#7 - JRL 8243 - JRL Home
TITLE:
PRESS CONFERENCE WITH PIR CENTER EXPERTS REGARDING THE UPCOMING G-8 SUMMIT
[INDEPENDENT PRESS CENTER, 13:00, JUNE 2, 2004]
SOURCE: FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE (http://www.fednews.ru/)

Moderator: Good day. Our guests today are PIR Center and the topic of the press conference is "International Security for Eight: What Will Emerge from the Upcoming Sea Island Summit?" I am glad to introduce our guests: Gennady Mikhailovich Yevstafiev, Lieutenant- General and senior adviser to the PIR Center who has worked for more than 40 years at state institutions and the UN Secretariat and Soviet embassies. He is a major specialist on non-proliferation and arms control. Gennady Mikhailovich has taken part in disarmament negotiations and in working out human rights treaties.

Our second guest is Daniil Olegovich Kobyakov, PIR Center research fellow and coordinator of the research project Global Partnership. And the first speaker will be Gennady Mikhailovich Yevstafiev.

Yevstafiev: Let Daniil be the first. He is a young and aggressive man.

Kobyakov: Thank you. Dear colleagues, I am glad to meet you. The main topic is the upcoming summit of the G-8 on Sea Island in the United States. It is six days to go to the summit. The summit will take place in the State of Georgia on June 8-10, 2004.

Let me say from the start that for Russia participation in the G-8 is not only a matter of prestige, but also an important forum in which our country can solve concrete problems in the field of the economy and in the field of international and national security. Our leadership, notably President Putin, have repeatedly noted that the problem of non-proliferation of mass destruction weapons and their delivery means, the problem of international terrorism constitute the main challenge in the 21st century.

In these areas Russia is cooperating with the leading countries which are also aware of the reality of this threat and for several years now there has been concrete cooperation within the G-8 in countering these threats.

Already leading US officials, for example, Undersecretary of State Bolton who is directly involved in the preparation of the summit, as well as Russian officials have noted that the problems of proliferation of mass destruction weapons and means of their delivery as well as the problems of international terrorism should be central to the agenda of the forthcoming summit.

These problems are also going to be raised in the course of bilateral Russia-US meetings between President Putin and President Bush.

What specifically will be discussed? One item is the program of global partnership of G-8 countries against the proliferation of mass destruction weapons and materials of which I will tell you more in a second. Also there will be other things like Middle East security, the Security Proliferation Initiative, that's an international initiative Gennady Mikhailovich will be able to tell us in more detail. Russia joined the Initiative just recently. On the whole, progress will be reviewed in global partnership of the G- 8 countries over the past two years.

What is global partnership? The initiative was put forward in 2002 at the G-8 summit in Avian and under that initiative the G-8 countries have committed up to 20 billion dollars to solve the problem of non-proliferation, mainly in Russia. What are the main areas? Disposal of nuclear submarines, the destruction of the stockpiles of chemical weapons (Russia has more than 40,000 tons and the problem is not yet being properly addressed), disposal of nuclear materials (several hundred tons of these materials are to be destroyed and many of these materials are of interest to terrorists). Also the problem of retraining of specialists were previously engaged in the field of mass destruction weapons and armaments so that their knowledge does not spread over the world and is not used by terrorists for their aims.

Specifically you can see how much each of the countries has undertaken to contribute under the global partnership scheme. The figures are impressive. The program was intended for ten years, from 2002 to 2012. And what do we have at this point in time?

Since the launching of the global partnership program in 2002, 48.7 million dollars was allocated for disposal of nuclear submarines, and 70.2 million dollars for the destruction of chemical weapons.

I can cite several figures on chemical disarmament. Since the signing of the Convention whereby we are to destroy chemical weapons by 2007, Russia has spent about 500 million USD. At the same time the amount of foreign aid without which this program is impossible to complete, the declared amount is 1.5 billion dollars, but in reality only 186 million dollars has been disbursed. And up to 70 percent of that sum remains abroad and is spent in the donor countries on administrative matters, fees to subcontractors, research organizations and that money never reaches Russia.

In 2003 contracts worth 90 million dollars were signed, but only 42 million dollars has been paid. Experts note that if the implementation of the program proceeds at such a pace, it may take several hundred years to fulfill these commitments, 1.5 billion dollars. But we don't have several hundred years or several decades. The threat of the spread of mass destruction weapons and terrorism with the use of such weapons is very pressing. This is universally recognized. Both bin Laden and Al Qaeda have said they would use such weapons and the Chechen terrorists have repeatedly declared the same. So, the problem should be dealt with in very short order.

