#1 - JRL 7305
Izvestia
August 28, 2003
NIKOLAI ZLOBIN: BETWEEN ALLIANCE AND BANKRUPTCY
How shall we draw up a new agenda for Russian-American relations?
Author: Georgy Bovt
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
IT WILL SOON BE TWO YEARS SINCE RUSSIA BECAME A MEMBER OF THE INTERNATIONAL ANTI-TERRORIST COALITION "OSTENSIBLY LED" BY THE UNITED STATES. WHAT ARE THE RESULTS? WHAT HAS BEEN THE OVERALL IMPACT OF EVENTS IN IRAQ ON THE ALLIANCE BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE WEST?
It will soon be two years since Russia became a member of the international anti-terrorist coalition "ostensibly led" by the United States. What are the results? What has been the overall impact of events in Iraq on the alliance between Russia and the West? Finally, what will presidents Putin and Bush discuss at their meeting on September 24 at Camp David? Nikolai Zlobin, Director of Russian and Asian Programs at the Center for Defense Information in the United States, discusses these issues.
Question: The anniversary of September 11 is also the anniversary of a turnaround in Russia's foreign policy. Back then, the West said it was wonderful that Putin had decided to join the anti-terrorist coalition. This seems to be sounding rather less fresh these days. The battle against terrorism has not become any less relevant, but it's still necessary to think of something new, and a new agenda is proving difficult to write. Or will anything change at the September meeting between Putin and Bush?
Nikolai Zlobin: I agree that the situation in Russian-US relations is highly alarming. In my view, our relationship is completely bankrupt these days: intellectually, politically, and economically. This is very alarming. The brief era of seeking a partnership ended with Iraq. Russia didn't make it as a strategic partner. There is no fundamental basis for Russian-American relations. Cooperation is underway in certain specific areas, such as terrorism and energy, but there is no overall concept of relations - what they're for, or what they'll be like 20 years from now. The relationship is empty.
Question: What if we replace the word "Russia" with "Germany" - is there a fundamental basis for its relations with the US?
Nikolai Zlobin: There is a difference: the American elite had a conflict over Iraq with the German government, but not with Germany. America's relations with Germany remained as normal, and will continue that way: vast trade turnover, unity on political, moral, ideological, and cultural values - none of this has been disrupted by the tactical disagreement over Iraq. And the same applies to France. But in Russia the situation is quite the opposite. There are very good relations between the presidents, and goodwill between the elites on both sides; but the relationship between the countries is practically non- existent. In Russia, relations between the two countries can only function to the extent that that Bush and Putin like each other. But if it suddenly turns out that the next presidents of the United States and Russia can't work together, there is a great danger that Russian- American relations will deteriorate again.
Question: I think it would be enough to have the Russian elite maintain normal relations with the American elite. After all, the general public in Russia plays no part in shaping the political agenda. The gulf between the elite and the citizenry in Russia is far greater than in Germany. Actually, although a friendship has developed between Putin and Bush, anti-American attitudes have increased greatly in Russia over the past few years. So in terms of public opinion, our president would seem to be making a mistake in being friends with Bush. But ordinary citizens aren't criticizing Putin for that.
Nikolai Zlobin: One shouldn't attach such significance to anti- American attitudes in Russia. Paradoxically enough, Russia is a fairly pro-American country, if you look at values, attitudes to personal liberty, and so on. It's the most pro-American state in Asia. And it's not only important for the elites of both countries to be positive about each other; they need to be capable of cooperating as well. Relations between them lack a healthy pragmatism. The Iraq events showed that the Russian elite was sure the Americans would have huge problems in Iraq without Russia's support, and sure that Russia could offer great support. Among the American elite, on the other hand, the prevailing opinion was that America is so strong that it doesn't need any help from anyone. We are now seeing some backing down from such extreme positions.
Iraq is also revealing for another reason. For the past decade or so, during the so-called period of improvement in Russian-American relations, we have postponed dealing with unresolved problems. We kept postponing the problem of Iran, and now it has grown so large that there's no escaping it. Or look at the problem of North Korea. The Iraq problem could have been postponed as well. In any case, the outcome will be worse. Russia has postponed the problem of the "northern territories" dispute with Japan until the next generation. The world's second-largest economy doesn't want to do business with Russia, or even invest in Russia's energy sector; it is not among Russia's allies in the Far East.
Question: There's a problem here. The Russian elite has a "Kozyrev syndrome": the idea being that in the Kozyrev era of diplomacy, in the early 1990s, we "gave up everything to the Americans." And where is their gratitude? There's a sense of grievance, of feeling short-changed. The same with Japan: if we had given away the South Kuril Islands, it would have turned out later that Russia still doesn't have a good enough investment climate for Japan to invest in Russia. When dealing with the Americans, the Russian elite is constantly thinking: what will we gain from this? And the Russian elite refuses to understand that it won't gain anything in specific terms. What will we gain if we give up nuclear cooperation with Iran, thus losing $1 billion or more, taking future reactors at the Bushehr power plant into account? It's hard to sumount the opinion that we won't gain anything in particular.
