#14 - JRL 8387 - JRL Home
North Caucasus: Growing Instability Keeps Aid Out Of Chechnya
By Ahto Lobjakas
Copyright (c) 2004. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036. www.rferl.org

Chechnya has obvious humanitarian needs, and the international community -- led by the European Union and the United Nations -- has made available significant funds to meet them. However, growing instability in the region and fears for aid workers' physical safety are instead pushing support efforts further afield. RFE/RL spoke today with Philippe Royan, the head of the EU's humanitarian aid office in Moscow, who said the recent return of most refugees to Chechnya has made it harder for aid to reach them.

Brussels, 30 September (RFE/RL) -- The EU has spent years lobbying Moscow to ease access for aid workers to Chechnya.

But Philippe Royan said today there have been few results. Furthermore, he added, what little progress had been achieved has now been eroded by growing instability in the North Caucasus. Chechnya and its environs are becoming an increasingly dangerous place for foreigners.

Permits to enter Chechnya remain fairly easy to get. Travel within Chechnya is also relatively free. The trouble, Royan said, is that foreign aid workers do not want to risk it.

This problem is not only confined to Chechnya. Royan said foreign aid workers feel at risk in Ingushetia and North Ossetia, too. He said a June raid by suspected Chechen separatists in Ingushetia is forcing international aid organizations to consider moving their offices farther afield: "In June, the UN were considering withdrawing from Nazran [in Ingushetia] back to [the North Ossetian capital] Vladikavkaz [out of fear] that on the night of 21-22 June, when the rebels retreated -- if they had wanted, if they had planned to pass through houses where expatriates were staying -- they could have taken along a number of hostages, and probably nothing could have stopped them."

The Russian branch of the EU's humanitarian aid arm ECHO -- which also assists Moldova and the South Caucasus -- is currently based in Moscow.

Royan said the organization would like to be closer to Chechnya. The EU is the biggest single donor in the republic, disbursing 26.5 million euros ($32.6 million) in 2004. The funds are spent through UN and other aid agencies.

But Royan said that after the hostage drama in Beslan, even Vladikavkaz would not be a safe base.

He said the question now is not about looking for the best place, but the place that is the "least dangerous":

"In the plans for 2005, we were expecting the United Nations to take a position, a decision: 'Do we open -- yes or no -- a UN representation office in Grozny? Do we have -- yes or no -- a UNHCR (eds: UN High Commissioner for Refugees) protection team in Grozny?' [A positive decision would have pleased] Russian authorities, [who have been] asking for it for years now," Royan said.

Such a possibility, however, appears increasingly remote.

Royan said this will displease Russia, which argues the situation in Chechnya is normalizing and that aid agencies have no reason to operate out of Ingushetia or North Ossetia.

He added that Moscow never granted ECHO permission to open an office in Ingushetia, precisely because they wanted all aid offices to base themselves in Grozny.

He said Russia appears to want the international aid community to act as "messengers" that the worst of Russia's conflict in the republic is finished. They say the Chechen fight for independence is over and the only remaining problem is international terrorism.

The European Commission, however, will not authorize a move to Grozny. Royan said the security situation in the region is worsening and the conflicts are becoming more and more difficult to understand. It is also getting harder, he added, to know where the threat is coming from.

It's a situation, he said, that presents aid agencies with a dilemma: "So on the one hand there was a discussion about 'Should we go closer to the beneficiaries [by] opening a representation office in Grozny,' and on the other hand [we debated] 'Is it still safe enough to stay in Nazran, shouldn't we get a bit farther [away] and keep some distance from the Chechen republic?'"

Meanwhile, Royan said, the aid effort is becoming a "remote-controlled operation" for foreigners. Needs assessments -- necessary to allocate funds -- are being done from a distance. The results are questionable, and frustrating for ECHO, which is forced to stay in Moscow.

