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JRL RESEARCH & ANALYTICAL SUPPLEMENT ~ JRL 8026 POLITICS SOCIETY ECOLOGY FOREIGN POLICY RUSSIA AND ITS NEIGHBORS ARCHIVE : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : POLITICS 1. POLITICAL POTENTIAL OF THE SKINHEAD MOVEMENT Source. Sergei Belikov, Britogolovye: Vse o skinkhedakh. Ekskliuzivnye materialy [Skinheads: All About Skinheads. Exclusive Materials]. Moscow: Publishing Center of the Russian State Humanitarian University, 2002 Sergei Belikov is one of those rare writers who have an in-depth, "inside" understanding of the skinhead movement -- at least as "inside" as you can get without actually becoming a skinhead. From his book you learn not only how Russian skinheads beat people up, but also something of how they feel, think, plan, organize, join and leave the movement, and relate to other youth subcultures, political parties, the army, and the world of work. Here I focus on just one of the important questions about skinheads in Russia that are illuminated by the author's information and insights: their political potential. In terms of organizational structure, the skinhead movement consists of autonomous groups of four kinds (pp. 114-8, 146): (A) By far the most numerous are groups made up of friends who live in the same locality. Usually it is through such a group that a youngster first becomes a skinhead. Relations among the members are generally egalitarian. There is little emphasis on ideas. The main activity of a local group is to "patrol" the neighborhood and attack any hated individual whom they may encounter. (1) Local groups may form loose alliances over larger areas, such as the Northern Front and Western Front in the northern and southwestern suburbs of Moscow respectively. (B) Other groups take shape around a strong charismatic leader, generally an experienced "old skinhead." (Old is a relative term -- roughly, early 20s.) Ideas are somewhat more important in these groups. (C) Some groups, consisting mostly of old skinheads, are more organized and political, though they do not qualify as full-fledged parties. In addition to violence, such groups produce literature, share money and other resources (often including basement or other vacant premises for meetings and rest), maintain interregional and even international links with similar groups, and take an interest in extreme nationalist politics and ideas. These groups are the most closed and conspiratorial in nature. (D) Finally, there are small groups of enthusiasts who fulfill specialized functions for the movement as a whole, such as the production and distribution of propaganda (including videos, sound tapes, and internet sites as well as magazines and leaflets) and entertainment (musical performances -- though music is also a form of propaganda). Among old skinheads, especially in some groups of types (C) and (D), there are a fair number of intellectually and culturally sophisticated individuals. Yes -- contrary to stereotype, such "skinhead intellectuals" do exist. It must be borne in mind that skinheads come from ALL social backgrounds and that many are students in higher educational institutions. The level of organization of the skinhead movement may not meet certain formal standards, but it suffices to plan, organize, and carry out quite large-scale and well-focused violent actions. The author outlines a hierarchy of such "tactics," each with its own label: the group beating, the raid, the mass fight (makhach), and the pogrom (pp. 152-4). Thus a raid is a carefully planned attack by several groups of skinheads on a specific target -- a hostel for foreign students, let us say. The layout of the hostel is surveyed, with special attention paid to the location of guards and escape routes. Before the raid the participants put on inconspicuous clothing and arm themselves with clubs, chains, and other weapons. In Belikov's opinion, the best-planned action of the skinhead movement to date was the pogrom of the market near the Moscow metro station "Tsaritsyno" on the evening of October 30, 2002. From 6 p.m. onward several hundred young "fighters" gathered in the area between the metro and the market. At 7.30 metal rods were distributed. (2) At 8 they burst through the main entrance to the market shouting slogans and started to assault nonwhite traders (mainly from the Caucasus) and smash up their stalls. Three people were killed and several dozen badly injured or crippled. After a few minutes police arrived but were unable to stop the pogrom until about 8.20, when they fired warning shots into the air. The attackers, except for some 25 who were detained by the police, then retreated to the metro. Two large groups proceeded to other targets, which were attacked about 8.45 -- the Hotel Sevastopol and the market by the metro station "Kashirskaya." The choice of the date for the pogrom itself bore witness to well-informed planning. On the day concerned, most of the Moscow police were deployed in the city center where the World Economic Forum was in progress and violent anti-globalist demonstrations were anticipated. Other police officers were at a soccer match where violence was also expected. In the event, there was no trouble in either location (pp. 155-6). There has been talk in skinhead circles of organizing action of a more ambitious kind. One idea, for example, is the "ring of freedom." At a prearranged time, several hundred "fighters" would form a ring around Moscow or one of its satellite towns and carry out lightning raids against multiple targets along axial routes, beating non-Russians, setting fire to synagogues and mosques, etc. (pp. 147-8). The author describes the general attitude of skinheads toward extreme nationalist organizations as ambivalent. Many skinheads are willing to cooperate with the politicos, especially if paid for doing so. At the same time, they tend to despise them as talkers not doers. "We fight for the triumph of the white race every day." Over the last two or three years, the People's National Party led by Alexander Ivanov-Sukharevsky has had the most success in winning the support of skinheads. Many skinheads in Moscow and its environs and whole groups of skinheads in some of the provinces have joined the party, and the celebrated skinhead hero Semyon Tokmakov has been made deputy party leader (pp. 148-51, 163-4). (3) To sum up Belikov's concluding assessment (pp. 169-70): * There are now tens of thousands of Russian skinheads and the number continues to