan, be sent to the Dutch capital. It is remarkable that many Russians in the last years have addressed the European court and even to the American president as a last resort for the defense of their rights, as did 70 retired military officers in the Krasnoyarsk region in 2004. Some of these people, as can be seen from the talks on radio station Echo Moskvy, cherish the idea that their politicians and oligarchs also can be found on the docket before foreign judges.
The third scenario is quite risky, but often seen as more tolerable to the leader. It is labeled here as the "flight scenario." It supposes the successful flight of the demoted leader during a rebellion to a foreign country that is ready to accept him or her. The use of a plane or helicopter, as in the case of Akayev's getaway, revolutionized the technology for saving a deposed head of state from rebel forces. After WWII, the heads of all states had personal planes. A personal plane was used by Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in January 1979. In some cases, it is the allies loyal to the deposed leader who send the plane to save him from imminent death or arrest. Ferdinand Marcos, when the masses began to rush into the Malacanang Palace in 1986, took flight in an American plane. In the same way, the Soviets brought a plane to Matyas Racosi, the Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party, in Budapest during the Hungarian revolution in 1956, and to Ayaz Mutalibov, the Azerbaijani president, in 1992; both leaders escaped the armed insurrections. Personal planes, with engines running, await the orders of Putin, Lukashenko, Karimov and Castro.
Contemporary authoritarian leaders are in a much better situation than those leaders who could use only old techniques for the flight from their capital, like the French King Louis the 16th who tried in June 1791 to escape his fate with a carriage (it was stopped halfway to Germany, in Varennes, by a post clerk) and Alexander Kerensky, the first Russian democratic head of state, who succeeded in his getaway from the Bolsheviks only because he was dressed as a woman. We can only speculate how Lenin and his colleagues in July 1918 might have fled when the Bolshevik regime was close to collapse with the offensive of the White armies coming closer and closer to Moscow. It is well known that Yakov Sverdlov, the third figure in the Kremlin, kept foreign passports for himself, his relatives and friends.
The fourth scenario-labeled as the "soft scenario" after the Georgian leader who was ousted by "the rose revolution" in November 2003-supposes the forgiveness of the leader by the rebels and permission to live in his own country, even if no one can be sure that in the future the new authorities will not sue or punish him for his past acts of corruption and crime. Of course, this scenario is quite undesirable in regard to the standard of living of the demoted president, and the attitudes of the authorities to his or her private property and to the private property of his family. The new Georgian authorities, for instance, left Shevardnadze with his villa and promised to pay him a pension of $410, which the former president considered a pittance. It is not even enough for the payment of utilities, which, according to his estimate, costs $800. At the same time, they confiscated the property of his son-in-law.
The Russian Case: Which Scenario Will Putin Choose, or Which one will Choose Him?
In no other post-Soviet or Communist country do all eight scenarios described above circulate with such intensity in the minds of so many people as in Russia. The year 2008 (the presidential election) has created a nervous climate in the country, first of all for ruling political, economic and media elites. It is the result of the high uncertainty surrounding Putin's choice of scenarios, as well as the reaction of foreign countries and the Russian public to his choice. The tension in Russia about 2008, which would have been high without additional events, became even more nervous due to a series of revolutions in the post-Soviet republics. Three presidents have been removed from power in the last two years and one resorted to blood shed to stay in power. There is no doubt that the public debates over the scenarios reflect the arduous mental work of Putin and his staff. At the same time, the prediction of the developments around 2008 is strongly correlated with the views of those who offer the most probable scenario. The pessimistic and optimistic visions of Russia's future, the degree of sobriety or wishful thinking and, of course, the material and political interests of the forecasters are all factors that strongly influence the prediction of the experts and politicians.
Russia today can be seen as an experimental ground to study scenarios for all post-Soviet and Communist countries, taking into account the richness of the available information on this country, where people still enjoy some political freedoms.
The Scenarios that Can Be Imposed on Putin
Let us start with the scenarios that can in no way be chosen by Putin and can occur only in the case of a revolution or coup. All these negative scenarios have been discussed in Russia, even if not as hotly as the scenarios that Putin can choose. A mass revolution, crowned by Ceausescu's fate, is a beloved theme for Communists and nationalists and is considered by liberals as having some likelihood. Radicals dream about the various revolutions that would swipe the regime and eliminate its head. Some of them are confident that "the rotten regime which is kept alive only because it is frozen, will collapse," and this will happen in 6-18 months.
