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Azerbaijanskie Izvestia
October 14, 2004
Between “Good” and “Bad” Separatists
A dialogue with Nikolai Zlobin and Vladislav Inozemtsev
Two prominent American and Russian political scientists reflect on why Russia isn’t working harder to bring stability to the Caucasus region.

Recent events have again sparked discussion about what needs to be done to ensure peace and stability in the greater Caucasus region. A combination of approaches has been proposed and debate has focused on what the countries of the region need to do. In Germany, for example, support has again been voiced for concluding the so-called Stability Pact. The idea of the pact was advanced five years ago, first by Geydar Aliev, president of Azerbaijan, and later by the former president of Turkey, Suleyman Demirel. However, observers sense that Russia is in no hurry to negotiate a comprehensive peace in the region and is declining to act accordingly with other key players. These issues were the topic of discussion at a round table organized by Azerbaijanskie Izvestia’s Moscow bureau. Nikolai Zlobin, senior fellow and director of Russian and Eurasian Programs at the Center for Defense Information, and Vladislav Inozemtsev, director of the Center for Research of Post-Industrial Society and editor-in-chief of the Russian magazine Svobodnaya Mysl’ XXII, answered questions put to them by Yevgenia Verlina.

Do you agree with the assertion that Russia has been given a carte blanche in the Caucasus; in the sense that without its participation, no system for securing the region’s stability and security is realizable?

Zlobin: A very advantageous situation has developed externally in the Caucasus for Russia, in the sense that Moscow truly has the deciding voice. It decides whom to invite or not to invite to resolve the smoldering conflicts there. Without Russia’s “permission” no one may enter the region. And no one in the world knows how to overcome Russia’s veto, how to obtain Moscow’s approval for the entry of NATO, America or any other players. On the other hand, no one is willing to risk compromising good relations with Russia over the Caucasus. In contrast to the Balkans, where at the signing of the Dayton Agreement in 1999 a group of more or less equal participants in the peace process gathered, such is not the case in the Caucasus. Regardless which country you consider, Russia is the leading player. And it isn’t willing to give up its role as principal operator in the region to anyone. So, I don’t see any possibility of internationalizing the settlement of the Caucasus issues, if Russia doesn’t want this.

How did such a situation come about?

Zlobin: I believe you have to look to the USSR’s final days for the answer. At the beginning of the 1990s, an informal pact was concluded between Moscow and the West. This agreement established Russia as the dominant power in the Caucasus region, provided that it maintain stability, peace and security there. Now, however, this pact is subjected to ever mounting skepticism in the West, because there is a growing sense that Russia has failed to meet its obligations. First, as a result of Russia’s sole presence the Caucasus has not remained stable. Second, Russia seems to be interested in somehow maintaining the status quo. By declaring loyalty to the territorial integrity and unity of the region, Russia, in my view, is indeed interested in keeping these nations divided. This, after all, allows for a policy of playing on contradictions to persist, and I consider this rather primitive and short-sighted.

Are “good” and “bad” separatists the pawns in this game?

Zlobin: Yes, it turns out that they are. The “good” ones are welcomed, while the “bad” ones are engaged in battle. And here we face the main reason why Russia will never accept a multilateral guarantee of stability in the region. Russia is willing to settle conflict in the Caucasus on its own terms and no one else’s.

The erosion of established international standards is hurting Russia

Mr. Inozemtsev, with respect to this, as an economist, do you think that Moscow’s control over the region if this control does indeed exist is in some way useful for Russia in economic terms?

Inozemtsev: As Nikolai has correctly stated, it is more of a political rather than economic problem. The fact is that ideologues of Russian politics have in contrast to, say, their American counterparts demonstrated ineptitude over the past decade at finding new approaches. With this, I don’t want to justify America’s invasion of Iraq or evaluate how successful Europe’s integration has been. But, one way or another, these approaches highlight the West’s consistency, its determination to refuse doctrinaire approaches to the inviolability of a nation’s sovereignty, to the issues of integration, etc. Russia is currently experiencing a condition of “duality.” On the one hand, it is making clear that it doesn’t really recognize Georgia’s sovereignty in the Caucasus or Azerbaijan’s sovereignty over the Karabakh region. At the same time, however, Russia is seeking to remain within the bounds of decorum. That is, these new “bodies” are recognized de-facto, but simultaneously Russia is reluctant to do this openly. Going by purely pragmatic reasoning, holding a direct referendum on Abkhazia’s accession to Russia, for instance, and Moscow straightforwardly addressing this issue would be a much more honest approach than the current situation. Yes, it may possibly lead to conflict, but it would, in any event, stimulate some kind of movement forward. If Russia wants Bush to speak with Tbilisi with Moscow’s permission, then logically Moscow should speak with Sukhimi with Tbilisi’s approval. That is, the approaches should mirror one another. You have to always remain consistent. If you don’t recognize Georgia’s sovereignty over Abkhazia, then unite it with Russia; make Abkhazia the 90th subject of the Federation and on its behalf, negotiate with the Georgians for a settlement of the conflict. Or don’t do this, but also don’t support the Abkhazians. The ambiguity today is very dangerous.