increase rapidly. They are to be found not only in big cities but also in small towns and even rural settlements. The skinhead movement is the strongest and most active of the country's youth subcultures: its symbols and slogans appeal to a significant proportion of the young generation. * Russian skinheads tend to be more aggressive and political than Western skinheads. The cultural aspect of the movement (music, style, etc.) is of relatively less importance to them. However, they are not fully politicized: i.e., they are not organized as a serious political force that sets itself clear tasks and struggles for power. * The skinhead movement does not pose a direct threat to the state. However, it spreads racism and xenophobia among young people, creates an atmosphere of fear and cruelty in society, and constitutes a reserve for the growth of extreme nationalist organizations. Notes (1) Targets are often selected on a racial or ethnic basis (blacks, Jews, people from the Caucasus or Central Asia), but can also be members of rival youth subcultures -- rappers (fans of rap music) are especially hated -- or antifascist activists or homeless vagrants. The strongest member hurls the target to the ground, while the others confine their heroism to kicking and trampling the prostrate victim. (2) Most of the participants were skinheads, but there were also some soccer fans and members of Russian National Unity. Besides the rods, they used stones, empty bottles, and anything else that came to hand. (3) For an account of this party and its leader, see Stephen D. Shenfield, Russian Fascism: Traditions, Tendencies, Movements (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), pp. 222-31. Tokmakov is celebrated for leading an assault on a black American marine, a guard at the US embassy, in Filevsky Park in May 1998. : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : POLITICS 2. RELATIONS BETWEEN REGIONAL OFFICIALS AND ORGANIZED CRIME Source. Robert Orttung's report of a conference of criminologists at Yaroslavl State University on January 20-21, 2004. Russian Regional Report, Vol. 9, No. 1, 3 February 2004 (1) Russia's laws against organized crime are extremely difficult to enforce because the criminals often have high-level protection from state officials, impeding collection of the exact evidence required. Under these circumstances, regional and local officials "find it more effective in terms of maintaining stability" not to try to arrest organized crime leaders but "to work cooperatively with [them] to handle local situations." Some experts advocate that requirements for evidence be relaxed in order to facilitate prosecutions. One major issue concerns the allocation of responsibility among the members of a crime group. Vladimir Yakushin, rector of the Volga University in Tolyatti, favors holding the head of a crime group responsible for all actions of the group. (This view does not have wide support.) Others argue that province governors and other state officials who work directly with criminals should also face criminal sanctions. There are many problems involved in defining the concept of an "organized crime group." Existing legislation is poorly worded and in places contradictory. Some types of crime group do not fall within the current legal definition. For example, some critics question the Russian Supreme Court's decision that only a "stable" group can be considered an organized crime group. Much controversy surrounds amendments to the Criminal Code adopted in December 2003. Among other things, these amendments replaced the penalty of confiscation of property by fines up to one million rubles, although criminal profit is often far in excess of this figure. Some experts defend reliance on fines on the grounds that property confiscation is unenforceable. Deputy head of the Yaroslavl province department for combating organized crime Vladimir Glazkov reported that the region has not had a major crime case for about three years despite the presence of ten functioning organized crime groups. In 2002 some 70 crimes of an organized character were registered, most connected to the energy sector or illegal alcohol production. Political pressure to remove organized crime leaders has evaporated. The authorities refuse to move against the current crime boss "because they believe that he does a good job keeping the situation under control and maintains a form of order." Organized crime groups are increasingly taking over cities and even regions. The car-manufacturing center of Tolyatti in the Volga region is one example. Local crime bosses [vory v zakone] head the administrations of many small Siberian towns. "Such criminal-politicians are often popular because they ensure the provision of basic social services, such as the payment of pensions. Removing them can lead to new turf battles and shooting wars. Therefore policies to deal with organized crime must be more sophisticated than simply arresting crime leaders. Others will appear to fill the vacuum." Note (1) A biweekly publication jointly produced by the Center for Security Studies at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) Zurich (http://www.isn.ethz.ch) and the Transnational Crime and Corruption Center (TraCCC) at American University, Washington, DC (http://www.American.edu/traccc). The conference was sponsored by TraCCC and supported by the US Department of Justice. : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : SOCIETY 3. THE POSITION OF LABOR IN RUSSIA Source. Karin Kleman (Karine Clement), Mir naemnogo truda kak "vnutrenniaia periferiia" i t.n. antiglobalistskoe dvizhenie v Rossii i na Zapade [The World of Hired Labor as an "Internal Periphery" and the So-Called Anti-Globalist Movement in Russia and the West], pp. 174-89 in D. Iu. Glinskii, ed. Rossiia v tsentro-perifericheskom miroustroistve. Sbornik statei [Russia in the Global Core-Periphery Relationship. Collection of Articles]. Moscow: Moscow Representative Office of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 2003 The author is a French specialist in the sociology of labor who resides in Russia and is affiliated with Paris-10 University and the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences. She is also a participant in the international trade union and "anti-globalist" movements. (She prefers the term "alter-globalist movement" -- that is, "alternative globalist.") The share of workers' wages in Russia's GDP has fallen over the years of reform to about 20 percent. The