Johnson's Russia List
#7202
31 May 2003
davidjohnson@erols.com
A CDI Project
www.cdi.org
Contents:
1. BBC Monitoring: Putin pays tribute to Peter the Great.
2. RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly: Jonas Bernstein, STATISTICS BEAR OUT
PUTIN'S CONCERN OVER DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS.
3. Reuters: Putin urges prudent 2004 budget despite election.
4. BBC Monitoring: Russian big business starts funding Putin's election
campaign - TV. (Yuliya Latynina)
5. Washington Post editorial: Potemkin Democracy.
6. Moscow Times: Catherine Belton, Court Bans Kompromat on Yukos.
7. AP: Russia, U.S. Disappointed Over Relations.
8. Brookings Institution: Clifford Gaddy, Is Putin Running Out of Steam?
9. Washington Profile News Agency: Russia and America: From One Crisis to
the Next? Nikolai Zlobin's Conversation with Ambassador Stephen Sestanovich.
10. The Economist (UK): The secret policeman's ball. Russia has a chance
to show off its president's mixed achievements.
11. Izvestia: RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR YURI USHAKOV: NONE OF MY PREDECESSORS
WORKED UNDER SUCH FAVORABLE CONDITIONS. The Jackson-Vanik amendment is
Washington's loss.
12. US Department of State: Text: Vershbow Says Russia's Help Needed on
Iran, North Korea.]
*******
#1
BBC Monitoring
Putin pays tribute to Peter the Great
Source: Channel One TV, Moscow, in Russian 1100 gmt 30 May 03
During celebrations to mark the tercentenary anniversary of St Petersburg,
Russian President Vladimir Putin has paid tribute to the city's founder, Tsar
Peter the Great. In a speech made at one of the city's museums, an excerpt of
which was broadcast by Russia's Channel One TV, Putin congratulated the
city on
the occasion of its anniversary.
"A great number of places in the city are linked to that person's name. And
that makes sense - after all, he conceived the city, he began to build it, he
put the city on its feet, and he made it great.
"It wasn't just government buildings and palaces which immediately appeared
in St Petersburg. Almost at the same time, as if in a fairy tale, appeared
majestic places of worship, plants, factories, fortifications, hospitals,
universities and theatres. And it was all done with imperial splendour and
verve. This
was worthy of the city, which was laying claim to global importance.
"People will return time and time again to the genius of Peter I, they'll
think about what drove him in his work, and they will analyse the results
of his
work and his service to Russia. I am sure that there will always be many
people here - those who love Peter the Great, those who recognize
everything that
he did for our homeland, and those who love St Petersburg. Congratulations!"
Putin said.
After the speech, Putin was shown an exhibition of paintings by local
children.
*******
#2
RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly
Vol. 3, No. 21, 29 May 2003
STATISTICS BEAR OUT PUTIN'S CONCERN OVER DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS.
(Jonas Bernstein)
President Putin devoted a portion of his annual address to parliament
on 16 May to the issue of Russia's "demographic decline." The
country's death rate, he noted, grew by 10 percent over the last
three years, while the average life expectancy declined from 67 years
in 1999 to 64 in 2002. Among the causes of these "sad figures," Putin
said, were high rates of illness, accidents, poisonings, and
injuries. "New epidemics" like drug abuse and AIDS, he added, are
"exacerbating the situation."
The week following Putin's speech saw developments that
added a sense of urgency to his concerns about the state of
Russia's health. Valentin Pokrovskii, president of the Russian
Academy of Medical Sciences, told a conference devoted to the
country's public-health priorities for 2004-10 that only half of
Russian boys currently aged 16 will live to the age of 60, newsru.com
reported on 23 May. The mortality rate for Russian males of working
age increased 80 percent over the last decade, Pokrovskii said, the
main causes being alcoholism, accidents, violations of work-place and
environmental safety, and imperfections in the public-health system.
Some 109 million Russians live in areas plagued by "ecological
disasters," he said, with more than 30 percent of water samples taken
around the country failing to meet sanitary standards. "The
conditions for life have become unbearable," Pokrovskii concluded,
adding that the country's future development and security depends
on the physical, psychic, and intellectual health of its population.
He called for an increase in health-care funding.
Speaking at the same conference, former Health Minister
Vladimir Starodubov, who now heads one of the ministry's research
institutes, predicted that in the best-case scenario, Russia's
population will drop to 121 million people by 2050, a decrease of 24
million. According to Starodubov's worst-case scenario,
Russia's population will drop to 102 million by 2050, a decrease
of 43 million.
In addition, he predicted that the percentage of children and
adolescents in the population would drop from 26 percent of the total
to 19 percent and that the number of working-age adults would drop
from 55 to 47 percent and the percentage of elderly would increase
from 19 to 34 percent. The main causes of mortality due to factors
other than aging or chronic illness are defects in the health-care
system, "the drop in living standards of part of the population in
the process of reform," and alcohol poisoning, Starodubov said,
adding that deaths from the latter have reached a "crisis" level.
Earlier this month, the State Statistics Committee reported that
7,829 Russians died of alcohol poisoning in the first two months of
this year, up 5.5 percent over the same period last year (see "RFE/RL
Newsline," 7 May 2003).
As if these depressing statistics weren't enough, the
Washington, D.C.-based Worldwatch Institute declared Russians the
heaviest smokers in the world. Citing research by the U.S. Department
of Agriculture, the institute reported that in 2002, Russians smoked
1,931 cigarettes per capita -- more than twice the world average,
regions.ru reported on 23 May.
Meanwhile, Vadim Pokrovskii, head of the Federal Center for
Preventing and Combating AIDS, said on 21 May that while there are
officially 238,405 HIV-infection cases in Russia, experts believe the
real number of cases is 500,000-1.5 million (see "RFE/RL Newsline,"
22 May 2003). Official statistics from Tolyatti, Irkutsk, and
Orenburg indicate that one in 100 people in each area are infected
with HIV, the virus that causes AIDS, regions.ru reported on 22 May.
As these statistics suggest, the health situation in some of
Russia's regions is nothing short of catastrophic. Tula Oblast
currently has more than 3,000 registered HIV-infection cases,
including 102 babies born to HIV-infected mothers. The infants are
now being cared for in the oblast's AIDS clinic, Regnum reported
on 16 May.
Meanwhile, the average life expectancy for men in Arkhangelsk
Oblast is 57.5 years, Regnum reported on 15 May. A region-wide
children's health drive conducted in Arkhangelsk Oblast last year
found that 65.6 percent of those children examined were sick and 58.7
percent suffered from chronic illnesses.
Russia's overall demographic and health situation, while
alarming, is not totally bleak. As President Putin noted in his
annual address, birthrates over the last three years grew by 18
percent, and infant mortality dropped by 21 percent. Infant
mortality, the president said, is at "an absolute record low in our
history."
******
#3
Putin urges prudent 2004 budget despite election
MOSCOW, May 30 (Reuters) - President Vladimir Putin said on Friday that
Russia's 2004 budget must lay the foundations for steady economic growth
and aim to
improve living standards of ordinary Russians, many of whom live below the
poverty line.
Putin, who has set an ambitious target to double the size of Russia's economy
within 10 years, also called on his government to stick to conservative
budget policies despite looming parliamentary polls in December.
"The main task of budgetary policy remains the improvement of the well being
of the population and ensuring the country's steady economic growth," Putin
said in a letter to the cabinet, which is due to discuss next year's draft
budget on June 5. "The 2004 federal budget must not become a hostage to
pre-election ambitions, industrial lobbying and clearly unfulfillable
promises," Putin
added.
Putin said the government should channel windfall oil revenues into a reserve
fund to shield the oil dependent economy from wild swings in global crude
prices and requested that a tight lid should be kept on primary budget
spending
next year.
"The aim is to ensure a lower tempo in the rise (of primary budget spending)
compared to economic growth," Putin said.
Last month the government approved fiscal guidelines for 2004 calling for a
budget surplus of 95 billion roubles ($3.06 billion), or 0.6 percent of gross
domestic product (GDP) in 2004 despite planned tax cuts.
Russia is looking for ways to spur growth and narrow the gap with western
economies. The government has proposed eliminating a sales tax and reducing
value
added tax to 18 percent from 20 percent in 2004 to stimulate domestic demand.
Putin said that value added tax could be cut further to 16 percent in 2006 if
the overall financial climate is favourable.
The government also intends to slash social security taxes paid by businesses
to 26 percent from 35.6 percent in 2005 to help boost investment.
