#17 - JRL 8310 - JRL Home
The Jamestown Foundation
www.jamestown.org
Monday, 2 August 2004 - Volume 1, Issue 64
EURASIA DAILY MONITOR
MASKHADOV VOWS TO STEP UP ATTACKS
By Charles Gurin

Chechen rebel leader Aslan Maskhadov, who in the past consistently stressed his readiness for political negotiations with the Kremlin, has delivered a message promising stepped up attacks in Chechnya, Ingushetia, and beyond, and that rebel forces will kill the winner of the next Chechen presidential election, set for August 29.

In a "video interview," the transcript of which was posted on the Kavkazcenter.com and Chechenpress.info websites on August 1, Maskhadov said he had "approved" the June raid on law-enforcement and governmental installations in Ingushetia, that it had been conceived and prepared by the rebel Military Committee, and that it was "revenge" for depredations committed against Ingush and Chechens by federal and local pro-Kremlin forces in Ingushetia. "The war in Ingushetia started from the time that Ruslan Aushev, who was elected [president] and recognized by the people, was removed from office and FSB employee [Murat] Zyazikov was put in his place," Maskhadov said. "It was precisely the Russian special services that unleashed war against both Chechen refugees and their own Ingush. Bulldozers were used against the refugees. They were deprived of light and gas. They were murdered. Accusing many local inhabitants of helping the mujahideen, they [the Russian special services-EDM] surrounded their homes with Ingush troops, APCs, set [their homes] on fire, killed, and tortured their owners. . . . Witnessing this, the number of those wanting to fight on our side, including our Ingush brothers, increased."

According to Maskhadov, 950-1000 "mujahideen" gathered from the rebels' Ingush, Suzhensk, and Achkoi-Martan "sectors" participated in the Ingushetia operation, which was under the command of veteran Chechen rebel field commander Dokku Umarov. This account differs somewhat from one given by Kavkazcenter.com on July 26, which said that both Umarov and rebel field commander Shamil Basayev were in charge of the operation. This posting quoted Basayev as saying that 570 rebels had taken part in the raid and contained a video segment of Basayev and Maskhadov (see EDM July 30).

In any case, both the July 26 and August 1 postings make it clear that while Maskhadov did not participate in the June operation in Ingushetia, it had his blessing. Further, Maskhadov indicated in the August 1 message that there will be more such operations. "That fact that 1,000 mujahideen entered three cities [in Ingushetia-EDM], completely carried out their tasks in the time allotted, and came back with [only] several wounded shows that the operation was successful," Maskhadov's statement read. "We have the capability to carry out such operations in Ichkeria, in Ingushetia, and in Russia. And we will prove that."

Maskhadov reserved perhaps his greatest wrath for members of Chechnya's pro-Moscow administration, whom he called "traitors" and "hypocrites." Referring to the August 29 presidential election necessitated by the May 9 assassination of Akhmad Kadyrov, Maskhadov said: "It makes no difference to us who Putin names: that person only has the time left until the hand of the mujahid reaches him. Allah decides everyone's term." Maskhadov also said his forces will not "cross the boundary of what is allowed by Allah" and thus will "not touch the fathers and mothers, sisters, and brothers of the hypocrites." However, he added: "But I swear to Allah -- and this is my vow to the mujahideen who remain alive -- that there will be no place in our country for those hypocrites who do not repent. They must be harshly punished within the boundaries of what Allah permits." The war in Chechnya, Maskhadov said, will end when "the troops withdraw, the people pause for breath, and the president is a person chosen by the people themselves" (Kavkazcenter.com, Chechenpress.info, August 1).

Maskhadov's hard-line rhetoric was not entirely out of the blue. In a July e-mail, he told Reuters that negotiations were only "one of the paths to ending the fighting" and "not an end in themselves," adding, "as sad as it sounds, I think the current Russian-Chechen war will outlive Putin." He also suggested that his forces would strike targets around Russia. "As for Chechens carrying fighting into Russian territory, my opinion is: this would be absolutely legitimate -- in any case, no less legitimate than the allies in World War II carrying fighting into the territory of Hitler's Germany," he wrote. "If Chechens possessed warplanes or rockets, then air strikes on Russian cities would also be legitimate." In the e-mail, Maskhadov called the August 29 election a "farce" (Reuters, July 18; see also EDM, July 27).