There is an even simpler problem: visas. One thing may be said at summits, whether with the EU or the US; but then a Russian citizen goes to a Western consulate and sees something different. And feels humliated. So friendship between the people isn't happening, unlike the circumstances of America and Germany.
Nikolai Zlobin: The idea that Russia hasn't gained anything is highly deceptive. Hasn't Russia's security improved as a result of better relations with the United States? Aren't Russia's global interests more secure?
Question: I'll call you on that. Many among the Russian elite believe that relations with America and the West have shaped the context of all the changes in our country over the past 15 years. Well, in that context, many believe that Russia's security has deteriorated: apartment buildings were never blown up in the USSR, and suicide bombers didn't strike at rock concerts. And it's all because we've let the country fall apart, they say. It's all that "damned American" influence. Democracy wasn't established in Russia by a "velvet" revolution. It was brought in from the West. It wasn't a conscious act of liberation for either the elite or ordinary citizens.
The final impulse that led to bringing in liberalism and weakening was the fear of the Soviet elite that it would lose the military technology contest with the US. Horror gripped the Soviet gerontocracy - not visions of the people's rage, or demands for liberty and a market economy, but visions of Reagan's Star Wars. So the gerontocracy decided all this had to be slowed down. We had to become slightly more friendly towards the Americans.
The entire Russian elite - Soviet at its roots - hasn't generated anything particularly democratic from itself. It has largely been borrowing. In many respects, it continues to perceive the overall context - not only relations with America - by looking backward. This is a characteristic feature of Russian politics, including dialogue with the US.
Nikolai Zlobin: I agree. But blaming everything on the US or anybody else would be a childish stage of political development among the elite and the citizenry. America cannot be held responsible for the bankruptcy of the USSR. As for security, you have to look at the basic issues. Putin has said repeatedly that the greatest danger to Russia today is Islamic fundamentalism. Has this danger increased since Russia started cooperating with America? The destruction of the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the destruction of the Iraqi regime - hasn't this undermined the positions of Islamic fundamentalism? And take relations with Europe: any improvements in relations with the EU over the past few years have taken place under the influence of the US. Europe is in no hurry to draw Russia closer to itself; America is trying to make the EU do this.
Visas are a very sensitive issues. However, the Russian elite and especially the presidential administration have been caught in their own trap. A year ago, during President Bush's visit, I took part in many conversations about giving Russian citizens the right to travel to America on the same terms as Eastern Europeans. However, Moscow then started calling on the West to acknowledge that international terrorism was active in Russia - primarily in Chechnya. How, then, should the West open its borders? By acknowledging that international terrorists are active in Russia (in Chechnya), Russia has placed itself alongside such nations as Pakistan, Libya, Lebanon, and so on, where international terrorism is also active.
Question: Should we have declared Maskhadov's supporters to be freedom-fighters?
Nikolai Zlobin: No. But Russia shouldn't have placed itself in the list of countries that can't handle international terrorism. While Russia gained a tactical victory in reducing criticism of the war in Chechnya, it lost more than that in strategic terms.
However, I would warn Russians against something else: efforts to relax visa requirements could lead to only the elite being able to travel. And at that point the issue would be closed.
Question: I also see this as a danger.
Nikolai Zlobin: And here's another interesting point. I've noticed many in Russia speaking of being disappointed with the West these days. But there is also disappointment with Russia, elsewhere in the world. Many expectations regarding Russia have not been borne out, just as many of Russia's expectations about the West have not been borne out. It's also odd to hear discussions about which countries Russia should choose as allies. China, India, in Asia overall, in the CIS, or whom to support in Europe. But what's usually ignored is the following question: who wants to form an alliance with Russia? It seems to me that Russia doesn't have a single reliable friend these days, or any friends at all. There's a vacuum... But for some reason many in Moscow are sure the choice is up to Russia.
Question: It seems to me that the Russian elite would do well to consider whether we need any foreign policy alliances at all these days. At one time, isolationism served America well. Could isolationism become a key foreign policy concept for Russia? Maybe Russia should focus on itself for a while.
Nikolai Zlobin: I agree. But in order to do that, an understanding of strategic development goals is required. And if you decide that it's not worthwhile for Russia to deal with Africa at present, there needs to be an agreement that someone else will deal with Africa. America. America has a practical interest in strengthening Russia's influence in places where American influence is insufficient. Central Asia, primarily. Russia, as a regional great power, can get a lot more done close to its borders than America can... I agree that Russia's foreign policy ought to be self-centered. Russia shouldn't be like a dog taking a walk - marking one tree here, another tree there. Just for the sake of making its presence felt in Asia, in the Islamic world, in the Far East, in China, in Europe, in America, everywhere. Foreign policy will remain impulsive and unpredictable until Russia gives an answer to the question of whether it is prepared to resolve strategic security problems, in alliance with America or not. Nobody likes a nation with impulsive and unpredictable foreign policy - neither its friends nor its enemies.
(Translated by P. Pikhnovsky)
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