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Moscow Times
April 27, 2004
What Was in It for Russia?
By Pavel Felgenhauer

Last week, Russia surprised the world by suddenly vetoing a U.S.- and British-sponsored UN Security Council resolution that would have guaranteed the security of Greek and Turkish Cypriots if they accepted a UN-sponsored plan to unify the island. The Greek Cypriot leadership, supported by Athens, called for voters to reject the plan in a referendum, which they did overwhelmingly, while the Turks approved it. The Greek authorities apparently believed the UN resolution could sway voters and asked Russia to help by exercising its veto.

The Greek authorities believe the UN plan favored the Turks too much. Now only the Greek part of Cyprus will join the EU on May 1, while the Turks will not. Greek Cypriots, in turn, will lose billions of dollars in EU and U.S. aid as punishment, and the prospects of any future reunification now seem dim. This is a Greek problem, a Greek gamble and a Greek decision. But why did Russia get involved?

The official explanation that the veto was "technical" does not seem plausible, and in fact Russian officials do not deny that the decision to veto was a deliberate pro-Greek move made after discussions with Greek officials. Greece is a friendly Orthodox Christian nation, as well as the only NATO member that has been buying large amounts of Russian weapons and financing Greek Cypriot arms procurements from Russia.

A move to oppose a U.S.-British UN resolution in today's Russia seems so natural, it hardly needs any further explanation. Greece may also in the future buy some additional Russian-made weapons. But the negative repercussions for Russia of exercising its veto may substantially outweigh any benefits.

In Washington and London, the Russian veto will cause annoyance. But it may be argued that the United States and Britain have too many other problems to worry about -- Iraq, for example -- to get too upset over Cyprus.

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has put a lot of effort into the UN plan, which the Greeks have now rejected with Russian help. Undermining Annan does not seem to sit well with Moscow's "increasing the role of the UN" mantra.

However, the worst long-term consequence of the UN veto may be a serious rift with Turkey. Joining the EU is a major priority for Ankara. The present Turkish government strongly supported the UN unification plan and hoped that if Turkish Cyprus joined, it would help the rest of Turkey to follow suit.

Turkey is a nation that is very important strategically and economically for Russia. A large portion of Russian oil exports reaches world markets via the Bosporus. Russia has built a pipeline under the Black Sea to sell natural gas to Turkey. But if need be, the Turks can find alternative sources of natural gas in the Middle East or the Caspian.

A confrontation is brewing between the central Georgian government and Adzharia. There is a small Russian military presence in Batumi close to the Turkish border -- a garrison Georgia demands Russia must withdraw.

Turkey is the dominant military power in the region, with an army that is better armed, better disciplined and simply much bigger than anything Russia can possibly field in the Transcaucasus. If there is a military conflict in or around Adzharia anytime soon, possibly involving Russian troops, Turkey's position may decide the outcome.

On balance, Russia's UN veto seems an extremely odd political move that apparently did not take into account our true national interests. But this is not the only instance in which Russian foreign policy has flip-flopped.

On many occasions, the United States and the West have declared they are our partners and almost allies in the war on terrorism. Then last week, Konstantin Kosachyov, chairman of the State Duma Foreign Affairs Committee, announced at a conference in Moscow that al-Qaida is not an enemy of Russia and that an alliance with the United States can only bring trouble.

The constant wavering of Russian foreign, defense and economic policies has often been attributed to the influence of special interest groups. Over the last decade, billions upon billions of dollars from Russia were parked in, or moved through, Cyprus offshore banks and shell companies. As a result, the Greeks seem to have enough influence to force Russian foreign policy to serve their interests.

If the Greeks can do it, who else can? It seems that President Vladimir Putin's cherished political stability is just providing cover for a bazaar where any government decision is up for grabs.

Pavel Felgenhauer is an independent defense analyst.