Johnson's Russia List
#7199
29 May 2003
davidjohnson@erols.com
A CDI Project
www.cdi.org
[Contents:
1. AP: China, Russia Issue Multipolar World Call.
2. AP: Revelers celebrate through the night in St. Petersburg.
3. Moscow Times: Vladimir Kovalyev, Celebrations Are Priceless but How
Much on What?
4. New York Times: Yevgenia Albats, When Good Friends Make Bad Diplomacy.
5. New York Times: Anders Aslund, A Russia Resurgent.
6. RFE/RL: Jeremy Bransten, Will Weekend Handshakes, Summit Smiles Signal
Healing In Trans-Atlantic, Trans-European Rifts?
7. AP: U.S.-Russia Nuclear Treaty Clears Hurdle.
8. www.inthenationalinterest.com: Dimitri K. Simes and Nikolas K. Gvosdev,
The Mood in Moscow.
9. Diplomatic Courier/Nezavisimaya Gazeta: Nikolai Zlobin, Disappointment
Replaces Friendship. In response to Russia's anti-American hysteria, Washington
stops seeing Moscow as a friend and an ally.
10. Invitation to Hudson Institute Forum for David Satter's Drkness at Dawn.
11. Reuters: EU and Russia smooth over differences on Chechnya.
12. AP: Report: 1st SARS Case Confirmed in Russia.
13. New book on Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe from Cambridge U
Press.
14. Amnesty International: Open letter from a coalition of non-governmental
organisations to Vladimir Putin. (re "discriminatory practices and procedures
are preventing many former Soviet citizens in the Russian Federation from
obtaining permanent residency rights and Russian citizenship.")
15. New York Times: Michael Wines, Putin's Sure Hand Abroad Belies
Problems at Home.]
********
#1
China, Russia Issue Multipolar World Call
May 28, 2003
By VLADIMIR ISACHENKOV
MOSCOW (AP) - Chinese President Hu Jintao on Wednesday called for a
``multipolar world'' and a strategic partnership with Russia to counter
U.S. dominance, and oil executives signed a preliminary deal for pipeline
to carry Siberian oil to China.
``The trend toward a multipolar world is irreversible and dominant,'' Hu
said in a speech at a Moscow university specializing in international
relations.
A joint call for a ``multipolar world'' - the term Russia and China used to
describe their shared ambition to offset U.S. global dominance - has
cemented the post-Soviet friendship between the two former rivals.
On the sidelines of Hu's visit, China National Petroleum Corporation and
Russia's Yukos oil company signed a preliminary agreement on shipping
Siberian oil to China by a $2.5 billion, 1,400-mile pipeline that would
link Angarsk in eastern Siberia and Daqing, China.
Along with the Chinese route, the Russian Cabinet considered a rival,
Japanese-backed proposal that would first lay the pipeline to Russia's
Pacific port of Nakhodka. But the Cabinet now appears to favor building the
Chinese section first with the route to Nakhodka to come later. A final
decision is expected in the next few weeks.
Under Wednesday's deal, Yukos would ship about 5.1 billion barrels along
the new pipeline to Daqing over 25 years beginning in 2005. The deal is
estimated to worth more than $150 billion.
Hu chose Russia for his first trip abroad after replacing Jiang Zemin as
president in March. He hailed a friendship treaty that Jiang signed with
Putin in 2001, saying it had created ``political guarantees for the
long-term and steady development of Chinese-Russian relations.''
The treaty became the first such document since 1950, when Josef Stalin and
Mao Zedong created a Soviet-Chinese alliance that slid into rivalry and
then hostility in the 1960s.
Hu said that warmer ties have helped to clear border disputes and increase
bilateral trade from about $6 billion in the mid-1990s to $12 billion last
year.
Without naming the United States, Hu assailed unilateralism in world
affairs and condemned the use of force in settling disputes. ``Peace can't
be achieved through using force,'' he said.
On Tuesday, Hu and Putin issued a joint declaration urging North Korea to
relinquish its nuclear ambitions, but also voiced support for the North's
demand for security guarantees and warned against using force to resolve
the crisis.
On Thursday, Hu and Putin will take part in a Moscow summit of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization, a six-nation group that also includes four former
Soviet Central Asian republics. Hu also is scheduled to attend weekend
festivities marking the 300th anniversary of St. Petersburg, Russia's
former imperial capital.
*******
#2
Revelers celebrate through the night in St. Petersburg
May 28, 2003
By IRINA TITOVA
ST. PETERSBURG, Russia (AP) - Thousands of revelers celebrated through the
night on Wednesday, taking advantage of the first ever round-the-clock
opening at the State Hermitage Museum in honor of St. Petersburg's 300th
birthday.
But those who came to see one of the world's greatest art collections in
the wee hours of the morning got more than they bargained for: many had to
wait out the entire night in the ornate Hermitage, after being temporarily
cut off from their homes by the raised bridges over the Neva.
The crowds - ranging from devoted art lovers to the merely curious - wound
around the huge Palace Square outside the museum. Museum officials said
they had never seen so many visitors at once.
``I've been a regular visitor to the Hermitage all my life, but I've never
been here at night,'' said Tatyana Yaposhekhontseva, 64, a retiree. ``I
came here to dedicate this night of my life to the Hermitage, and I feel
enormous joy in my soul.''
Many visitors said they came out of curiosity: would Rembrandt's Danae and
other famous works look any different when darkness hangs over the Neva
river outside.
``It produces the impression of something unreal,'' said Yulia Plotkina,
35, geologist, who came with her 10-years-old daughter Katya.