So, what problems are on the agenda of Global Partnership? First, broadening the geography of global partnership. At the Avian summit in 2003, new countries acceded to the partnership. You will see the six countries indicated here. Now the challenge is to increase the number of donors and the number of recipient countries. For instance, one pressing issue is to spread the global partnership programs to other regions of the world where the problem of proliferation of WMD exists. You can see in the map that these include such countries as Libya, Iraq and Iran in the Middle East, India, Pakistan as well as North Korea. All these countries pose a threat in terms of proliferation.

The international community is taking measures such as joint threat reduction and global partnership, and the approaches that have been worked out as part of these programs can also be considered for the above-mentioned countries.

Already there are concrete results in this area. For example, just last week an agreement was signed by the Secretary of Energy and the head of the Agency for Nuclear Agency, Rumyantsev, on bringing back enriched uranium from research centers in various countries. The agreement embraces 17 countries. Plans call for completing the process by the end of 2005 and for fresh fuel and recycle fuel by 2010, if I am not mistaken.

This is a very important agreement, because highly enriched uranium is a material which can be directly used for the production of nuclear weapons.

What will there be on the Sea Island agenda? It has been decided already that the number of donor and recipient countries will be increased. In particular, such countries as Belgium, New Zealand have been listed among donors. New Zealand has made a statement that they would allocate funds, around a billion New Zealand dollars or about 600 million US dollars for 2003 and 2004. Such countries as South Korea and the Czech Republic, Australia, Ireland, Denmark and Spain may also get involved.

The number of recipients is also expected to grow. Such countries as Georgia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Ukraine have been named. In this context, Belarus was also mentioned.

The United States also insisted that other countries should join the program as recipients, including Iraq and Libya.

What does the expansion of the list of donors and recipients mean from Russia's point of view? We would like to note that new donors are relatively small countries. Their contribution is around a million dollars per country on average, or several hundred thousand dollars usually. They cannot radically change the situation related to financing of the global partnership program. The stated amounts make less than 17 million dollars, when combined. That is less than required by 3-5 billion dollars, if Russia is not taken into account. It is necessary to raise 4 billion dollars at least to meet political commitments, but those new donors cannot influence the situation.

At the same time the growing number of recipients mean that the donors will find it easier now, in political terms, to avoid meeting their commitments concerning financing priority projects in Russia. It will be necessary to start with discussions concerning defining strategic priorities, working up new projects and the like. And this could slow down the progress of interaction. And this will happen against the background of underfinancing of priority projects in Russia, related to chemical weapons and submarines.

There still are outstanding problems in cooperation, inherited by Russia since the early 1990s, those related to cooperation with the United States, such as the utilization of funds in the global partnership framework. This problem exists both in donor countries and in Russia.

In Russia, we should admit that the audit of programs that are under way is insufficient. Both Russia and the donor countries often lack information on how much has been allocated, how much has been transferred, how much has reached Russia and has been used for particular projects. Expert examination of new projects is lacking, in particular independent examination which would allow avoiding problems already at the initial stage, when those projects start, avoid unreasonable use of funds. In this connection, nongovernmental organizations could play an important role. They could provide assistance to governmental agencies and to donor countries so they would make more reasonable decisions.

There are certain problems related to access to facilities. Donor countries often want to get free and unrestricted access to Russian nuclear facilities. Naturally we have certain rules which do not allow this. It is necessary to discuss those problems. In the past there were certain problems when delegations from Western countries included people having no relation to projects implemented at those facilities. In particular, they included aides to senators and the like, who were not directly responsible for those problems.

There is another important problem. It is a technical problem, but it impedes the implementation of many projects in Russian-US cooperation. It is the problem of potential damages during the realization of projects.

Under the existing agreements, in the event that during the implementation of a joint Russian-US project damage of any nature is done -- for example if it turns out that the American personnel are Al Qaeda members and blast a Russian reactor -- Russia should cover all potential damages. The United States has fully shunned the responsibility.

We have long raised the issue. Those who have intentionally caused damage, should pay. Including the Americans. But there has been no progress on their part, and a number of projects have been suspended. The problem is resolved and political will is required.

There also are other problems. It is necessary to increase the participation of the private sector in dealing with those problems, improving the way information is provided to the public and private businesses, information related to terrorists activities. This would be in common interests.

Some projects are actually not too expensive. For example, the Czech Republic is ready to allocate an equivalent of 100,000 pounds sterling ... 45,000 for global partnership programs. Actually, projects of this size could be financed by big private businesses. But the problem is how they could be attracted to take part in those projects. I think this would be in the interests of both Russian and foreign businesses, and they should be more active in those projects.

