In JRL 9226-2, Anders Åslund has provided a welcome clarification of his provocative view exposed in paper "Putin's Decline and America's Response". I agree with his main statement that Russia will either stop growing economically or abandon its current authoritarian method of governance. Our positions coincide on the point that economic growth is desirable for Russia. However, I disagree with Åslund that only a revolution can break authoritarianism in this country. I find that the Putin Administration is capable to move forward politically. Actually, the whole essence of the Putin's second term is to advance administrative and political reform that is conducive to democracy.

Åslund concentrates on the problem of 2008 that he views as the litmus test for Russian democratic progress. I agree. However, my reading is that the Putin Administration works consistently to ensure democratic transfer of power. This difference is principal because it explains contrasting explanations of the same political processes that Åslund and his opponents - me including - have. I realize that the format of JRL forum does not allow a detailed discussion of this contentious issue but few examples of different interpretation are instructive.

Example 1: administrative centralization. Åslund believes that centralization reduces the ability of the center to correct mistakes. Such belief is based on the assumption that mistakes are made centrally and not locally. I find that this assumption is invalid in the current case. Opinion polls suggest that the Kremlin functions at par or better than local bodies do. Thus, centralization is not indicative of deteriorating quality of policy-making. In fact, the centralization drive appears to be a tactical move aimed at improving local policy-making capacities. It is likely to be reversed as Åslund notes himself referring to oncoming local self-government reform.

Example 2: poor handling of political crises. Åslund does not repeat the four blunders in his current response but he continues to state that the Putin Administration is pathetically inept. My reading of the recent events suggests that the opposite is true. The handling of social reform was appropriate - the government backed down on minor points while preserving the substance (monetization). The mini-sub PR crisis has been resolved successfully. The Beslan crisis might come close as an example of governmental incompetence but it is too area-specific. Åslund needs to come up with additional examples to prove the point.

Example 3: "The all-absorbing focus on 2008". Åslund suggests that the Kremlin is dysfunctional because of its "fear of the people". I am not quite sure what people he means - oligarchs? revolutionaries? - but I do not observe that the Kremlin is obsessed with security measures that should follow if Åslund is right. True, there is systematic dismantling or marginalization of institutions or individuals that may provide a basis for extra-legal power struggle (like establishing oversight over foreign-funded NGOs or Kasyanov case) but they are precautionary measures aimed at preventing recent crises that took place in the near abroad. Certainly, such development would be worrying if the process of creation does not take place simultaneously. Note that there is quite a lot of public activism in Russia today - Public Chamber, youth movements, enhanced role played by political parties - that I would not discount as mere PR events. (Digression: nominating Markov as the head of the Public Chamber gives him an opportunity to launch a political career. Pavlovsky has publicized this idea and the Kremlin is likely to mull it over.) Through such actions, the Putin Administration addresses a dire problem that Russia faces today - high degree of public pessimism and mistrust in political system. Obviously, it conducts experiments that may go wrong but I disagree that one should pronounce them "dysfunctional" at this early stage.

Finally, I concur with Åslund on another point. The Russia's G8 chair is an excellent opportunity for the Western leaders to review the progress that this country has made establishing institutions of free market and democracy. Russia does not qualify to be a full member as it "differs" from the rest in too many respects. However, does it strive to develop similar norms - the respect for human rights, the evidence of free and fair election and the rule of law? The answer to this question should determine whether a revision of the Western policy towards Russia is necessary.