#14 - JRL 7276
Rodnaya Gazeta
August 1, 2003
WHY DOES PUTIN NEED THE SECURITY STRUCTURES
The Kremlin has not attacked Khodorkovsky
Author: Aleksei Bogaturov
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
DID THE PRESIDENT CHOOSE THE RIGHT MOMENT FOR HIS "ECONOMIC REVOLUTION"? WILL THE PROCESSING INDUSTRY BE ABLE TO RENDER ENOUGH FINANCIAL, POLITICAL, AND ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPORT TO THE PRESIDENT COMPARED TO THE RAW MATERIAL SECTOR? WILL THE PRESIDENT BE ABLE TO RETAIN HIS FULL POWER, HAVING REJECTED THE SUPPORT OF THE RAW MATERIAL INDUSTRY?
The hot July weather has thickened the atmosphere of the "triple" crisis.
First is the personnel issue. After the reform of the security structures has been completed, the issue of Boris Gryzlov has become especially acute - whether he should remain the party leader or to be just the interior minister.
Second is the organizational-political crisis. A month before the September beginning of the election race, the flabbiness of the right centrist bloc is especially obvious, but there are no outlines of a different pro-presidential coalition.
Third is the trust crisis. On the threshold of the "second presidency race" Putin needs strictly determined relations with the security structures, bureaucrats, and businesses, while he is apparently only beginning to look for the new power formula. Moreover, neither the "defeated business" nor the "victorious security structures" can understand the president's intentions and the latter does not hurry to explain them. It is not clear whether the former security officers will become the determining force in the Russian politics or the president will find a counter-balance for them later.
The first and the second crises are deeply intertwined. The matter is that the president does not have a post for Gryzlov, loyal people are very rare, and usually this ties their bosses to them more than any rational calculations. The absence of charisma in the ministers is the reverse side of this political role of the president's shadow and right-hand man rather than an independent figure. The real crisis is that Gryzlov and his party colleagues have been unable to raise the centrists into a normal independent political organization. Hence, the power still does not have a "natural foundation" in the society. "Artificially conceived" four years ago, right centrist bloc has provided the Duma voting machine for the Kremlin. It has existed replete and lazy, as a cheerleaders group where candidates were mostly appointed by the power rather than those who funded it. Now, the bloc is old and worn out. The main issue is that it will be unable to continue its life independently, without Kremlin's surgery - all medical indices say that the old right centrist coalition should die.
The development can be different. It is not ruled out that the Kremlin will take a risk to crate another artificial bloc from the remaining fragments of the right center. Having reinforced it with loyal people and relying on the administrative resource, it is possible to risk to "sell" this scheme to voters. The media are obedient, presidential envoys are in provinces, obstinate regional governors have been cracked down.
However, there still are doubts: the right centrist bloc looks so faded. Over the four years in the Duma, they have not promoted a single noticeable figure. On the contrary, even charismatic Primakov and Luzhkov have lost some of their color having joined the right centrists. Have they become like this on their own or observing the "gray" party style discipline? Before, voters voted for the bright. Have they changed?
One way or another, it is evident that the Kremlin does not work seriously with other political forces. The right wing is still being kept at a distance. Their speeches are listened to but never followed. The left wing is not treated any better - regardless all the talks about the possible cooperation, nothing has been done. Either the president does not trust the left wing or cannot figure out who of the leftists can be trusted.
Perhaps, the Kremlin has believed in the possibility to rule "above" political parties. Then, it would be more reasonable to look for a different power formula: presidency without the Duma. Bureaucrats, security structures, the province, and entrepreneurs will delegate their candidates to the government and presidential structures basing on direct negotiations with the president. The latter will choose candidates from the presented lists according to the adequacy indices he sets. The State Council and the being reformed upper house of parliament are ideal for such a dialogue with the regional governors. The business structure also fits the dialogue form well, although the mechanism has not yet been adjusted. Voloshin is busy with the bureaucrats - he has selection parameters of his own. There are the security structures left. Ideologically, they were invited to the power because the objective internationalization of interests of the Russian oil and gas business had gone too far. The security structures have become a counter-balance for the oil and gas lobby that had bought the whole "Yeltsin's system". Politically, the president still needs them today as a guarantee against the "Family's" revenge.
However, the security structures do not have an independent political role although they have been an instrument of the most risky and important start since Putin became the president. While the society has expected a reform of political institutes, Putin without trespassing the constitutional field has started an "economic coup d'etat." The essence of the revolution is distancing raw material tycoons from the power levers and redistribution of power and influence inside the business society in favor of processing industry corporations.
At the same time, the president has never called in question liberal freedoms as a whole and the right of business to influence the power in general. In these terms, Putin's second presidency promises to be as pro-market as the first one. At the same time, as any revolution, the current one is accompanied with the growth of the mobilization readiness of the regime and its aggression in relation to supporters of the former regime. The Kremlin has attacked not Khodorkovsky, but rather the threat of the oil and gas economic development model being continued in Russia.
There are only three questions left. Did the president choose the right moment? Will the processing industry be able to render enough financial, political, and organizational support to the president compared to the raw materials sector? Will the president be able to retain his full power having rejected the support of the raw material industry and having replaced it with help from their competitors and security structures? August isn't looking quiet right now.
(Translated by Arina Yevtikhova)
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