Royan said the case of the kidnapped Dutch aid worker Arjan Erkel is a good case in point. Erkel, who worked for the French group Doctors Without Borders (Medecins Sans Frontiers [MSF]), was kidnapped in Daghestan and held for 20 months until a ransom of 1 million euros was paid.

Royan said Western aid workers increasingly fear being targeted by hostage takers: "Everybody, basically, is aware in the Caucasus that an MSF worker is worth at least 1 million euros -- that's what was paid after 20 months. So you can imagine that an MSF expatriate is a bit, not reluctant, but not... Some would say that the situation is more difficult today than when Arjan was still detained."

Royan said another recent concern is that aid workers could become the victims of indiscriminate killings by forces who want to keep foreigners out of Chechnya.

He stressed that aid money for Chechnya is not a problem -- there is no evidence of "donor fatigue." The problem is security.

Ironically, this means that the tens of thousands of Chechen refugees who have in recent months been forced to return from their camps in Ingushetia and Dagestan end up even worse off.

"It is the same problem we had from the start of the last Chechen conflict," Royan said. "There are a lot of things to do, there are a lot of things we could do, we just don't have the partners to do it because they don't have access possibilities for monitoring and needs assessment. It's the same problem. And now, when a good part of the beneficiaries have moved from Ingushetia back to Chechnya -- even from Daghestan -- the problem becomes bigger, because the more beneficiaries we have in Chechnya, the more difficult it is to help them."

Royan said aid agencies and other international organizations could start large-scale reconstruction work in Chechnya virtually overnight -- but only if the security situation permitted it.

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#15

Moscow Times

September 30, 2004

No More Kremlin Wizardry

By Boris Kagarlitsky

It was clear from the outset that President Vladimir Putin's second term would differ markedly from his first. Even the legion of well-connected experts insisted that the president would need time to solidify his hold on power. After accomplishing this task during his first term, we were told, Putin would devote his second term to solving the country's problems.

Much changed after Putin won re-election last spring. The fire that destroyed Moscow's Central Manezh Exhibition Hall on election day was a bad omen. When changes in the structure and makeup of the new government were announced, the gloom really set in. And the mood of most Russians was spoiled for good when the government announced its policy priorities.

Policies that no one wants are usually described as unpopular but necessary. There are various schools of thought as to who stands to benefit from such policies. But the real issue is whether or not the regime, in its current form, can successfully implement its own agenda.

Everything seems fine at first glance. The government controls parliament and faces no opposition. Yet something isn't right. The United Russia faction in the State Duma gave up vacation time to cancel benefits for pensioners, and urgently set to work eliminating subsidized housing and universally accessible education. But for all the deputies' hard work, the triumphant march of reform has faltered. Lawmakers make little attempt to justify their actions. Instead, they play around with language in order to conceal the true intent of the bills they pass. Officials at all levels of government pass the buck, and the governors are obviously less than anxious to start putting the Kremlin's reforms into practice.

The situation is even worse in Chechnya. Following the assassination of Akhmad Kadyrov, the Kremlin lost the plot for a while. Finally, the decision was made to combine the posts of president and regional top cop, and to install a suitable candidate, Alu Alkhanov.

As if to spite the Kremlin, fighting broke out in Ingushetia, where a similar system had been developed in recent years. Ingushetia made clear that the system doesn't work; it leads instead to more setbacks and more unpleasantness. For the Kremlin, it was too late to change course. The future leader of Chechnya had already been unveiled.

Until recently, the Kremlin believed that the war in Chechnya, the rise of nationalism and the collapse of traditional political parties increased the power of the president. Putin's power is now more than secure, but the crisis in the political system continues unabated. Putin's team has grown concerned about the growth of nationalism and xenophobia, but has no idea how to stuff the genie back into the bottle. Instead of bolstering Putin's image as a strong, decisive leader, the war in Chechnya reveals his regime's inability to tackle its biggest problems. The Kremlin gutted the old political parties, but has been unable to form new ones.

Everything that worked so well during Putin's first term has now gone wrong.

