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RIA Novosti
May 25, 2004
WHAT CAN RUSSIA EXPECT FROM THE JUNE G8 SUMMIT?
MOSCOW (Alexander Konovalov, President of Strategic Assessments Institute,
for RIA Novosti) - To reply to the question about Russia's expectations of the
June G8 summit in Georgia, USA, we should determine the role which the G8, a
club with a vaguely defined status and mission, is playing and can play in
global politics and economy. This role is highly significant. It is determined
by globalisation and the fundamentally new nature of political and economic
risks and threats. No country in the world, however rich and industrialised, can
stand up against these threats single-handed.
The G8 has quite a few serious drawbacks. To begin with, it is a virtual
organisation and hence its legitimacy is questionable. It cannot make binding
decisions and does not have a mechanism to ensure their application. On the
other hand, formal institutions often merely seal vital decisions in big-time
politics and big business made at golf or tennis clubs. But such informal
decisions should be made at the sufficiently high level. G8 summits offer a
unique opportunity for direct contact between top leaders.
Another vital element of these summits is that the new threats to security
call for immediate reaction and high standards of co-ordination of the leading
countries. Regrettably, such traditional institutes as the UN or NATO cannot
ensure this. So, G8 summits, thought they cannot make binding decisions, can
reach agreements that will outline the vectors of global development for the
future.
What problems will the G8 leaders discuss in Georgia and what position could
Moscow take on them? The situation in Iraq specifically, and the struggle
against international terrorism as a whole, will certainly be at the top of the
agenda. The Russian leadership has said and keeps saying that the military
operation in Iraq was a mistake. Today, it has many more arguments to prove its
point.
At the beginning of the war, the US tried - uselessly - to convince the world
that it was a logical continuation of the anti-terrorist operation in
Afghanistan. But it was apparent that the regime of Saddam Hussein, though cruel
and inhuman, was not connected with global terrorist networks. Deputy Foreign
Minister of Russia Yuri Fedotov recently expressed concern over the
transformation of Iraq "into a bridgehead of the terrorist threat and a breeding
ground of terrorism."
To elaborate their stand on Iraq, the leading countries of the world should
be aware of changes that have happened in the country since the beginning of the
Anglo-American operation. When they sent their troops to Iraq, the coalition
forces had one military adversary - the army of Saddam Hussein. But today the US
is fighting at least three military adversaries there.
The most dangerous of them is international terrorism, which flocked to Iraq
across its open borders. The US army, which has been thrown from its protected
home bases to the Iraqi deserts and cities, is an easy target of nearly daily
bloody attacks carried out by international terrorists.
The second adversary is the Iraqi Shias. The US is facing not just the 3,000
fighters of the al-Mahdi army commanded by Sheikh Moqtada Sadr, an ambitious
young leader who is fighting for influence in the Shiite community and is
dreaming of an Islamic state in Iraq. The enemy includes also much larger groups
of Shiite fighters who received military training in Iran.
And the third adversary is the Sunni groups formed presumably of former
officers of the Iraqi army who have not been employed by the new authorities.
In short, Washington has fulfilled the nearly impossible task of rallying
Sunni and Shiite Arabs in the struggle against the US presence.
By removing the regime of Saddam Hussein, the Americans lifted the lock of
blood and fear, with which the dictator kept together the ethnically and
religiously diverse country. And now they will have to fulfil this task by
applying other instruments. It was believed that democratic institutions, above
all free democratic elections, would be the glue for the state structure. It is
clear now that this plan has failed. There will be no real transfer of power on
June 30 and no withdrawal of coalition forces, although the troop levels might
be significantly cut.
If free democratic elections were held today, they would bring to power the
most radical Shiite groups simply because Shiites make up the overwhelming
majority of the Iraqi population. If foreign troops were withdrawn now, the
country would be plunged into a destructive civil war that would split the state
and considerably strengthen the positions of international terrorism, which
would assume control of the rich country in a strategic region of the world
under any scenario. Since Iraq is closely connected with Iran and Turkey, this
would destabilise the situation in a region far beyond Iraq's borders.
In this situation, Russia and other participants in the forthcoming G8 summit
should think about minimising damage. It should be clear to all that troops will
have to be pulled out of Iraq and power will have to be transferred to the
Iraqis. And so the leading states of the world, including Russia, should
elaborate a plan of political actions, determine the role of the UN in it, and
do their best to establish Iraqi statehood quickly.
Another crucial problem that will be certainly discussed at the summit is the
threat of WMD proliferation, which is becoming especially alarming in view of
the strengthening of terrorist organisations. Russia and the West largely agree
on this issue, but there are some details that may set them apart. One of them
is Russia-Iran nuclear co-operation and the persistent desire of the US to
involve Russia in its Proliferation Security Initiative, designed to strengthen
export controls over chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. Russia is the
only G8 state that has not joined the initiative so far.
Russia's caution is logical. The US views Iran and North Korea as the main
threats. Russia thinks the situation in Iran can be controlled by IAEA
mechanisms, especially after Iran joined the 1997 protocol on surprise nuclear
inspections. As for the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea, Russia is
categorically against helping them acquire nuclear weapons, especially since
this would increase the probability of terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons and
their components and could eventually destroy the system of nuclear arms
control.
However, it would be inadmissible to reduce the problem of nuclear
proliferation to the acquisition of such weapons by Iran and North Korea. The
nuclear weapons threats can be divided into two blocks. First, the level of
threat depends on who owns the weapons and the owner's awareness of his
responsibility. And the second is the fact of existence of nuclear arms. The
Americans spotlight the first block, striving to prevent nuclear weapons from
falling into the hands of "bad boys."
This must not happen, of course, but we should also remember that the logic
of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty is based on the voluntary pledge of the
signatories not to own nuclear weapons. Under Article VI of the treaty, the five
nuclear powers agreed that complete elimination of nuclear weapons is the best
guarantee against their proliferation. These states confirmed their resolve to
liquidate their nuclear arsenals in May 2000. In other words, nuclear weapons
are a threat because they exist. However, at present the nuclear powers cannot
harmonise a joint strategy for the liquidation and prohibition of nuclear
weapons.
And lastly, the G8 leaders will no doubt discuss economic problems. An
alarming trend has developed recently: G8 countries are more willing to
spotlight the economic problems of others and less willing to discuss their own
economic problems.
On the one hand, it seems only logical that the eight leaders assume at least
some of the responsibility for global economic problems. On the other hand, they
should remember that there are economic instability and risks not only in non-G8
countries. Moreover, there are reasons for economic concern in the G8 countries
themselves, which should worry the eight states and other countries.
Consequently, the authority and influence of G8 will largely depend on the
ability of its members to discuss their own economic problems openly and
elaborate a co-ordinated strategy to solve them.
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