Meanwhile, the Associated Press on August 1 quoted an anonymous official of the pro-Moscow administration as saying that thirteen servicemen, including seven Russian soldiers, three Federal Security Service officers, and three Chechen police officers had been killed over the previous 24-hour period.

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#19

Mosnews.com/Gazeta.ru

August 2, 2004

Stray Bullets as Means of Peaceful Settlement

Ironically, Georgia’s President Mikhail Saakashvili appears to be highly interested in a new outbreak of the interethnic conflict in South Ossetia, hoping that it would enable him to seize the initiative by accusing Russian peacekeepers of failing to keep the situation under control and thus to enlist support of the Western nations.

Georgian troops clashed with South Ossetian forces on the border of the self-styled autonomy several times in the last week on July. The Thursday clash erupted into a shootout near Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia. Ossetians then accused Tbilisi of an open aggression against the self-proclaimed republic.

Actually, there was no aggression. What happened was the erratic shooting that came from the direction of Georgian villages, pushing South Ossetia another step closer towards the new outburst of the inter-ethnic conflict simmering for over the decade.

A question arises whether Georgia’s aspiration to restore control over its restive province is substantiated.

Some may cite the principles of international law recognizing territorial integrity of as well as inability and unwillingness of the incumbent government of South Ossetia to reign in smuggling and rampant crime; others may dwell on ethnic and cultural traditions and the fact that the republic has been de facto independent for over a decade now.

The only thing that is obvious is that in the situation where Tbilisi is firmly set to restore control over Georgian lands by all means available, the fast and bloodless scenario that has been realized in Ajaria is believed to be the most desirable.

Indeed, the president of Georgia Mikhail Saakashvili, too, would like to see South Ossetia follow the Ajaria scenario, or the one applied in Tbilisi, where the ruling regimes, weakened by the onset of internal opposition, tumbled down with minimal casualties.

Successful dethronement of Georgian president Eduard Shevardnadze and Ajaria’s leader Aslan Abashidze fuelled Saakashvili’s resolve to restore control over South Ossetia, which, unlike Ajaria, showed no willingness to compromise, actively augmenting its military potential and openly seeking accession to the Russian Federation.

Saakahsvili has nowhere to retreat, he needs a new victory. It must be impressive and it must be attained relatively quickly. He has to preserve his status of a ’politician of a new generation’ waging war against feudal remnants of the Soviet and post-Soviet order.

The main hindrance the Georgian leader is facing is, first and foremost, Russian peacekeeping forces deployed in the volatile region. Their presence does not only protect the regime of Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity from the large-scale military attack. Their presence emphasizes that Georgia and Ossetia are the sides of the conflict, whereas Russia is an intermediary between them. And this is what vexes Tbilisi these days.

Armed units deployed in Georgian settlements, night shootouts of which nothing is ever known for sure as regards to who, at whom and from where was shooting, are all points on the direct road to further escalation of the conflict between Georgians and Ossetians.

Exacerbation of the conflict will enable Georgia to accuse Russian peacekeepers of failing to accomplish their mission and of siding with Ossetia, thus casting doubt on legitimacy of their peacekeeping status.

In this case Russia will no longer be perceived as an intermediary in the inter-ethnic conflict between Georgians and Ossetians. On the contrary, this will enable Saakashvili to picture Russia ­ from the traditional post-Soviet angle ­ as a decrepit empire preventing the renewed Georgian state from embarking on the path of building a Western-type democracy by encouraging and supporting separatists.

Ironically, to be perceived as a ’positive character’ by the world community Saakashvili is highly interested in blood being spilled in clashes between Georgians and Ossetians. And, judging by the way the things are, this is precisely what Tbilisi’s efforts in forcing a wedge between the two peoples are aimed at.