Alexander Prokhanov, in one of his editorials in Zavtra, for which he serves as the editor, characterizes the situation in Russia as "pre-revolutionary." He declared that Putin's head will be "cut off." As Prokhanov asserts, everyone is "against Putin" in Russia, including the "humiliated governors," the oligarchs, the liberal intelligentsia, the nationalists, the West, and the Russian people as a whole. With a sadistic premonition, radicals talk about the "court scenario." Prokhanov proposed that Putin should "prepare himself for the Hague, where he will give a deposition on Chechnia, the explosion of the houses in Moscow, and the fraud involving Yuganskneftegaz" (an oil company that was part of Yukos). Most of those who want to send Putin to the Dutch capital blend their hatred of Putin with their rabid anti-Americanism and prophesize, as they did in the article "The route, the Kremlin, the Hague," that Putin will be sent to prison by the ungrateful Americans, who did the same with their vassal in South Korean, President Roh Tae Woo, and Milosevic. Sergei Dorenko, a journalist with pro Communist sympathies, operates with the "court scenario" and predicts that Putin might be ousted by a sort of revolution and even sent to Magadan, the capital of Stalin's Gulag as a criminal responsible for various crimes including the blood bath in Chechnia. But he also considered the "flight scenario" for Putin, musing over the possibility of Putin's move to Germany or Austria after 2008. As if responding to the media's speculation about his possible flight from the country, Putin recently insisted that he will remain in the country after 2008.
However, the most ardent advocates of the "court scenario" for Putin are not people in Moscow, but in Chechnia, as well as among the people abroad who are furious about the Russian policy in the North Caucasus. Andre Glucksman, a famous French philosopher, after staying illegally for five weeks in Chechnia, told a Russian newspaper that "Milosevic, who committed no more crimes against mankind in Bosnia and Kosovo than Putin in Chechnya, was officially indicted by the international tribunal in the Hague. The same fate may await Putin, or at least the highest echelon of the General Staff." As the Russian newspaper Izvestia informed its readers, only a few days before the summit of European ministers of foreign affairs in May 2005, it was possible to see in Warsaw a "Wanted" poster with Putin's picture on it.
Quite a few Russian liberals also predict a collapse of the regime before 2008, either as a result of mass riots or a coup, without specifying Putin's personal fate. Nikolai Petrov said that Putin's regime will be replaced by another regime that is able to modernize society. Boris Nemtsov predicts a revolution in Russia, but not an "orange" one. He talked about a "brown" revolution, an allusion to the victory of Russian Nazism. Evgenii Kisilev and Dmitry Oreshkin, in an almost friendly manner, warned Putin about the intentions of the "hawks in the power ministries" who want to replace him with "a harsher leader." Even the consistent pro Kremlin analyst Viacheslav Nikonov declared in September 2005 that "he has no doubt about the imminent attempts to depose the regime by non parliamentary methods." It is remarkable that almost half of the Russians, according to the survey of Bashkirova's firm, believed in August 2005 that a coup against Putin's regime is possible.
The Kremlin is Prepared for a Revolution
The Kremlin camp, after the series of "color revolutions" in former Soviet republics and the rebellion in Andijan, considers the eventuality of a revolution quite seriously. The best indicator is Putin's public attitudes toward these revolutions over the last year. In his December 2004 press conference, Putin showed his high irritation with the revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, condemning the idea of "permanent revolution" and preaching, as any ruler who is concerned about losing power, about the importance of law. Eight months later, in September 2005, at a meeting with Western political scientists, Putin continued to fume about the Ukrainian "orange revolution." The participants of the meeting said that Ukraine was a leading emotional issue at their meetings.
Is a revolution possible?
The Kremlin is aware of the high level of polarization in Russian society and the large number of poor people in the country. As the Levada Center's August data showed, 52 percent of the Russians were discontent with the government because of inflation; 41 percent mentioned the low level of social benefits; 36 percent, unemployment; 23 percent, crimes; and 22 percent, corruption. Only 27 percent of the Russians were satisfied in July 2005 with the developments in the country. The mass protest actions of the retired people against the social benefits reforms in January 2005 showed that the famous Russian patience could suddenly vanish.
