#12 - JRL 8344 - JRL Home
RFE/RL Newsline
August 26, 2004
THE CAUCASIAN VORTEX
By Robert Bruce Ware
Robert Bruce Ware is an associate professor at Southern Illinois University who studies the Caucasus.
Copyright (c) 2004. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036. www.rferl.org

The Chechen conundrum was neatly encapsulated on 8 August, when Alu Alkhanov, Chechnya's top policeman, and the Kremlin's favored candidate in the 29 August election to choose a new Chechen leader, addressed Russia's Federation Council. The upper house had never before invited a report from a candidate for a elective post in one of its constituent members. Alkhanov took advantage of this unprecedented occasion to make one crucial point, but his speech ignored a second, closely related and equally critical point. The neglected point was, however, underscored by Alkhanov's very appearance before the Federation Council.

In his report, Alkhanov emphasized that security issues in Chechnya are closely connected to economic development. "Unemployment and poor living conditions are forcing people to join criminal groups," he said. He added that "as long as social problems remain unsolved, complete stabilization will be impossible." This is true not only in Chechnya but throughout the North Caucasus, where there are few employment opportunities outside of law enforcement, the narcotics trade, and war.

Indeed, much of the time law enforcement, the illegal-drug trade, terrorism, and war are essentially four branches of the same encompassing and self-sustaining enterprise. Some North Caucasians are turning to drugs to help them cope with anxiety, frustration, and despair. The drug trade is rapidly expanding in the North Caucasus through the growth of efficient, hierarchical, criminal organizations. The expansion of the drug trade not only feeds other forms of organized crime, but also creates employment opportunities in law enforcement. Additional law enforcement jobs are created when militants and Islamist extremists pay young men to attack police stations and targeted police officials. In Daghestan more than 20 of these officials have been murdered so far this year; more than 20 were killed in 2003. Police officials were primary targets in the 22 June attacks in Ingushetia.

Moscow has focused on the security situation in the North Caucasus without seeming to grasp the extent to which it is connected with problems of economic development. Along with its big stick, Moscow has also offered carrots, in the form of budget subsidies for the North Caucasian governments. Apart from Chechnya, Daghestan has received the greatest federal support, regularly accounting for more than 80 percent of the republic's budget. In Ingushetia, smaller federal subsidies provide 85 percent of the budget. But when this money is funneled into the upper echelons of local government, little trickles down. This was part of Alkhanov's argument in his address to the Federation Council. He told representatives that "large federal resources...are simply being mishandled," noting that of the 67 billion rubles ($2.3 billion) allocated for Chechnya's reconstruction since 2002, only 10 billion ($344 million) has reached Chechnya. More is lost to corruption within the republic. That embezzlement is one of the reasons why of the 88,000 applications made for cash compensation for destroyed housing, only 8,000 have been accommodated.

But it is not just economic problems that are fuelling discontent and alienation across the North Caucasus. Over the last five years all of the North Caucasian republics have seen a contraction in the circles of economic and political elites that has narrowed both financial access and democratic participation. While this contraction has local causes, it has also been exacerbated, since the spring of 2000, by the recentralization of the federal government, which has strengthened its influence throughout this region. Whereas regional elites were previously bound by their need for a local political base, Moscow's expanded influence has now become the basis for their power and has tended to insulate local elites from local accountability. This has alienated regional and village leaders and other activists who previously constituted the core of local political bases, but who are now finding their roles to be increasingly redundant.

Historically, democratic traditions were more developed in the Caucasus than in some parts of Russia, and electoral fraud and arbitrariness on the part of officials has on occasion triggered larger-scale protests in the North Caucasus than in other parts of the federation. Hence, there is something deeply corrosive in Moscow's support for those North Caucasian leaders who display few virtues beyond their loyalty. In an effort to reduce the spirited proclivities of North Caucasian honor cultures to something more compatible with its own cultural traditions, Moscow tries to construct local hierarchies of power and obedience. These efforts only multiply local frustrations.

Yet these efforts were also the reason for Alkhanov's unprecedented appearance before the Federation Council earlier this month. Alkhanov has emerged as the Kremlin's anointed successor to Akhmad-hadji Kadyrov, the pro-Moscow Chechen leader who was assassinated on 9 May. Alkhanov is almost certain to win following the elimination from the race on the basis of an absurd technicality of Moscow-based businessman Malik Saidullaev, who would have attracted some support on the basis of his proven entrepreneurial skills and his philanthropic work in support of Chechens refugees. Yet even in a fair election, a Saidullaev victory would have been far from certain, since it is by no means clear whether he could provide the one commodity that is of primary concern for many Chechens -- physical security.

Hence, Saidullaev's elimination from the race has two results. First, it has ensured that Saidullaev will not acquire the political influence that he might have won through a strong showing. This is unfortunate, for while Saidullaev knows little about security issues, he might have contributed to programs for reconstruction and economic development. Second, it has deprived Alkhanov of the political legitimacy that he would have won through an open election. Since the people of Chechnya and the Russian leadership need a legitimate government in Chechnya far more than Alkhanov does, they are the real losers.

Alkhanov was correct when he told the Federation Council that economic development is closely linked to security in Chechnya. What he neglected to mention is that democracy is also closely linked to security, not only in Chechnya but throughout the North Caucasus. Perhaps he did not need to dwell on that point since his very presence before the Federation Council was ample proof of democracy's failure. The point that should be taken from Alkhanov's unprecedented appearance is that democracy, economic development, and security are inextricably linked in the North Caucasus, and so long as Moscow neglects the first two of these it will never be able to guarantee the third.