Let me stop here. Gennady Mikhailovich, if you can add something, do please.

Moderator: Gennady Mikhailovich Yevstafyev.

Yevstafyev: Daniil Kobyakov has told you everything. So, I will only make certain remarks to add some information on the topic of this press conference. I will proceed from the assumption that Russia needs the program of Global Partnership. And not because in its present state Russia is incapable of destroying its chemical weapons and nuclear submarines and so on.

Let us look at it from this angle. This year we expect -- in fact, it was supposed to have been announced in May, but the announcement hasn't come yet, it will probably come any day now -- that we will dispose of three submarines before the end of the year. And one nuclear submarine will be disposed of in the Far East with Japanese help. That makes four.

The amount disbursed is not so large. The Japanese have promised 6.7 million dollars, but so far have disbursed 2.1 million dollars. Britain has promised 23.2 million dollars, but so far we have received 3.2 million dollars. Perhaps Norway gave us more than others, because they promised 17.5 million dollars and have already allocated 12 million dollars. You understand why the Norwegians are so active, because this affects them directly, this is their headache. So, they are prepared to tackle this task more aggressively than other countries which are far away from the Kola Peninsula and the Barents Sea.

Russia itself has allocated 138 million dollars, of which 101 million dollars has been disbursed. My point is that Russia is an active participant in the process and in principle we have the technical potential for disposing of 15 submarines a year. Today we have about 100 submarines waiting to be destroyed and at the rate of 15 a year we could complete the job within 7-8 years. But our problem is that we don't have enough money of our own to maintain such a high level. So, foreign aid is essential to this process.

What is the problem there? The problem is that unfortunately our partners are mainly thinking in terms of cutting the bodies of submarines and give us little or no help in creating the coastal infrastructure of the fuel removed from nuclear reactors. And we need containers for storage and transportation of fuel rods to other places because the coastal infrastructure can only serve as temporary storage facilities.

What is the non-proliferation threat? The threat is that, according to most specialists, in particular an American specialist by the name of Krupnik, nuclear fuel is safer while it has not yet been removed from the submarine, safer than after it has been removed and is not stored properly under good protection. Leakage of nuclear fuel is more likely than from moored submarines.

I have given you a few figures. A total of 49.7 million dollars has been released for the disposal of submarines. That is not enough. And there is a very big gap between what has been promised and what we have received. That is one of the problems that was high on the agenda of the conference held under the aegis of PIR Center and the Council for Sustained Development of Russia on April 23-24.

There was a very interesting question raised and I want to draw your attention to the figures. There were 262 participants with a high percentage of foreigners. I won't cite the figures now, but if you are interested, I can get them for you. When asked whether a breakthrough has occurred in implementing the program launched at Kananaskis, most of the specialists -- they are not just lay people from the street, they are government officials, experts and research workers -- most of them answered "no".

Of course, the program is more than two years old because many things were started under the American Threat Reduction Program. It is to be regretted that there has been no breakthrough, but on the other hand, it is clear that it is a very major program. Initial difficulties and unresolved problems are inevitable in such programs. But it would be unfortunate if a breakthrough does not occur in the coming year, then we would have to reassess the program.

And it is not a matter of indifference for our partners for political as well as economic considerations. Most of those who have committed money are in this way supporting their own industries. Take the Germans for example. The German Economy Ministry chooses who will supply the equipment. In some cases -- for the chemical weapons, for example -- we had to accept the technologies that were not, in our opinion, progressive enough and we had other schemes, but they didn't have the equipment for those schemes. They are not just bureaucrats who go on business missions and due to that overheads grow. But they get certain return for their major firms supplying equipment. In this case tenders are not held and equipment is supplied at relatively high prices.

But I have focused too much on technical details. In political terms, the past two years and the conference held here in April have shown that those programs are promising. The fact that new donors are joining them, as well as recipients show that they are expedient, and people pin their hopes on them.

It is important for Russia in this process to protect and expand the level of realization of those promises we received. You know Russia allocates around 10 percent for those purposes.

Naturally, 2 billion of 20 billion is our own funds. This is an important fact, but we have rarely mention it. It looks like this is a program for Russia and they give us everything and sponsor us. Nothing of the kind. We are speaking about partnership. On the Russian basis technologies and programs have been developed for which can be applied not only in Russia but also abroad, including in Western countries where utilization of certain types of what is covered by the global partnership program takes place.