The Kremlin is concerned that even a weak opposition could instigate an "orange revolution," mainly because of the West's hostility toward Russia. As claimed in a Russian newspaper in an article entitled, "Next stop ... Russia," "If we give up Ukraine this year, next year it will be Russia." The Kremlin is strongly discontent with the Western public and particularly the American critics of its manipulation of democracy. Among other things the Kremlin was irritated by a letter signed by 115 American and European politicians that was highly critical of Putin. Putin was particularly upset with the flow of money coming in to NGOs in Russia from the West. He lambasted these developments at the meeting with Western political scientists in September 2005 and vowed to stop the access of his opponents to these funds.
The Kremlin also does not want to discount the money of local and particularly exiled oligarchs. As a Moscow journalist comments, "Putin has acquired enemies with big money." These enemies also have some political capital in the West, which was revealed in the warm reception of Leonid Nevzlin in the American Senate in July 2005, reminding us of the permanent fears of the Soviet leaders in the first decades after the revolution of the Russian émigrés in Europe. Nevzlin has been mentioned in Russian media as an active supporter of the former prime minister for the position of president. It is remarkable that with the Kremlin's evident support, Sergei Markov, a known pro regime analyst and director of the Institute of Political Research, along with a few other experts, warned society in September 2005 about "the plot of oligarchs." As Moscow observers commented, this move should be considered as an ideological justification of a new assault against big business in the country. A similar ideological action preceded Khodorkovsky's arrest in 2003.
Still, by all accounts, its strategists, along with people from the FSB, attribute a low probability to the chances for a revolution or mass disturbance. Levada's data show that less than a quarter of the population even thinks about participating in a modest protest action. However, in order to be on the safe side and minimize risks as much as possible (the major postulate in the Kremlin's political life), Putin's people are prepared to undertake any measures to prevent such a course of events.
Putin's Playing Cards
The Kremlin regards its guarantee against revolution as based on two things: Putin's high and relatively stable public opinion rating and the unbelievable happy coincidence that oil prices have remained high and continue to rise.
Many Russians are dissatisfied with several aspects of their everyday lives, but they continue to see Putin as the single guarantor of political order and a decent international status for the country. Putin indeed restored to some degree the stability and unity of the country, which crumbled during Yeltsin's times. To the joy of ordinary Russians, he restrained the power of local barons and oligarchs and improved the standard of living in the country. In September 2005, according to the Fund of Public Opinion, 48 percent completely and 30 percent partially trusted the president. This was almost at its highest level in the last two years. Putin is still much more popular than any other politician in the country. Another public opinion firm, the Levada Center, showed that in July 2005 the number of people who would have voted for Putin (36 percent) was six times higher than the second most popular candidate, the Communist, Ziuganov. Asked "why people trust Putin," 42 percent said "no one else can be trusted." At the same time, most Russians are indifferent to Putin's curtailment of democracy in the country. Moreover, even some Westernized intellectuals support the anti-democratic tendencies of Putin's regime ("power is better than the people," suggested the famous liberal Leonid Radzikhovsky); some of them want Putin to be an even harsher leader in order to solve the nation's numerous problems.
High oil prices
The high oil prices are an even more important antidote to revolution. Oil revenues have inundated the state coffers with financial resources never before seen in the country. With these funds, even if the Russian economy developed rather slowly (or not at all, if to ignore the revenue from the extracting industry), the government would be able to mollify a rebellion, such as the protests of retired people against the reforms of social benefits in January 2005. In July 2005, 52 percent of the Russians supported this reform against 33 percent in January 2005.
The capital is not dangerous
The quality of life in Moscow, which is several times higher than in the province, is also very beneficial to the regime and diminishes the threat of revolution. Moscow, with its generous social benefits, escaped the mass protest of retired people in January 2005. All the "color" revolutions, as well as French and Russian revolutions, occurred in the capital cities, including Tbilisi, Kiev and Bishkek. Meanwhile, the stream of oil money has benefited Moscow first and foremost. The number of poor people in this city declined from 26 percent in 2001 to 10 percent in 2005, while the number of "rich" people increased from 16 percent to 28 percent. Forty percent of working Muscovites are heads of offices and firms or the owners of their own businesses. Still, with its policy of minimizing risk in political life, the Kremlin is quite proactive in its determination to avert revolution or dangerous mass disturbances.
The Ideological Strategy: Any Revolution is Bad
The Kremlin's ideological strategy is based on two deeply rooted Russian emotions: the fear of revolution (or any sort of instability in the country) and the hatred of the West.
