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#18 - JRL 7206
Transitions Online
www.tol.cz
June 2, 2003
Editorial
The Great Game in the Far East
The more important summit in Russia this week was arguably not between Putin
and Bush, but between Putin and China’s new president.
With the world’s only superpower in town, perhaps it was inevitable that
the headlines from the mass gathering of heads of state for St. Petersburg’s
party were dominated by U.S.-Russia relations. But arguably the Bush-Putin
meeting was less important than it might have seemed after the Iraq fallout.
The war over the war in Iraq has now been reduced mainly to sniping about
reconstruction. North Korea is of course a potential sore point, but Pyongyang
has said it considers its nuclear program to be a matter for it and the United
States alone, dashing Russia’s attempts at diplomacy. And as for Iran, some
clashes may be expected, but it is plausible to argue, as Nikolai Zlobin of the
Washington-based Center for Defense Information does, that “now the task for
Russia is to save face.”
The discussions between George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin may have been less
important, in fact, than Putin’s summit with China’s new president, Hu
Jintao. Both declared themselves supporters of a “multipolar world”--in the
wake of the Iraq war, the euphemism of choice for a world not dominated by the
United States. And both sides proved it with actions: Hu chose Moscow, rather
than Washington, as his first foreign port of call after assuming the leadership
of China, while Putin gave the go-ahead for a huge new oil pipeline to China
rather than choosing an alternative pipeline to Japan. We were therefore treated
to the spectacle of two great games in play at the same time: one for a
multipolar world, the other for Far Eastern oil.
Thanks to the volatility of the Muslim world, oil is now a stronger
geopolitical playing card for Russia than ever. Japan, which imports all its
oil, has embarked on an active search for new sources outside the Middle East
and in 2002 imported some Russian oil for the first time since 1978.
Diversification is also a new mantra for China, which became a net importer of
oil in 1993 and has since become the world’s third-largest importer. Japanese
companies now partner some of the Western giants in Siberia, while China has
been making a big bid for a stake in the development of Central Asian oil, with
the possibility of a pipeline from Kazakhstan.
The attractions of Russia as an alternative source have only been enhanced by
the discovery in recent years of an oil field near Angarsk, west of Siberia’s
Lake Baikal, that reportedly has reserves equal to those of Kuwait. For Russia,
the choice of a pipeline from Angarsk either to Daiqing, China, or to Nakhodka,
a port on the coast of the Sea of Japan, is the choice between serving one huge
market (China), or supplying up to a quarter of Japan’s oil needs and a
variety of rich markets along Asia’s Pacific coast. And, despite the
phenomenal size of the Angarsk oil field, it really is being presented as a
choice: Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov argues that there will be
insufficient oil in the foreseeable future to justify both pipelines.
From the outside, the choice between Japan and China would seem to have been
no competition. Japan’s relations with Russia still founder in a historical
time warp because of the dispute about the status of the Kuril Islands that
Russia seized during World War II. In contrast, Sino-Russian relations are
racing ahead and picking up speed. In 2001, Jiang Zemin, Hu’s predecessor,
signed a friendship treaty with Russia, symbolically opening a new page in a
relationship that, during the Soviet era, was by turns friendly, hostile, and
cool.
Trade between the two countries has doubled in less than a decade, and China
in 2002 accounted for more than half of Russia’s arms exports, according to
the Moscow-based Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies. Now, China
has for the first time assumed leadership of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization, a six-member group that currently focuses on issues such as
terrorism, separatism, and extremism in Central Asia.
An easy political choice, then, for Russia, but also a canny one in the
broader context of relations with the United States. In 1997, U.S. President
Bill Clinton began calling China a “strategic partner,” going on to become
the first U.S. president to visit China since the Tiananmen Square massacre in
1989. Since 2000, Bush has changed the wording to “strategic competitor.” In
choosing the Chinese route, Putin has taken an important step toward a “multipolar
world” by forming what is a long-term strategic partnership with China and
effectively promising to fuel the next stage of China’s economic development.
The hand of supporters of a “multipolar world” has therefore been
strengthened, while the stakes have risen for the United States and its allies
in the other great game, in the Caspian and Central Asia. With much of the oil
from eastern Siberia going to China, they should be even more concerned to
ensure that oil from Kazakhstan flows westward, not eastward--and that Russia
will have less say in control of Caspian oil.
Conceivably, the West might ultimately get the better of Russia in the
Caspian and Central Asia, but it would also be a tricky victory, forcing it into
a commitment to regions that, like the Middle East, are deeply volatile and in
which Russia is bound to retain major influence.
Meanwhile, back in the East, Russia is still keeping its bargaining chips
with Japan and the Western-style economies of the Pacific. It continues to hold
out the possibility of a pipeline to the Sea of Japan.
Having lost out once, Japan should logically be even more keen to up its
already very generous offer to foot the entire bill for the construction of the
pipeline to Nakhodka. At the same time, Russia can--when needed--always pull out
one old card, the status of the Kuril Islands, or play on Japanese fears that
Russia might instead build a pipeline to South Korea.
So, the honors for this round of the Far Eastern Great Game go to Russia. But
most of all they go to China for securing a much sought-after supply line. As
Russia provides the oil that drives China forward, Putin will be able to
contemplate the neglected truth about his vision of a multipolar world. It is
China, not Russia, that has the power to become an alternative pole to the
United States. Once junior to Russia/the Soviet Union, China is now the stronger
and more dynamic of the two. The fundamental difference comes down to their
economies: China’s is now five times larger than Russia’s.
If Russia does want a multipolar world, it will need to double its GDP in 10
years, as Putin wants to do. That requires average growth of about 7 percent a
year. Difficult, but China, for one, has shown that it is possible.
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