corresponding figure for Western countries is much higher. In the US, for instance, it is about 60 percent (although the share of wages is falling in the West too). Why? Dr. Clement sees the main reason in the highly unequal and deteriorating correlation of forces between labor and capital in Russia. "If Russia is a periphery of the world capitalist system, then Russian labor forms the periphery of a periphery." Specific factors in the unfavorable correlation of forces include the following: * Despite the creation of vast corporate amalgamations at a higher level, large production units are being broken down into small semi-autonomous workshops where there is no one to whom workers can address their demands. * The ideology of post-Soviet liberalism devalues the contribution of workers to the economy and views them as "superfluous and lazy people." Many workers are themselves influenced and demoralized by this ideology. They "prefer to work quietly, just so long as they are left alone and not fired." * Workers are weakly organized. They do not regard the trade unions, most of which are still the successors to the old Soviet trade unions, as effective instruments for defending their rights. They say that the most effective approach is to seek personal privileges and improvements from management on an informal basis. In a survey of workers conducted in 2002 by the All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM), more than half the respondents reported that their labor rights (as specified by the labor code) had been infringed, but only half of those affected had expressed any objection and a mere 5 percent had taken the matter to court. The majority of enterprise directors with whom the author spoke said that they could always find a way to evade their legal obligations or get rid of an unwanted worker. Workers too do not think that laws or written rules can fulfill any useful function. These factors constitute a system that "destabilizes and fragments" the world of labor and blocks the development of a workers' movement. Labor almost ceases to be a collective subject of social relations and is reduced to peripheral status as cheap, atomized, and flexible labor power. Dr. Clement draws parallels with similar tendencies in the organization of labor in the West, where employers also aim to make labor mobile, flexible, and "plastic." What are the prospects for overcoming the peripheral status of Russian labor? The author does not think that the struggle for economic rights on its own can greatly improve the position of labor under the new conditions. She advocates a many-sided political, economic, and social struggle to raise the status of labor. This struggle must be directed against the system as a whole at all levels from the enterprise to the planet. And so she places her main hope in the so-called "anti-globalist" movement, which -- she points out -- is an international and internationalist movement and is therefore not opposed to globalization as such, but rather seeks to give the process a socially just character. Note (1) She has published works in Russian and French. Her major work is the book "Les Ouvriers Russes dans la Tourmente du Marché, 1989-1999: Destruction d'un Groupe Social et Remobilisations Collectives" [Russian Workers in the Torment of the Market, 1989-1999: Destruction of a Social Group and Collective Remobilizations] (Paris: Editions Syllepse, 2000). : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : ECOLOGY 4. FOREST FIRES Source. Anatoly Greshnevikov, Yolki-palki, les pustoi... [Stick-Trees, the Forest is Empty] (Rybinsk: "Zhizn' i mysl'" and "Rybinskoe podvor'e," 2002), pp. 41-8 This booklet, one in a series authored by a prominent environmental activist, is devoted to the ongoing destruction of Russia's forests. There are several aspects to this destruction. The author discusses the trade in timber, much of it illegal, with special emphasis on the insatiable maw ("like a vacuum cleaner") of the Chinese market. But, as it turns out, the single factor of greatest importance is forest fires, which devastate an area of forest 5-6 times as large as that cleared by timber felling. Each year 25-30,000 fires incinerate over two million hectares of forest, roughly equivalent to the area of Armenia. Direct monetary damage is reckoned in trillions of rubles. The larger fires often burn down human settlements together with the surrounding forest, killing people who do not escape in time as well as many firefighters. The ecological damage caused by forest fires has several dimensions. Some are connected with the destruction of forest (however caused), others with the fires themselves: -- Forests are the planet's lungs: they absorb carbon dioxide and release oxygen. Thus their destruction reduces the oxygen content of the atmosphere and adds to atmospheric CO2. This contributes to global warming, CO2 being a greenhouse gas. -- The destruction of forest degrades the water/soil regime, leading to flooding at some times and places and drought and soil erosion at others. -- The fires release into the atmosphere enormous amounts of material as gas and soot, some of which is toxic. While the gas contributes to global warming, the soot particles block the sunlight over the areas affected, cooling them and harming agricultural output. This effect is analogous to that caused by big volcanic eruptions and the putative "nuclear winter." Who or what ignites forest fires and why? * Leaks of oil from pipelines are a common cause of forest fires. * Some fires are started accidentally by people using the forest for recreational purposes. The immediate source may be a bonfire or the dropping of a lit cigarette. * Some are started deliberately by psychically deranged arsonists ("maniacs"). * But arsonists may be in the pay of "mafia" entrepreneurs seeking to clear land for building or other uses. Fire is a quicker and cheaper way of clearing land than felling. * In some rural areas, it is the practice in the spring to burn meadow and pasture in order to facilitate the growth of new grass. The fire easily spreads to adjacent forest. : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : FOREIGN POLICY 5. RUSSIAN PUBLIC OPINION ON THE 'ANTI-TERRORIST' ALLIANCE Source. John O'Loughlin, Gearóid O Tuathail, and Vladimir Kolossov, A "Risky Westward Turn"? Putin's 9-11 Script and Ordinary Russians, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 56, no. 1, January 2004, pp. 3-34 Less than a fortnight after the events