When people see that their actions deliver the desired result, they're apt to repeat them. But few people stop to figure out why their actions were successful. What's worse, any boss is inclined to ascribe the success of his undertakings to his own undoubted virtues. When something works, he will repeat it over and over.

As it happens, the successes of Putin's first term resulted from external circumstances that had little to do with his policy decisions. Oil prices rose and the economic growth that began in the wake of the ruble's collapse continued by inertia. Most importantly, the country expected change. People were hopeful that the new president would restore order following the chaos of the Yeltsin years, and they were prepared to put their faith in anyone that wasn't associated with the Kremlin of the 1990s. In this situation, another president pursuing an entirely different program would have enjoyed no less success.

But circumstances change. When the honeymoon's over, the people's trust must be earned. Economic growth also gave rise to increased expectations that the regime cannot satisfy, not least because it is simultaneously trying to satisfy the demands of big business. Festering problems are making themselves known.

Putin now resembles a wizard whose magical powers have faded. He waves his magic wand and pronounces his spells as before, but nothing happens.

The era of political wizardry is over, and tough times lie ahead.

Boris Kagarlitsky is director of the Institute of Globalization Studies.

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#20 Moscow News September 29-October 5, 2004 Kremlin Cronies Seeking Control over Big Business By Dmitry Dokuchayev

It became known last week that Viktor Ivanov - a high-ranking member of the presidential staff - was appointed to Aeroflot's board of directors; moreover, he may soon become the airline's board chairman. This is one in a series of recent appointments. In mid-summer, presidential aide Igor Shuvalov was appointed to the board of directors of joint-stock company Russian Railways. Three weeks ago, the presidential administration's deputy head Vladislav Surkov became board chairman of Transnefteprodukt. In mid-summer, a similar post at Rosneft went to another deputy head of the presidential staff, Igor Sechin.

Those appointments were soon followed by the merger - announced with pomp and ceremony - of state-owned Rosneft with Gazprom. Gazprom's board of directors has for several years now been headed by presidential staff chief Dmitry Medvedev, the immediate superior of Surkov and Sechin.

Yevgeny Yasin, a research supervisor at the Higher School of Economics, tells MN what are the motives behind the new appointments of the prominent Kremlin administrators.

What has compelled the top members of the presidential staff to take seats on the board of directors of some major companies? Do they want to control the companies' cash flows?

I would not regard these appointments as a move to establish control over companies' cash flows. I think these have long been under control, but not so openly. Only several years ago, the then presidential staff chief Alexander Voloshin was board chairman at national power grid Unified Energy System. He was the first member of the presidential staff to hold such a corporate post, and this was seen as an exceptional precedent. After all, Voloshin was a professional economist. Later, Gazprom's board chairmanship was accorded to Dmitry Medvedev, who was Voloshin's deputy at the time. Today, it has become common practice to place presidential staff members on companies' board of directors.

Why has this happened?

We are witnessing a fresh redistribution of property, as exemplified by the "Yukos affair." The aim of the redistribution is control primarily over the oil and gas sector, which is being established by high state officials. On the other hand, 2008 is approaching, and with it, the next presidential election. This means that if the present Kremlin dwellers are to keep their lucrative jobs, they must build "spare airfields". Although Kremlin control over the "power vertical" is practically complete and will be hundred percent after the State Duma approves the president's latest initiatives, these people still have to consolidate their positions just in case. Formerly, there were no grounds to do so in public; now, they don't hide their intentions.

Besides Russia, is there any other country where top government officials sit on companies' board of directors?

No, because no industrial nation has big companies where the state has such stakes. Moreover, definitely no nation has such a powerful body as the Presidential Administration. In other countries, this office does mostly clerical work. A similar setup that comes to mind is that of some Arab countries, where royal family members sit on the boards of directors of oil majors.

So members of the Kremlin Administration are becoming corporate executives. How good are they at this job?

