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#19 - JRL 8347 - JRL Home
Moscow Times
August 30, 2004
When Turnabout Is Not Fair Play
By Mikhail Delyagin
Mikhail Delyagin, head of the Modernization Institute and chairman of the Rodina
bloc's policy committee, contributed this comment to The Moscow Times.
In the spring of 1999, then-Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov set off on an
official visit to the United States. Over the mid-Atlantic, however, Primakov
ordered his pilot to turn the plane around and return to Moscow. He canceled his
visit to protest the bombing of Yugoslavia by the United States and its NATO
allies.
Five years later, Russian capital moving through illegal channels -- below
the radar of state regulatory agencies -- staged an equally dramatic turnaround.
The balance of such capital movements falls under the heading of errors and
omissions in Russia's balance of payments.
Throughout the period of economic reforms, this balance was negative or, in
rare cases, it approached zero. Capital was leaving the country illegally. This
trend continued in the first quarter of 2004, when capital outflow through
illegal channels amounted to $4.4 billion. In the second quarter, however, a net
inflow of capital ($1.4 billion) through these channels occurred for the first
time in the 10 years that such flows have been monitored. In the space of one
quarter, this turnabout amounted to $5.8 billion.
This change affected overall capital movements. In the second quarter of
2004, net capital outflow slowed sharply to $1.1 billion, down from $4.4 billion
in the first quarter. This is a seasonal adjustment regularly observed in the
second quarter. But this year capital movements through channels that are more
or less subject to state regulation did not show any significant change.
The outflow of private banking capital, for example, rose by $400 million in
the first quarter to $3.6 billion. This marginal increase occurred because a
decrease in Russian banks' foreign assets from $3.6 billion to $2.4 billion was
counterbalanced by a growth in liabilities: Foreign liabilities increased by
$400 million in the first quarter, they shrank by $1.2 billion in the second
quarter.
Improvement in total capital movements was achieved thanks to the
nonfinancial sector, which generally accounts for errors and omissions: An
outflow of $1.2 billion in the first quarter was followed by an inflow of $2.5
billion in the second. Meanwhile, growth of foreign liabilities was
insignificant (up $300 million to $8.8 billion), while foreign assets -- that
is, capital outflow -- jumped from $5.3 billion to $7.7 billion. Thus overall
capital inflow occurred thanks to a shift in the direction of capital flowing
through illegal channels.
Capital inflow through illegal channels seems to have resulted from a unique
combination of a favorable economic situation and the extremely complicated --
from the business point of view -- domestic political situation.
The significant volume of the Russian market -- secured for the foreseeable
future by continued high oil prices -- and the possibility for developing a
business here using little more than standard, modern management techniques make
Russia extremely attractive to investors, especially when compared to less
favorable conditions in the developed countries. This assessment has become a
commonplace in recent years.
At the same time, law-abiding companies are being frightened off by a number
of factors, including: the incompetence of the state bureaucracy; its impotence
when faced with real problems, as graphically illustrated by the recent banking
crisis, which resulted largely from the Central Bank's failure to take timely
and decisive action; its tendency to resort to propaganda rather than take
action; and the widespread phenomenon of copycat crackdowns by government
officials at all levels during the Yukos affair.
The best indicator of how this process works -- even better than falling
stock prices, which are susceptible to speculation -- is provided by an analysis
of overall capital movements.
According to Central Bank data, capital outflow in the first half of 2004
amounted to $5.5 billion, exceeding outflow during the first half of 2002 ($2
billion) and during all of 2003 ($2.3 billion). Keep in mind that in the first
half of 2003, before the beginning of the Yukos affair, Russia enjoyed a net
capital inflow -- of $3.9 billion -- for the first time during the entire period
of economic reforms.
When you look at capital movements during the year that has passed since the
Yukos affair began -- in other words, from July 1, 2003, to July 1, 2004 -- with
the situation one year earlier, the deterioration of the situation becomes even
more clear. In the 12 months preceding the attack on Yukos -- from July 1, 2002,
to July 1, 2003 -- the net outflow of capital amounted to $2.2 billion. During
the next 12 months, in far more favorable external conditions, net capital
outflow skyrocketed to $11.6 billion.
In the second quarter of 2004, however, capital outflow through channels
regulated by the state was increasingly offset by capital inflow through
unregulated channels. Illegal business began to erode the position of its
relatively upstanding competition. Essentially, illegal capital began to squeeze
out not only legal but also quasi-legal capital that is at least partially
monitored and controlled by the state. It is now clear that entrepreneurs who
employ illegal schemes for moving money operate without fear of reprisals
because they have carefully calculated the risks involved in such operations,
they know how to seal a deal, and they are confident that, in terms of business
acumen, they are far superior to the government bureaucrats who regulate them.
The consequences of this situation for Russian business and for society as a
whole are clear. Just as they did during the years of stagnation under Leonid
Brezhnev, the business and social life of the country will once more retreat
into the shadows, where regulatory mechanisms are not transparent and subject to
public control but entirely corrupt and destructive for the life of society.
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