of September 11, 2001, Putin announced that Russia would join with the US and other countries in the fight against "international terrorism." The authors (1) analyze the "script" that Putin and other top Russian officials have used to articulate this strategic choice and assess the extent to which they enjoy the support of public and elite opinion. In basic respects Putin's script is very similar to that of Bush. Both present the fight against terrorism in moral rather than political terms, as a fight between good and evil, between civilization and barbarism (not between one civilization and another), and indeed between humans and non-human enemies (with terrorists pictured as vermin, parasites, viruses or plague germs). No attempt is ever made to explore the political context or origins of terrorism. Terrorism is envisaged as a global threat that might come from anywhere, although there are specific locations where the threat exists in concentrated form. Here some divergences arise between Putin and Bush. While they agreed that Afghanistan should be the first target of the anti-terrorist campaign, they do not put the same emphases on other locations. For obvious reasons, Putin puts very heavy stress on Chechen terrorism and has been much more willing than Bush to name Pakistan and Saudi Arabia as major sources of the threat. Putin's pan-human rhetoric about the need for all mankind to unite against a common threat is a faint echo of Gorbachev's "new thinking" on global cooperation against such threats as nuclear war, disease, and ecological disaster. Unfortunately, these problems are of no interest to Putin. The authors also link Putin's decision to ally with the US to his readiness to jettison traditional geopolitical ideas in favor of geo-economic thinking. Geo-economics has its stronghold in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but the military regard it with suspicion: no more than one third of army officers support Putin's foreign policy. In order to assess the reactions of ordinary Russians to Putin's script on terrorism and the anti-terrorist alliance with the US, the authors conducted a survey of 1,800 respondents in 202 locations across Russia in April 2002. For the purpose of reliable comparison between Moslem and non-Moslem parts of Russia, respondents were drawn disproportionally from Tatarstan and Bashkortostan in the Volga region and from the northwestern Caucasus. (2) A large majority of respondents -- 74 percent with 15 percent disagreeing -- considered the alliance between Russia and the US in the fight against international terrorism a positive development. However, this apparent public approval of the alliance in principle has to be seen in the light of two countervailing factors: * Only 26 percent believed that Russia was an equal partner of the US in this alliance. 35 percent thought that the US was imposing its policy on Russia, while a further 28 percent regarded the alliance as short-term and artificial. These perceptions suggest that support for the alliance is broad but not deep. * Approval for the anti-terrorist campaign in principle was tempered by much greater ambivalence concerning the specific forms that it was taking and might take. Thus on the US war against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, respondents were evenly split -- 44 percent approved, 40 percent disapproved. Women, and especially older women, were less likely than men to approve of the war. This, the authors speculate, is because they had been more influenced by Soviet peace propaganda (tut, tut!). Or perhaps, unlike the authors, they remember the experience of the Soviet war in Afghanistan? Respondents in Moslem area were also less likely to approve: 29 percent in the Volga region, 17 percent in the northwestern Caucasus. The survey was conducted before the war in Iraq, but respondents were asked: "Would you approve military actions of the US against other countries suspected of supporting international terrorism?" Only 21 percent approved and 67 percent disapproved. Moreover, strong opposition to an extended war existed across all socio-demographic groups. On the specific question of military action against Iraq, 16 percent approved and 68 percent disapproved (12 and 73 percent respectively in the Moslem areas). Respondents were also asked why they thought the US had set up military bases in Central Asia. They were shown a list of possible motives and invited to choose up to three. The proportions of respondents who identified different motives were as follows: * to assist in the fight against terrorism -- 17 percent * to promote democracy and civil rights in the region -- 4 percent * to expand the US sphere of influence -- 48 percent * to enhance US control over the region's oil and gas resources -- 31 percent * to replace Russia in its traditional sphere of influence -- 37 percent Notes (1) The authors are affiliated with the University of Colorado at Boulder, Virginia State University, and the Institute of Geography of the Russian Academy of Sciences respectively. (2) That is: Tatarstan and Bashkortostan -- 150 respondents; northwestern Caucasus -- 150 respondents; and the rest of Russia -- 1500 respondents. The authors seem quite unaware of the deep differences between the northwestern and the northeastern Caucasus and wrongly extrapolate their findings for the northwestern Caucasus to the North Caucasus as a whole. : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : RUSSIA AND ITS NEIGHBORS 6. LUKASHENKA'S BELARUS: NOT SO BAD? Source. Grigory Ioffe, Understanding Belarus: Economy and Political Landscape, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 56, no. 1, January 2004, pp. 85-118 This is the last in a series of three articles in successive issues of Europe-Asia Studies in which Professor Ioffe (Radford University) challenges dominant views about Belarus and the Lukashenka regime. The first two articles focused on the linguistic situation in Belarus and the evolution of Belarusian identity, the weakness of which he attributes to powerful historical factors rather than any deliberate policy of assimilation on Russia's part. Here the author discusses other aspects of the political and economic situation in Belarus. He argues that many Western and liberal Russian commentators present this situation in an unfairly negative light. While things are indeed very far from ideal, they are actually not so bad by the standards of the post-Soviet region -- and this is the most relevant