******
#4
BBC Monitoring
Russian big business starts funding Putin's election campaign - TV
Source: TVS, Moscow, in Russian 0420 gmt 29 May 03
Political observer Yuliya Latynina comments on the ways Russian big business
is funding President Vladimir Putin's 2004 election campaign. Little has
changed in the country since 1990s, and financial sources of presidential
candidates aren't transparent as before, she says. The following is an
excerpt from the
My Opinion slot on the Russian independent TVS channel on 29 May:
[Latynina] There is a political tradition in Russia to finance presidential
election campaigns. The one who sponsors the campaign, has his president in
office. All large-scale property re-distributions of the past were
connected with
presidential elections.
Yeltsin had to be re-elected in 1996. Two groups were fighting for control
over his election campaign: the big business clan headed by its chief of
staff,
[Anatoliy] Chubays, and the military and security clan headed by Yeltsin's
chief bodyguard [Aleksandr] Korzhakov. The oligarchs intended to privatize
state
property for peanuts, to allocate some part of the catch for the election
campaign, to steal another part and to provide for Yeltsin's democratic
victory.
The party of Korzhakov and [former Russian Deputy Prime Minister Oleg]
Soskovets did not understand such cunning financial tricks. They intended
to cancel
the election and to offer Yeltsin power from generals' hands. The business
clan
won. It's noteworthy that the oligarchs were paid for their support before
the
election, in the course of loan-for-shares auctions. Clever oligarchs
realized that nothing would be given for free afterwards. [Media tycoon
Vladimir]
Gusinskiy did not obtain [the communication holding company] Svyazinvest,
reportedly promised to him, though he made a decisive contribution in
Yeltsin's
victory.
The election of Putin [in 2000] was also accompanied by property
re-distribution. I don't mean the hunt on two media magnates, Gusinskiy and
[Boris]
Berezovskiy, one of whom was imprudent enough to form an opposition to the
president
and another was silly enough to boast that it was he to whom the president
owed his victory. I mean the large-scale re-distribution of aluminium
industry
in favour of the Russian Aluminium company, representing the interests of the
outgoing Family [Boris Yeltsin's entourage]. It happened before the election.
It's noteworthy that all post-election attempts to re-distribute property,
made
by the same people [Russian Aluminium chiefs Roman Abramovich and Oleg
Deripaska], failed.
[Passage omitted]
A new re-distribution of financial flows is under way in Russia. It's taking
place before the election and is aimed at funding the election campaign. The
new Russian elite [so-called Putin's St Petersburg group] has seized
managerial
control over several state-run companies like Gazprom [gas monopoly],
Rosspirtprom [alcohol producer], Rosneft [oil company] and Rosoboroneksport
[arms
trader]. They immediately launched a big fund-raising campaign.
Everybody contributes to Putin's re-election, even those who never saw him in
flesh and blood, a top manager told me angrily after his company, one of the
biggest in Russia, was asked to make a donation for restoration of the St
Petersburg Konstantinovskiy Palace. An average sum of a voluntary donation
reportedly was 10m dollars. The Kremlin administration collected 290m
dollars to have
the palace restored, and needs 40m dollars more.
[Passage omitted]
The state-run Rosneft oil company, headed by [Vladimir] Bogdanchikov, who is
close to the St Petersburg group, paid 600m dollars for the controlling stock
in the oil company Severnaya Neft [Northern Oil]. Oil magnates hinted that
the
price of the deal should have been 100m-200m dollars less. Rumours had it
that the extra money will be spent on the election campaign. The head of
Yukos
[oil company], Mikhail Khodorkovskiy, made such a hint straight at a meeting
with the president [on 19 February 2003]. Putin's reaction was so angry [he
suggested that Khodorkovskiy should better give an account on how his company
managed to acquire more oil deposits than it actually needed] that it
failed to
refute the rumours, to put it mildly.
Let's look at another deal. This year Gazprom is going to sell Turkmen
natural gas to Ukraine through the Hungarian company Uraltransgaz. The
company with
charter capital of 12,000 dollars was set up by four individuals and
registered in the Hungarian village of (?Chebdy). According to experts of
the Hermitage
Capital Management consulting company, its future earnings will vary from
320m to 940m dollars, depending on where Uraltransgaz will sell the amount of
natural gas due to it as a pay for its services.
Let's assume that the Ukrainian side will claim half of this sum. However,
it's hard to imagine that Gazprom could strike a deal of this kind with an
obscure Hungarian company if not for some election-related obligations.
People say that the cost of Yeltsin's election in 1996 was only 100m dollars
in cash. One can see with a naked eye that this time the price will be much
higher. This sum of money will be sufficient to have Putin elected not only
the
president of Russia but also the president of the United States. Even the
oligarchs, in spite of all their power, can't afford anything like this.
The present-day regime is a successor of Yeltsin's regime, as our elite is
still dividing financial resources under the pretext of presidential
elections.
But there is an important difference: the re-distribution of industrial
assets
has been replaced by re-distribution of financial flows.
[Passage omitted]
******
#5
Washington Post
May 30, 2003
Editorial
Potemkin Democracy
WHEN HE VISITS St. Petersburg this weekend, President Bush will see gleaming
spires, fresh paint and the faces of hundreds of officials and diplomats, all
there to celebrate the city's 300th anniversary. He will not see any homeless
people or meet many of the locals: The homeless have been cleared from the
streets in anticipation of the event, and the locals have been told that they
would be better off leaving town. Some of the unrestored buildings will be
masked
by large billboards. A fence will line the road from the airport so that the
dignitaries cannot see the poverty.
In other words, the tradition of the Potemkin village lives on -- and not
only in St. Petersburg. In recent weeks the Bush administration has
recommended a
large cut in funding of aid to Russia -- more than a third from the past
fiscal year -- which will probably kill off some of the programs Russia needs
most: those that promote human rights and democratization. The Office of
Management and Budget has told both the State Department and the U.S.
Agency for
International Development that it is time for Russia to "graduate" from
democracy
assistance, presumably on the grounds that Russia is now a democracy. But
while
Russia is a far more open society than it used to be, many of the media are
still controlled, the judicial system is still corrupt and opponents of the
president find it ever harder to maneuver. If the administration believes
this is
full democracy, then it has been fooled by a barely plausible facade.
Some suspect the real justification for the cuts is financial. If so, that is
extremely shortsighted. Relatively speaking, the amount of money involved is
small and the impact of these programs is potentially large. If, as others
suspect, they are being cut because President Vladimir Putin no longer
approves
of them, then the shortsightedness is even more pronounced. Congress rightly
spends billions of dollars every year to ensure that Russia's weapons of mass
destruction are dismantled -- but if Russia were a more open society, with a
fully free media and more robust opposition, control over these weapons
would be
easier to establish. Congress should fully fund the aid programs, as well as
the grants it has authorized -- but not appropriated -- to organizations in
this country, such as the Andrei Sakharov Archives, that promote human
rights in
Russia.
Many in Washington long to build a "strategic partnership" with Russia in the
war on terrorism; but until Russia shares more of America's values, that
relationship will always be fragile, as Russia's behavior in the weeks
before the
war in Iraq proved. The democratization of Russia is something the United
States should care about, not merely because it is right but because it makes
strategic sense.
*******
#6
Moscow Times
May 30, 2003
Court Bans Kompromat on Yukos
By Catherine Belton
Staff Writer
Russia's best-known muckrakers have dedicated hundreds of pages of their
glossy monthly magazine to the dirt they've dug up on the controversial
pasts of
dozens of top businessmen and politicians.
The staff of Kompromat.ru magazine have managed to examine in detail the
contentious climbs to power of Kremlin chief of staff Alexander Voloshin,
Security
Council chief Vladimir Rushailo and the dynamic Alfa Group duo of Mikhail
Fridman and Pyotr Aven -- all without a legal hitch.
But then they went after Russia's richest man, oil magnate Mikhail
Khodorkovsky.
In an unprecedented legal action last week, a Moscow court banned the
distribution and sale of Kompromat.ru's latest issue, titled, in English,
"Who Is Mr.
X," a play on the first letter of Khodorkovsky's name in Cyrillic.
On Thursday, Moscow's Khamovniki Court held a preliminary hearing on the
magazine's appeal and decided to hear the case in full June 16.
The disputed, 98-page edition is filled with articles covering virtually
every aspect of Khodorkovsky's meteoric and scandal-tainted climb to the top,
including original reporting along with reprints from the Russian and Western
press.
Bailiffs from the Khamovniki Court were acting on a complaint issued by
Alexei Kondaurov, an aide to the president of OOO Yukos Moscow, a division
within
the oil major's structure.
According to a copy of Kondaurov's suit obtained by The Moscow Times, the
Yukos official claims the magazine's allegations that he is connected to the
Communist Party are false and have damaged his business reputation. On that
basis,
the Khamovniki Court ruled to stop the publication of the magazine. Not a
word is mentioned in the suit about other material in the issue of the
magazine
that allege past misdoings by Yukos owners and managers.
