Moderator: Dear colleagues. Welcome to the RIA Novosti Press Club. The topic was prompted by the director and founder of the National Strategy Institute Stanislav Belkovsky: "Shift to the Left, the Khodorkovsky Manifesto and the Kremlin's Real Plans". Stanislav Alexandrovich, you predict that the Kremlin will "veer to the left" in September.

Belkovsky: It's quite probable. It is no secret for anyone of you that the article by Mikhail Khodorkovsky published in Vedomosti last week under the title "A Shift to the Left" has provoked a lively discussion both in Russia and in the world. And of course it has provoked a reaction from the President's administration. As far as I know, the reaction was one of irritation, on the one hand and even of fright, on the other hand. The point is that the President's administration was planning as early as September this year to introduce a series of measures simulating a left turn. The concept of these measures is being intensively developed, has been under development for at least two months.

The idea of a shift to the left in the Kremlin policy, or rather, the idea of a public relations exercise to demonstrate the alleged shift to the left was itself a reaction to the events in late 2004 and early 2005 both in Russia and in the post Soviet space. It means above all the revolution in Ukraine which was in many ways driven by left-wing slogans and sentiments. Whatever may be said about it, the Kremlin analysts understand this fact very well. Then there were popular protests against the monetization of in-kind benefits. Though they were not on a very large scale, they were critical for the Kremlin because the analysts within the Kremlin administration were absolutely sure that such protests were impossible. They expressed this confidence as late as the beginning of the year. And then one should mention the relative success of the left -- the CPRF, the Pensioners' Party and Motherland -- in some regional elections, including the last gubernatorial elections, before they were abolished, in the Nenetsky Okrug.

That was the time when the Kremlin conceived of its counter- revolutionary program. An effort began to create the infrastructure to ensure succession of power in 2008 and to prevent a revolution. And we must state that all this program and the Nashi movement owe their existence to just one person, Viktor Andreyevich Yushchenko, the President of Ukraine. But for his electoral victory the President's administration would have seen no need to create such an infrastructure, and the main internal slogan became the need for correct vote counting. In the case Yanukovich had won at the previous elections in 2004, it would inevitably have happened. So, the unpredictability of events prompted a reaction from the Kremlin and along with a counter-revolutionary program a program of a left turn started to be developed. What does that program consist in?

First, a shift to the left of the President's rhetoric which is expected to take place starting from September and which will play up the slogans of social justice, the creation of a new infrastructure for the protection of the population and, also very important, the start of disbursements from the Stabilization Fund and the copious currency reserves of the Central Bank of Russia.

Secondly, the creation of several more structures similar in terms of the true aim and the mechanism of functioning and control to Nashi. For example, the creation of a front or army in defense of consumers who will, starting from September, terrorize unpopular bureaucrats and oligarchs by a series of "self-implementing" regulations demanding from them serious concessions to Russian citizens as consumers of goods and services. It is very much on the cards that a well-known TV presenter loyal to the Kremlin will head up that organization. A patriotic structure will be created parallel to Motherland because the President's administration has become totally disenchanted with Motherland. It no longer considers it to be its own party or a party that it can control. The events of last Friday and Saturday when a essay by a young writer, Sergei Shergunov, provided grounds for accusing Motherland of links with Khodorkovsky attest to this.

It may be that one of the key figures in this structure designed to replace Motherland will be the People's Artist of Russia, Nikita Sergeyevich Mikhalkov who was seen as a possible successor to Boris Yeltsin at the end of the 1990s and perhaps this is his big break, again because of the growing popularity of the left in Russia and the fact that projects that used to be considered Kremlin projects have got partly out of control. And one cannot rule out the participation of Nashi in social direct actions. There are grounds for thinking that there are shortly to be some changes in personnel designed to emphasize the leftward shift in the policy of the Kremlin. In particular, the resignation of the least popular of current ministers Zurabov, as well as important officials in the Finance Ministry and Ministry of Economic Development and Trade. They will be replaced by people who will be presented to the public opinion as left-wingers although ideologically they will be carbon copies of their predecessors.