Mia Mityushina, 35, described herself as a night owl and said she ``finally
felt in her own shoes, being able to concentrate'' on the art while at her
most alert.
Visitors, mingling with actors dressed in 18th century costumes, said they
felt a sense of history emanating from the czarist-era palace. Some also
felt something a little more supernatural, noting the often-repeated myths
about late-night hauntings inside the Hermitage.
``It gets really scary to walk through the museum when the lights are
off,'' said Antonina Gerasimova, who has worked at the museum for seven years.
By early morning, after the free all-night opening was winding down,
hundreds spilled out of the museum, where they had spent the night, and
lined the city's streets as the bridges lowered and the subway started
working again, allowing them to get home.
If they managed to get some sleep after their midnight museum visit, they
could have been energetic enough for another of the jubilee's big events -
Wednesday evening's concert in Palace Square featuring renowned conductor
Valery Gergiev.
Thousands of people poured onto the square for the evening of opera and
ballet excerpts performed by singers and dancers of Gergiev's Mariinsky
Opera and Ballet Theater.
People craned their necks to see the dancers and huddled together for
warmth against a harsh evening wind.
``The dancers must be very cold. I'm worried they might get sick,'' said
spectator Yelena Yerofeyeva.
St. Petersburg is gearing up for visits by dozens of foreign leaders to
celebrate its founding 300 years ago by Peter the Great. Festivities will
culminate over the weekend with a Russia-European Union summit and a
meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President George
W. Bush.
*******
#3
Moscow Times
May 29, 2003
Celebrations Are Priceless but How Much on What?
By Vladimir Kovalyev
If I had to pick one word to describe Russia, I think that word would be
"priceless." Now, before anyone accuses me of going off on a patriotic
tangent, let me explain what I mean by "priceless" in this instance:
Particularly in the case of government-financed projects, it is often
virtually impossible in this country to find out exactly what something
costs.
My frustration over this comes both from the difficulties it poses for my
work as a journalist and from what I feel is a legitimate interest as a
Russian taxpayer.
How much, for instance, is being paid for the sod that has been laid around
the Hermitage and the Kazan and St. Isaac's cathedrals in recent days?
Watching the birds trying to lift the pieces of sod in search of grass
seeds underneath, I found myself wondering how much we were paying to
witness their confusion.
Last spring, I recall that the local media were full of cheer and reports
about the fact that, to finance preparations for St. Petersburg's 300th
anniversary, approximately $1 billion was being transferred from the
federal budget.
Among the projects that the money was supposed to be spent on was the
completion of the eastern part of the city's Ring Road (not yet completed),
renovation of the city's flood-protection barrier (it remains in pretty
much the same condition) and the repair and reopening of the flooded
stretch of metro line between the Ploshchad Muzhestvo and Lesnaya stations
(I don't know about the water, but the line is still closed).
What these projects have in common is that if they came to fruition they
would mean a genuine improvement in the quality of life of ordinary citizens.
From what I can see, the effect of the $1 billion has been mostly cosmetic,
a facelift to make the city look -- in the opinion of many locals -- more
attractive to foreign bigwigs coming for the celebrations.
The most serious questions have been raised by a number of Kremlin and
justice officials, and these have been about the efficiency -- and even
legality -- of the way the money has been spent. The Northwest district
prosecutor, for example, said earlier this spring that about $15 million
had been misspent.
Given the spending habits of the government here, the amount -- which is
only about 1.5 percent of the total sum involved -- doesn't disturb me that
much. It's pretty standard around here. What is most annoying is that they
won't tell us where and with regard to which projects the violations
occurred.
This lack of specifics is the case just about anywhere you look.
I'm happy that St Petersburg's railway stations have all been renovated,
and a new one has even been added. The federal Railway Ministry says that
the price tag was 7 billion rubles (approximately $230 million).
But it's impossible to find out, for instance, what the work done on the
Moskovsky Station cost.
Fine. Maybe I'm trying to be too specific. But what about last week's
announcement by Valentina Matviyenko, the presidential representative in
the Northwest Federal District, that the Finance Ministry is coughing up
the money to ensure good weather in St. Petersburg during the days of the
celebration. Here, again, she won't tell us how much taxpayers' money this
is going to cost.
The only explanation that seems feasible to me in this case is that,
because aircraft from the air force will be used in the project, the
secrecy has something to do with state security.
Seeking help, I turned to the Internet, where it took me a few minutes to
find out that one hour of flight time for a MiG-29 fighter, for example,
costs $5,500. It's still hard to estimate the total cost, since I don't
know how much time they'll have to spend in the air.
If it's eight hours a day for -- let's say -- three days, the total cost
for the 10 jets Matviyenko said would be involved would be about $1.32
million.
All of these calculations only work if my guesses are right on how much
flying time is involved, the information on the number of jets from
Matviyenko is accurate and there are no other costs I have neglected to
consider. The chances that I've met all of these conditions are virtually nil.
So, as an ordinary taxpayer, I'm right back where I started -- unable to
determine how much of our money has been spent. Barring an offer of
employment from the federal Audit Chamber (unlikely), I'll probably never
know just how much the (promised) good weather will cost.
I'm not saying that there haven't been positive aspects to the preparations
for the festivities. Recently, a friend who lives on Antonenko Pereulok,
just a few meters away from St. Isaac's Square and the Hotel Astoria (where
President George W. Bush will stay for the celebrations), complained about
the spending.
"Look out of my window," he said. "The huge pile of garbage in the center
of the courtyard has been there for two years and I can't do anything to
convince local communal services to take it away."
