#10 - JRL 7282
www.gateway2russia.com
August 7, 2003
Operation Cleanup
Reform at the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) will depend on the whims of the
political market Oleg Khrabry
The MVD officers and the general lieutenant from the Ministry for Emergency Situations arrested recently in the so-called “turncoat investigator” affair are being held in the Lefortovo prison. This says a lot. The well-known Federal Security Service (FSB) prison is reserved for state criminals. Public opinion has long been the deciding factor for those looking for a way out of Lefortovo.
The short and sweet term “turncoat investigator,” originally part of the professional slang at the MVD’s Commission for Internal Security (GUSB), has now entered the common Russian vocabulary. It has also sealed the fate of the upcoming show trial. The arrests were presented to the media as a huge success for the United Russia party (according to the Public Opinion Foundation, almost 80% of Russians know about the operation and the overwhelming majority support it). For this reason alone, the trial is sure to end with harsh sentences. The crimes the former officers of the Moscow Criminal Investigations Department (MUR) are accused of include falsification of criminal proceedings, illegal arrest, abuse of authority, illegal possession of firearms and narcotics, and extortion. However, they also stand accused of violating Article 210 of the Russian Criminal Code by “forming a criminal organization.” Prosecution under this law requires incontrovertible evidence of guilt.
Making money, taking money
“Police today don’t make money; they take it. Those who get the `money’
jobs stay put. You would think no one would agree to work for only two to three
or even ten thousand rubles. But there are no vacancies. Any logical person can’t
help but wonder why. In Russia, there is a kind of contract between bureaucrats
and the state. The state hires the bureaucrats, but lets them know they will
have to get money on their own,” says Sergei Maksimov, a professor at the
Moscow MVD University and an expert on the Duma Commission to Fight Corruption.
The number of police force employees expanded by several times during the 1990s,
reaching its peak in 2000 at 1.4 million. It hasn’t changed since. The number
of officers grew but budgets stayed the same. All this only served to whet
police chiefs’ appetite for power. The increase in numbers was a substitute
for improvement in quality. Pointless “cleanup” operations by the police
compensated for their inability to prevent terrorist attacks in the course of
their daily work.
According to one businessman who came in frequent contact with the heads of the regional division of the now defunct Tax Police, the overwhelming majority had millions of dollars they were forced to keep secret. However, this tactic is gradually becoming a thing of the past. “Obviously, the era when police bosses have to lead double lives is over. The system is already incapable of concealing the monstrous gap between form and content,” believes lawyer Genrikh Padva.
Occasional anti-corruption operations only require officials to lay low for a while and refuse all profitable deals, while the price for their services skyrockets.
Many of those who spoke with Expert believe that the Moscow Criminal Investigations Department simply lost all material incentive to work effectively. While other MVD departments, the courts, and public prosecutors had continual access to good bribes and big money, “the MUR guys didn’t have any consistent source of income and were forced, as they say, to look for greener pastures.” The only way for officials from MUR “to make a living” was blackmailing businessmen and other well-to-do people by manipulating criminal cases that could be exposed or hidden for a price.
According to some at the GUSB, the MUR with the exception of the so-called “murder” division (which investigates murders and continues to work with professionalism and commitment) died in the late 90s. The fate of the fifth division of the MUR, the one involved in illegal firearms and home of the “turncoats,” is vivid proof of death for this once renowned police unit.
Outside control
By 1999-2000, the spheres of influence had been divided up. Organized criminals, often in cahoots with low-level police “protection,” continued to deal in drugs, prostitutes, and illegal firearms. Legal businesses connected with money laundering and illegal monetary operations were under the control of MVD officers from a wide variety of departments, ranging from the Economic Crimes Commission to the Organized Crime Commission to Extradepartmental Security. Big business—factories, major companies, oil and natural gas producers—were the territory of former secret service agents.
Relations between top officials at the MVD and the FSB have always been difficult. The expansion of police power reopened old wounds. The conflict almost got political, as it exactly reflected the battle for power between different factions. The Secret Service felt that the MVD had too much power and had gotten too independent, overextending its “area of responsibility.” While the Secret Service had the technology, the MVD had the armed units that the SS had to work in conjunction with, or in other words, depend on.
After Boris Gryzlov replaced Vladimir Rushailo as Minister of Internal Affairs in 2001, the MVD was put under external crisis management and structural reforms became possible. Almost everyone Expert spoke with thinks that the reform and cleanup of the Ministry of Internal Affairs needs to start from the top. In this context, putting a civilian in charge of the agency seems justified. Especially as those currently in charge of cleaning up the ministry’s act are department directors. These consist mainly of former FSB officials. Apparently, this is the only way to control one of Russia’s most powerful agencies from the outside. Its assets, to put it in economic terms, have to become transparent. Even if this means bankruptcy.
Double dealing
Logically, the new management at the MVD led to the ruin of the MUR. It is now disbanded and more than 700 of its employees have been taken off staff. After a series of careless remarks about the “turncoat” affair, Viktor Trutnev, head of MUR, was also removed. The entire system seems frozen, awaiting its fate. The pressure is off middle-level business for a while. However, in the course of this purely cosmetic cleanup, current and former police officials are making horizontal and vertical connections, and many former officials are moving to law firms. “This is a frightening trend. Many people who have nothing to do with law work in law offices. These former police officials use their old connections to take people’s money. Currently, a lot of investigators have gotten together with their lawyer buddies who are at their beck and call. They are willing to sign anything for money or to strengthen old ties,” recounted one official.
It is possible to solve the problem of police officials moving into “grey” areas of activity for once and for all. However, this would require a radical restructuring of MVD financing and a reduction in staff in order to make the ministry more flexible and adaptable. In November 2002, Boris Gryzlov was forced to become head of the Supreme Council of the United Russia Party, while keeping his post as Minister of Internal Affairs. Many believe this will inevitably slow down the structural changes underway at the ministry. It is indeed hard to imagine that any radical shakeups in the police force will happen before the elections. The MVD’s image among voters is already tarnished, and it’s already time to take the political game to the party frontlines.
Nonetheless, the current cleanup operations and restructuring at the MVD have taken on a political, or rather promotional, tone, and set the gears of reform in motion. One would think this is good thing. Gryzlov, however, is extremely vulnerable. He is a political figure. At any moment, all of his reforms could be thrown into reverse.
This is the point of view shared by Russia’s business elite. The double game of politics and reform makes one wonder what will become of state agency reforms once political goals are achieved. Anticorruption bills have languished in the Duma for years. They contain control mechanisms for state employees and codes of conduct for civil servants. The deputies who created them have no hope that they will be passed by this Duma or the next. Reforms will remain piecemeal. The most essential parts of the justice system, public prosecutors and the courts, seem fated to remain political tools for putting pressure on Russian business.
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