Putin's ideologues try to exploit the gloomy heritage of the Bolshevik revolution of 1917. In their counterrevolutionary ardor, Putin and his supporters bear some resemblance to the Russian emperors, such as Katherine the Great and Nicolas the First, who were worried that the revolutionary infection-in one case coming from France in 1789, and in the other from Hungary in 1848-could spread to Russia. In both cases, their concerns were unfounded.
The preservation of national unity is an important ideological argument against the enemies of Putin's regime. It is likely that the Caucasian card, which played a crucial role in the installation of Putin in the Kremlin in 1999-2000, can be used in the interest of Putin again. The developments in the North Caucasus in general and particularly in Daghestan (even more than in Chechnia) present, as the Kremlin's emissary in the region Dmitry Kozak noted in a secret report (recently uncovered), a mortal threat to the Russian presence in the region and may bring consequences for the country. A proclamation of a state emergency in this region or even in the whole country would surprise Russians only moderately.
The American card
The core of the Kremlin's ideological strategy is to convince the public that any revolution in Russia will be sponsored by the United States. Putin is presented as a bulwark of Russian patriotism, as the single leader able to confront America's intervention in Russian domestic life and protect what is left of the imperial heritage. This propaganda is addressed mostly to the elites (particularly elites in the military and FSB, as well as other active people), who sizzle with hatred and envy of America. It is directed much less to ordinary people who are generally indifferent to the U.S., and among whom only one third have strong anti-American feelings. At the same time, this anti-American card does not hinder Putin, a great connoisseur of Byzantine politics, from demonstrating, in his contact with the United States, loyal attitudes toward America.
The anti-American strategy is being implemented in two forms. First, the Kremlin and its propagandists use the American critique of the anti-democratic processes in Russia. The Kremlin, however, claims that the United States are not sincere in their critique suggesting that it only reflects a deep American hostility toward Russia.
The Kremlin uses the same "American scare" tactics as the Soviet leaders in the last decades of the USSR. The Kremlin then presented the dissident movement as a totally foreign group. In order to discredit people like Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov, the Kremlin exploited the West's sympathy for these public figures. Today, the opposition is again described by the Kremlin as an agent of the United States. In fact, the Kremlin has gone even farther, insisting that Washington's "obkom" (a reference to the Soviet regional party committee with its dictatorial power over its territory) is determined to run "the operation of the departing president" in their own interests.
The Kremlin exploits any public statement made in the United States that admonishes Russian political life. Some of these statements are so beneficial for the Kremlin that one would imagine that they were made at the request of Putin's staff. It is particularly good for the planners of the 2008 election when an American public figure recommends that the American government should extend to Russia the experience of such youth movements as Ukraine's "Pora," the organization that is, in the opinion of Russian elites and the masses, a creature of the American special services.
Summarizing these views, Vladislav Surkov, one of the most influential figures in Putin's "narrow circle," with his hardly concealed anti-Americanism, lamented "the besieged country" and the danger of the country's disintegration if "the elite does not consolidate around the Kremlin"; he talked about the "fifth column" which evidently serves the U.S. inside Russia and nurtures an overturn of the regime.
The imperial card
Another important part of the Kremlin's propaganda, which is directly connected to anti-Americanism, is the encouragement of imperial feelings in the Russian population. The goal of this propaganda is to present the Kremlin as the protector of Russian imperial interests. The degree of attention to the imperial factor has oscillated over the last decade, depending on the Kremlin's interests. With 2008 on the horizon, the imperial topic has been highlighted by the Kremlin's political technologists, this time with a focus on the post-Soviet space. The Kremlin and its media started to talk about the vital importance for Moscow to claim special rights in the post-Soviet space, use its economic leverage-the price of oil and gas in the first place-to force the leaders to look at Moscow with deference, and to defy the U.S., which tries to oust Russia from this region. Against the background of the factual collapse of the SNG-the Alliance of Independent States-which included initially all former Soviet republics besides the Baltic states, the campaign for the strengthening of the position of Russia has little real political meaning and is mostly propagandistic.
The military card
As an important propagandistic tool for the 2008 election campaign, the Kremlin uses demonstrations of devotion to the Russian army, with Putin at the center of these ideological activities. Each day, Russian TV stations cover army exercises or the testing of new weapons, a big contrast to the TV policy only one year before. The electronic media show how Putin has visited various military installations, ships and military bases, watched various maneuvers, met with generals, soldiers, sailors and took a four hour trip in August 2005 on a strategic bomber, the TU-160.