The next day, he decided to get his piece of the celebration pie and called
some friends at NTV, asking them to report on the sorrowful state of
courtyards located alongside roads "of federal significance."
Within a day, the garbage was gone, supporting his claim that fear of how
the Kremlin might react is the only pressure that works here.
While I'm glad that the garbage is gone, it doesn't help me much.
There's no way I can find out how much it cost.
Vladimir Kovalyev is a Staff Writer for The St. Petersburg Times.
*******
#4
New York Times
May 28, 2003
When Good Friends Make Bad Diplomacy
By YEVGENIA ALBATS
Yevgenia Albats is a columnist for Novaya Gazeta.
It is fitting that President Vladimir Putin of Russia is welcoming
President Bush to his hometown of St. Petersburg. An imperial backdrop
makes sense for two men creating empires of the 21st century. When Peter
the Great built his city 300 years ago, he had two somewhat contradictory
purposes in mind. He wanted to showcase Russia's world-power status, but he
also wanted to create a "window to Europe." (Europe's hand would poke
through, pulling Russia into a more modern era.) The question is which of
the two St. Petersburgs Mr. Bush will focus on: the gold-encrusted imperial
capital, or the portal to the West and its values of human rights and
liberal democracy.
My guess is that he'll pick the first, because that's the one President
Putin wants him to see. Gone are the days when American presidents stood up
to their Russian counterparts and openly pressed them to bring about
democratic reform. Now relations at the top are largely about personal
friendship. Diplomacy is tied to personality. Bill Clinton related to
Russia largely in terms of his relationship with Boris Yeltsin. Mr. Bush
has followed suit, making American policy a hostage to his personal
attachment to Mr. Putin.
This is all rather surprising. Remember that in the 2000 presidential
campaign, Mr. Bush and his advisers were critical of the personality-driven
approach to diplomacy and of the White House for paying only lip service to
ending the epidemic of corruption in Moscow and the brutal war in Chechnya.
Yet after taking office, Mr. Bush looked into Mr. Putin's eyes and saw a
kindred spirit, and apparently one doesn't ask tough questions of one's
soulmate.
Not much good has come of this style of foreign affairs. Despite this cozy
relationship between the leaders, the situation in Russia has not improved.
The war in Chechnya continues. Corruption is on the rise (businesses now
pay an estimated $33 billion a year in bribes to government officials,
equal to about 10 percent of the gross domestic product). And, in terms of
personal liberties and democracy, things are much worse than before Mr.
Putin came into power. Last month Freedom House, an independent group that
monitors civil liberties around the world, downgraded Russia from being a
country where the press is "partly free" to one where it is "not free" at
all.
So why is the Bush administration so willing to repeat the mistakes of its
predecessor? Why does it seem to be more interested in personality than in
working as an agent for democratic change in Russia? The answer, I think,
is that it doesn't really believe Russia matters. After all, Russia is no
longer a superpower, and it no longer poses a credible threat to the United
States. This sentiment was summed up neatly when I recently asked a senior
White House aide whether he was concerned about rising anti-American
feelings in Russia. His reply: "We don't care."
And I have to admit, the politics of "don't care" has brought some
short-term benefits to the United States, including the NATO expansion in
Eastern Europe. However, that American triumph has had unfortunate
consequences. The ease with which America waved aside Moscow's objections
weakened Mr. Putin among the hard-line nationalists in the bureaucracy, and
he was forced to give them a freer hand. Now the parliament is little more
than a rubber stamp for the government, and the Kremlin has near-total
control of the press.
The rise of anti-Americanism in political circles has trickled down to the
public at large. And it came at the same time that many Russian liberals,
who had once seen the United States as a reliable promoter of democratic
politics, decided they had been betrayed by Washington and stopped raising
their voices against demagogues who see the United States as pure evil.
Even if the Bush administration won't support Russian democracy for its own
sake, it has plenty of pragmatic reasons for pushing Mr. Putin back on
track. For one, the 9/11 attacks made clear yet again that terrorism tends
to originate in authoritarian countries, not democracies. An unaccountable
authoritarian regime, driven by nationalism and equipped with nuclear
weapons? That should worry even the world's only superpower.
So as Mr. Bush sees the sights with Mr. Putin, I hope he'll keep in mind a
bit of Russian history that will receive scant mention during the jubilee.
St. Petersburg might have been created as a window to the West, but it was
built on the bones of tens of thousands of serfs who perished while raising
it out of the swamp. If Mr. Bush is truly a good friend, he should look Mr.
Putin in the eye again and ask him which St. Petersburg he wants to build.
*******
#5
New York Times
May 28, 2003
A Russia Resurgent
By ANDERS ASLUND
Anders Aslund, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, is author of "Building Capitalism: The Transformation of the Former
Soviet Bloc."
WASHINGTON Last month Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain traveled to
Moscow to discuss postwar Iraq with President Vladimir Putin of Russia.
Although the war was effectively over, Mr. Putin remained skeptical of its
aims. "Where is Saddam?" Mr. Putin asked at a press conference after the
meeting. Where, he continued, were the weapons of mass destruction, "if
they really existed?"
This weekend, President Bush is scheduled to meet with Mr. Putin in St.
Petersburg. He might face a similarly rude awakening.
On 9/11, President Putin was among the first foreign leaders to phone
President Bush. During the war against Afghanistan, he allowed United
States military planes to fly over Russian territory, accepted American
bases in Central Asia, and shared intelligence in spite of strong
opposition from the former Soviet security establishment.