This means that this is an equitable partnership, because we have already reached an important level and we need a breakthrough, but this breakthrough can only be accomplished if partnership is equitable. I do not mean to say that everything is perfect here. We have a problem, and it is a problem of civil responsibility. It is not only their problem. It is our problem.

We have resolved this problem with some states. For example, such countries as Canada have allocated their funds via countries with which we have resolved this problem, and we should try harder and try to resolve those issues.

The efficiency of utilization of funds, even those that have been allocated, is a big problem we face.

On the whole, the global partnership program is an important instrument in ensuring international security. It is not that we have just decided to liquidate all that. Our goal is combating proliferation of nuclear weapons, technologies and materials. In this sense this program is very important. It is a program of international cooperation. And it is a unique program, because programs involving such a number of participants and funds, even though far from all of them have been provided, have never existed before.

Passing over to nonproliferation, I have to say that during the past several years contradictory trends have been registered in the nonproliferation sphere. Very contradictory. On the one hand, as you know, we have Iraq. It is a shame which has led to the emergence of a certain Iraq syndrome. True, the American military, Ramsfeld, say that they have proceeded with their search. Perhaps, they can find something somewhere. But this is a decided matter.

On the other hand, Iraq was a manifestation of the use of force, of the concept of combating proliferation in a very primitive and straightforward interpretation of the Bush administration. The idea is not not new. It has existed for many years, but the initiators of this concept used to be junior partners in the Bush Sr. administration. They have now grown and must have decided to realize now what they could not do then. And this is what happened.

The concept itself and their moves have been a total flop. Personally I believe that the administration has at long last come to realize that it is a flop and started crawling away from the abyss. This has created new conditions for interaction.

But I have stepped aside from global partnership. This interaction manifested itself, for example, in that a year after the Krakow initiative of Bush Jr. Russia has joined the so-called Security Proliferation Initiative. On May 31, precisely a year after it was voiced in Krakow.

And this is good, because Russia's participation in the SPI, its having joined the core countries, will allow doing away with the euphoria which followed the victory in Iraq and for that reason ingrained very aggressive elements in the SPI concept. Frankly speaking, they did not invite us to join it at the time, because they realized that we would have tried to smooth it all out.

Now that their aggressive intentions have been a fiasco, Russia can work in the SPI framework and make certain adjustments and obstruct that extremism in the United States policy. I mean that every time when attempts were made to use force to resolve the nonproliferation problem, there were always great problems. And Iraq has confirmed this. But then, as we insisted, the policy of peace talks prevailed, it always yielded positive results. They have learned from experience, because what happened to Libya, some are trying to make it out that Kaddafi was frightened and decided to own up. This may be true up to a point. But in any scenario, before Libya ceased to be a willful proliferator, there were negotiations and discussions and not the use of force because for years Libya was threatened with the use of force.

The same is true of the still outstanding problem of Iran, because the Iranians have embarked on the path of negotiations and discussions with the IAEA. And let the Americans, let Bolton say that things are not moving fast enough and that they are negotiating with Russia. Nevertheless, the problem has been defused. So, there is only one way to proceed.

By the way, a sustained dialogue with North Korea has been put in place in the Far East, in Northeaster Asia. The next round of the "six-party" talks will be held in June. And the process is firmly on track. Previously they would agree to meet from time to time but now working groups have been set up which continue to hammer away at the problem difficult as it is.

So, on balance, although the work of the preparatory committee for the 2005 NPT review conference was not very successful -- it saw some controversy -- but it happens every year because the problem of access to new technologies and the problem of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation have been so closely intertwined that it is impossible to resolve them by imperial methods, solutions acceptable to all must be found. And it is a staggering problem.

I just want to draw your attention to one problem. Several de facto nuclear states do not take part in the NPT: India and Pakistan, which is one of the main proliferators, illegal proliferators of nuclear technologies. You know about the activities of Abdul Qader Khan that created a new phenomenon in the international black market. Neither Pakistan nor India are under any restrictions in developing their nuclear capabilities. For example, the US and Russia, even if the ceilings are high, but they exist.

Theoretically one can imagine that if they had the money they could quickly build more nuclear warheads than Britain and France and become leading nuclear countries. They don't have that much money. And the fact that they do not take part in NPT makes the organization less universal and less effective.

Unfortunately -- this is my personal opinion, and I don't want to impose it on anyone -- but I'd like to tell you that the international community has somewhat resigned to the existence of these states and is unable to draw them into any kind of meaningful interaction in the nuclear field.

I don't think the problem can be solved at one stroke, one should proceed step-by-step, one should reach agreements on official self- imposed restrictions and on the basis of these self- restrictions to develop the process of bringing them to sign the key agreement.