The common exercises of the Russian and Chinese armies in August were, as a leading Russian newspaper noted, "an unprecedented anti-American action." A known Russian political analyst Fedor Lukianov characterized this action in the same way. These maneuvers should also be considered as a stunt in the pro Putin election strategy. The challenge to the United States during these maneuvers was demonstrated by the participation of 10,000 troops from all the armed forces and the presence of the Russian minister of defense. Putin's political strategy assumed that among the two threats to Russia-one from the United States and one from China-most Russians would see America as a greater evil and therefore would see Putin as a true defender of the motherland.
Practical measures
Along with an ideological campaign aimed at warding off possible revolutions as well as to prop up any scenario chosen by Putin, his staff has undertaken various "material actions." For several years Putin and his team were afraid to spend money from the famous "Stability Fund," which was built up with oil money. The Kremlin is still afraid of a state default, as it happened in 1998, or a steep decline in oil prices. However, in September 2005, Putin decided to use $4 billion from this fund to drastically increase the salaries of doctors, teachers, scholars-almost to the level of state employees-and improve housing and agriculture. This action was considered by most analysts as part of the Duma election campaign in December 2005, as well as part of the presidential campaign.
Another sign of the Kremlin's determination to completely control the regime after 2008 was seen in its toleration of xenophobic and anti-Semitic activities. As stated in the report of the Moscow branch of Human Rights, Russia now contains fifteen thousand nationalist extremists, besides the thousands of skinheads who are ready to join any sort of violent action against non Russians. The fact that 50-60 percent of the Russians support the slogan "Russia for Russians" shows how serious this development is. At the same time, Putin's administration publicly condemns nationalist extremism, presenting itself as the single bulwark against Russian Nazism.
At the same time, seeing the youth as the major motor of the orange revolution in Ukraine, the Kremlin in the last years spent a lot of time and effort in creating youth movements that can be used in the case of an emergency. The youth movement "Ours" is openly controlled by the Kremlin and it enjoys the president's special sympathy. Putin met with its representatives in his country house last summer. Other organizations are in the shadows, such as the wild groups of "fanats" (the fans of various soccer teams) and a youth movement inspired by the aggressive Eurasian ideology, with its strong anti-Western overtones. The movement calls for violence against Putin's enemies. It was headed by Alexander Dugin, a well-known figure in the Moscow political establishment.
While increasing the number of youth organizations under their control the authorities monitor and repress the oppositional youth movements that recently began to mushroom in the country. They pay special attention to the activities of "the national Bolsheviks," the most aggressive of all of them, though it only attracts a tiny minority of young people. In the end of August 2005, pro governmental youth organizations showed their mettle when they rudely attacked the youngsters belonging to the opposition with evident police connivance. Many analysts interpreted the event as the Kremlin's signal to those who plan street actions against the regime.
The Options for Putin: Both the "Forever scenario" and "Clean scenario" are Unlikely
Today, even the toughest of Putin's political foes consider the "forever scenario" unrealistic and nobody thinks that the Kremlin will simply cancel the election. The West is the major reason that such an action would be improbable. In any case, the general consensus is that Putin will choose a scenario that includes democratic procedures. Only a few voices, such as the prominent Russian economist and moderate nationalist Mikhail Deliagin, insist that in order to keep power by all means Putin will cancel the elections in 2008, as Yeltsin almost did in 1996.
At the same time, almost no one, including the people who represent the Kremlin, suppose that Putin will choose the "clean scenario" and follow a purely democratic procedure in 2008. No more than 30 percent of the Russians believed in August 2005 that there would be a "clean election" in 2008. The most ardent deniers of a normal democratic scenario are Putin's aggressive critics among liberals and people on the left. Yulia Latynina, a prominent journalist, suggested that "any project which supposes that after 2008 the president of Russia will not be Vladimir Putin is at odds with a basic instinct of political psychology: nobody lets authoritarian power slip from their hands." Pavel Felgenhouer seconded her, insisting that there is no way that Putin will leave the Kremlin. He gave his article on the future of the Russian presidency the ironic title, "There will be no 2008." These authors are supported by Olga Kryshtanovskaia, the highest Russian authority on elites, who also suggested that by all means Putin will be "number one in whatever armchair he sits."