And the President's administration also has a plan which has yet to be approved but some of its aspects may be put into practice, the so-called plan of a "simulated revolution". That would bring out huge masses of the people into the streets in order to induce the Kremlin to take certain decisions that are being planned anyway. This will take place within the framework of the front in defense of consumers, Nashi and other elements of the infrastructure of ensuring succession of power. They may for example seal off for three days the building of the Ministry of Health and Social Development and thus cause Mikhail Zurabov to resign. The aim of this system of measures is undoubtedly to hijack left-wing slogans and the left-wing agenda and to prevent the opposition forces, both current and future, to gain broader support because of the aggravation of issues on the agenda of the left, above all, the redistribution of the benefits from the oil boom, the redistribution of the economic fruits of the last five years when oil prices were extremely high. And of course the issue of legitimization of the 1990s privatization, the issue that remains open and until this issue is closed one way or the other, property in Russia will not be legitimate.

In reality, as we see it, the only real measure within the framework of the Kremlin's shift to the left will be the start of disbursements from the Stabilization Fund and the Central Bank currency reserves. One may imagine that part of the resources, about 30 percent of the Stabilization Fund and 20 percent of the Central Bank's reserves will be used, but only a small portion of it will be used for social measures. The bulk will be used to issue credits to big business, above all, those owned by Oleg Deripaska and Alexei Mordashov, the auto enterprises because crediting of the automobile industry appears to be socially oriented. And also credits to export- oriented programs of the metallurgical industry. These enterprises, unconnected with oil, but belonging to the same pool of big businessmen, will be the main beneficiaries of the Kremlin's shift to the left.

In my view these measures of course reflect the Kremlin's awareness that a left shift and a change of the national agenda are objective and are not something thought-up by ill-meaning leaders of the opposition or disgraced oligarchs. But on the other hand, I think that the lack of an answer to these questions in real politics as opposed to the world of political technologies, is very dangerous for the country because the people will demand real answers to the question of social justice in the context of redistribution of the oil revenues, to the question of privatization. And I must say that in parallel to this left shift at the Kremlin, the presidential administration is forging a true project, a national-liberal project based on the United Russia Party. United Russia should become a structure from which a successor to Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin will emerge. And that successor will be a right-winger. There is a whole range of potential successors beginning from Dmitry Nikolayevich Kozak, currently the President's envoy to the Southern Federal District, who in the near future may become an important official in the president's office or the government, to the Krasnoyarsk Governor, Alexander Khloponin. Those people will run during the elections of 2007 and 2008, as devised today, in the fold of United Russia, the helm of it, under the core slogan of "Motherland and Freedom". In other words, a left turn, as performed by the president's office, is rather intended to be a veil of smoke that should allow this project to succeed.

I believe that historically such a project cannot be successful. The only way to avoid answering questions on the leftist agenda, the most topical ones, is aggravating the authoritarian nature of the regime and shifting to totalitarian methods of government, which are impossible because all infrastructure of authoritarianism in Russia, such as the army, special services, ideological organizations, career in which for a substantial share of conformists has a principled nature, is in ruins.

Even the notorious infrastructure aimed at ensuring succession of power in 2007 and 2008, which is being created today, does not call for any social mobility -- true, in the Nashi movement's framework, one may grow, but if one was making his career in the Komsomol and could expect to make a career in the party and could really advance from a cowboy to the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in the mockup structure having been created now by the president's office, this is impossible. One may make one's career for as long as one pleases within the Nashi movement, within United Russia, but this will have nothing to do with any real power, with joining any key posts in any of the power branches.

So, I think that either the Kremlin should itself seriously treat the leftist agenda or we should not underestimate the chances of the opposition which, according to Khodorkovsky's and other forecasts, has good chances to win the elections of 2007 and 2008. Thank you.

Moderator: Thank you. Dear colleagues, we are passing on to your questions. The Zavtra newspaper.