Why is this so?

Inozemtsev: The fact is that in the end established international standards and norms in Russia are being eroded, which consequently hurts Russia itself.

Zlobin: The situation is really somewhat peculiar. After all, for a long time there was talk that Abkhazia wanted independence from Georgia. Both the Abkhazian and the Russian sides periodically speak about this. Now you get the feeling that it is no longer a matter of Abkhazia’s sovereignty, but its becoming a part of Russia. But this is a fundamentally different issue. Abkhazians have started to receive Russian passports, that is, they have begun getting Russian citizenship. U.S. policy, Americans reason, should be corrected accordingly. That is, relevant U.S. authorities now must take into consideration that some people holding Russian passports are almost certainly not Russian citizens. The question then arises: in such conditions, how do you control the sale of weapons, the creation of terrorist networks, people traveling with Russian passports? And then questions arise for the Russian authorities, too. What authority will these “citizens” pay their taxes to? Who will represent them in public office? And, in the end, what is Abkhazia’s status anyway? Is it a formation moving toward Russia but still a part of Georgia? Or is it something else? And the distribution of Russian passports appears to be happening in South Ossetia as well. But even if all Abkhazia’s leaders obtained Russian passports, then what? Would you consider the transfer of arms by Russia to Abkhazia a kind of expansion of the Russian army’s defense forces? These issues seriously concern Americans. It’s not an issue of who will influence the region, The United States or Russia. It’s an issue of dangers arising from the emergence of disorderly regions. Hence, I don’t think the United States will leave Russia alone in this matter.

Stubbornly saying “no,” leads you down a dead end

And if these “self-made governing entities” decided to join non-proliferation regimes and other international treaties, would the global community’s concerns then be mollified?

Zlobin: From an international legal perspective, Abkhazia, for instance, could do this only if it were part of Georgia. After all, only nation-states can administer certain non-proliferation regimes. That’s the problem.

What if nation-states are not allowed to do this?

Zlobin: Then they should be helped. For example, if Pakistan is not able to monitor one of its provinces where terrorists are hiding, then of course the world community should be interested in helping it gain control over this province. In the Caucasus we see a different situation developing. From a formal international legal viewpoint, Russia is hindering Georgia from maintaining control over Abkhazia. In general, the whole non-proliferation monitoring system has collapsed, and in the wake of the Cold War we are not prepared even conceptually to put forward a new monitoring system. Here’s one example. An agreement concluded between the US and the USSR exists that prohibits the production of intermediate-range missiles, which Russia still observes today. But no one else signed this agreement. Who ever can produce such missiles does so actively. But, according to their agreement, Moscow and Washington cannot do this. So the question now arises who will be the first to breech the agreement. I believe Moscow could likely be the first one, and by doing so would be viewed positively by Washington. Russia may deploy its missiles in Europe to Asia and the Caucasus region. I’m citing this as an example that again illustrates the fact that the non-proliferation monitoring system no longer works.

What do you think about the Russian leadership’s recently announced intentions to carry out preventive strikes against terrorist networks in any part of the world?