Several developments in Putin's Russia support the view about the improbability of the "clean scenario." Indeed, Putin eliminated all traces of the division of power. He turned the parliament into a puppet institution, not unlike the Soviet Supreme Council of the past. The judicial system has become as obeisant to Putin as it was to the Soviet masters of the Kremlin. Putin has also reduced the independence of the media, which had been autonomous during the Yeltsin regime. Russian TV is now a direct instrument of the Kremlin. Putin appears on TV no less than 5 to 7 times during a 30-minute news program. In fact, he makes more television appearances than comrade Brezhnev did in the Soviet times. In most cases, the president is portrayed as a great leader who takes care of everything in the country.
The Kremlin managed to reduce to political non entities all Russian politicians who could even remotely be seen as a threat to Putin's absolute political monopoly. The list of political corpses comprises people on the right, such as Nemtsov or Yavlinsky, as well as people in the center and left, such as Primakov, Luzhkov and Ziuganov. He permits nationalist politicians supported by the Kremlin, such as Zhirinovsky and Rogozin, to function only under the Kremlin's conditions. Ultimately, having destroyed all possible rivals, Putin does not need (as recently noted by Boris Nadezhdin, a leader of the "The Union of Right Forces") to rig elections in any form to inflate the number of people who vote or to falsify the results, as was done in the presidential election of 1996, or what is being done regularly in the case of local elections.
Preparation for the Presidential Election in 2008
In the last two years, Putin considered retaining his power in one or another ways after 2008. It is the leading goal of his domestic and foreign policy. The whole attack on "Yukos" and the jailing of its president, Khodorkovsky (2003-2004), was motivated not only by the desire to take control of the revenues of this oil company, which will also be useful for the election campaign, but also to eliminate from the political arena a person who could be an annoyance to Putin's political plans. Putin's determination to minimize the risks associated with Khodorkovsky was revealed by his reaction to a publication of this jailed former oligarch. In this article, Khodorkovsky talked about an imminent shift to the left in Russian society and the bad prospects of the Putin regime. For publishing the article, he was punished by prison authorities who diminished his living conditions. While one year before Putin's fear of the political ambitions of this current inmate of the notorious Moscow prison, "Matrosskaia tishina," looked preposterous, today this is not the case. A Russian TV journalist on the popular station "Ekho Moskvy" named Khodorkovsky as the "single free person in the country" and someone who would have been an excellent presidential candidate.
Another event was the elimination of the former Prime Minister Mikhail Kasiianov from the list of potential rivals. After declaring his willingness to participate in political life, Kasiianov was brought up on corruption charges, an accusation that can be lodged by the Kremlin whenever it wishes. The actions against Kasianov are considered in Moscow as part of the general offensive against "the family" (the Yeltsin clan). The abolishment of gubernatorial elections in 2005 should also be interpreted as a starting point in the journey to allow Putin to become a presidential candidate again. This action makes governors absolutely dependent on Putin. The most important sign of their loyalty will be their uncompromising support for the Kremlin in 2008.
Will Putin follow Yeltsin's Pattern?
Many Russian experts predict that the "heir scenario" will prevail, and feverishly discuss the candidates who may become the heir. Among the most cited successors are the current Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov, the president's emissary in the South Federal District (which includes the North Caucasus) Dmitry Kozak, the governor of Krasnodar, Alexander Tkachev, the head of a Russian railway corporation Vladimir Yakunin and several others. In any case, all the people who have been named as possible heirs by the public have denied that they have been chosen by the president. They are afraid that they will be denigrated by their political rivals before the election.
They are all aware of the Byzantine character of the Kremlin's policy and remember how Yeltsin dropped his candidates for this position one after another (Boris Nemtsov, Sergey Stepashin, Sergey Kiriienko, Nikolai Aksenenko were in this list).
A Version of the "Continuity Scenario"
The "continuity scenario" is very popular in the country. Those who are most loyal to Putin are personally interested in the complete continuity of his regime. Putin's major enemies, who totally mistrust him, are also united in their prediction of this course of events. As Sergey Roy, a political analyst and the editor of the site "Intelligent.ru" formulated, "there is no one, absolutely not one person on what is known as the 'political Mount Olympus' who could outshine Putin in terms of stature, popularity, and record of service to the country."
Many experts and politicians, whatever their attitudes toward Putin, believe that the "continuity scenario" will be modified and transformed into a version that would change the Russian Federation from a presidential to a parliamentary republic. With this development, Putin would take the position of the leader of the party and an omni-powerful prime minister, giving the president, also picked up by him, only a ceremonial role. The union of Russia with Byelorussia, which would demand a new constitution, would allow Putin to be elected as president again. It is possible to imagine that the Kremlin's notorious "political technologists" could invent new tricks to perpetuate Putin's rule, such as an early parliamentary or presidential election. In any case, many Russian politicians and analysts have discussed various options that look more legitimate than a blatant violation of the constitution.