Q: To what extent do the measures you have predicted concerning the utilization of the Stabilization Fund and the gold and hard currency reserve correlate with the growing corporate debt of the Russian Federation? Are they in attempt to offset its growth somewhat, as this debt has by far exceeded the sovereign debt of the Russian Federation?

Belkovsky: Well, the corporate debt has emerged, to a great measure, due to capital outflow, because the main creditors of Russian corporations are offshore firms owned by the owners of the same corporations. It is a form of protection of capital and moving capital out of the country.

As for the resources of the Stabilization Fund, naturally many enterprises purchased by big business, especially in the past years, in particular, car manufacturing enterprises, can hardly make ends meet or struggle to survive. As a result, inexpensive resources are required to keep them afloat, and naturally the stabilization fund's money will be inexpensive resources. Therefore, I proceed from the assumption that those measures will be guided by the interests of big capital, rather than the socially oriented.

Q: Rustavi-2. You have mentioned key figures, but for some reason you have not mentioned Rogozin. In your opinion, what is his part?

Belkovsky: The president's office sees Rogozin as a political dead body. Dmitry Olegovich may think otherwise, but he is wrong. He does not understand the level of cooling down of his recent patrons to him. The Kremlin no longer makes its stake on Rogozin. They are looking for alternative figures, such as by creating an army of consumers led by a TV star, such as bringing Nikita Mikhalkov back into the orbit of potential political leaders.

Q: RIA Novosti. Could you comment on the fact that one of the members of the so-called youth leftist front used to be employed with YUKOS? That front, in particular, united AKM, the Union of Communist Youth and, if I am not mistaken, the Workers Party.

Belkovsky: Perhaps you mean that one of YUKOS employees, Ilya Ponomaryov is a former leader of the youth leftist front. This is not surprising. The thing is that YUKOS, as we know, used to sponsor the Communist Party before the 2003 election and Ilya Ponomaryov was one of those delegated to organizations close to Communists. But as far as I know, that individual, that organization and Khodorkovsky no longer maintain contacts. That is, the youth leftist front is in a somewhat different niche.

Q: But AKM, for example, was not part of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. This makes this cooperation strange.

Belkovsky: You know, the Communist Youth Vanguard (AKM) and the Union of Communist Youth (SKM) used to be satellites of the CPRF. Those ties have now weakened substantially.

Q: The CPRF?

Belkovsky: Yes, sure. No doubt about it.

Q: Polit.ru. What should the existing forces do under the current conditions?

Belkovsky: They should undergo radical personnel and ideological modernization, because in their current shape the Communist Party is just a huge and amorphous body which has lost manageability in many respects just because regional organizations and regional politicians which used to interact with the Communist Party tend to become disillusioned with it as a real political player. Naturally, unless they reshuffle their leaders the Communist Party in its current shape cannot expect to success during the next election, in my opinion. But it is certain that the Communist Party's infrastructure, its potential electors can flow to other forces, and the CPRF brand will be important in some or other way.

As for Rodina, I find that Rogozin is a rather promising figure having a future. He is certainly a charismatic leader. His two key problems are certain dependence on the Kremlin which still exists in Rodina and the need to substantially widen the ideological field where Rogozin is playing. Unless this field is widened, he will be unable to rise to a nation-scale leader.

I cannot rule out that new leftist organizations may be formed, with the participation of liberals of yesterday and today.

Q: Why should Khodorkovsky be interested in that left turn, in your opinion? What is his personal interest? Second, the reshuffle in the Moscow city government, the fact that Shantsev has been moved to Nizhny Novgorod -- are those facts related with any political reshuffle in Moscow?

Belkovsky: In my opinion, Khodorkovsky's interest is becoming a politician. In a situation when he is free from any assets, economic commitments and dependence on the president's office, he has no other choice. We have been able to see the evolution of Khodorkovsky's views in his articles. This has not happened overnight.

As for the fate of Moskovskiye Novosti, I think this project is now in the periphery --

Q: I meant the Moscow authorities.