The Bush administration responded by accepting that the Chechen resistance
was linked to international terrorism but that was it. President Bush
promised to work to persuade Congress to revoke the obsolete Jackson-Vanik
legislation, which threatens economic sanctions against Russia because of
emigration policies not followed since the Soviet era, but so far he has
failed. In the year following the attacks of 9/11, the Bush administration
abandoned the ABM treaty with Russia and then supported the enlargement of
NATO.
Mr. Putin accepted these decisions graciously, but he received nothing in
return. In the Russian debate, he was increasingly compared with the
hapless Mikhail Gorbachev, who was said always to have given in to the
Americans without getting anything.
As the war in Iraq approached, Russia initially took a back seat. While not
supporting Saddam Hussein, it wanted to secure some commercial interests in
Iraq, like oil concessions, financial claims and trade contracts. But
Russia enjoyed too little attention from the United States. In the first
quarter of this year, no government official more senior than an under
secretary of state visited Moscow.
Meanwhile, public opinion in Russia, as in Germany and France, evolved
against the war. The Russian Communist Party benefited a fact that Mr.
Putin, an avid reader of opinion polls, could not ignore in an election
year. With no results to show from his pro-American policy, he joined the
French-German position against the war. (Besides, Germany is twice as large
an export market for Russia as the United States.)
So where does this leave American-Russian relations on the eve of the
summit meeting? The scales of influence, if not the balance of power, have
shifted.
The United States has relatively little to offer Mr. Putin. After years of
discussion about American-Russian energy development, the Russian oil
sector is doing well on its own. Russia's attempt to enter the World Trade
Organization has, unfortunately, encountered domestic resistance and no
longer tops the meeting's agenda. And after four years of annual economic
growth averaging about 6 percent, the Russian economy requires no financial
aid.
Russia, in contrast, has gained some leverage. As one of Iraq's main
creditors, Russia belongs to the so-called Paris Club, which renegotiates
government debt of countries in default. For Iraq to recover quickly, its
debt of about $380 billion must be reduced by about three-quarters. But
Russia, which never got any debt forgiven itself, is reluctant to grant
such relief and could complicate international financing of Iraq's recovery.
Russia's export of nuclear technology to Iran could also prove challenging
for the United States. The United States has long tried to persuade Russia
to stop the practice. Russia has refused, partly because it would hurt its
nuclear industry and partly because it sees Iran as the most predictable
and reasonable country in the region.
Still, President Putin has no interest in a bad relationship. In his speech
to the nation on May 16, he emphasized Russia's opposition to terrorism and
to weapons of mass destruction as two key principles of Russian foreign
policy. Clearly, there are issues on which Russia and the United States can
cooperate North Korea, for example. And both the United States Senate and
the Russian Duma have ratified the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty,
which requires both countries to reduce their nuclear weapons.
Economically, Russia also has much to offer. A scramble is under way for
Russia's large undervalued private oil companies, and American oil
companies may want to participate in a major venture. Increasing its
imports of Russian oil will also benefit United States foreign policy.
For much of the last decade, the United States was able to dictate the
terms of its relations with Russia. The war against Iraq showed that Russia
can resist America's demands and that it can be strengthened in the
process. It is this strength that Mr. Bush will meet in St. Petersburg.
*******
#6
U.S./Russia: Will Weekend Handshakes, Summit Smiles Signal Healing In
Trans-Atlantic, Trans-European Rifts?
By Jeremy Bransten
St. Petersburg's 300th anniversary celebrations this weekend will mark the
first time since the end of the war in Iraq that the leaders of Britain,
Germany, France, Russia, and the United States will find themselves at the
same forum, RFE/RL reports. The leaders will then travel to Evian, France,
for another joint appearance at this year's G-8 summit. Do the meetings
signal an end to the trans-Atlantic and trans-European rifts over Iraq, or
has too much damage been done to be repaired so quickly?
Prague, 28 May 2003 (RFE/RL) -- Like Kremlinologists of bygone days,
journalists and political scientists will be taking the measure of every
handshake and declaration at this weekend's international summits in St.
Petersburg and Evian, France.
The focus will not be so much on substance as on style. That is because
this weekend's meetings will be the first time the leaders of the major
European powers, Russia and the United States have sat down together since
the end of the divisive Iraq war.
Although deep differences of opinion remain on the war and other issues,
and no one expects them to be resolved in two days, everyone will be
watching for signs that there is a political willingness on both sides of
the Atlantic to mend strained relations.
Bernhard May, head of the trans-Atlantic relations program at the German
Council on Foreign Relations, spoke to RFE/RL about the upcoming meetings.
"The meetings of the leaders are, first of all, very important and a good
opportunity that should not be missed to move towards each other because,
after all, on both sides of the Atlantic, people are realizing that there
are important issues those leaders have to discuss and if governments are
not talking to each other, nobody is really benefiting from this
short-sighted behavior on the part of too many governments, unfortunately.
So it's good news that those leaders have to meet in St. Petersburg and in
France," May said.
In the wake of the U.S.-led military intervention in Iraq and the
sidelining of the United Nations, world leaders have much to talk about.
May says the future role of the United States in world affairs is the
central question on everyone's mind and that the weekend summits may
provide a forum to start discussing the issue.
"The more profound and difficult question is what kind of role is the
United States willing to play in the world order and what kind of world
order are we talking about? Obviously, it cannot be accepted by the rest of
the world that the United States is telling the world what it has to do.
This kind of unilateral approach is not to the advantage of the United
States either. On the other hand, the Europeans maybe have to think how
they can come up with new proposals, how they see the role of Europe in a
changing world," May says.
That thought is echoed by political scientist Aleksandr Konovalov, head of
the Moscow-based Institute for Strategic Assessments.
