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RIA Novosti
April 11, 2005
RUSSIA-EU RELATIONS: THE CONTEMPORARY SITUATION AND PROSPECTS

MOSCOW, RIA Novosti. -- Russia-EU relations are currently contradictory and even in a critical condition, as serious political differences and tough economic competition go hand in hand with a cooperation program designed to ensure that Russia accepts European rules and norms.

What is the real scale of Russia-EU interdependence and cooperation? How will relations develop in the future? And could Russia become a EU member in the future?

In a bid to answer these questions, the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy, the Institute of Strategic Assessments and Analysis, the editorial board of the magazine Russia in Global Politics, and Aeroflot organized an analysis entitled Russia and the European Union: the Contemporary Situation and Prospects. Leading Russian experts on relations with the EU, representatives of the relevant ministries and agencies (the presidential administration, the ministries of foreign affairs, economic development and trade, transport) and businessmen contributed to the document.

The main problem of Russian policy on Europe is that Russia does not have a strategic vision of its place in Europe. The declared "European choice" is not being implemented in practice either in foreign or domestic policy. The whole complex of steps with regard to the EU suffers from the lack of a strategic dimension and to a greater extent from poor administrative execution.

Russia may repeat past mistakes, replacing specific projects with widely publicized declarations, for which partners may demand unilateral concessions.

This scenario may take the form of a series of agreements on the four common spaces between Russia and the EU (a common economic space, a common space in the field of external security, a common space of freedom, security and justice, and a common space of research, education and culture). Russia should not be in a hurry to sign formal agreements on these spaces, particularly if specific concessions, and not strategic areas of cooperation, are at stake.

Instead, efforts should be concentrated on drafting a new "major" Russia-EU agreement to replace the 1994 Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation. Even now, Russia should develop an internal working mechanism for drafting its own model of the new founding document to avoid having to react to a version that has already been prepared and is on the table.

In addition, Russia should dampen its enthusiasm for relations with the EU for a while to preclude unrealistic expectations and hence disappointment. It should pay greater attention to projects on a lower, practical level, which will allow the sides to bring the formal cooperation framework into line with its real political and economic indices. This will allow Russia and the EU to return to developing a higher level of integration virtually from scratch, not from the current negative state.

There are currently no objectively insurmountable obstacles to raising the question of Russia's accession to the EU. The solution of this issue depends, above all, on the evolution of the European Union (a federative "quasi-state" or a social and economic union with a certain foreign-policy and defense component) and Russia's development (authoritarian stagnation or confidently developing democracy).

Both Russia and Europe put forward arguments about Russia's "special mindset," its vast size and relative economic backwardness to justify the hypothetical impossibility of the country joining the EU. These claims are true, but they should not be seen as the absolute truth. Many countries that have joined or are joining the EU have lower economic growth indices or a mindset that starkly differs from conventional "European" thinking (Turkey is a case in point). The argument about size is hardly important in the modern communication era and is counterbalanced by Russia's resources.

Not only economic relations but also geopolitical and cultural realities should prompt Russia to make its choice in favor of closer relations with the EU. It will be hard for the country to develop and even survive on its own in the current and future environments. The south is becoming increasingly unstable, while a close alliance with China is hardly possible for a number of reasons. Most, if not all western and southwestern countries of the former USSR are joining or will join the Euro-Atlantic zone or the EU's zone of attraction. Within the next two to four years, Ukraine will most likely join NATO and start the negotiating process on joining the EU. Moldova and probably, after political changes, Belarus will do the same.

Moreover, considering the grave demographic crisis in Russia and the growing scientific and technological gap between it and advanced countries, its role as an independent global center of force will inevitably decline.

The specifics of Russia-EU economic cooperation are as complex as the politics of cooperation. At present, the EU accounts for 48.6% of Russia's foreign trade. At the same time, the absolute majority of Russia's exports are energy resources and direct derivatives. Russia accounts for 7.6 % of the EU's aggregate imports and 4.4% of aggregate exports. Russia is the EU's fifth largest trade partner after the USA, Switzerland, China and Japan. Although this asymmetry in trade is markedly limiting bilateral relations even now, Russia objectively needs not so much to reduce the EU's total share in foreign trade as to diversify exports and develop other directions, including for traditional commodities.

The structure of Russian exports to the EU market currently reflects and corresponds to the real competitiveness of Russian products. Moreover, Russia traditionally exports oil and gas to EU countries, which acts as a kind of "an airbag" against a potential aggravation of political relations. However, this is not enough to expand relations with the EU. Broadening the range of goods and changing the correlation between individual items are only possible if more competitive goods and services are produced in Russia.

For their part, EU countries are not displaying any great interest in expanding the range of Russian exports. They see Russia, and will continue seeing it in the medium term, as simply a source of raw materials. Russia must make every effort to dispel this stereotype.

The Kaliningrad problem, which concerns transit and the freedom of movement, cannot be solved if the problem of the freedom of movement between Russia and the EU as a whole is left undecided. A model of signing a special agreement providing for exemptions from the Schengen Agreement and abolishing transit visas is out of the question.

Generally speaking, continued ambiguity and differences in the approaches and in Russia-EU relations are unacceptable, as they are detrimental to the future of Russia and Europe and their political-economic relations. Russia should develop its own strategic agenda for relations with the EU and reform the system of cooperation. Russia needs self-determination with regard to the strategic aims of cooperation with the EU, a new Europe and its political culture.

Furthermore, even now and under any scenario for the development of bilateral relations, Russia needs to significantly strengthen "the European" dimension of its state apparatus and start implementing a serious program to ensure it knows more about the EU and find ways of practical cooperation with it.

At the same time, the Russian side should not sign any binding agreements with the EU in the next two or three years. The country should explain to its European partners that, in the current conditions and considering the need to draft a new Russia-EU agreement, it would be impractical to rush individual agreements, and even more so a package of agreements on the common spaces.