context for comparison. Thus most assessments of Belarus' economy are full of "doom and gloom." Nevertheless, the economy has been growing since 1996 and has almost returned to the 1990 level of industrial output. By and large, Lukashenka kept his main pre-election promise of 1994: he restored economic ties with Russia and thereby got Belarusian enterprises back on full capacity work schedules. Professor Ioffe marshals some impressive figures from the CIS Statistical Yearbook for 1999: * Belarus' GDP was up to 84 percent of its 1991 level, the second smallest decline in GDP among CIS countries. (Uzbekistan fares best on this indicator.) * Belarus produces 70 percent of all the buses manufactured in the CIS, 60 percent of the tractors, 50 percent of the TV sets, 30 percent of the trucks, and 25 percent of the shoes. * Belarus accounts for over half the world output of electronic microchips for watches. * Agricultural output declined by only 32 percent in Belarus, as against 40 percent in Russia and 43 percent in Ukraine. * Belarus is ahead of all other post-Soviet states in per capita output of meat, potatoes, milk, butter, and cooking oil. The UN ranks Belarus above all other post-Soviet states (and some East European countries too) on its Human Development Index (Human Development Report for 2001). Moreover, the international migration statistics for 1998-2000 show Belarus as the only country in the post-Soviet region with in-migration from every other country in the region exceeding out-migration to that country. While net immigration from the rest of the CIS is only about 20,000 per year, it does suggest that something real does underlie the statistics. There are people who "vote with their feet" for Belarus. Besides a tolerable standard of living, the country offers them relatively good infrastructure and social benefits and a low level of social tension and ethnic nationalism. Whether the economic revival is sustainable is, of course, another matter. The author acknowledges that to some extent it is based on Russian subsidies in the form of low gas prices. Another problem is the scarcity of investment to renew the aging capital stock. But this hardly makes the revival a "myth" as some analysts call it. Professor Ioffe also acknowledges Lukashenka's authoritarian tendencies, and attributes them to the legacy of peasant mores in a country that industrialized very late. But he asks whether Lukashenka is really any more authoritarian than the presidents of half a dozen other post-Soviet states. He finds parallels with oriental despotism, such as the definition of the regime as "sultanism," peculiarly inappropriate. He points out that citizens of Belarus have free access to opposition and Russian media that not merely criticize but "mock and humiliate" Lukashenka, and that many people are not afraid to express disapproval of the president to a stranger. Just contrast this with the situation in places like Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan! The author observes that corruption in Belarus remains at relatively low Soviet levels and is less rampant than in Russia, Ukraine or even Poland. He wryly notes how one author attempts to expose Lukashenka's corruption by revealing that he has a special extra-budgetary fund and has used it to build a new house for his mother, repair his wife's house, buy himself suits, and give presents. How many people in countries throughout the world would be only too glad to have leaders whose corruption is on such a modest scale! Why then does Lukashenka get such a bad press in the West? Why is he shunned by Western politicians who are happy to welcome despots from the Caucasus and Central Asia? Surely it has nothing to do with human rights. Professor Ioffe suggests two reasons: * Lukashenka frustrated Western expectations that Belarus would reorient itself geopolitically from Russia to the West, although these expectations were unfounded to begin with. * The West relies for its information about Belarus on a few opposition-minded and insufficiently objective intellectuals and on even more biased and out-of-touch Belarusian émigrés. Allow me to suggest three more: * The double standard on human rights in different parts of the world is linked to the belief in the superiority of European civilization, and in some cases indeed to white racism. You can't expect Asiatics to respect human rights -- if some of them do, it's a miracle -- but Europeans are supposed to live up to higher standards. (1) * Lukashenka's success in reviving the Belarusian economy without large-scale privatization is ideologically unpalatable to the supporters of private capitalism. * Belarus has no oil. Note (1) I am indebted for this point to my colleague Terry Hopmann at Brown University -- not that he put it in quite these terms! : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : ARCHIVE 7. NOTES OF AN INTERVIEW WITH NATALYA NAROCHNITSKAYA Introduction The new Duma elected in December 2003 contains many more or less extreme Russian nationalists. Their views are presented in a recent report by Nickolai Butkevich, research and advocacy director of the Union of Councils for Jews in the Former Soviet Union: "In Their Own Words: Extremist Nationalists in the New Duma" at http://www.fsumonitor.com/stories/011204DumaElections2003.shtml One of the individuals featured in this report is the historian Natalya Narochnitskaya, a leading ideologist of the new nationalist pro-Putin bloc Motherland, which won 9 percent of the vote in the elections. When I saw her name I had a sudden flash of recognition: I had interviewed her on a visit to Moscow in October 1992. We were introduced by Yuri Davydov, a colleague of hers at the USA Institute of the Academy of Sciences (ISKAN), who wanted me to learn about nationalist ideas firsthand. The interview, if you can call it that, took place in a room at ISKAN. Narochnitskaya talked nonstop, oblivious to the stream of people entering and leaving the room and the constantly ringing telephone. Getting a word in edgeways required a major effort of the will. My late colleague Richard Smoke was also present during part of the interview. At that time, Narochnitskaya was vice-chairperson for international affairs of the Constitutional Democratic Party (Party of the People's Freedom), which claimed to be the successor of the original Cadet Party that was founded in 1905. In fact, there were two parties of this name that made the same claim. Narochnitskaya belonged to the more