"The world is changing. The world is changing very rapidly. We live in a
period that is already being called a period of 'compressed history,' and
we have to react quickly to these changes. We need a new role for the UN,
to figure out what the UN lacks for the fight against terrorism, what we
need to do together, what the role of the United States will be and how to
respond to new challenges while remaining within the boundaries of
international law, how to expand this law, how to modernize it. It's clear
to me that everything has to be expanded and modernized, including our
current concept of state sovereignty," Konovalov says.
Of course, it may be a challenge for U.S. President George W. Bush to have
fruitful discussions with French President Jacques Chirac and German
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder given the level of personal animosity that
still hangs in the air. Chirac, in an interview with the "Financial Times"
of London this week, said he remains -- in his words -- "struck by the
level of hostility coming out of Washington."
Bush also has let it be known through aides that the German leader is
viewed with equal disdain at the White House. But analyst May says that,
despite these personal antipathies, the United States appears keen to
restore good working contacts at lower levels.
"What we are told by Americans is that several high-ranking members of the
Bush administration, including the president, are so angry that it will be
very, very difficult to go back to business as usual between President Bush
and Chancellor Schroeder and therefore, what we are looking forward to and
what we are hoping for is that the rest of the team will work much better
together. And, of course, there is good news. [U.S. Secretary of State]
Colin Powell just recently came to Berlin, and he was working together
quite well with [German] Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer. But even our
minister of the interior, Otto Schilly, is working closely together with
[U.S. Attorney General] John Ashcroft," Konovalov says.
Divisions across the Atlantic are not the only rifts opened by the Iraq
war. The European Union also emerged scarred from the conflict, when Spain,
Britain, Denmark, Italy and most of the future EU members in Central and
Eastern Europe sided with the United States against Paris and Berlin.
This gulf has not healed and may be intensified by ongoing negotiations
over the EU Convention on the Future of Europe, which is set to map the
scale of the organization's future integration.
"We have a problem in that the European Union is right now in a very
difficult transition period. We have to think about the Convention and how
to reform the European Union's institutions. And we have to realize that
several members have quite different opinions about how fast to move on the
goals of the European integration process and secondly, what they think
about trans-Atlantic relations. That's not only a problem between Great
Britain, Spain, Italy, Germany and France, this is also true for the new
[future] members," May says.
The best that can be hoped for, says May, is that world leaders, starting
at this weekend's summits, will start to learn to manage their differences
and move away from a black-and-white vision of the world -- both in Europe
and in the United States.
"Sometimes people have this -- sorry to say -- naive idea that it's either
black or white. Well, in real life, you have to realize that countries have
several interests, those interests are different and one has to work
towards a compromise and make sure that everybody can join in. It's not
'either you are with us or you are against us,' like President Bush put it.
It would be a mistake to also use the same language in Europe," May says.
Ironically, of all the multilateral and bilateral relations that will be
represented this weekend in St. Petersburg and Evian, U.S.-Russian ties may
have weathered the Iraqi crisis best.
Marie Mendras, a specialist in international and Russian affairs at the
Paris-based Center for International Study and Research, says, "The
Russian-American relationship, in my view, is of a different nature if we
compare it to trans-Atlantic relations like French-U.S. relations,
British-U.S. relations, German-U.S. relations. I think we have to keep in
mind that Russia is not an ally. It's not a member of NATO. It's different.
So the stakes with Russia, in a way, are not as high. It's easier, I think,
for the Americans and the Russians to smile at each other because the
relationship is not that deep."
Despite U.S. displeasure at Moscow's continued nuclear cooperation with
Iran and Russia's well-documented ties with Iraq before the war, Washington
has approached its relations with Moscow pragmatically and can be expected
to do so in the future, for strategic reasons. Russia still has vast stocks
of nuclear weapons, meaning the United States wants to ensure the stability
and reliability of its leadership, but Moscow is no longer seen as a threat
to U.S. economic or political interests, so an extended hand seems
practical and logical.
Expect lots of smiles but little substance in St. Petersburg, analysts say,
between Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President George W. Bush.
If the same happens with America's European allies, then the meetings will
be judged a success.
The EU-Russia summit in St. Petersburg is scheduled for 31 May. The
U.S.-Russia summit is due the following day, on 1 June. The G-8 summit in
Evian begins later that same day and will run until 3 June.
******
#7
U.S.-Russia Nuclear Treaty Clears Hurdle
May 28, 2003
By MARA D. BELLABY
MOSCOW (AP) - Russia's landmark nuclear arms deal with the United States
cleared its final hurdle Wednesday, winning overwhelming support from the
upper house of parliament and opening the way for big cuts in both nations'
nuclear arsenals.
The Federation Council ratified the accord, known as the Treaty of Moscow,
in a 140-5 vote with two abstentions in a meeting held behind closed doors.
The vote was considered a mere formality, coming after the State Duma, the
lower house of parliament, ratified the treaty earlier this month and the
U.S. Senate approved it in March, but its timing - days ahead of the
Russia-U.S. presidential summit - was significant.
President Vladimir Putin and President Bush are expected to exchange
ratification documents in St. Petersburg on Sunday, bringing the accord
into immediate force.
``This document meets Russia's national security interests and broadens the
opportunity of cooperation with the U.S. and other countries on security
issues,'' Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said on state-controlled television.
Putin, who negotiated the treaty with Bush last year, lobbied hard for its
ratification, which became temporarily threatened by Russian anger over the
U.S. war in Iraq.