Belkovsky: Sorry. As for Shantsev, I cannot see any ideological aspects here, his move to Nizhny Novgorod. It's just that in the Nizhny Novgorod region there was a conflict between irreconcilable candidates. One of them, the former governor Khodyrev, had the backing of some influential figures in the Kremlin, while the speaker of the legislative assembly was backed by other influential figures at the Kremlin. As a result, a third figure was put forward, that of Valery Pavlinovich Shantsev. He accepted the appointment -- and it can only be seen as a promotion by a certain stretch -- partly because he was not on either the Kremlin's or Luzhkov's list of successors to the mayor of Moscow.

Moderator: I now invite you to ask questions. You have spoken about the establishment shifting to the left. What is your assessment of the Public Chamber and can this institution be seen as a kind of instrument in bringing about this shift to the left? And who will form the nucleus of that institution, I mean, the Public Chamber?

Belkovsky: The nucleus will be formed by the people and representatives of the structures who took part in the recent meeting with President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin --

Moderator: Including Mikhalkov --

Belkovsky: Last week. I doubt that it will be an instrument to bring about the shift to the left because the Public Chamber is not a political organ but an organ called upon to review the decisions of the administration and to give it advice. As we know, there is not much need for advice. The establishment does have an ideology, a clear program of actions and it only needs advice to the extent that it fits into its action program.

Q: How well grounded are the accusations leveled by the United Russia against the Motherland of financial links with Khodorkovsky?

Belkovsky: Well, so far the only proof United Russia has provided of such links is the article by Sergei Shergunov in the newspaper NG-Ex Libris. I have read this essay and I did come across some turns of phrase that attest to sympathy for the author of A Shift to the Left, but no more. It was not a political essay.

I don't think there is at present such a connection and it is hardly possible in the coming years because you shouldn't overestimate the current financial resources of Khodorkovsky and the chances of building a funding scheme with his participation. I would say that Khodorkovsky may be useful to the left camp as a political figure rather than as a sponsor.

Q: What is the role of the present Defense Minister in the real shift of the Kremlin's policy to the left? In the light of the events of the past few days.

Belkovsky: I don't see any special role of the Defense Minister in the political shift to the left because Defense Minister Sergei Borisovich Ivanov is faced with a colossal challenge of keeping under the control the army in which there is growing discontent. The officer corps today consists of people who are apathetic and are trying to get discharged from the army. And those who stay in the army are, in their majority, unhappy about the military reform and the presidential policy with regard to the military. This situation is very difficult to keep under control, especially since no meaningful political measures aimed at changing military policy are in the offing. I think that Sergei Borisovich is too busy now with military policy and military reform. And the probability that he would become the successor to Vladimir Vladimirovich is diminishing year by year, today he is no longer among the favorites.

Q: What will be the economic consequences of the Kremlin's behavior, that is, if it starts spending the Stabilization Fund? I mean other than inflation.

Belkovsky: I am not an economist, and it is hard for me to give a detailed answer to this question. I can only say that in my opinion the use of the Stabilization Fund will only take the shape of long-term cheap credits. That will definitely spur inflation. But the government will still have some die-hard monetarists who will not be busy bringing about a shift to the left and will combat inflation instead. And it is the manner in which the government will continue to muddle through. Therefore, there will be no other social measures, I mean handing out money to the people. I am absolutely sure of that. At least it won't happen until the Kremlin senses a potential threat of massive popular unrest. And it will be some time before it senses it, certainly it won't happen this year or next year.

Q: You have mentioned that new left-wing projects headed by former liberals may come into existence. What do you have in mind and who would finance these projects?