A spokesman for Yukos, Alexander Shadrin, said the company viewed the issue
of the magazine "very negatively," and that it published "all kinds of crap."
He said the company was "particularly disturbed" by the fact that it had
reprinted articles over which Yukos had sued in the past -- and won.
However, he
would neither name the specific articles nor could he say whether Yukos
itself
would sue the magazine. He said that "would depend on the outcome of the
other
case."
Even though Kompromat.ru does not have a reputation for dogged fact-checking,
media watchers said the case marked a new level of litigiousness from the
company owned by Russia's most powerful oil magnate.
"This in essence looks like censorship," said Alexei Pankin, the editor of
media magazine Sreda. "But it is difficult to take publications like
kompromat.ru seriously. You can never tell whether it is serious
investigative journalism
or just zakazukha," referring to articles reporters are paid to publish.
The case against Kompromat.ru comes on the back of a wave of suits filed by
Yukos against the Western press. It is currently suing Bloomberg in London,
and
last year it sued Britain's Sunday Times.
The litigious activity, in turn, comes on the heels of an image makeover for
Khodorkovsky. After gaining back full ownership control of Yukos in 2000
following a series of high-profile conflicts with minority shareholders in
which he
diluted their stakes, Khodorkovsky embarked on a massive -- and remarkably
successful -- PR campaign to clean up his public persona. Khodorkovsky and
Yukos
are now the darlings of the Western media and investment community, the
epitome of good corporate behavior.
But it hasn't always been that way.
Back in 1999, when he had minority investors locked out of shareholders
meetings, he was seen as the embodiment of what had gone wrong in the
country's
transition to oligarchic capitalism. Questions were asked about how he had
parlayed Komsomol connections in the early 1990s into the rights to handle
billions
of dollars worth of government accounts. Observers also wondered aloud how he
managed to acquire the bulk of Yukos, a company now worth more than $20
billion, for a mere $159 million in 1995.
Kompromat.ru founders and editors Sergei Sokolov and Kirill Belyaninov say
Khodorkovsky now wants to control the media to make sure no more questions
appear in the press about his past or present business dealings.
"[Yukos] is acting like the Politburo," Belyaninov said. "This marks the
return of censorship. It is against the law for a court to ban the
distribution of
the press."
Belyaninov said 5,000 copies of the magazine were handed over for
distribution on the evening of May 19. Just hours later, he and Sokolov
received a phone
call from Kondaurov inviting them out to dinner. Another 5,000 were meant to
have been printed later. He said that during their meeting, Kondaurov offered
to buy the entire print run -- an offer he said they refused.
Just three days after that, they received a court order to remove the
magazine from distribution, he said.
Reached on his mobile telephone Thursday, Kondaurov would say only,
"Everything that was written was absolute lies, not just about me, but
about Yukos,
too."
He attributed his ability to move so quickly to ban the magazine to his
having managed to get a copy of it "before it came out."
"Yukos has been saying it's the most transparent company in Russia,"
Belyaninov said. "We're saying that's not the case."
Khodorkovsky's profile has become even higher in recent months as he has
moved into the political arena. He has publicly stated he will finance the
liberal
Yabloko party and the Union of Right Forces in parliamentary elections later
this year, while another sizeable Yukos shareholder, Sergei Muravlenko,
reportedly intends to underwrite the Communists.
Since announcing that he would step down as Yukos CEO in 2007, Moscow media
have been filled with speculation that Khodorkovsky intends to run for
president in 2008.
The head of the Communist Party press service, Andrei Andreyev, denied they
had received any funds from any Yukos shareholders.
He did, however, confirm that Kondaurov had run as No. 4 on the party list in
the Far East in 1999 State Duma elections, but had not been elected. Andreyev
also declined to confirm or deny the Kompromat.ru reports that Kondaurov had
been an influential supporter of Zyuganov, saying only it was "theoretically
possible."
As its power has grown, Yukos has moved to cultivate links with journalists,
funding a program to help to develop the regional press.
*******
#7
Russia, U.S. Disappointed Over Relations
May 30, 2003
By DEBORAH SEWARD
MOSCOW (AP) - During meetings in Russia and France, Russian leader Vladimir
Putin and President Bush will try to patch up a once warm relationship that
has
cooled because of differences over the Iraq war.
Diplomats and analysts think the two leaders will succeed - at least in part
- because each side believes the relationship is too important to remain
mired
in resentment.
The climate of friendship that followed Putin's bold support for Bush after
the Sept. 11 terror attacks all but evaporated during weeks of acrimonious
U.N.
debate.
While Washington felt let down by Russia, analysts and diplomats say the Bush
administration never held high expectations for Kremlin support of the Iraq
war. That, they say, is why Putin's stance produced a much milder response in
Washington than the icy reaction to rejection of the conflict by French
President Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder.
The leaders of the ``coalition of the unwilling,'' as France, Germany and
Russia were dubbed, have a chance to make up with Bush this weekend, first at
ceremonies hosted by Putin in honor of the 300th anniversary of the
founding of
St. Petersburg and then at the G-8 summit in Evian, France.
``We don't need to dramatize these problems,'' said Vladimir Baranovsky,
deputy director of the Institute for World Economy and International
Relations,
speaking of the rifts over Iraq.
Putin, who in recent weeks has emphasized Russia's ``strategic partnership''
with the United States, is likely to have an easier time than Chirac, with
whom the White House maintains frosty relations, and Schroeder, whom senior
U.S.
officials believe they can ignore.
The relationship between Bush and Putin has had an almost transcendental
quality since the American president concluded he ``was able to get a sense
of his
soul'' after meeting Putin for the first time in June 2001.
For Putin, the connection with Bush is just one component of his strategy to
increase Russia's international influence.
``Only together with the United States are the Russians stronger,'' said
Horst Teltschik, the top foreign policy adviser under former German
Chancellor
Helmut Kohl. ``President Putin will not put his relationship with Bush in
danger.''
Throughout the winter and early spring, the Russian Foreign Ministry voiced
its displeasure over the Iraq crisis almost daily. But unlike France, Putin
did
not openly work against Bush or recruit anti-U.S. votes in the United Nations.
Still, nobody is expecting any reconciliation miracles in St. Petersburg or
Evian.
``We're not going from bad to good, or from bad back to the old relationship,
but from bad to indifferent,'' said Michael McFaul, a Russia expert at the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Bush was most certainly disappointed with Putin, McFaul said in Moscow this
week. ``He understood his (Putin's) position, but he expected more,'' he said.
As a result of Russia's siding with France and Germany, Washington no longer
sees it as a good investment to develop big projects with Russia, which is
now
``very far down,'' on Bush's list of priorities, McFaul said.
Sliding down the agenda is frustrating for the Kremlin, although it appears
that in contrast to Germany and France there will be no major punishment for
Russia's failure to support the U.S.-led action in Iraq.
Serious work in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
requires Russian participation, and Washington is seeking Moscow's help in
dealing with North Korea and Iran.
Those and other issues could be on the agenda in St. Petersburg and Evian,
and there is already talk of a Putin visit to the United States in the fall
for
further talks with Bush.
Hard issues for Putin, such as the war in Chechnya and Russia's worsening
record on press freedom, are so far down on the Bush agenda that those
involved
in summit planning say there's no guarantee they will even be raised.
*******
#8
Brookings Institution
www.brook.edu
May 29, 2003
Is Putin Running Out of Steam?
Clifford G. Gaddy, Senior Fellow, Governance and Foreign Policy Studies
Written for the Brookings Website
President George Bush's meeting this weekend with Russian president Vladimir
Putin is drawing attention to Putin's character and policies. The Russian
leader's annual message to parliament on May 16, describing "the situation
in the
country and on basic directions of the internal and external policies of the
state," revealed little new about Russia but a good deal about Putin's
state of
mind. That message was not encouraging. Lacking logic, focus, and intensity,
the speech suggested that Putin is running out of not only ideas but also
energy. As a consequence, perhaps more by default than by design, Russia's
"internal and external policies" both seem to be headed in the wrong
direction.
Although he achieved a measure of prominence by opposing U.S. policy in Iraq,
Putin said little about foreign policy. Indeed, he did not even mention the
word "Iraq." He made an oblique reference to "certain countries" that, under
the guise of fighting terrorism, use their "well equipped national armies" to
"expand their zones of strategic influence." Otherwise, he made a
half-hearted
endorsement of sticking to the rules of the international order and using the
United Nations.
But it would be short-sighted to welcome Putin's relative withdrawal from
global politics. His previous engagement in international affairs had the
important side effect of ensuring that Russia itself would try to live up to
international standards. He had to allow all aspects of Russian behavior,
at home and
abroad, to be subject to scrutiny--and criticism--by the world community. If
Putin abandons his effort to help shape the new international order, Russia
will
have diminished incentives to play by international rules across the board.
