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Moscow Times
June 3, 2004
Where Is Chechnya Going?
By Boris Kagarlitsky

The assassination of Chechen President Akhmad Kadyrov has created a power vacuum in the republic. The Kremlin has no Kadyrov replacement waiting in the wings. The late Chechen leader fought using his own methods: Where the army proved incapable of neutralizing the rebels by force, Kadyrov was able to win many of them over by persuasion. He was feared, but also respected after a fashion. Now, just one wrong step by the federal center will be enough to send the "reformed" rebels running for the hills.

The Kremlin has sufficient resources to prod things in the direction it desires, the only problem is that it doesn't have a clear idea what it wants. The Russian leadership seems to be taking a timeout until August when a new election will take place in Chechnya. They don't know whom to appoint as next president and, more importantly, what the role of that person should be play.

If the political will existed, it would be possible to resolve the crisis fairly simply. Nowadays, many in Chechnya realize that it makes sense to preserve ties with Russia. Chechnya's status within the Russian Federation should of course be the subject of negotiation, as Kadyrov himself had insisted. The central issue, however, is not Chechen independence or Russia's territorial integrity, but democracy in Russia and Chechnya. Free elections are needed that will result in the formation of popularly accountable authorities.

The Kadyrov regime was dictatorial and ruled by terror. Chechens would hardly have been better off if this regime had suddenly been granted independence. On the other hand, if free elections were held and if a genuinely accountable administration was formed, such an administration should not only be able to reach an agreement with Moscow over the status of the republic, but also to guarantee the fulfillment of its side of any agreement.

The problem is that up to now, the powers that be in Russia have had no need for peace in Chechnya. As in George Orwell's "1984," the authorities need a low-intensity, permanent war. The war in Chechnya is not intended to preserve territorial integrity, but resolve completely different PR and psychological problems of the Putin regime. The key to resolving the Chechen problem can be found in Moscow, not Grozny -- and it involves the country's democratic transformation.

Characteristically, the Kremlin ignored the appeals of certain nationalist politicians to do away with the post of president in Chechnya and to appoint a governor from Moscow. Of course, this would mean admitting the complete collapse of the strategy developed over the past few years, but the collapse is plain for all to see anyway.

One could appoint a governor, but what would this lead to? More repression? Then everything achieved under Kadyrov would have been in vain. The Chechen police would revert to being rebels and take to the hills with their newly-acquired weapons.

You could leave everything as it is, but without Kadyrov's experience and connections, a Russian official would not be able to cope. The only reason for appointing a Russian governor would be as a first step on the path to negotiations.

There are still people in Moscow who understand the Caucasus. A good Kremlin appointee could conduct tough, but effective, negotiations, paving the way for gradual regulation of the conflict as in Northern Ireland. The trouble is that the Kremlin is not ready for this and, as a result, the vacuum remains.

There are no obvious local candidates to replace Akhmad Kadyrov. Former Grozny Mayor Bislan Gantamirov has declared his intention to run for president, but he does not sound too sure. Moscow-based Chechens are not much trusted in the republic, and they don't seem overly keen to return to Chechnya in any case.

This leaves Salambek Maigov, who ran in the State Duma elections on a ticket of compromise and reconciliation within Chechnya. Although, everyone understands that at the end of the day it is not the electorate that decides but the Kremlin. And it seems the Kremlin will wait until the fall, then wager on the first credible figure to pop up.

It is, therefore, important that the right person be in the right place at the right time. All the rest will depend on the diplomatic and backroom abilities of the candidate, who will have to deal simultaneously with four different parties: the federal center, the armed opposition, the kadyrovtsy and, last but not least, the Chechen people.

Boris Kagarlitsky is director of the Institute of Globalization Studies.