Inozemtsev: My answer is emphatic: Russia is impotent in terms of military strength. So, there can be no talk of carrying out strikes. But I want to address something different here, namely the art of diplomacy. Russia has certain economic interests in Abkhazia; for example, properties owned by large financial and industrial conglomerates. But from a legal point of view, it’s obvious that the privatization that took place in Abkhazia had no legal basis, including the sale of these properties. In other words, if Georgia regains full sovereignty over Abkhazia, all this will be deemed unlawful and Russian business will suffer considerable losses. From here you can assume that certain business circles will push for measures by the Russian leadership to ensure that a rollback of privatization doesn’t happen. But why don’t the Russians use diplomacy to address this problem and start a dialogue with Tbilisi? You recognize the results of Abkhazia’s privatization and we will recognize your sovereignty over the region. At the same time, Russians should make clear that they will help establish Georgia’s sovereignty, but only provided that this happens peacefully. This is a normal scenario, if you want to settle something in a peaceful manner. If you stubbornly shake your head and say ‘no’, then the path will lead to a dead end, similar to the “strong arm” method.

Going back to my previous question, what do you think about the potential effect of Russia’s “preventative strikes”…?

Zlobin: If in this case you are speaking about Georgia for example, the Pankissky George then this would be a highly irresponsible decision.

And if it were an attack with precision-guided weapons targeting Georgian territory?

Zlobin: I don’t see any reason to assume that events will develop in that direction. It’s impossible. In contrast to Bin Laden, who assailed the United States, Georgia did not attack Russia.

Russia’s biggest misfortune is its tendency to hold grudges

Let’s turn once again to the economy. Why would it be so bad for Russia if the West strengthened its presence in the Caucasus?

Inozemtsev: For Moscow, it isn’t so important whether the region is stable or not, rather who stabilizes it. If this is done by, say, the Americans, Russia will perceive this as extremely humiliating, a reason for feeling inadequate, proof of our government’s complete failure to get something accomplished. By leaving the region, we loose nothing in terms of national security. However, we do loose in terms of self-esteem and experience. After all, Russia’s biggest misfortune is that it has a tendency to hold a grudge because when the country’s borders shrink, so too does its influence.

Zlobin: I would pose the question differently. Except for Russia, no one is rushing in to stabilize this region. Who needs to? After all, if something happens there, Russia will be stung most severely, not America or Western Europe. Therefore, no one can understand why Russia doesn’t work more seriously toward stability in the region. Yes, the U.S. will enter the Caucasus if it becomes critically necessary to do so. But why on earth would you go in with the sole purpose of clashing with Russia? After all, another issue is America’s miniscule understanding of the region. There is no other country in the world that knows as much about the region as Russia. The Americans entered Iraq and most of the mistakes they made came from their lack of knowledge of the region. So, if the Americans were to arrive suddenly in the Caucasus, they would destabilize the region due to their ignorance of the local customs, history and mentality. Thus, you have to ask not only what will happen if Russia leaves the region but also, who is capable of entering the region? For the most part, there are no takers. Thus, a more logical expectation is that, Russia, recognizing this vital necessity, will finally engage the region; not for the sake of trivial interests, or to come to the rescue of the local elite that’s loyal to Moscow, or because of any property interests; but to do so as a matter of course in global politics. If in the end Russia really is unable to do this, if she finally discredits herself as a participant in the stabilization process, then someone will of course enter the region. And Russia will loose out, which is something the Kremlin should be concerned about.

In your view, why doesn’t Russia want to cooperate with the West in the Caucasus?

Zlobin: Moscow is very mistrustful of westerners’ intentions. Russians think that if you allow “western friends” to enter the region, they will never leave. In fact, Russia stands to gain the most if any combination of countries is able to provide assistance for establishing stability in the Caucasus. All other scenarios promise nothing but failure for Russia.

Inozemtsev: Russia is responsible for the curious position it has gotten itself into in the North Caucasus. This is due not only to its policies, but also its rhetoric. Everyone in Moscow is talking about Chechnya as if it were a breading ground for international terrorism. We should note, however, that Russia is the only one being attacked, not Azerbaijan, Ukraine or Armenia. But as soon as someone in the West brings this fact up, Moscow announces: “Chechnya is a domestic issue.” But if it’s a domestic issue, don’t blame it all on international terrorism! If international terrorism is at the root of the issue, then everyone needs to work toward solving this problem together. Russians understand little about the reasons for the instability in the Caucasus, but they are interested in taking advantage of it. They perpetuate this powder keg to stir up fear in others and, if necessary, to ignite it sometime in the future. Russians reason that they may be able to scare the West with something even more horrible. And as far as their domestic agenda is concerned, this works to create a kind of sense of security: yes, it’s bad here, but it’s worse in the Caucasus. So, westerners, you needn’t get involved…

Translated by Scott Stephens, CDI research assistant.