Instead it will look to cut deals with individual countries (mainly the U.S.)
on specific issues, leaving all else outside the discussion. One of the
leading
models for this approach is in Russia's own neighborhood, the former Soviet
republic of Uzbekistan. Thanks to its enthusiastically pro-American stance on
Iraq, Uzbekistan feels it has to listen to no one's criticism of its abysmal
record on human rights, market reform, or democracy.
Judging by his speech, Putin's three main goals for Russia are all related
directly to economic policy. "By 2010," he said, Russia can and must double
its
GDP, "overcome" poverty, and modernize its armed forces.
What is one to make of such patently unrealistic objectives? Doubling
Russia's GDP by 2010 would require average annual growth of 10 percent.
This is
easily three to four times the current rate of growth (once one removes the
windfall effect from high world oil and commodity prices). The other two
goals are
more abstract but equally unrealistic. To call them "strategic, vital,
historical" tasks smacks of the rhetoric used by Soviet leaders, who
regularly urged
their countrymen to perform "heroic feats" in 10 years or so.
But the real problem with Putin's economic goals is not that he can't meet
them. It is that he will try to. The only way Russia could come close to
achieving the goal of doubling GDP in the requisite time period is to
further crank
up--not, as it should, shut down--the wasteful production that it inherited
from
the Soviet Union. Since much of that is based in the old military-industrial
sector, this is consistent with his announcement of a new arms production
program. The key to making it all work is continued subsidization of
value-destroying industries by the energy sector. Putin therefore strongly
rejected the
idea of raising energy prices closer to world market levels.
Until now, Putin has tried to avoid choosing between two conflicting
imperatives: modernization of the economy, on the one hand, and social
stability and
cohesion, on the other. They conflict because modernization--which would
entail
not just building new industries but closing down old ones on a large
scale--would lead to a more productive and efficient economy, but only down
the road.
Along the way things would be messy and painful. Output, especially in
physical
terms, would initially decline, unemployment would rise, and poverty would
increase. Regional disparities and social dislocation would intensify.
In his address, Putin made clear that he is not going to let Russia proceed
along this risky course. He criticized those who would put priority on
further
structural reforms. Such people, he said, advocate "reform for the sake of
reform." There will be no "permanent revolution," he said, evoking the
language
that Stalin used to disparage the policies of his rival, Leon Trotsky, in the
1920s. Stalin portrayed himself as the apostle of stability. His opponents
were
the adventurists.
By rejecting destabilizing economic reforms, Putin is making a choice with
political implications as well. In 1999 Russia's most liberal market-oriented
reformers decided to back Putin as a means to an end. They were convinced
that a
couple of years of political stability under a firm leader would help build
the strong central government they needed in order to push through radical
reforms. Meanwhile, they would lie low and demonstrate their loyalty to the
new
president. The price of admission to Putin's team was high: they had to
agree to
voice no dissent whatever to his renewed war in Chechnya.
In his speech, Putin said that the foundation for achieving his economic
targets is a "consolidation of the forces of society." This is code
language for
no dissent. The political parties will have to demonstrate their "civic
responsibility"--in other words, refrain from opposing the government's
economic plan.
Having sacrificed their principles on Chechnya, the reformers now risk seeing
their economic policies falling prey to a new test of loyalty: Do you or do
you not advocate growth without pain or instability?
The promises to double GDP and eliminate poverty in 10 years or less are not
the only statements in Putin's speech that were detached from reality. He
talked about the end of hostilities in Chechnya and asserted that the
holding of a
constitutional referendum in that region earlier this year showed that
Chechens "consider themselves to be a inseparable part of a single Russian
multinational people." He claimed that military reform has begun. Within
seven years,
he said, Russia will have a strong, professional army equipped with modern
arms. In fact, there is no momentum towards reform at all. The Russian
military
remains abysmally underfinanced. Units still depend for their very survival
on
handouts by regional and city officials. Sometimes cities "adopt" ships or
units named for them, sending packages of clothing, cigarettes, and other
basic
goods. The military in Chechnya is clearly not under the full control of
anyone
in Moscow, least of all Putin.
Why does Putin engage in these fantasies? Perhaps it is merely a phase of
fatigue, leading him to temporarily succumb to the age-old Russian
imperative of
pretending. But it may be more serious. Putin is halfway through his fourth
year as president. Attempts to reform Soviet and post-Soviet economies have a
distinct life cycle. They generally don't last more than four or five
years. By
that time, they either work or they don't. They are implemented or they are
not. In the Soviet period, when the reform impetus flagged, leaders felt
compelled to revive ideological fervor and artificially inject dynamism
into a system
that otherwise would slip into inertia and stagnation. The role of
ideological mobilizer of the masses is not one that Putin would either
enjoy or play
well. In his speech to parliament, he went through the motions and spoke of
"restoring Russia to greatness." But the words were empty, and the spirit was
lacking.
Putin comes across as a man defeated on all fronts. This is a disturbing
prospect. Without his energy and leadership, Russia is likely to lose its
way--drifting toward isolation in foreign policy, abandoning economic
reform, and
rejecting political pluralism.
*******
#9
Russia and America: From One Crisis to the Next?
Nikolai Zlobin's Conversation with Ambassador Stephen Sestanovich
Washington Profile News Agency
www.washprofile.org
nzlobin@cdi.org
May 30, 2003
Stephen Sestanovich is Ambassador at large and special adviser to the
secretary of state for the new independent states under President Clinton,
expert on Russia and the former Soviet states, as well as a member of the
board of the Washington Profile News Agency.
Nikolai Zlobin is Director of Russian and Asian Programs at the Center for
Defense Information and editor-in-chief of Washington Profile.
NZ: As someone who has worked within earlier administrations, what do you
see as the major differences in policy approaches toward Russia from this
administration?
SS: I think the previous administration has a record of some successes and
some shortfalls, and this administration has a record that's comparable.
Most American administrations are disorganized when they develop and
implement their foreign policy; this one is not an exception, neither was
the previous one. The biggest difference is that for a brief period in this
administration, there was a conviction that Russia could actually be
valuable to America policy in practical terms - that it was going to be
possible to put aside empty talk and actually have concrete cooperation. I
think this was exaggerated, but the hope was there, that there was a change
away from big declarations toward something more practical, and while this
was strongest after 9/11, it actually began a bit before. And it looked
like it was going to be successful, partly because for once, Russian and
American strategies seemed to match. Russian strategy was to seek a
positive atmosphere, in order to ignore policies of the US that it didn't
like and not have to take responsibility for countering them. And for the
administration, there was hope that they could have a new relationship with
Russia, because Russia had an effective leader, and one who could deliver,
who was popular and didn't have the liabilities of Yeltsin. That was the
first phase of Russian-American relations since Sep.11 and a bit before.
But we may be coming to the end of that phase, and re-entering a phase that
is more like Clinton and Yeltsin, where cooperation has less substantive
value, where there is an effort required by both presidents to pretend that
there is a mutually valuable relationship. But I think even this will be
different from Clinton-Yeltsin, because the inclination on the part of the
Bush administration to pretend will not last very long. This is an
administration with a mission, with a pressing agenda of security problems,
and they're not inclined to waste time with agreements and relationships
that are mostly for show. In that respect, it could be not only a decline
in Russian-American relations from the first post-Sep.11 phase, but a
retreat from the relationship we had in the 1990s, where there was a strong
willingness on the part of both presidents to pretend, and I think the
challenge for Bush and Putin when they meet, and even more as they look
forward to subsequent meetings, and as they instruct their assistants and
advisers when they try to decide what to implement, the challenge for them
is to find some content to make Russian-American relationship meaningful.
NZ: I personally believe we are at the lowest point in the relationship of
the past 10 years. What do you think was the highest? What was the great
moment, if any?
SS: The very early 1990s, when Yeltsin came to Washington and was treated
as a great hero. Obviously that time is hard to compare to today because
the kinds of hopes people had were almost limitless. But if you take the
period since then, there have been few big achievements, and that's why the
period after Sep.11 looked so new - you had presidents who were committed
to a positive relationship, who were dominant politically in each country,
and it seemed as though perhaps all the possibilities had been regenerated.
NZ: But the relationships weren't good in the early 1990s, just a lot of
optimism. Was there a period of time when we had good fundamentals,
practically speaking?