nationalist of the two. They called themselves "patriotic democrats" or "statist democrats." While Narochnitskaya's views may have undergone changes over the intervening eleven years -- I have not read her recent writings -- the notes that I took of my interview with her back in 1992 may still be of interest. My notes of the interview I am against Bolshevism, but I am also against those democrats who in the name of fighting Bolshevism crush the Russian state. The Russian state long antedates the Bolsheviks, who survived only by exploiting its tradition. I do not recognize the unconstitutional division of historical Russia and wish to see the country reunited, though not in its Soviet form, through the convening of a Constituent Assembly. Otherwise there will be more wars, as few of the new states are viable within their existing borders. SDS: As a new union is hardly feasible at present, isn't it worth supporting initiatives to strengthen the CIS, such as the proposal of Kazakhstan's President Nazarbaev? I suppose so, but the value of the CIS as a means of securing Russia's interests should not be absolutized. The former USSR is the natural sphere of Russia's vital interests. This means that no other power should be allowed to deploy military forces within this sphere, even under the aegis of the United Nations. It means that none of the new states should be allowed to join an alliance directed against Russia. Yes, just like the Monroe Doctrine. Empire in itself is not a bad thing. The Russians in the other states must be defended. The government is stuck in a reactive stance on this issue. The secession of the Baltic states is illegitimate and should be recognized only if they grant citizenship to all former Soviet citizens living on their territory. Are the Baltic states viable? They are doomed to be border states. Either they will be under Russian domination or they will be under German domination. The same goes for Poland. Are the Poles our friends or our enemies? Their mentality is divided. Their Slavic roots pull them toward Russia, but they have a history of aggression against Russia and Ukraine and as Catholics they are drawn into the Vatican's intrigues against Orthodoxy. Only a strong Russia can ward off the Chinese and German threats to Europe. Germany is returning to the 19th-century geopolitics of shifting coalitions of powers, playing the Baltic and Ukrainian cards against Russia. It has its eyes set on Kaliningrad. That is why we must not create a precedent of revising post-WW2 borders in the Far East [by returning the Kuriles to Japan]. A certain level of Russian weakness is in the interests of Western Europe, but that level has been surpassed. Europe needs a strong Russia. I don't mean a bellicose Russia. A great country should have a strong POLICY, a strong will, so that it does not need actually to APPLY force. National interests must be defended. The democrats neglect them and call them "old thinking." They are ruining the country. On the other hand, Russia is forced by its weakness, as it was after the Crimean war, to restore its independence, to isolate itself. It is wiser not to undertake military interventions for the time being, even in the North Caucasus. Let them first exhaust themselves in internecine strife. Like China, Russia should keep its distance from the US. For instance, it should not support US sanctions against Iraq. However, it is easier to say what Russia should NOT do than to say what it SHOULD do. As Russia is in no position to further its own interests in the world, the best thing for it to do is to freeze, to do nothing. I believe in the civilizational approach to the understanding of history -- past, present, and future. A civilization is defined by the answers it gives to the four fundamental questions of the relationship of man to God, of man to man, of man to society, and of man to nature or the cosmos. Civilization is closely connected to religion -- Orthodoxy, Catholicism, Islam, Confucianism, and so on. The civilizational approach is opposed both to cosmopolitanism, which seeks to impose uniformity upon humanity, and to ethnic exclusivism. Russians have very little feeling of ethnic solidarity precisely because they conceive of their identity in terms of civilization. The true Orthodox Russian either builds a supra-ethnic state or retreats into isolation. I am against the nihilistic interpretation of Russian history. Orthodox Russia had a tolerant culture. Unlike West European colonialism, it did not proselytize, let alone exterminate, other peoples. [Not necessarily a completely accurate view of Russian history --SDS] The purpose of Russia in history is to hold the balance between East and West. Russians are disillusioned with a foreign policy oriented solely toward the West, which is leading to a loss of independence. They are turning to Eurasianism. The Lord will not allow Russia to die. But its prospects over the medium term are gloomy. Russia is under attack around its periphery -- from pan-Turkism, from Islamic fundamentalism, and from Catholicism. Islamic fundamentalism is less dangerous than pan-Turkism, but dangerous nonetheless. But our main enemy is the Vatican. It works in league with Germany, which again has an expansionist ideology. The Germans and the Vatican exploded Yugoslavia. This is a new Munich. If Russia had held fast to its own values, no one would have DARED destroy Yugoslavia. Ukraine faces the threat of partition from Catholic Poland in the north and the Crimean Tatars in the south, as it did in the 17th century. -- How would you map the ideological scene in Russia today? It can be understood in terms of a triangle of values -- populist egalitarianism, liberal rationalism, and nationalism. The mentality of those poor people out in the street combines egalitarianism with nationalism. Our party combines liberalism in economics with nationalism in politics. That is a fairly unusual combination. [But no longer --SDS] -- It's all very complicated, isn't it? Yes, often I cannot get to sleep at night as I have so many ideas swirling around in my head. : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : ARCHIVE 8. THE "GRAZHDANIN" SOCIETY: ETHNIC MINORITIES IN MOSCOW Introduction The "Grazhdanin" [Citizen] Society was a civic organization that in the early 1990s tried to contribute to the resolution of ethnic and interstate conflicts in the former USSR by means of "people's diplomacy." I never learned much about its activity. It had sister societies in