Belkovsky: I don't mean that there will be new left-wing projects with former liberals at the head, but former liberals may either make a rapid shift to the left or become integrated with some coalitions of traditional left-wing forces. I don't think there is an answer to the question how that would be financed, but money always flows into political projects that appear to be successful. If these projects attract real attention and gain real political support, especially in the regions, money will always be forthcoming. In fact, I don't think money is the key factor in politics, especially at crucial historical moment. We remember, for example, that in Ukraine money did not play a significant part. So, I think that such figures as Vladimir Ryzhkov or Irina Khakamada may move to the left in the foreseeable future. And I think that part of Yabloko may shift to the left breaking off from its mother structure. As for the Union of Rights forces, it will not move to the left, on the contrary, it will dig in in the niche which is occupies now.

Q: May the shift of the establishment to the left bring a change to the issue of recognition or non-recognition of the unrecognized states that neighbor on Russia in order to gain popular support? Do you see a possibility that these states may become part of Russia?

Belkovsky: No, they may not become part of Russia. Russia's policy -- well, as regards Transdniestria, the initiative belongs to Ukraine and the Yushchenko plan will, reluctantly, be adopted by Transdniestria. The plan envisages a de facto change of power in Transdniestria and its integration into Moldova. On that issue, Russia has lost the political initiative, not today, but three years ago when it put its stake on Vladimir Voronin, the president of Moldova, and effectively joined the political blockade of Transdniestria.

As for Abkhazia and South Ossetia, because the Kremlin does not have a strategic recipe regarding what to do, the administration will seek to maintain the status quo, not to rock the boat. Obviously, Russia will not take any decisive steps to incorporate these unrecognized states. Even if such statements are made, they are likely to be made not by official representatives of the Kremlin, but rather by politicians traditionally used by the President's administration to test the waters, such as Vladimir Zhirinovsky.

Q: We have touched upon the issue of the post-Soviet space, and my question is somewhat marginal to the topic. Russia's relations with the Baltic countries have seriously deteriorated. How will they develop in the future? And what do you think about the demand for a multi-billion compensation for the damage caused by the so-called "Soviet occupation"?

Belkovsky: The nationalist upsurge that created the Baltic states in 1990-1991 has spent itself. So, it is obvious that the political elites in these countries need new ideological schemes to provide grounds for national mobilization.

In fact, political demands concerning compensation are absolutely senseless. This lets them provoke, so to say aggressive reaction of the Europeans and then make those nations close their ranks against Russia, thus legitimizing the current political elite in those countries and letting them avoid the issue of modernization of political elites, which is ripe in the Baltic countries like it is ripe in Russia and most post-Soviet countries. Therefore, this is the card the current elites will continue to use for several years, but this will not lead to any performance of those commitments.

As for Russia's policy regarding the Baltics, I believe that Russia has always had economic levers sufficient for putting pressure on the Baltics to attain certain political results, even though those levers tend to weaken. In fact, they have never been used, because many in Russia's ruling elite, primarily big business and bureaucracy, have been interested a lot in having offshore mechanisms, so to say, and in having mechanisms for supplies of raw commodities via the Baltic countries.

This explains why there was rhetoric in some places, while real economic interests were in different places. In particular, a huge number of accounts of our major business people and bureaucrats have been opened with Latvian banks. Clearly, this is a serious lever for Latvia's influence on Russia, because at any moment Latvia can disclose this information absolutely unofficially, not on its own behalf. There are mechanisms of disclosure.

Therefore, I think that the process of interaction will be a sluggish schizophrenic process and will mostly belong to public relations, rather than real politics. In real politics, there is just one problem Russia should deal with and it has not actually dealt with. It is the problem of the numerous Russian-speaking population of Latvia which has virtually been rejected in that country, stripped of the ability to study in Russian. They are virtually driving them out of Latvia. This would be real politics, rather than PR campaigns. This problem cannot be resolved without Russia's assistance. But Russia has been lagging behind for reasons I have mentioned.

Q: Will border agreements be signed with Estonia and Latvia in the foreseeable future?

Belkovsky: Perhaps, yes, if this meets some interests, if the United States or the EU ask Russia to do this, if this fits in some swap system whose content we will never know to the end. It is the same as in Georgia, when a year ago it was stated that eleven years and $55 million will be required for moving Russian bases out of that country. Those bases will now be moved out within three years and will virtually require no funding. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that those agreements will be signed, despite the current rhetoric.