SS: Pretending that there was a positive relationship was not a completely
wasted effort, because it allowed for a gradual transition in which both
sides could define a new policy without antagonizing each other. But it was
very unfortunate; perhaps hard to avoid, that in the 1990s the political
leadership in both countries was so vulnerable to critics, and it made it
hard to be realistic about Russian-American relations, it meant that each
government spent much of its time simply trying to defend itself for having
any desire for good relations in the first place, and that meant it was
rather difficult to get things done. The most important change with the
appearance of Bush and Putin was that neither had to worry about that kind
of criticism. Senator Helms and Yevgeny Primakov and other even more
critical people were suddenly quiet. This gave each president room to do
something. But it was also important that a lot of the issues of the 1990s
were put aside. To be fair, in addition to the political weakness of the
two governments, the problems piled up, and the pile got bigger and bigger,
so that by the end of the Clinton administration the two countries
disagreed on many more issues than they agreed. In the course of the 90s
you can look at a long list of issues that were resolved, but two important
ones that no longer had to preoccupy Bush and Putin were the Balkans and
Russian economic distress. The Balkans and Russia's economic needs were
high on the agenda through much for the 1990s. With the resurgence of the
Russian economy in 1998 and the fall of Milosevic, those problems at least
were gone. But the other problems seemed to disappear - ballistic missile
defense was handled successfully by Bush and Putin - they said they weren't
in agreement, but they weren't going to keep talking about it. NATO
expansion was handled in a similar way - no full agreement, but not a
continuous source of friction.
NZ: So it seems that we didn't reach any success; the only success was not
spoiling the relationship further over a problem.
SS: The real test after Sep.11 was not whether Russia and the US could
simply avoid disagreement, but whether there would be a possibility of
active cooperation. In the first phase after Sep.11, the improvement was
due mostly to not disagreeing. The fact that the US was going to be
militarily active in Central Asia did not create a disagreement. Russian
threats against Georgia and American support for Georgia - this too did not
lead to a disagreement. The challenge in the second phase has been that the
two sides have not been able to actually achieve active cooperation. Iraq
is the most conspicuous example, and its' a real setback. What is even more
worrisome about Russian-American relations is that the big issues on the
American agenda cannot be dealt with by simply agreeing to disagree; they
really require a greater convergence of policies, or else there will be
plain old disagreements. I'm talking about Iran, North Korea…these are
issues that will be hard to deal with simply through great politeness
because these are now the big problems of holding off nuclear proliferation
by states that the US considers dangerous, and Russia also in some ways
considers dangerous, but it's not been willing to take the next step and
say, "If these are dangerous states, we have to have an active policy of
preventing the acquisition of nuclear capacity. "
NZ: We used to have a non-proliferation system based on a balance of power.
I would argue that after the break-up of the Soviet Union, the old concept
served the US better, because it's a superpower and can control more with
its economic tools than Russia can. Russia, for example, doesn't have money
for developing new technologies and weapons, cannot modernize the army, it
must rely on quantity instead of quality, which goes against the old
non-proliferation concept. Don't you feel that Russia has a point about
nuclear non-proliferation, saying "We have a different situation then in
the 1980s, agreeing on non-proliferation as a main concern."
SS: I'd put it this way. For a state like Russia that has been a major
nuclear power, but whose military strength is overall decreasing, it is
quite important to keep other states from acquiring nuclear weapons,
because that tends to elevate them. Nuclear acquisition by particular
states like Iran and North Korea create problems that Russia has few
resources for dealing with. That means that it is a threat to Russian
interests, but because Russia is weaker, it has fewer instruments for
actually dealing with this problem. And it's tempted to try a policy of
détente or appeasement or commercial advantage as with Iraq. A policy that,
in the end, has negative consequences, but in the short run, produces
commercial benefits. The problem for the US in trying to get Russian
cooperation to deal with these problems is that Russia has tended to pursue
short-term commercial benefits and has no real inclination to view them
with the same seriousness that the US does. As a consequence, you now have
a well-developed American suspicion that Russia is not prepared to deal
effectively with these issues.
NZ: Is there a good solution for this problem?
SS: The problem has now become more serious, because each country has
acquired a certain degree of autonomy in its nuclear weapons program, and
it's harder for outside powers to influence their decisions.
NZ: We saw Putin's inability to influence North Korea…
SS: Putin is not alone in learning unhappy lessons from his dealing in
North Korea - the US has had the same experience - I think there is in that
the fundamental ingredient of Russian policy. I understand that Russians
don't want to look as if they simply bought the policy of the US - they
want to look as though their policy reflects Russian interest, and it must
do that or it won't be sustainable over the long term. Russia should not
have to say "Okay, we give up, now we adopt America's position." Their
policy should be one of evaluating the reliability of Iran and North Korea
as partners, not for the US, but for Russia. How have Iran and North Korea
treated Russia? I would say deceitfully. They have exploited their
relationship with Russia. If I was an advisor to Putin, I would say the way
out of the political dilemma that Russia faces is to blame Iran, blame
North Korea. There is in that the kind of approach that Putin generally
takes - he wants to find ways of making himself look strong even when he's
not taking an action that expresses strength. In the case of Iran, there
are technical kinds of cooperation that is probably senseless for Russia to
continue - they only help Iran move closer toward nuclear weapons. Even in
the past 6-12 months it's become clear that Iran is covertly pursuing a
nuclear program and this has been discovered not by American intelligence,
but by the bureaucrats of the International Atomic Energy. The head of the
agency, and Egyptian lawyer, went to Iran and visited a nuclear facility,
and what one hears is that he and his colleagues were shocked by the scale
and sophistication of their program. It's pretty clear, if you're a nuclear
expert, that this is a program whose aim is not simply to keep Iran from
being dependent on its own abundant oil and gas resources - there's
something else going on here. I've had Russian officials tell me - they
understand there's probably something else going on here - but now it's
perfectly obvious. This will come up as a subject for discussion in the
IAEA meeting is June. But it's got to be more than just saying that
something is not quite right. Iran is essentially making itself an outlaw
state within the regime of nuclear non-proliferation. And the question that
American policy is asking of Russian policy is - what do we do now? There
aren't any really good answer, but certainly the first step is telling the
truth about what the situation is.
NZ: Is any cooperation possible on Pakistan and Israel, can they be part of
the non-proliferation package?
SS: There is a big difference between countries that already have nuclear
weapons and those that don't. Obviously, the alarm that any government
feels about another government getting nuclear weapons depends on a large
extent on how it views the policies of that government - whether it's a
friend or a foe.
NZ: This is what Russia is complaining about - that Iraq is attacked by
America because it's not an American friend; Pakistan and Israel are in the
same situation, but because they follow American policies, they're not a
target. It's a double standard, no?
SS: No. I believe that Russia participated in the UN consensus at the of
the Persian Gulf war that Iraq should not have nuclear weapons. It was part
of the deal struck between not just the victorious powers, but the Security
Council as a whole, which said "If this war comes to an end and Iraq is to
ever have any chance of rejoining the international community as a member
in good standing, it has to be absolutely clear that it has abandoned its
efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction. And that was a consensus
that existed among the great powers. They forced that deal for most of the
1990s, but it began to unravel, and for about 5 years or so, the US and
Russia have not been in agreement about how to enforce that deal. The
result is where we are now. But you're right that dealing with the problem
of states getting nuclear weapons and dealing with the consequences once
they get them is not just a technical problem that nuclear engineers and
inspectors can resolve, it's also a very political one. If there is going
to be any successful defense of Russian and American interests, the two
countries should to cooperate not just on the technical issues, but also on
the political issues as well. Right now, it's clear how dangerous it is
that both India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons, because every time there
is an increase in tension between the two of them, we have to worry about
the possibility of a gigantic nuclear war. So it hasn't served anyone
interests for those states to have nuclear weapons. Frankly, both Russia
and the US have played a less-than -heroic role there. Although the really
serious proliferation problem for the future has less to do with anything
that Russia and the US have done, and more with a kind of loose coalition
among the nuclear establishments and military establishments of several
countries who have been cooperating for strategic and commercial reasons -
Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, China. In the case of Iran, Russia's role has
not been good, because it has made possible for Iran to create the cover of
a superficially legitimate nuclear program under the cover of which it has
really been pursuing nuclear weapons.
I've written that America has now adopted a more absolutist view of
non-proliferation - that is - this is a first-order threat to our security
which the American administration is prepared to act very decisively to
deal with. And Russia has now drifted into the fatalistic view of
proliferation - it's probably going to happen, there's nothing we can do
about it, why worsen our relations with the states that want nuclear
weapons when we could jus ignore it. There's a mismatch between these two
approaches, and I don't know if that's possible to overcome. It does seem
to me that approaches to this problem are not getting closer together,
they're getting further apart.
NZ: It seems to me the problem is not nuclear weapons themselves, but who
is in charge of them. So can we put the question in the slogan of the NRA:
"Nuclear weapons don't kill people; people kill people." Maybe
proliferation should not be about weapons, but about the people.