some of the other post-Soviet states, including Tajikistan; in spring 1992 it had a conference on Russian-Ukrainian relations. I don't know whether it still exists. While I was in Moscow in October 1992, the society's chairman Viktor Girshfeld, a former army officer and international relations expert, invited me to come to its annual meeting. The meeting took place in the conference room of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology (IEA) in the new high-rise headquarters of the Russian Academy of Sciences. I was the only "real foreigner" (that is, from outside the former USSR) present. Perhaps my notes of the meeting will still be of some interest to students both of post-Soviet ethnic relations and of civil society. I don't think that the problems discussed have changed much, except for the worse. My notes of the meeting The meeting was chaired by Taras Shamba, chairman of the Moscow-based World Congress of Abkhazians. Also on the presidium were Girshfeld, the prominent ethnologist Mikhail Guboglo, (1) and Rafik Nishanov, chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet, who headed the society's honorary council. In the middle of the meeting, a young man arrived and joined the presidium, introducing himself as a chief specialist in the department of nationality affairs of the Moscow Soviet. There were roughly 60--80 people present. They were mainly representatives of many of the 68 Moscow cultural societies of various ethnic minorities, by occupation teachers and other "minor intelligentsia." The cultural attaché had also turned up from the Azerbaijan embassy. Girshfeld delivered the opening address. The gist of his remarks was: "Let us learn to understand one another better." Each time he referred to the society as "the independent non-governmental civic peacemaking association Grazhdanin." After the opening address he remained silent for the rest of the meeting. Nishanov spoke briefly. "However much we may all wish otherwise, there is no way back to the Union. Yet we are so interdependent that a sharp break anywhere is felt everywhere." He too took no further part in the proceedings. Guboglo stood up and delivered quite a long scholarly lecture. Most of it was about the position of mountain tribal minorities in Vietnam! I supposed that he had been invited to talk about anything he liked. After a while the audience began to show signs of restlessness and irritation. Later a man criticized Guboglo for talking about Vietnam and not Russia. Then Shamba spoke. He started by giving the World Congress of Abkhazians a plug. Then he held up a sand-glass and explained how he was going to use it to limit the length of speeches from the floor. The man from the Azerbaijan embassy rose at this point to complain that the organizers had not explained what the purpose of the meeting was. They had talked vaguely about interethnic understanding, but what SPECIFIC problems were to be discussed? He urged speakers to avoid issues of interstate politics and focus on the tense ethnic situation "right here in Moscow." The reaction of the floor was positive. I suggested that a representative of Grazhdanin present a brief report on the work of the organization over the past year as a starting point for discussion. The reaction was again positive. "Yes, what on earth is Grazhdanin anyway?" someone asked. Shamba played for time. "Well, we have some proposals. Our foreign guest proposes that we make a report. That is quite an interesting idea. What does everyone think about that?" But no one offered to make a report. There followed twenty or so short speeches from the floor. Here are my notes of a few of them. Man from the Azerbaijani Cultural Society: "The system of residence permits blocks the formation of ethnic neighborhoods in Moscow like those in New York or London, with their own restaurants, stores, and cinemas. The ethnic minorities in Moscow are so dispersed that even if we had our own facilities we couldn't make good use of them. For example, if an Azerbaijani school were opened how could we send our children there from all over the Moscow area? Moscow is an ethnically Russian city. Non-Russians are marginalized. There is public concern only for the Russian refugees in Moscow. Who cares about the Azerbaijani refugees who are also here? There are little symbolic things that create unease, such as Yeltsin's public identification with Christian ceremonial... Our society is a new one. We have been begging the Moscow authorities to give us some accommodation. All we ask for is one room." Another Azerbaijani: "There is a political campaign in progress against Azerbaijani speculators. Russian and Kazakh speculators are fine, only Azerbaijani speculators are unacceptable... The Azerbaijani community in Moscow is very poor. It is not true that we have a powerful armed organization. We don't even have any schools." Chairman of the Moscow Tatar Social Center: "A quarter of a million Tatars live in Moscow. We have been here for generations. We helped build the city and we pay taxes. Isn't it our city too? But we have no theater or other buildings that we can call our own. We are not demanding compensation for past wrongs. Moscow has the most reactionary nationalities policy in the whole of the former USSR. What we get from the Moscow Soviet is mere kopecks. We have to struggle to get a room for our office, while Popov and Stankevich (2) have palaces. The media pay no attention to the minority communities. Not a single Tatar sits as a deputy in the Moscow Soviet. Russians won't vote for candidates with non-Russian names, so we need ethnic quotas. We claim ten seats for Tatars." Man from the Society of Crimean Tatars: "According to the census there are 200 Crimean Tatars in Moscow, but I personally know of 1,000. They conceal their origin and pretend to be Russians. On the buses I hear people muttering about 'those accursed Tatars'." (3) Man from the Association of Karaim (4) "There are only 2,700 Karaim in the former USSR. 350 of us are in Moscow. Most of the rest are in Crimea; there are a few in St. Petersburg, the Baltic states, and Galicia. We formed our association in 1990. Recently we won a victory. The government agreed to send the ancient Karaite manuscripts to Israel, but we protested and they are to stay in the Lenin Library after all." Man from the ethnic-German Freiheit Society: "There used to be ten million Germans in Russia. [Objections from other participants: "What? You mean two million, surely?"] Why are we all