The Duma delayed an earlier scheduled vote that would have coincided with
the start of the U.S. invasion. But after intense Kremlin lobbying,
lawmakers put the accord back on the agenda this month.
Ivanov attended the Federation Council's closed-door session Wednesday to
make a final pre-vote plea for ratification.
The accord calls on Russia and the United States to cut their strategic
nuclear arsenals by about two-thirds, to 1,700 to 2,200 warheads, by 2012.
The treaty's supporters say it will allow Russia to retain its Soviet-built
missiles equipped with multiple nuclear warheads, which form the core of
the nation's nuclear arsenals and were to be scrapped under the earlier
START II arms reduction treaty. Russia never ratified that accord.
They also note that Moscow would have had to decommission many of its aging
nuclear missiles anyway.
Opponents note the treaty allows each country to stockpile the warheads,
which are to be taken off-duty, contrary to Russia's initial push for their
destruction. The cash-strapped Russian military cannot afford to maintain
nuclear arsenals on a par with the United States.
Mikhail Margelov, chairman of the foreign affairs committee of the
Federation Council, was quoted by the Interfax news agency as saying that
the treaty fills ``a legal vacuum in the sphere of strategic stability''
left by Washington's decision to withdrawal last year from the 1972
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in order to deploy a national missile defense
shield.
Moscow and Washington's carefully constructed friendship came under strain
with the Iraqi war, which Russia strongly opposed.
The Kremlin has since made an effort to mend the rift, with observers
noting that this treaty's ratification will likely be used to send a sign
that the relationship is moving beyond the Iraqi disagreement.
``In fact, there are many issues that play a much bigger role than Iraq,''
said Sergei Rogov, director of Russia's USA and Canada Institute, citing
the arms treaty as an example.
******
#8
www.inthenationalinterest.com
The Mood in Moscow
May 28, 2003
By Dimitri K. Simes and Nikolas K. Gvosdev
Dimtri K. Simes is president of The Nixon Center. Nikolas K. Gvosdev is
editor of In the National Interest.
On the eve of the St. Petersburg summit--with its much-anticipated meeting
between Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin, the first after the
American-led victory in Iraq --the attitude in Moscow toward the United
States may best be described as "hopeful anxiety."
Certainly there is an uneasiness in the run-up to the meeting, almost
bordering on embarrassment. After all, Russia found itself, once again, on
the losing side, supporting a nasty dictator against the United States .
However, the fact that Moscow found itself in the company of two of the
West's leading democracies-- France and Germany --and that most nations
expressed sympathy with Russia 's position, has helped to cushion the blow.
Nonetheless, in their current pragmatic mood, most Russian officials and
centrist politicians admit that they misread President Bush's steely
determination to remove Saddam Hussein. They underestimated U.S. military
capabilities and wildly overestimated Iraq 's ability to offer a credible
defense against coalition forces. The United States did not become bogged
down in a military quagmire; there was no need for Russia to offer its
services as an "honest broker" to procure a settlement between Washington
and Baghdad .
For the first time, Russian politicians and commentators are publicly
acknowledging that, whether they like it or not, the United States is the
only remaining superpower in the world. They are questioning whether it
makes any sense to be on the wrong side over a peripheral issue like Iraq .
At the same time, however, there is a sly satisfaction that Russia 's
opposition to the war has not extracted a high cost. After all, President
Bush is still coming to St. Petersburg . In recent weeks, National Security
Advisor Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of State Colin Powell both came to
Moscow to conduct what Russia considers to be fairly successful
negotiations. (One outcome has been the establishment of a new "direct
channel" between the White House and Putin's personal staff--at the
suggestion of the United States--to avoid any future misunderstandings.)
The Russians believe that the principal American anger over Iraq has been
directly mainly against France (and to a lesser extent, against Germany ).
It seems that Russia got a "pass"--meaning that there can be a rapid return
to "business as usual"--the construction of a new and more substantial
partnership between Moscow and Washington .
Yet, there remains a strong apprehension that even with Iraq out of the
picture, and with Russian interests strongly favoring partnership with the
United States (especially in the business sector), major difficulties lie
ahead. The Russian political mainstream learned an important lesson from
the recent Iraq unpleasantness. They failed to effectively calculate their
interests and the best way to promote them during a crisis when their views
differed from the American hegemon. (What they still have not accepted is
that the hegemon was right.) But now there is an inclination to accept
America 's leadership in the future, particularly in instances when their
own important national interests are at stake.
Accordingly, the Putin Administration will seek to avoid confrontations with
the United States whenever possible. Russia is reviewing its ongoing
nuclear cooperation with Iran in light of reports that Iran has constructed
secret uranium enrichment facilities. Yesterday, Deputy Foreign Minister
Georgy Mamedov met with the Iranian ambassador to ask Tehran to provide
substantial guarantees that Russian assistance in the construction of a
reactor at Bushehr--ostensibly to generate electrical power--is not being
diverted for a crash nuclear weapons program. In the case of North Korea ,
Russia , in both private and public demarches, has made it clear that a
nuclear North Korea is unacceptable to Moscow . Yesterday's unprecedented
joint Sino-Russian declaration reaffirming the nuclear-free status of the
Korean peninsula and calling on Pyonyang to observe its non-proliferation
commitments are an encouraging step.
At the same time, however, Moscow prefers to defuse potential crises such as
North Korea or Iran , not resolve them on American terms. There remains
strong opposition to any attempts to destabilize the Iranian regime. Moscow
is prepared to pressure North Korea but is against the imposition of
sanctions, to say nothing about the outright use of force, to ensure
compliance.