SS: Some of the people say that one of the worst consequences if North
Korea gets nuclear weapons is that South Korea and Japan will get nuclear
weapons. Frankly, I'm no so worried about Japan and South Korea having
nuclear weapons because they're basically responsible governments that are
not going to do something crazy, although the result will of course be
nuclear confrontation, which will be inherently dangerous. The most
dangerous consequence of North Korea getting nuclear weapons is that North
Korea seems to be a regime that is prepared to act totally irresponsibly,
to sell anything that it has, because it is an impoverished dictatorship
that is only able to maintain its rule by marketing dangerous technologies.
So it doesn't make any sense that the effect of South and North Korea
having nuclear weapons is equally dangerous. To control the problem
effectively, we want to keep both countries from getting them, but South
Korea will only get nuclear weapons if it feels endangered by North Korean
nuclear weapons. North Korea seems to want to have nuclear weapons in part
because they're an interesting commodity.
NZ: Russian-American relations are empty now - no substance, no purpose.
After the end of the Cold War, it was like: we used to be vital enemies,
now we have to be vital friends. And we didn't invest enough in
Russian-American relations. I argued from the beginning against improving
Russian-American relations because what we have is unimprovable, because it
existed for different circumstances. We spent 12 years ignoring
fundamentals - we have diplomacy on the surface, but nothing beneath, which
is very dangerous. At some point we have to change everything - switch from
a steam engine to an electric one. There is no strategy, no vision. Can we
bring substance in this relationship, bring in fundamentals?
NZ: You're acutely describing some of the emptiness that has often
characterized Russian-American professions of friendship. Some efforts to
build Russian-American relationships over the past ten years has involved
what you said - trying to fix the problem of the Cold War - remaking Europe
in a way that didn't offend Russia. We're close to the end of that process,
and neither country feels that Europe represents a security concern, so
it's not the basis for a real partnership. Some people thought economics
would be the normal basis for Russian-American relations. I'm skeptical of
this view because it seems that there are many obstacles to cooperation,
and if there's going to be a close relationship on economic terms, it's
going to have to develop more on its own, without the direction of the
government. And you see some of that happening, but it doesn't create a
strategic foundation for a relationship. It creates reasons for oil
companies to work together. Sep.11 seemed to offer that leap to a new kind
of engine, to security problems, to an era when the two states would
actually face similar kinds of security problems and would want to deal
with them in broadly similar ways. We're now far enough away from Sep.11 to
see that this cooperation was not enough to be created just by rhetoric and
by dealing with one or two common problems. Long-lasting cooperation
requires a deeper consensus on the kinds of problems we face. It requires
an institutionalized cooperation in which our governments actually have an
ability to communicate with each other that creates confidence in the long
term. The problems of cooperation are directly relevant to the slow process
of transformation of the old institutions of the Soviet security
establishment - they have not been as thoroughly regenerated as would be
necessary to create a modern Russian-American relationship. The kind of
relationship we're talking about probably depends on close cooperation
between the staffs of the two presidents.
NZ: Let me clarify. If you say that the most promising fundamentals are a
common threat, could you say that if there is no threat, there is no
fundamentals?
SS: You're describing something very important about Russia and the US that
to some degree distinguishes them from others. We tend to think our foreign
policy is primarily about providing for the security of our country and
defending our interests. In Europe, the foreign policy of many states is
not primarily about security. It's about the coordination of a whole series
of policies - education, agriculture, and countless other issues. Russia
and the US tend to think that the world still presents us with security
problems that we have to deal with or else our countries will be
threatened. This means there is a potential for cooperation, but it also
means that both governments are wary, because they can easily find
themselves at odds. When you formulate policies based on national security,
you can easily become suspicious of others.
NZ: And in Russian-American relations, if you disagree on security, you
have nothing else to agree on...
Transcript prepared by Seva Gunitskiy, CDI Research Associate, seva@cdi.org.
*******
#10
The Economist (UK)
June 1-7, 2003
The secret policeman's ball
Russia has a chance to show off its president's mixed achievements
LIKE a flustered society debutante putting on every single piece of
jewellery she can find, Russia is desperate to look her best for the
50-odd foreign leaders expected on May 30th in St Petersburg.
Celebrating its 300th anniversary, the city will glisten with fresh
paint and new gold leaf (though the bright facades, like most ball
dresses, conceal flimsy supports and hasty fixes). Unsightly
birthmarks, such as the vegetable patches of people living in sight
of the Konstantinovsky palace where the leaders will gather, have
been forcibly removed. Even body odour will be banished: the
authorities have encouraged locals to leave the city for the weekend.
And, as at any coming-out party, young Lady Russia's conversations
will be charming but inconsequential. In a separate meeting with
European Union leaders, Vladimir Putin, Russia's president, is to
discuss a common economic area and visa-free travel, but those are
distant goals. Expect even less from a summit with leaders of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (minus the three Baltic ones) that
emerged from the old Soviet Union. Russia this year gave up the CIS
presidency for the first time, letting Ukraine's Leonid Kuchma
be "elected" to the job, showing just how irrelevant it now considers
the CIS to be.
So the event is truly a chance for Vladimir Putin, Russia's
president, to show off how well the debutante is doing. Adolescent
Russia has been putting on a growth spurt. As the rest of the world
totters, last year's GDP grew at a perky 4.3%. In April most analysts
began predicting even faster growth this year, thanks mainly to high
oil prices and unexpected productivity gains.
Mr Putin, who became president just as Russia was recovering from its
1998 default, can take some credit. He has pushed through tax cuts.
Bureaucratic reforms, though limited, have made things easier for
business: a study sponsored by the World Bank found that small
businesses now rate each other's competition, rather than
bureaucracy, as their biggest challenge. But Mr Putin's main feat—
though no small one—has been to bring stability.
That is thanks partly to his taste for control—he has strengthened
his direct powers over those of the legislature and regional
governors, and put a lot of former secret-service colleagues in key
posts—and partly to his own knack of looking like the calm point in
every storm centre. He makes sure to appear separate from his
government and is often seen on television berating officials for not
being up to scratch. His control over the media helps too. This year
Freedom House, an American think-tank, downgraded Russia's media
status to "Not Free" after the last more-or-less independent national
television boss, Boris Jordan, was squeezed out of the best state-
owned channel, NTV.
As a result, when things go wrong, polls find that public opinion
turns against ministers or against the pro-Kremlin political party,
United Russia, but that the president's own rating has barely
flickered. Nor does the bloody war still grinding on in Chechnya,
where a fortnight ago nearly 80 people were killed by suicide
bombers, seem to dent Mr Putin's popularity much.
Tsar Vlad, again
This, and the fact that there are no other plausible candidates,
makes Mr Putin's re-election next year very likely. United Russia's
chances in December's election for the Duma, the lower house of
parliament, are less clear. But the Duma is becoming a parody of a
parliament anyway, with business moguls falling over themselves to
bankroll political parties and ensure friendly voting blocks. Mr
Putin's sway over the Duma will depend more on his negotiating skills
after the election than on campaigning before it. The real question
is whether in a second term he will push through knottier but delayed
reforms such as a revamp of the bloated armed forces.
But if he is secure at home, Mr Putin is on shakier ground abroad.
His criticism of the war in Iraq hurt his warm relations with George
Bush, and there has been much hand-wringing in both Moscow and
Washington about how to restore them.
This, though, is the least of problems. American officials have been
admitting that the policy, in a well-worn phrase, is to "punish
France, ignore Germany and forgive Russia" over Iraq. Mr Bush will
sit down with Mr Putin for 45 minutes in St Petersburg but will, it
is said, avoid France's Jacques Chirac. (Then they will all fly to
the French town of Evian for a meeting of the leaders of the world's
eight rich countries, Russia politely included.)
The fear is not that Messrs Putin and Bush will find it hard to talk,
but that there is little left to talk about: the main argument over
Iraq is over, the delayed Moscow treaty on disarmament has been
ratified, and Russia is said to be paying more heed to American
worries about its support for Iran's nuclear programme. Officials are
casting about for new subjects—the war on AIDS, perhaps, or the space
programme?—to fill the bilateral agenda.
Much trickier are relations with the EU. After next year's
enlargement it will account for over half of Russia's trade and
provide many more complex issues—trade tariffs, visas, border
security, energy prices, and so on. Russia's dark human-rights record
matters more to the Europeans too. Russia and the EU, says Fyodor
Lukyanov, editor of "Russia in Global Affairs", need a permanent co-
operation body. Otherwise Russia may risk being the eternal
debutante: chattering prettily to all her suitors, but never getting
very far with any of them.