talking about nothing but cultural centers? Is that all we aim for? We need statehood! The Freiheit Society thinks that the best solution is to set up a Baltic-German Republic in Kaliningrad province. Kaliningrad will be Koenigsberg once more. We shall restore our own architecture there, our own houses and churches. This is our only hope of resisting the genocide of forced assimilation. Half of our young people marry out. We don't trust the Russian parliament to solve our problems." (5) Man from the Kazakh Society: "In our society we have not only Kazakhs but people of many other ethnic origins [who have ties with Kazakhstan]: Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Jews, Tatars, Uzbeks. They are all fluent in the Kazakh language. We have a cinema on Lenin Prospect, financed by the Kazakhstan government. We Kazakhs have a right to be in Moscow. Kazakhs fought with Kutuzov. (6) And there are not so many of us Kazakhs in Moscow, while there are VERY many Russians in Kazakhstan... Elderly Lak (7) woman: "We need some elementary human culture, not just ethnic culture. All the ethnic minorities should work together to solve our common problems. Why not establish a single cultural center that could be used by different ethnic societies on different evenings? I used to live in an old communal apartment with 36 residents of many nationalities. We were all very close. How many people are ashamed of their nationality! You should not be ashamed of being a Tatar or a Jew! You should not change your name or lie to the census taker! I won't accept any passport that doesn't show I am a Lak! (8) The young man from the Moscow Soviet was prevailed upon to respond to the societies' demand for office space. His speech was eloquent, flowery, and demonstratively "sincere." Here is an extract: "We never use the expression 'national minority.' It is immoral, repulsive, and logically absurd. Your task is to bring about the rebirth of Moscow's true culture. We want to help you. But it's much more difficult than you think. Dear friends, don't just go on and on about how bad the Soviet regime [sovetskaya vlast'] is. (9) We all know how bad it is. What shall we do now, in concrete terms -- for example, in terms of legislation? I ask you to cooperate. We arranged a meeting, but none of you showed up." Responses from the floor: "We were never told about it!" "We're all very busy. We can't just leave our regular jobs at the drop of a hat and go to a meeting at the Moscow Soviet during working hours. It's very hard for us to find time for our cultural work, let alone constantly go to meetings." He announced a new meeting at the Moscow Soviet in three days' time and, without a word of explanation or apology, started to collect his things in order to leave. Very politely, Shamba rebuked him: "We are grateful to you for taking the trouble to come, but we are not so pleased that you ask for practical suggestions and then leave right away without waiting to hear any." After he had left, a number of speakers from the floor repeated the same point in rather less polite language. They were quite upset. Notes (1) Guboglo was at this time deputy director of the IEA. He is now head of the Ethnological Research Center. (2) Gavriil Popov was mayor of Moscow and Sergei Stankevich deputy mayor. In 1995 Stankevich fled the country to escape corruption charges. (3) This was probably connected with the tension that existed at this time between the Republic of Tatarstan and the federal center. (4) The Karaim (or Karaites) are an ancient Judaic sect who accept only the Torah and reject the Talmud and other rabbinical literature. (5) The ethnic German community was divided on this issue. Many other Germans considered the Kaliningrad option unrealistic and aimed instead to restore the autonomous German republic on the Volga. Most Russian Germans have now given up on any solution within Russia and left for Germany. (6) Prince Mikhail Kutuzov commanded the Russian armies in the war against the Napoleonic invasion (1812-13). (7) The Laks are one of the ethnic groups native to Dagestan. (8) Whether the entry on ethnic affiliation in internal passports should be removed has was a matter of controversy for many years. The ethnic minorities were themselves divided on the issue. The entry was finally removed. (9) He used the present tense here despite the fact that the Soviet Union no longer existed because he was referring not to the Soviet regime in the sense generally understood in the West but to the system of administration based on Soviets, which was abolished only in October 1993. : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : Dear Dr. Shenfield (1) This is just a short note to thank you for the article you put in David Johnson's JRL (16 Jan 04). It is beautifully done -- and will be a great help to people interested in the problem of TB (not yet solved!) and in the Russian health care system. It is so nice to see a concise and contextual statement of the present confrontation with an old enemy. My own interest in the TB problem goes back to the 'pre-chemotherapy' era (late 40's), when we were not very optimistic -- until streptomycin came out -- and we used it like penicillin -- daily to the points of SM-resistance and vestibular toxicity; then dihydro-SM, which we used the same way -- until permanent deafness and resistance; then PAS, leading to "combination therapy," and finally -- the godsend of them all, INH or isoniazid, that cheap little chemical sitting up on the chemist's shelf for fifty years, (2) with its tremendous power, low molecular weight, and almost NO toxicity. I was lucky enough (and old enough now) to have been involved in the VA-Armed Forces studies of the TB chemotherapy programs in the 50's, to see the end of "strict bedrest" as a form of treatment, to have enjoyed the "IPROniazid effect" -- with the patients with "far-advanced" TB "dancing down the halls" -- and to see TB humbled as a major threat to societal well-being. And then came the HIV virus -- and there went the great value of "being tuberculin positive" -- that "benign outcome" status of 100 percent of the med school graduates of the pre-chemotherapy era... Again, thank you! Sincerely, Pat Storey : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : NOTES (1) I have a Ph.D., but am not a medical doctor. (2) This substance was known as a chemical compound for fifty years before its value in treating TB was discovered.
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