Which Scenario, "heir" or "continuity," is Preferable for Ordinary Russians?
While the clean scenario is doomed, the Kremlin faces a difficult choice between two "dirty scenarios." The "continuity scenario" has a lot of supporters among the major actors in Russian society, including the public and the elites, and probably the president himself.
The population
The position of the Russian public is deeply contradictory. Most Russians are concerned about the future. The majority want stability, even if there are many people who hate stagnation. This position explains why the people voted for an obscure politician in 2000, who was recommended by a despised leader. The masses preferred the continuity of the regime over any other option. As declared by Konstantin Pulikovsky, former commander of the troops in Chechnia and now the presidential emissary of the Far East, "Russians need a tsar, and here is the core of the issue."
The Russians face two alternatives, both of which look unpleasant: a change in the Constitution or a change in leadership. As one expert on public opinion formulated, the "Russians want to leave the president in for a third term and do not want to change the constitution," a sort of Catch 22. The data show that Russians are split on this issue, but have a clear tendency to prefer continuity in the Kremlin. As a leading Russian expert on public opinion mentioned in August 2005, "The Russian public is far from defending to the end an article of the Constitution that bans the third term of presidency." According to data from the Levada Center, 44 percent of the Russians prefer the idea of Putin staying in power, and only 16 percent think that it would be bad for the country; 32 percent think "that it hardly will change something in the country." According to the data produced by another firm, ROMIR, 60 percent of Russians support the idea of a third term for Putin.
The elites
Many members of the economic and political elite have been in a hurry over the last year to show their support for what they see as the most secure position, the "continuity scenario." The analytical report of Alpha Bank, a leading financial institution in the country, is a typical forecast that combines a willingness to demonstrate to the public their complete loyalty to Putin and their belief in what is best for Russian corporations that grovel before the regime. The authors of the report unequivocally begged Putin to choose the Lukashenko strategy and stay in power for a third term, because Putin is "a symbol of stability" and "the best democratic candidate," as suggested by Alexander Lebedev, a known banker, who commented on the report.
The advocacy of the "continuity scenario" by politicians close to Putin already has a long history. One year ago, the Speaker of the Upper House Mironov started several initiatives "from below" to beg the president to stay in power for the sake of the country. In August 2005, lawmakers in two regions (the Far East and St. Petersburg) proposed amendments to the Constitution that would abolish presidential term limits. A leader of the upper house, Yuri A. Sharandin, pretending to keep his distance from this proposal, said that "if this sentiment begins to dominate, it may lead to amending the laws and Constitution of the Russian Federation." Georgii Boos, the vice chairman of the governing party "Unity" declared that Putin is "the single politician in Russia able to govern the country."
The close circle
It is quite remarkable that Putin's close circle (according to one Moscow expert, it contains 175 individuals) is divided between the "heir" and "continuity" scenarios. Many of the Kremlin's residents are "extenders," as a Moscow author named them. As suggested by a leading Moscow political journalist, "under the existing realignment of forces it is easier for the Russian president to stay in power than to leave it, because in the interest of his retinue, he continues to be 'the first guy on the block.'" However, another group, the "legitimists," insists on the advantages of the "heir scenario." A major argument used by Putin's friends who advocate for the observance of the Constitution in 2008 is that it is better to travel to the West for lectures as a private citizen, as Gorbachev does, than stay isolated like Lukashenko in his country.