*******
#11
Izvestia
May 30, 2003
RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR YURI USHAKOV: NONE OF MY PREDECESSORS WORKED
UNDER SUCH FAVORABLE CONDITIONS
The Jackson-Vanik amendment is Washington's loss
Author: Yevgeny Bai
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
RUSSIA AND THE US HAVE MOVED BEYOND THE DISAGREEMENT OVER IRAQ. YET
THERE ARE VIEWS THE TWO NATIONS HAVE NOTHING MORE TO OFFER EACH OTHER
CURRENTLY. RUSSIA'S AMBASSADOR TO THE US DENIES THESE RUMORS SAYING
THE AGENDA OF THE UPCOMING RUSSIA-US SUMMIT IS QUITE RICH AS NEVER.
On the eve of the latest Russian-American summit, we interviewed
Yuri Ushakov, Russia's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to
the USA.
Question: Many experts in Washington claim that the subject of
disagreement between Russia and the US over the war on Iraq has been
closed, and that is good news. But the bad news is that the two
nations have nothing to offer each other at the next summit, so the
agenda of the upcoming summit is extremely lean. What would you
comment on this assertion?
Yuri Ushakov: Yes, no one is frustrated that Russian-American
dialogue has one problem less. As for our cooperation, the agenda is
impressive and rich as never. In St. Petersburg, the presidents are
going to discuss the fulfillment of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive
Reductions both sides have ratified. There is a prospect of real
interaction in the missile defense area, which is also a subject for
conversation. In St. Petersburg, one cannot get by without a talk
about the threat of WMD proliferation either, and about joint fight
against international terrorism. Another subject is regulating
regional conflicts.
Question: They say it is easier to deal with American Republicans
than with Democrats, because they are more predictable. What is
Washington's political atmosphere like under Republicans?
Yuri Ushakov: As an ambassador, I would leave out the comparison
who is easier to deal with. The main thing for us is different - what
place this or that administration reserves for Russia in its system
foreign policy priorities. A qualitatively new atmosphere has been
formed in the last two years in Russian-American dialogue. The talk to
the Americans goes on not the same way as formerly. It is apparently
impossible to say we "have made friends for ever," but there is much
more trust in relations. This is already a success.
I should observe that the atmosphere, the spirit of relations are
incomparable with what we had just a few years ago. Even in spite of
Iraq. Probably none of my predecessors in Washington worked in such a
favorable situation.
Question: Representatives of Russia's business elite - Potanin,
Khodorkovsky, Aven - have been frequent guests to Washington lately.
However, America's business is so far not too active in Russia, while
Congress again has put off considering the Jackson-Vanick amendment...
Yuri Ushakov: The executives of large Russian companies do not
spend time on travel "for no particular reason." So if they have been
frequent guests here, this means something is changing drastically.
Speaking about figures, trade turnover between Russia and the US has
started growing again; last year it exceeded $9 million. At the same
time, Russia's exports to the US significantly exceed our imports from
that country.
The Jackson-Vanik amendment? It is a barrier. It is a Cold War
relic. How can one link issues of emigration from the former USSR
(everyone who wished to go has left, and there is no more USSR) with
problems of American poultry meat exports to Russia?
In my view, we should not exaggerate the significance of this
amendment by paying attention to it. This Cold War relic is an
American phenomenon, so it is up to them to fight it. The very
existence of the amendment is Washington's loss.
(Translated by P. Pikhnovsky)
*******
#12
US Department of State
29 May 2003
Text: Vershbow Says Russia's Help Needed on Iran, North Korea
(May 26, Moscow: Ambassador Vershbow remarks at Russian institute
(INION RAN)) (2980)
Russia has "a major role to play" in the international community's
efforts to fight terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD), said U.S. Ambassador to Russia Alexander Vershbow
in Moscow May 26.
"The cases of Iran and North Korea demonstrate that the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime is not working as intended," he
said. Russia can help determine "what new tools, what new forms of
leverage" can be brought to bear "to stop these two countries from
acquiring nuclear weapons, and to strengthen all the non-proliferation
regimes."
Vershbow made his remarks at the Institute of Scientific Information
on Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences (INION RAN).
He noted that in Iraq, "we and our coalition partners had to use force
to topple a regime that refused to give up its WMD peacefully....
While we consider the use of force in Iraq to be fully legitimate, we
share the disappointment that a peaceful solution could not be found.
The lesson is that we need to develop better tools to deal with the
next proliferation challenges - Iran and North Korea - if we want to
avoid the need to use force in the future."
On the overall theme of his remarks, titled "Russia, NATO, and
International Organizations," Vershbow said "it is essential for
global stability that Russia be more deeply integrated into the
structures and institutions that will deal with the political,
economic and security challenges of the 21st century."
He cited the NATO-Russia Council as "one of the good examples of how
Russia and other democracies can cooperate." And in other ways, he
said, "Russia is playing an important role in many other key areas of
importance to world peace and security."
"Our joint efforts to fight terrorism and WMD proliferation are not
the only areas where Russia's contribution is needed. The most
immediate topic on the agenda, of course, is post-war Iraq," Vershbow
said.
"We are glad we have found common ground on the essential first step,
passage of a new UN Security Council resolution to lift the sanctions.
That agreement will help the people of Iraq, and will help restore
confidence in the UN Security Council itself as we turn our attention
to Iran, North Korea and other future challenges."
Regarding the Middle East peace process, Vershbow said the United
States hopes Russia "will use its influence with the new Palestinian
leadership, and with the Government of Syria, to halt the terrorist
activities of radical groups - Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic
Jihad, and many others - that threaten the chances for peace."
He noted that Russia has "a larger stake than most countries in
helping to ensure global security, if only because geography puts it
on the front lines in dealing with the dangers posed by North Korea,
Iran, and by terrorism and instability in the Middle East and South
Asia."
Following are Vershbow's remarks as prepared for delivery:
(begin text)
Moscow
May 26, 2003
RUSSIA, NATO, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Remarks by Alexander Vershbow
U.S. Ambassador to the Russian Federation
Institute of Scientific Information on Social Sciences, Russian
Academy of Sciences (INION RAN)
It's a busy time in Moscow, as hardly a day goes by without a
distinguished international visitor coming to town. I'm not just
thinking about Paul McCartney, although I don't underestimate the
significance of Saturday's concert as a landmark event in Russia's
integration into the global music community. But that's a subject for
a different seminar, which I am sure Tatiana Parkhalina could organize
with her usual skill and expertise. In any case, I should tell you
that when I refer to "the Quartet" later today, I'm not talking about
the Beatles.
Although perhaps less famous than Paul McCartney, Moscow's other
recent visitors have included Prime Minister Tony Blair, former German
Chancellor Helmut Kohl, and my boss, Secretary of State Colin Powell,
as well as my former leader, [NATO Secretary General] Lord Robertson,
and the NATO Ambassadors who attended the first-ever Moscow meeting of
the NATO-Russia Council two weeks ago. And, of course, this coming
weekend 43 leaders from all over the world, including President Bush,
will gather in St. Petersburg to pay tribute to that city's 300th
anniversary.
The St. Petersburg events - as well as President Bush's two previous
visits to Russia in the past twelve months - also reflect the
importance of Russia in the 21st-century geopolitical environment, a
world very different from the one that existed for most of the second
half of the 20th century. We no longer live in a Cold War world
divided by East-West conflict and ideological disputes about communism
and capitalism. Instead, we face new threats such as global terrorism
and weapons of mass destruction, threats that must be dealt with more
effectively by the community of civilized nations.
From the point of view of the United States, it is essential for
global stability that Russia be more deeply integrated into the
structures and institutions that will deal with the political,
economic and security challenges of the 21st century.
* Russia's cooperation with NATO and the European Union, and its
direct participation in the Council of Europe and the OSCE, are the
means by which we hope to see Russia play a central role in shaping a
more peaceful, stable and prosperous Europe and a more solid
Euro-Atlantic partnership.
* Globally, Russia's status as a permanent member of the UN Security
Council and participant in non-proliferation regimes, as well as its
future full membership in the G-8 and World Trade Organization, give
Russia additional means to contribute to meeting today's challenges
and to advance Russia's own interests.
Indeed, with Russia's transformation into a country that shares the
same values as Western democracies (individual freedom, democracy,
economic liberty, the rule of law), there shouldn't be any limit to
Russia's integration.
NATO is one mechanism that helps us deal with the post-September 11
security environment. The United States believes that a larger NATO
and a strong NATO-Russia partnership, uniting like-minded states, will
enable us to confront new security challenges that emanate from
outside Europe. NATO itself is now undergoing a dramatic
transformation to equip itself to deal with 21st-century risks, in
particular terrorist attacks together with nuclear, biological and
chemical threats. NATO had its difficulties during the Iraq crisis;
but the fact that NATO forces will be running the international
peacekeeping force in Afghanistan, and that NATO will be supporting
Polish and other coalition forces in post-war Iraq, suggests that the
Alliance's future remains bright.