In the end, the Putin government is uncertain about the direction of
American foreign policy and what it perceives as the mixed messages
emanating from the Bush Administration. Officials and politicians alike
argue that if the U.S. objective is to lead a broad-based fight against
international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(combined with support for the extension of democratic principles across the
globe), then Russia should be prepared to extend the necessary cooperation
and to function as America 's junior partner.
Yet, there is a palpable suspicion in the corridors of the Kremlin that
American ambitions go far beyond this program--that the neo-conservative
faction in the Bush Administration wants to establish American global
dominance which under the guise of promoting security and democracy would
actually allow the United States to unilaterally act as the arbiter of
international politics. There is real concern that what the administration
wants is not allies and partners, but followers expected to blindly
implement Washington 's directives (in turn viewed as often expressing the
preferences of the current Likud government in Israel ). One Russian
commentator said that what Russia is being offered is the chance to act as
America 's jackal. Is the United States really proposing a genuine
partnership to Russia , one in which Russia 's interests will seriously be
taken into account? The debate goes on.
And while it does, Russia --while continuing to express interest in closer
cooperation with the United States --keeps its options open. The flirtation
earlier this year with Paris and Berlin is one sign. Putin continues to
quietly strengthen Russia 's nuclear deterrent and to work on the production
of a new generation of nuclear weapons--all of this in keeping with a
concept adopted by the Russian Security Council two years ago to pursue
"technical and technological modernization" of Russia 's military in a
timely and efficient manner. And while Chinese President Hu Jintao joined
Putin to publicly castigate North Korea , they also managed to sign a
far-reaching agreement on military cooperation between the two nations.
(The Chinese, after all, are reportedly interested in Russian efforts to
develop glide- and maneuverable-reentry vehicles capable of evading
interception by any of the proposed missile-defense systems that could be
deployed by the United States .)
What Washington does in the days and months following the Petersburg summit
will have a major impact in determining to what extent Russia explores these
other options. Now is the time for Washington not only to demonstrate to
the Russians the costs of further defiance, but to spell out the advantages
and benefits of acting as a partner.
******
#9
Diplomatic Courier, Nezavisimaya Gazeta
May 28, 2003
Disappointment Replaces Friendship
In response to Russia's anti-American hysteria, Washington stops seeing
Moscow as a friend and an ally.
By Nikolai Zlobin
Nikolai Zlobin is the Director for Russian and Asian Studies at the Center
for Defense Information and editor-in-chief of the Washington Profile News
Agency. (nzlobin@cdi.org)
On June 1st George Bush will embrace Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg and
congratulate him on the anniversary of his native city. Speeches will be
made about the need for strengthening Russian-American relations, and
revelations will be made that the recent sparring over Iraq did not hurt
the fundamental partnership of the two countries. There has already been a
dress rehearsal for this ceremony, in the form of Colin Powell's short trip
to Moscow. But that recent visit, just like Putin's speech in the Federal
Council, went virtually unnoticed by the American mass media and political
elite. The disagreement over Iraq and the unprecedented storm of
anti-American hysteria that squalled over Russia have severely downgraded
it on Washington's current list of countries that the American
establishment considers important as potential partners.
The bitter reality is that relations between the two countries are their
lowest point in the last ten years. Differences over Iraq have forced us to
see what we had previously ignored - there are sharp, fundamental, perhaps
even intractable differences between Russia and the US, in their approach
to building a new world order and a system of global security, in their
understanding of contemporary threats as well as how the threats must be
met, and in their attitude toward international law. A moment of mutual
honesty is upon us. The conflict over Iraq has concluded an entire epoch in
our relations.
After the end of the Cold War we stopped seeing each other as enemies.
Today, Washington has stopped looking at Russia as an ally and a partner.
As a result, the American elite's interest in the country has dropped to
zero, and if you ask a member of the Bush administration a question about
Russia, you are likely to get a perplexed pause, followed by hollow words
about how yes, it would be nice to be friends, but, you know
Russian-American relations remind one of a train that long stopped in its
tracks, and which has used its engine to sound the horn, while the wheels
are frozen in its tracks. The train has become immobile. Russia's loss of
prestige and importance in the eyes of Washington is a result of many
factors, but Iraq catalyzed the process. Many in America are re-examining
Russia as a country that's relatively well-armed, but useless as a partner
(recall Thatcher's "Upper Volta with nuclear weapons",) a country that is,
moreover, in the midst of a prolonged economic and demographic crisis.
Despite all the harsh critique lobbied at the Bush Administration for the
way it conducts foreign policy, we have to face facts: Russia took a deeply
mistaken stance on Iraq, and lost more than could afford. Moscow's position
was removed from simple pragmatism; it did not correspond to the country's
economic or national interests. It was, therefore, in direct contradiction
with Russia's main foreign policy principles, as defined repeatedly by
Vladimir Putin. Russia's position on Iraq caught Washington off guard.
It now seems that the famous "strategic choice," supposedly made by Putin
on Sep.11, was not so strategic after all. Perhaps it was tactical; perhaps
emotions played their role that day, but for the past twenty months, the
Kremlin has not bothered to explain what this choice means in reality, nor
to justify the choice to the Russian society and political elites, nor even
take any steps toward realizing that choice. Both sides of the ocean saw
the publication of many articles, and even books, about the "revolution in
Russian foreign policy". Everyone, it seems, wanted to believe that the
choice had really been made, that Vladimir Putin has jettisoned small ideas
for grand ones. That's why the disappointment is even more painful.
This cannot all be blamed on the unilateral approach to international
affairs displayed by the US, or their egotism, or the series of steps that
could hardly be called friendly toward Moscow - from protectionism for the
steel industry, to Jackson-Vanick, to forcing Russia out of Afghanistan.
