#15 - JRL 7276
Yezhenedelnyi Zhurnal
July 28, 2003
RULES WITHOUT A GAME
Arm twisting continues: the corrupt state intends to become ubiquitous and
caring
Author: Mikhail Fishman
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
AT STAKE IN THE YUKOS AFFAIR IS NOT YUKOS OR ITS POLITICAL AMBITIONS. WHAT'S AT STAKE IS THE CONTRIBUTION OF THIS POPULIST CAMPAIGN TO PUTIN'S VICTORY AT THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, WHICH IS INEVITABLE BUT STILL NOT DIVIDED BETWEEN FACTIONS IN PUTIN'S TEAM. IT IS A FIGHT FOR AUTHORITY DURING PUTIN'S SECOND TERM IN OFFICE, FOR THE 2008 ELECTION PROSPECTS, AND STATE POLICY.
The independent Russian court left billionaire Platon Lebedev in prison having ignored the recent statements of the president concerning "arm twisting" and "getting to cells". YUKOS press release that followed the court decision assumed that the court was subjected to "an unprecedented pressure". The press release says, "In fact, The Prosecutor General's Office that does not subordinate to anyone and whose major objective is to observe the law has taken a hostage and is beginning to blackmail private businesses."
As soon as the scandal with YUKOS started, Vladimir Putin referred to Gennady Seleznev and accused large businesses of bribing Duma deputies. Later, there were informational leakages from the Kremlin that said that the president is discontent about YUKOS's contacts with political parties and Duma deputies. Eventually, President of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RUIE) Arkady Volksy had an audience with the president and after it explained to the public that the development of the conflict will depend on "confirmation of common game rules". Apparently, this means that the Prosecutor General's Office is entirely independent but the president who protects the interests of the nation would like YUKOS to stop its inadmissible lobbying and reduce its political ambitions. Lobbyism and ambitions may have different forms: either the form of effective resistance to the increase of rent duties or the form of direct funding political parties "for the future". Both are inadmissible: the nation in the person of the president and the parliament should not be deprived of its natural monopoly for the protection of its national interests.
It seems to be evident that the claims against YUKOS do not reflect the essence of the matter and are incompatible with the scale of repressions against the company. Its Duma lobbying of economic laws - even the significant ones - does not extend the limits. The accusation of funding the Communist Party is nothing but a conspiracy clich?. One way or another, it cannot not justify the provocation of a real political crisis.
Nonetheless, returning to Volsky's formula, the "game rules" were really broken. The president and his interpreters displayed their discontent in the expressions permitted by the same rules. The rules are rather tough: in particular, they prohibit to call things their names.
Another key rule of the game is that privately-owned raw material business in Russia is not privately-owned in the usual sense of the word. In fact, those who it formally belongs to do not own it, but have rather long-term leased it on terms of complete loyalty and double rent. The first rent, open and legal is given to the federal budget. The second is spent on funding the political order in general and Kremlin's projects in particular. According to the rules the real difference between for instance Gazprom and YUKOS is that Gazprim is a monopoly while YUKOS has reasons to optimize its activities and spending. Another difference is that YUKOS top management cannot be replaced by a governmental order. By the way, judging by everything, the latter has become one of the reasons for the conflict. No one required YUKOS to be transparent although the company is very proud of it. On the contrary, according to the rules, transparency, which is simultaneously investments attractiveness and competitiveness, interferes with trustful relations and is considered as an intention to withdraw from the agreement and to re-register the concession in to a full-value property.
Besides, there is one more rule that is rather a historical fact: the Russian state has unlimited authorities. Now, Putin's new state has a carte blanche for manipulations that will reduce this national inferiority complex. It is a carte blanche for restoration of Russia. It is a rather sensible and decent therapy. However, the issue is that a weak state cannot heal. The only thing it can do is to expand under slogans of putting order and consolidating the nation. As is known, where there is a lot of state, there is little freedom, market, and naturally, economic growth. At the same time, the nation needs the freedom, the market, and economic growth.
The state is being torn between its own and economic growth trying to conciliate these two different things. The presidential administration where the real political power is concentrated has a power struggle between the "business party" and the "order party". The former controls concessions, receives the rent, and is in charge of growth and stable functioning of the half-open governed market without full-valued economic participants. The latter controls security structures and connives at national complexes pretending to be restoring the fairness. Informal leader of the former is head of the presidential administration Alexander Voloshin. As the president prefers to remain the above the fight arbiter, the latter is nominally headed by his emissaries Igor Sechin and Viktor Ivanov. Hence, Vladimir Putin is a symbol of the state but acts so that he was not associated with the state apparatus - that at last has a mission but still no trust - successfully protects his image of the people's president.
These parties are fighting for resources, rent, and apparatus influence - both look rather unattractively. In autumn 2001, the "tycoon party" introduced the term "St. Petersburg security team" when it presented the conflict between the prosecutor's office and the customs service as the deadly fight between good and evil in the presidential surrounding. However, according to the media, the picturesque intrigue was as follows: furniture stores controlled by FSB did not pay "the smart money" for furniture smuggling to the customs service. When the customs service objected, FSB set the prosecutor's office against the customs service. Actually, the present state apparatus condition should be called an internal default.
At stake in the YUKOS affair is not YUKOS or its political ambitions. What's at stake is the contribution of this populist campaign to Putin's victory at the presidential election, which is inevitable but still not divided between factions in Putin's team. It is a fight for authority during Putin's second term in office, for the 2008 election prospects, and state policy.
(Translated by Arina Yevtikhova)
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