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#12 - JRL 8416 - JRL Home
Moscow Times
October 19, 2004
Nukes Will Not Be Used
By Pavel Felgenhauer
Following the Beslan tragedy last month, Russian officials began threatening
to attack Chechen rebel sympathizers and representatives abroad. Last week,
Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, who was attending a meeting of the NATO-Russia
Council in Poiana Brasov, Romania, said that Russia would launch pre-emptive
strikes against terrorists worldwide, but would stop short of using nuclear
weapons.
Hours later, the first "pre-emptive strike" occurred in London. The homes of
exiled Chechen rebel envoy Akhmed Zakayev and former Federal Security Service
officer Alexander Litvinenko were attacked with Molotov cocktails. Zakayev is
the chief representative of Chechen rebel leader Aslan Maskhadov in the West.
Litvinenko has in the past accused the FSB of carrying out the 1999 bombings of
Moscow apartment buildings in order to create a pretext for invading Chechnya
and of plotting to kill Boris Berezovsky. Zakayev, Litvinenko and Berezovsky
have been granted political asylum in Britain.
The arson attacks damaged property, but no one was injured and no arrests
have been made. Boris Labusov, the official spokesman for the Foreign
Intelligence Service, or SVR, ruled out any SVR involvement. Technically,
Labusov may be telling the truth, but the SVR is not the only branch of Russia's
intelligence services operating abroad. In Qatar, two officers of the General
Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate, or GRU, were convicted for a car bombing
in February that killed former Chechen rebel leader Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev.
The Kremlin never admitted it was behind the Qatar attack, but in Moscow the
incident was hotly discussed within the intelligence community. A number of GRU
officers, both active and retired, told me about the indignation within the
service about the mishandled assassination and how the SVR botched its part of
the job.
In the Soviet era, the SVR -- then part of the KGB -- handled covert
political assassinations abroad. That know-how has now been lost. GRU special
forces were trained to assassinate Western leaders in the event of a war with
NATO in Europe. The only aim of such an operation would have been to eliminate
the target. Misleading investigators after the fact would not be a priority. My
sources in the GRU insist that their job -- the actual assassination -- was done
well, but that the SVR failed to evacuate the agents as planned.
In Russia today, as in the Soviet Union, the activities of most government
agencies are a state secret. No Freedom of Information Act allows the public to
demand access to government files. But when everything is classified, it's
impossible to tell the important secrets from the trivial ones. And in Russia
today, there is a risk that almost any secret could be leaked.
Immediately after the Beslan tragedy, the security services put together an
11-point plan for Chechnya. It was sent to President Vladimir Putin. Along the
way, the draft was leaked and published, a common way to build support for
proposals that the bureaucracy is likely to reject -- in this case, increasing
anti-terrorist cooperation with Israel. Following its publication, the plan was
adopted by the Kremlin.
Point six of the draft reads as follows: "The SVR's stations in Western
Europe should constantly monitor Berezovsky's actions, because he is not only
the brains behind the anti-Putin opposition, but also has close contacts with
Chechen rebels and is behind all recent major terrorist attacks in Russia."
Point seven declares: "Despite the failed final phase of the operation to
kill Yandarbiyev, the practice of eliminating Chechen separatist leaders and the
emissaries of Maskhadov should continue."
Labusov ruled out the possibility of Russian involvement in the London arson
attacks, suggesting that "relatives or friends" of victims in the Beslan
hostage-taking might have carried them out. That's an interesting twist. During
the murder trial in Qatar, the Russian side was startled to learn that the
assassins could have been acquitted according to Muslim legal tradition that
allows acts of personal revenge, if it could have been proven that the agents or
their relatives had suffered at the hands of Chechen rebels.
The oversight of sending assassins to Qatar who had no motive for revenge was
much discussed in the Moscow intelligence community. From now on, it seems
attacks on Putin's political opponents will be connected with Beslan or other
terrorist outrages. But nuclear weapons will not be used.
Pavel Felgenhauer is an independent defense analyst.
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