Until recently, members of the government who were appointed as state representatives in large companies where the state is a shareholder were specialists in their relevant fields. The notion was that corporate postings were not for government administrators because they were not economic managers. Their business was politics. It appears that this notion no longer exists.

What changes have taken place in the situation?

I think that now the presidential staff members concerned are pulling their masks off: The assault on Yukos has been completed, and now they need not hide their true intentions.

By the way, it was not the government that mounted the assault on Yukos; it was the doing of presidential staff members. Their seats on companies' boards of directors are not just a sinecure; they show to the public that these men directly control the cash flows of all large companies in which the state holds shares.

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#22

Mosnews.com/Gazeta.ru

September 29, 2004

Why Re-write Holidays Calendar?

By Gleb Cherkasov

Holidays are more than just happy days off work. Holidays reflect national ideology, the public manifestation of a country’s fundamental values.

A multitude of holidays marked in Russia today, including the Soviet-era red-letter days, imperial Russia holidays as well as post-Communist dates, reflect the ideological chaos reigning in the country over the past 15 years.

Ordinary Russians, however, fully recognize only two holidays ­ the New Year and the May 9 Victory Day. All other dates colored red in our calendar are never celebrated by a majority of the Russian population. They either believe those ’holidays’ to be somewhat controversial or simply see no sense in their having been introduced in the first place. Take for instance, the Independence Day, marked on June 12.

Sooner or later the government will have to bring order to the national holidays calendar, adjusting it to its own views on what kind of national ideology the country needs. Namely that is why changes to the list of national holidays proposed recently by a group of senior lawmakers seem so interesting.

Heads of factions in the State Duma, the lower house of Russia’s parliament, have proposed the following. From January 1st to the 5th, the country should take a New Year’s break. The Dec. 12 Constitution Day and the Nov. 7 Day of Accord and Reconciliation ­ marked instead of the Soviet-era 1917 Great October Socialist Revolution Anniversary ­ should be altogether abolished.

Instead, two new holidays ­ the Day of National Unity to be marked on 4 November and the Day of Foundation of the State Duma (April 27) ­ are to be introduced. Apparently, the lawmakers have done their homework well. The first session of the State Duma was held on April 27, 1906. While on Nov. 4, 1612, the early 17th century Times of Trouble ended, according to the authors of the draft bill.

Let us leave the lawmakers’ desire to legitimize the all-Russian New Year drinking-bout aside and not be angry with them about their proposal to have their own birthday celebrated nationwide ­- this idea will most likely be rejected as immodest. Both the New Year and the Duma birthday dates have little affect on the creation of a new ideology.

Yet, as to the idea of marking Nov. 4 ­ the day the Times of Trouble ended ­ it gives a clear picture of a country the State Duma members and their patrons in the Kremlin seek to build.

The Times of Trouble that befell Russia in the early 17th century were, perhaps, the hardest ordeal for the Russian statehood. Russia’s sovereignty was at stake and the country’s future was vague.

Only in the Times of Trouble the enemy succeeded in conquering the Russian capital and held control over it for a long time. In the 20th century Nazi Germany failed to achieve the goal. Russia marks its victory over it on 9 May. It is logical that the end of the Times of Trouble, too, deserves to be celebrated.

By including Nov. 4 in the list of red-letter days our incumbent leaders admit the priority of interests of the state as such over all other interests.

The initiative to abolish the Constitution Day further confirms that point. The basic law is perceived by our powers-that-be as yet another attribute of state power. So why mark the day of that attribute? The same logic explains the motives of deputies’ desire to cross out Nov. 7.

Whatever it is called, for most Russians this holiday forever remains the Day of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the day when the USSR was actually born. But the country already has a day when the post-Communist Russia was founded ­ the June 12 Independence Day.

Besides, would it not be strange to celebrate the anniversary of Bolshevik revolution while at the same time advancing a slogan “State over Everything”… Remarkably, white emigration writers used to refer to the 1917-1922 period in Russian history as Troubled Times.