The United States was a strong advocate of the increased NATO-Russia
partnership that we are now witnessing with the NATO-Russia Council
formed exactly one year ago. The NRC is a notable advance over
previous efforts at cooperation in the Permanent Joint Council. I am
greatly encouraged to see that work in the NRC reflects a new spirit
of flexibility and compromise. The new Council relies on the same
principles of consensus, consultation and cooperation that have guided
the work of the NATO Allies over the past five decades. Russia's voice
is being heard in deliberations as an equal member when the Council
examines and debates critical issues. But the Council is not a debate
club - its success will be determined by its activities and actions.
Judged by this standard, the Council is off to an impressive start.
As I mentioned, the NRC met here in two weeks ago to celebrate its
first anniversary, and the Ambassadors of the "20" agreed that the
Council is evolving into an effective mechanism for consultation,
cooperation, joint decision-making and - most importantly - joint
action. Formation of the NRC has resulted in intensified cooperation
in the war against terrorism, crisis management, defense reform and
military-to-military cooperation:
* For example, last September Russia hosted a joint civil emergency
exercise in Noginsk, where 30 countries cooperated in responding to a
mock terrorist attack using chemical weapons - unfortunately, an
all-too-real threat in today's world. This exercise yielded valuable
lessons on how we can help save innocent lives through unprecedented
cooperation by first responders from all over Europe.
* In February NATO and Russia signed a landmark agreement on
cooperation in the area of submarine search and rescue. The agreement
specifies that NATO and Russia will work together to standardize
procedures and collaborate in developing the necessary equipment, and
conduct joint exercises.
* Military authorities have additionally completed joint assessments
of the threat posed by al Qaeda to peacekeeping forces in the Balkans
and to civil aviation. The NRC has made considerable progress in
carrying out a thorough evaluation of the threat of proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction.
* Perhaps most significantly, NATO and Russia have established a
mechanism for long-term cooperation in the area of European missile
defense. We hope this will lead to concrete forms of cooperation -
including among our defense industries - to defend NATO and Russian
forces and territories against the growing threats of ballistic
missile attack.
So the NATO-Russia Council is one of the good examples of how Russia
and other democracies can cooperate. Beyond the NRC, Russia is playing
an important role in many other key areas of importance to world peace
and security. One example in the headlines today is the search for
peace in the Middle East. The process has gained new impetus in the
aftermath of the Iraq war and, most recently, with the historic
decision yesterday by the Israeli cabinet to endorse the "Road Map"
for a comprehensive peace settlement based on two states. President
Bush is committed to seizing this new opportunity, and we appreciate
the key role Russia, alongside my country, the UN and the EU, is
playing in the Middle East Quartet. Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov has
demonstrated Russian leadership in the diplomatic efforts to reach a
consensus on the "Road Map." We hope that Russia will use its
influence with the new Palestinian leadership, and with the Government
of Syria, to halt the terrorist activities of radical groups-
Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and many others - that
threaten the chances for peace.
I have touched on just a few of the areas where cooperation with
Russia is going relatively well. Today, the world's great powers have
indeed recognized a common interest in confronting the threats that
face mankind: HIV/AIDS, drugs, poverty, trafficking in human beings,
and, of course, the spread of weapons of mass destruction and
terrorism. Moreover, if the great powers see their interests
increasingly through the prism of common values, one would argue that
achieving unity should be easy when crises arise. Unfortunately, this
did not prove to be the case when united action was required to deal
with the threat posed by Iraq. We need to ask ourselves why.
The disagreement over Iraq and the deep split that emerged in the UN
Security Council have prompted many commentators to suggest that we
need to transform the institutions by which we manage crises in the
21st century. I would submit, however, that the institutions
themselves are not at fault. Rather, what is needed is fresh thinking
about the nature of the threats we face to international peace and
security and the new tools that the international community needs to
counter those threats more effectively. If we can come to agreement on
how to deal with new and emerging threats, when the next crisis
occurs, it should be much easier to achieve the essential unity and
political will that were missing in the UN Security Council in the
weeks leading up to the Iraq war.
With this in mind, it is useful to compare how the International
Community is dealing with the two most serious threats to the global
security today, international terrorism and the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction.
Since 9/11, we have made considerable progress in strengthening
international efforts to defend our societies against the threat of
international terrorism. We have not only dealt the Taliban and Al
Qaeda a major blow in Afghanistan and in other parts of the world.
With UN Security Council resolution 1373, we have established a broad
set of obligations binding on all nations to block terrorist financing
and denying safe haven to terrorist groups. We have strengthened
coordination among law enforcement agencies and, in the U.S.-Russian
context, engaged in unprecedented forms of intelligence sharing that
have helped prevent attacks and shut down terrorist groups.
In saying this, I am not suggesting that the anti-terror struggle is
nearly over. Far from it. We have seen new, coordinated acts of terror
in recent weeks, and Osama bin Laden and other Al Qaeda figures are
still at large plotting new attacks. Yet, even though there is much
unfinished business, the international norms and the tools for dealing
with terrorism are well understood, and they are beginning to work
reasonably well.
The same cannot be said, however, with respect to our means for
countering the spread of weapons of mass destruction. In the case of
Iraq, we and our coalition partners had to use force to topple a
regime that refused to give up its WMD peacefully (which was the
condition for the ceasefire at the end of the Gulf War in 1991).
Diplomacy failed because the UN Security Council did not have the
unity of purpose to insist that Saddam comply with its demands, or the
means to make him comply short of war. While we consider the use of
force in Iraq to be fully legitimate, we share the disappointment that
a peaceful solution could not be found. The lesson is that we need to
develop better tools to deal with the next proliferation challenges -
Iran and North Korea - if we want to avoid the need to use force in
the future.
The cases of Iran and North Korea demonstrate that the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime is not working as intended. That
regime is based on a simple bargain: if a state renounces nuclear
weapons, it can gain access to assistance and technology for
developing peaceful uses of atomic energy. Although a state must
accept some safeguards and verification measures, the regime is based
heavily on trust. What has happened? North Korea has cheated on the
1994 agreement under which it supposedly gave up its nuclear weapons
by starting a covert program for uranium enrichment - and they did
this many years before the Bush Administration came into office. Now
Pyongyang has renounced the NPT and the North-South denuclearization
agreement, restarted its plutonium reactor, and even claims it already
has a nuclear weapon.
Meanwhile, there is new evidence that Iran is seeking to obtain
nuclear weapons. Previously our concerns centered on the nuclear power
station at Bushehr that Iran has been building with Russia's
assistance for some years. The risks from that project were supposed
to be reduced by Iran's reliance on Russia for supplies of nuclear
fuel and a commitment to return all spent fuel to Russia. Yet we have
now learned that Iran has secretly been developing its own uranium
enrichment capability - with technology from sources other than Russia
- which would circumvent the safeguards Russia has been trying to put
into place. Secretary Powell's talks here ten days ago suggest Russia
is coming to share this concern.
So we need to consider what new tools, what new forms of leverage, we
can bring to bear to stop these two countries from acquiring nuclear
weapons, and to strengthen all the non-proliferation regimes. Do we
need to impose stricter forms of inspections? Do we need to impose
sanctions or other punitive measures if diplomatic suasion doesn't
work? Should we accelerate our cooperation on anti-missile defense in
order protect our countries against nuclear blackmail in the event we
are unable to prevent proliferation? Do we need new strategies for our
militaries, or for the new NATO-Russia Council, to prevent or counter
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction? Russia has a major
role to play in finding the answers to these questions
Our joint efforts to fight terrorism and WMD proliferation are not the
only areas where Russia's contribution is needed. The most immediate
topic on the agenda, of course, is post-war Iraq. Success there - that
is, establishment of a stable government that represents the true
interests of all the Iraqi people, that does not threaten its
neighbors, that is free of WMD - could mark the beginning of a new era
of peace and progress in the Middle East as a whole. We are glad we
have found common ground on the essential first step, passage of a new
UN Security Council resolution to lift the sanctions. That agreement
will help the people of Iraq, and will help restore confidence in the
UN Security Council itself as we turn our attention to Iran, North
Korea and other future challenges.
I'm reminded of the Greek proverb that the measure of a man is what he
does with power. The same goes for nations, too, and the measure of
the greatness of Russia will be in how it wields its power in facing
the challenges that currently stand before us, and how well it
cooperates through the many international mechanisms that exist.
Russia has a larger stake than most countries in helping to ensure
global security, if only because geography puts it on the front lines
in dealing with the dangers posed by North Korea, Iran, and by
terrorism and instability in the Middle East and South Asia. In
addressing these many problems, it is our hope that we can replicate
elsewhere the cooperative spirit and new thinking that we have seen in
the new NATO-Russia Council.
*******
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