Moderator: In your opinion, Sergei Ivanov is not the odds-on candidate in the presidential race. Who could be a real candidate?

Belkovsky: In my opinion, the president tends to choose a candidate adhering to rightist, national liberal views, who would be bred within United Russia and represent that party during the election. That is a range from Dmitry Kozak to Alexander Khloponin. But as a political situation is unlikely to be inert in the coming three years, the current list is not exhaustive. In fact, it can radically change.

Q: Energy Intelligence Group. You mentioned the veil of smoke which is intended for disguising another project. Was its goal attaining particular results and strengthening Russia's position in post-Soviet space? Cannot it be that it has nothing to do with it?

Second, you said there will be certain organizations formed to directly combat oligarchy and bureaucracy. Again, is it a veil? Is it political rhetoric? Anyway, if there was an attack on Khodorkovsky and YUKOS, will anything else follow? How long will they try to convince us that the authorities' attitude to everyone is equally fair? In fact, YUKOS was not alone. Other companies did the same. Why has it happened to one company?

Belkovsky: There will never be an answer to this question, even if for that reason that key figures in that system will not be hurt. True, certain bureaucrats will be chosen as victims, those they intended to dismiss for other reasons, as well as business people who have displeased the president's inner circle. They will not be top rank oligarchs. Anyway, people like Roman Abramovich, Mikhail Fridman, Oleg Deripaska or Vladimir Potanin will not be among them. There are people who have displeased the president, including in St. Petersburg. Perhaps the attack will be against them.

As for answers to questions, I agree about the post-Soviet space. This does not have anything to do with the post-Soviet space because after Abkhazia, after Ukraine and even Kyrgyzstan, even though the revolution there did not look like the Kremlin's defeat, the Kremlin decided to focus on domestic problems. It now proceeds from the assumption that Russia does not have sufficient resources for retaining its moderator status in the post-Soviet space. True, certain attempts will be made, such as to take revenge in Ukraine this fall, but they will not lead anywhere. They will be sporadic, not systematic, and there is no key political entity that could guarantee this revenge. Even though at the level of rhetoric, such attempts will be made.

As for actual answers to actual questions, I have said at the beginning that the country, the public really need those answers. It is only possible to avoid giving answers by toughening the authoritarian nature of the regime, but required infrastructure is lacking. There is no Stalin, there is no Soviet Communist Party, there is no system of security bodies. There is nothing that would let them tighten the bolts to the level when they need not answer questions asked by the people or may answer them as they please. This is no longer possible.

Anyway, they will have to provide answers. If Vladimir Putin's successors do this, this will be beneficial for them. If they are not ready to do this, opposition forces will do it. This is why I believe that the project launched under the United Russia aegis is doomed. Even if they manage to ensure political succession in 2008, the life of the successor will be shorter than provided for by the Constitution.

Q: Radio Liberty. In your opinion, will policy change in the North Caucasus, in particular the Chechen Republic, if the left opposition comes to power in 2008? Another one. Communists ruled Russia, the Soviet Union, for 70 years. Putin's policy is now in line with that of the West. This cannot please Russia as Communists cannot please it. Where will Russia go, as a result?

Belkovsky: You know, history is a dynamic process. There have never been rulers who would rule forever or who would please everyone. Certain forces work in history. It would be wrong to say that Communists cannot please. Why? They used to please. Before the 1980s, it was a very stable and really popular regime. It's just that it gradually degraded, like any regime, its intellectual and moral elite degraded. It used up its historic resources and collapsed.

It's the same with Boris Yeltsin who was very popular, even if briefly. He came to power in 1991 on the wave of immense popularity. Vladimir Putin, when he came to power, was very popular. Therefore, the problem is what historic resources this or that regime has.