Putin: A Byzantine Politician
What about Putin himself? What are his plans? By the middle of September 2005, Putin's mind was as enigmatic as it was in the last two years of the debates, speculation and predictions about his future after 2008. He himself sends contradictory signals directly and through his courtiers about his intentions, which are probably part of a well-designed program to guarantee his key role in the country after 2008. In the beginning of August 2005, in an interview he gave in Finland, Putin declared that he is not against serving a third term, but the constitution does not permit it. This statement was considered in Russia as a clear signal of Putin's intentions to stay in power. In August 2005, there were numerous "initiatives" in the country from "below," including the local parliament's appeals to Putin to stay in office. However, one month later, answering questions during his meeting with Western political scientists, Putin apparently rejected this idea and looked very sincere in the eyes of some participants, if to judge from their interviews after the meeting on the subject of Putin's determination to leave "the court." Putin's meetings with foreigners reminds us (in spite of the essential differences between Stalin and Putin) of the encounters of the Soviet leader with prominent Western intellectuals, such as German writers Emil Ludwig (1931) and Leon Feuchtwanger (1937) who also took at face value many of the great leader's statements. It is remarkable, as Novaya Gazeta noted, that Putin's pledge to foreign experts to stay out was conspicuously ignored by the major Russian TV channels, which are directly controlled by the President. The observation of this newspaper was confirmed a few weeks later by Putin's answer to a well prepared question during a TV talk show. One citizen, declaring Putin as "the only leader that has enabled the country to live through a period of stable development," asked him to hold "a referendum on a third presidential term." Putin's answer was quite vague and without denying explicitly his unwillingness to serve the third term only promising that he does not see his job "as being to sit forever in the Kremlin."
However, only a few Russian analysts think that Putin has made up his mind and his intentions will remain intact over the next two and a half years, whatever the events that occur in the country and the world. Russians are accustomed to the habits of their politicians in ignoring reality and changing their views if it is useful for them. Yulia Kalinina, a prominent Russian journalist, characterized the Russian official media and all its highest officials as well as the Duma deputies as all involved in "total lying." The interviews of the pro Putin newspaper Komsomolskaia Pravda with several prominent figures in the country showed that all of them believe that "Potemkinski villages" is an organic part of contemporary Russian life. In light of the dominance of lying in the country (from the Kremlin down to the local authorities), it is preposterous to take at face value, without a critical assessment, the statements of any official in Moscow, including the president.
Putin indeed faces a very difficult choice. The cost of a third term is very high, since he would lose his standing in the West, which is extremely important to him, and much more so than any other Russian leader before him. However, the cost of losing his power in the country is also very high. Very few people would be amazed if Putin, with high reluctance, accepted in one or another ways his supreme role in Russia after 2008. Russians, with their love for history, remember, as noted by a Moscow journalist, that it is possible to expect the Kremlin technologists to persuade Putin to resort to the same trick as Ivan the Terrible. This tsar suddenly left the Kremlin in 1564, moved to the small village Alexandrov and apparently relinquished his power. As recounted by the famous Russian historian Vasilii Kliuchevsky, Moscow elites were quick to react, as Ivan expected, and sent a special delegation to implore the tsar to return to the Kremlin and rule the country "as he wished." The tsar could not resist the tears of the most prominent people in Russia and agreed to return.
Conclusion
A typical authoritarian leader reminds us in some ways of the heroes of Greek tragedies. He knows the terrible fate that awaits him, but does everything necessary to bring it about. When a politician reaches the apex of power in a country without democratic mechanisms, he or she almost immediately begins to prepare his or her own indictment, filling his or her personal record with more and more nasty events each day.
With their records growing worse, the authoritarian leaders lose the desire to leave office, not only because of the pleasures of holding power. The desire to stay in office has strengthened in the last decade, as foreign countries, particularly in the West, ceased to be seen as automatic refuges for leaders who wish to flee their countries.
Today, Russia and the whole world are trying to guess what Putin will do in 2008 when his second term ends, taking into account the fact that the current Constitution does not allow a third term. An assessment of Putin's regime and the possibility of its continuation beyond 2008 from the point of view of Russia's short term and long term national interests as well as from the point of view of the interests of international security go beyond this piece. In the opinion of this author, six of the eight scenarios have a rather low probability in Russia's near future. The two scenarios with the highest probability suppose that Putin, in one way or another, will be the supreme leader of the country after 2008. The United States and the world will have to deal with Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin for several years ahead.
The policy of Western countries toward the authoritarian leaders should take into account the personality of the leader. It is obvious that his or her decisions are based not on the national long-term interests of their countries, but on his or her determination to stay in power by all means. The pressures put on such leaders as well as the help given to the oppositional forces inside the country may bring a change in regimes. This regime shift may, in some cases, be positive for the country and the world, but in other cases may only help the authoritarian leader resort to more violent methods to maintain his power and may even encourage actions that are very dangerous to the world. This generalization is extended also to the policy of development in Russia. In the opinion of this author, the West should restrain its desire to influence the movement of Russia toward true democracy. It is the business first of all of the Russians themselves, including their readiness to accept a continuation of Putin's regime in one form or another.
Acknowledgment: The author wishes to thank Joshua Woods for his editorial contribution to this article.
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