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#24

BLOCKBUSTER ERA BEGINS IN RUSSIAN FILM INDUSTRY

MOSCOW, September 29 (RIA Novosti commentator Olga Sobolevskaya) - The fashion for blockbusters has swept Russia. Now it is up to audiences, with 80% of them under 30, to decide whether they meet Western standards. Today's cinemagoers were brought up in an era when US films totally dominated and therefore have quite a good idea of Western film standards.

Yegor Konchalovsky, 38, and Timur Bekmambetov, 43, have earned their reputations as Russian blockbuster directors. Their "big films" originated from TV advertisements, as both of them were successful commercial directors. Everything they did in the movie industry before they shot their blockbusters gave them a good grounding for their future hits. And then came the turning point: Konchalovsky released his Anti-Killer in 2002, and then Anti-Killer-2 a year later.

Both action films, which follow the confrontation between policeman Filipp Korenev (performed by the super star of many recent films and TV presenter, Gosha Kutsenko) first with the mafia and then terrorists, were hits with young people looking for extreme sensations. But they were attracted to the cinemas by the unprecedented, stunning advertising campaign.

The producers used all the tools at their disposal, from billboards to the Internet. There is even a computer game called Anti-Killer. The elderly were shocked when experienced middle-aged actors agreed to participate in Yegor Konchalovsky's experiment that was made in the style of a TV commercial and with little food for thought.

In 2004, Timur Bekmambetov's blockbuster, Night Watch, based on Sergei Lukyanenko's novel, became the hit of the season. The United States has already purchased the rights to screen "the Russian miracle." The film, which was shot in the fashionable science-fiction genre and describes events in modern Moscow, but involves a mythological battle between good and evil, set Russian box office records tumbling. It even beat the record of the Oscar-winning, The Lord of the Rings, by earning $16 million. The secret of its success is the same as Konchalovsky's: an entire constellation of superstars, suspense, stylish music and production design, and a large-scale advertising campaign.

Inspired by the laurels of Konchalovsky and Bekmambetov, their colleagues Alexei Sidorov, 36, and Nikolai Lebedev, 38, have also decided to shoot blockbusters. In the final count, this is what the Russian market demands and this is something capable of competing with Western films. All the above mentioned are directors from the younger generation who understand the importance of good marketing - the screening destiny of their pictures, box office takings and the relevance of the film to the public sentiments. Nikolai Lebedev's picture, Star, managed to partially satisfy society's long-standing thirst for patriotism. This film depicts the exploits of a reconnaissance detachment operating behind enemy lines during WWII. The feature was even awarded a State Prize in 2003 and attracted not only youngsters but also the older generation. However, now, Lebedev has decided to pay tribute to the science fiction trend. His new project, Wolfhound, is scheduled for release no earlier than next December. This is all that the public knows about the film, other than it was shot in Russia, Slovakia and Malta.

Alexei Sidorov, the director of the scandalously successful Brigada series (which romanticised criminal friends, provoked a few juvenile delinquencies and encouraged debates about the moral mission of art), is shooting a film called Battle With a Shadow. Its protagonist is a boxer seeking fame, whose main battle takes place outside the arena - he has to fight the criminal world. The movie will hit the screens next March.

In 2005, Anti-Killer-3 will come out too, but The Escape by Yegor Konchalovsky is expected to be of more interest. The director obviously has taken his inspiration from Hollywood's 1993 film, The Fugitive, which starredHarrison Ford. The new project will involve a few Anti-Killer stars.

The older people are fairly sceptical about these young directors' works. Andrei Konchalovsky, 67, a film master with Western experience and Yegor Konchalovsky's father, says: "Feature films have become pure entertainment. They have lost their role of masters of thought. Today, people do not need films that attempt to unravel the mystery of man. They need entertainment, fast food, McDonald's.

"Films were an art form when there were no such words as 'marketing' or 'superstar'. In Fellini's era, there were no superstars but simply stars. And when 'super' begins, it means the end of the art of filmmaking," Andrei Konchalovsky concludes nostalgically.