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#4 - JRL 8297 - JRL Home
RIA Novosti
July 19, 2004
KVASHNIN HAS LEFT: WHAT WILL THE ARMY GAIN?
MOSCOW (RIA Novosti military commentator Viktor Litovkin) - Vladimir Putin
has signed an order dismissing Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed
Forces, General of the Army Anatoly Kvashnin, first deputy minister of defence.
Before that, Vladimir Putin signed a new wording of the law "On Defence," which
deprived the General Staff, called the brains of the army, of its function as
"the main agency of operational control of the armed forces." Kvashnin lost the
right to appeal to the Supreme Commander-President directly, bypassing the
defence minister, and was degraded to the post of first deputy of Sergei Ivanov.
Kvashnin is a bright individual with unlimited ambitions, who does not spare
himself or others. When he was a young man, a fighting vehicle burst into flames
and he rushed into it to save a private disregarding the danger of detonation.
Kvashnin never avoided the difficult sides of military service. He took over
command in Chechnya in late 1994, when one general failed and another refused to
assume the difficult job. However, an operation to storm Grozny in the New Year
night of 1995, which he elaborated, ended in a tragedy: more than 350 servicemen
were killed only in the 131st Maikop Motorised Brigade.
Uncontrollable drive, the inability and unwillingness to consider the price
of success measured in the number of lives were the old trump cards of the
Soviet school of military leadership. Anatoly Kvashnin learned his lessons very
well and applied them more than once when he commanded a military district and
became chief of the General Staff. It was under him and with his energetic
involvement that the Main Command of the Land Forces was dissolved and later
restored, that the Volga-Urals military district was split and re-integrated,
with the headquarters moved from one city to another, and that the Strategic
Missile Force was integrated with the Space Forces and the Early Warning System,
only to become independent again.
He got away with anything, possibly because in conditions of general decay in
the army he did his best to preserve the country's main weapons - the strategic
deterrence forces, to create an integrated system of their command, and to place
a new missile on combat duty that would ensure Russia's strategic security for
at least 30-40 years more.
Kvashnin did not tolerate rivals. The list of victims of his bureaucratic
infighting includes Georgy Shpak, commander of the Airborne Force, and Gennady
Troshev, commander of the North Caucasian military district. Kvashnin's
favourite method is thrust and drive - and a report to the president bypassing
his direct superior (defence minister), especially because he could do it by the
law "On Defence," which granted equal rights to the chief of the General Staff
and the defence minister.
But amendments to the law, which the State Duma adopted without notifying
Kvashnin, put a full stop to this practice. Kvashnin has lost. But will the army
gain from his departure?
The army has had and still has many problems apart from relations between the
Defence Ministry and the General Staff. Though it has been proclaimed more than
once that it would be reformed - or has been reformed, the Russian army remains
Soviet in the form and essence. The new methods of hostilities and new
structures, which the armies of all industrialised countries are developing,
have failed to take root in the Russian army.
In particular, the special operations command has not been created to this
day, there are no reliable reconnaissance systems, precision-guided weapons and
the possibility of quickly delivering troops not by thousands of kilometres but
to a small distance but at any time of day and night and in any weather. Neither
do we have an ideology and principles of using such troops, including by
rallying different troops and resources under single command.
The military claim that the General Staff will at long last stop fighting
forleadership in taking defence decisions and will start creating long-term
plans of the application of the armed forces in all possible situations. But to
be able to do this, it should have new officers and not the ones who graduated
from Soviet military schools.
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