There are always cycles in history, the need for change of paradigms. People voted for Putin because he was anti-Yeltsin, different from Yeltsin even in his image, not so much rhetoric. He was young, handsome and strong, while the country was sick and tired of having a sick president, of knowing little of whether he is dead or alive.

So there is a different agenda at various moments in history. Those who can answer questions on the agenda, say, Lenin, who issued a decree on peace and a decree on land, win.

Naturally, each area has its historic specifics. Paternalism has always been very strong in Russia throughout its thousand years of history. This fact cannot be neglected when shaping up any policy. Naturally, Russia developed and emerged as an empire, and this cannot be discounted either. As for concrete ideological and political programs, they alternate in history, and the one that wins corresponds more to the modern times and its challenges.

Moderator: And could you speak in more detail about the attitude to Chechnya?

Belkovsky: First of all, when we speak about a left national agenda, we do not mean concrete winners and it could be different winners. As far as I see it today, neither the CPRF nor the Motherland have a meaningful program on Chechnya because previously there was a commitment to destroying the separatists, but later, when Vladimir Putin came to be associated with the destruction of separatists, the position of the left softened up a great deal.

I think that whoever comes to power and whatever the platform of the left will be, the only recipe for keeping Chechnya within Russia is changing the nature of policy. In Chechnya, a transition to a parliamentary republic and a certain balance of interests instead of putting a stake on one clan which pretends, first, that it controls Chechnya, and that is not true, and secondly pretends to be loyal to Russia and under the Kremlin's control, which is also not true. More than a year ago, the National Strategy Institute prepared a corresponding concept, and I think it was presented in this very auditorium in May of last year. We hope that the next administration will find this concept useful.

Besides, one should not forget that we expect the situation in Dagestan to take a turn for the worse soon. And not only Chechnya, but Dagestan will be the number one problem for the current administration and in the process of transfer of power.

Moderator: In conclusion, we would like to know your forecast for the near term. Will the left shift of the authorities become real for us by the end of year?

Belkovsky: I have already covered most of the ground. I think we will feel a shift to the left if the Kremlin for some reason does not abandon its plan at the last moment.

Q: Could you say if the Kremlin's shift to the left will make a difference to its foreign policy? Perhaps there will be a rapprochement with the former left-wing bloc countries, for example, Vietnam, Cuba, possibly China. In fact, the relations with China are close in any way.

Belkovsky: Yes, at the PR level, the answer is yes. I think there may be more frequent meetings between President Putin and such die-hard leftists as the President of Venezuela. He is the main symbol now and the architects of the Kremlin's shift to the left are taking a leaf from his notebook, because he decided to spend Venezuela's currency reserves accumulated during the oil boom. But it will have nothing to do with real geopolitics because the key partners of Russia, not at the level of PR, but in reality, will still be the United States and the countries of Old Europe. This is linked with the vital interests of Russia's ruling class. Because the answer to the happiness of the ruling class is not in the Venezuelan banks.

Q: As an expert who, I remember, said once that you adhere to left-wing views, what personality or party are you working for as a PR expert?

Belkovsky: I have not yet made up my mind who I am going to work for as a PR expert because I don't know who the personality will be. A politician is not brought to power by PR or political technologies, he is brought to power by the course of history. Just like last year it was clear to me that Viktor Yushchenko would become president simply because it was dictated by the course of history and a whole set of fundamental characteristics that ran counter to the plans of the spin doctors.

Today I think Rogozin has some political potential, I even see that Khodorkovsky has some political potential, but I have no way of telling whether that potential will be realized and in my view the panel or circle of real politicians who can aspire to power on the left side of the spectrum will not become clear until the fall of 2006. That is the time I think it will take for such a circle to be formed.

It's another question that the winners, all the same, will be those Putin successors or opponents who will offer a realistic and not token answer to the question of the left-wing agenda. And whoever I cooperate with, it is not I who will determine the winner. The winner will be determined by history and by the extent to which a candidate meets the requirements of history.

Moderator: Thank you for this interesting conversation.

Belkovsky: Thank you.