Moderator: Thank you Gennady Mikhailovich. I now open it up for questions.

Q: The accession of Russia to the Bush Initiative -- will it affect the relations between Russia and Iran in the building of Bushehr and all the rest of it? And the second question. Why aren't India and Pakistan under the control, for example, of the IAEA? Why is Pakistan allowed to have weapons? Pakistan is not a hard Islamic state, but nevertheless, it is not included in the Axis of Evil. Could you comment on all these problems?

Yevstafiev: The last question must be directed to Mr. Bolton at the State Department. Put this question to Mr. Bolton and he will explain to you. Pakistan has been their strategic ally for many years, for more than 30 years. And the fact that they failed to take export control measures against Pakistan or any other political measures, and it has not been included in the Axis of Evil. But you will note that they are gradually dropping this term because it doesn't get you very far in the diplomatic world.

As for the Krakow Initiative, you see, the way I understand it, it is about intercepting illegal supplies of nuclear materials, equipment and components in violation of existing agreements. Basically it is aimed at preventing the military developments of the nuclear problem, preventing the circulation of the technologies, elements and materials connected with the creation of nuclear weapons.

As for our relations with Iran, we have very powerful control. The Americans have no arguments. Their arguments are only theoretical: what if? After all, we have solved the problems of return of spent fuel by the Iranians. And this is the key issue because they will have nothing to reprocess. So, I don't see any problems arising there.

It is another question that they want to squeeze us out not because of non-proliferation, but for economic and political reasons, as everyone understands. This effort has been underway for about 15 years. So far without success. In fact, the Western community is divided on the issue because firms in Germany and France and other countries are feeling the pinch and I think before long they will put up a challenge. And Iran still has a chance to come to terms with the IAEA.

Q: Could you say what concrete agreements can emerge from the G- 8 summit, what does Russia seek to achieve there and can anything concrete emerge from all this talk or will everything boil down to a restatement of the same problems that you have mentioned?

Yevstafiev: You have to put this questions to the sherpas who have already prepared these agreements. All the materials are ready.

Q: Do you happen to know --

Yevstafiev: No, I have nothing to do with the sherpas, I am a private individual.

Moderator: A researcher.

Kobyakov: On the whole, I would say that those two spheres I mentioned are the expansion of global partnership and adherence to it of new countries. The process has been institutionalized in the global partnership framework. Last year an annual report on the program's realization was prepared. Naturally, a new report will be prepared and adopted by a group of senior officials which has recently been reformed as the so-called high-level group. This is the right of those sherpas and their deputies taking part in the preparation of the G-8 summits.

Last year concrete documents were adopted on certain spheres, in particular, a declaration was adopted on the safety of radioactive sources. This year it is very likely that documents will also be adopted related to certain spheres in the nonproliferation framework.

Besides, last year the declaration on nonproliferation of mass destruction weapons was adopted in general. It mentioned particular countries, including Iraq, which was mentioned in the nonproliferation context. It is quite possible that regional aspects will also be discussed during the summit, especially given that the leaders of Middle Eastern nations will attend it. So, the nonproliferation problem will certainly be discussed.

Yevstafyev: It is important for Russia for the G-8 to give an additional impetus for a breakthrough in partner relationships in the global partnership program's framework. This impetus can only be given at the head of state level. You know, high-ranking officials do you always have the real picture of the situation. And it is necessary to show them the real picture. This could be done one on one. And when you show them that a lot has been promised, that they have made certain commitments, but they have not met them, this strongly influences further activities of those individuals, unless they have something up their sleeve.

You certainly understand that Russia's joining the SPI on May 31 is a big signal sent by Russia about its readiness to interact with the United States and other G-8 member states. I think this will be appreciated.

There is another thing which we have not discussed in detail today. The Americans have submitted their draft resolution in Iraq. The draft will certainly be discussed.

I think that the draft resolution as it is today cannot satisfy many nations, those who criticized the Americans in the past, because it is an attempt to show their readiness to compromise with the international community and stay there, in Iraq, under this pretext, while changing little and having made the United States responsible for the transfer of power process there.

The draft resolution will certainly be modified, because professionals working in the United Nations, including our diplomats, will certainly take care of that. Not only our diplomats, but also those from France, Germany and other countries. In a broader political sense the draft will certainly be discussed. The heads of state, their role there is reduced to just approving already prepared documents and exchange opinions, views and the like. This is the most important component of such meetings.

Moderator: Thank you. Any more questions? No questions. Thank you for your attention. And I would like to thank our guests.