The responsibility for failures in Russia's foreign policy lies entirely
with Moscow.
The situation with Iraq demonstrated that Russia not only lacks an
understanding of today's global processes, but doesn't even have a
strategically focused foreign policy. I wouldn't just blame the President.
Even if he had made a strategic choice, the outcome would have probably
been the same. One of the major lessons of Iraq is that Russia has neither
the infrastructure nor the intellectual potential to create an adequate
analysis of global events, provide realistic forecasts, or develop an
optimal behavior model for the country on the international arena. The
individuals and institutions assigned to these tasks were unable to handle
them. Moscow betrayed an unacceptable amount of improvisation. Taking into
account Russia's nuclear status, an improvisational foreign policy is more
than a sovereign policy, but also one that could detrimentally affect other
global developments.
In attempting to prevent the march to war, Russia only speeded it up.
Moscow's stance facilitated the split in Europe and weakened the European
Union, which is in direct contradiction to Russia's interests. Moreover, it
amplified the contradictions within NATO and brought about an increased
participation of Central and Eastern Europe within that alliance, which
will create difficulties for the European line of Russian foreign policy.
By attempting to keep the UN's status quo, Moscow facilitated both the
organization's downfall and a deep, perhaps irreversible crisis in the
Security Council, which is Russia's last bastion of exerting influence upon
the world.
President Putin has repeatedly emphasized that Russia's geopolitical
opportunities are tied to her economic might. But from that point of view,
was it not careless to quarrel with the largest economy in the world? Since
Russia was unable to become friendly with Japan, the world's second-largest
economy, its economic future is more bleak than a few months ago. Russia
has already lost the battle for American and Japanese investments, first to
China and Southeastern Asia, then to Latin America. If it's not careful, it
may lose to Africa next.
I'll repeat: Washington cannot be held blameless for the crisis in
Russian-American relations, but that is a different issue. After the end of
the Cold War I protested against the thesis of "the necessity for improving
Russian-American relations", trying to show that one cannot improve
something that was created for different political and international
realities. We should not try to improve relations that are not, by
definition, improvable, but form new bilateral relations on a fundamentally
different conceptual basis, which has yet to take shape. Both sides spent
over a decade on "improvement", and are now reposing, seething with mutual
irritation, next to the proverbial broken pot of their relations, lacking
both meaning and content in their behavior toward each other.
As important as the Bush-Putin friendship is, it's not what Russia needs.
It needs not only a well-thought-out, solid foreign policy, not only a
fresh elite that can develop one, but also a properly institutionalized
structure for its effective implementation. Presidential calls and kisses
are not sufficient. Otherwise, when a strategic decision is made, sometime
in the future, its realization will not extend beyond a friendly embrace.
Translated by Seva Gunitskiy
*******
#10
Date: Wed, 28 May 2003
From: "RSVP FOR EVENTS" <RSVP@hudsondc.org>
Subject: Invitation to Hudson Institute Forum for David Satter's
Darkness at Dawn
Subscribers to Johnson's list in the Washington, DC area are cordially
invited to a Hudson Institute Book Luncheon for Senior Fellow David
Satter's important new book, Darkness at Dawn: The Rise of the Russian
Criminal State (Yale University Press, May, 2003). The event will be held
Wednesday, June 4th at noon at the Hudson Institute Washington, D.C. office.
James Woolsey, former Director of Central Intelligence, will keynote the
event.
In Darkness at Dawn, David Satter tells the story of the reform period in
Russia from the point of view of Russia's citizens. He shows the contrast
between the desperation of the many and the insatiability of the few and he
offers a careful analysis of the September 1999 apartment building bombings
which provided a pretext for launching the second Chechen war that brought
Putin to power. He argues that the bombings were, in all likelihood,
carried out by the Russian government itself.
Newsweek said that Satter's "brave engaging book cannot be ignored. It
should be required reading for anyone interested in the post-Soviet state."
UPI described Darkness at Dawn as "vivid, impeccably researched and truly
frightening."
The luncheon will be held Wednesday, June 4th at noon at Hudson Institute's
Washington, DC office at 1015 18th Street, NW, Suite 300. A buffet lunch
will be served. Copies of Darkness at Dawn will be available for purchase.
To reserve your space, kindly respond to rsvp@hudsondc.org
What: Book Forum for David Satter's Darkness at Dawn
When: Wednesday, June 4, 2003. Noon to 1:30 PM
Where: Hudson Institute's Washington, DC office, 1015 18th Street, NW,
Suite 300.
*******
#11
EU and Russia smooth over differences on Chechnya
BRUSSELS, May 28 (Reuters) - Russia and the European Union have smoothed
over differences on Chechnya ahead of their summit in St Petersburg this
week, EU officials said on Wednesday.
While a dispute over Moscow's demands for visa-free travel to the EU for
its citizens could still sour Saturday's summit, officials said there was a
good chance of a post-summit communique.
The issuing of a communique is an important symbol of agreement after such
meetings, and had been in doubt.
"Chechnya is in the draft statement. The question is how to get an
agreement on visa-free," one EU official said.
"I would say there was a 75 percent chance for a final communique," a
diplomat said.
The official said the statement would express hopes for a peaceful solution
in Chechnya and stress human rights in the Muslim region, where Russia
launched its second war against separatist rebels in 1999.
The EU has often stressed the need for the respect of human rights,
although Russia says no violations take place.
EU officials said Russia was unlikely to get any commitment at the summit
for concrete steps to discuss the launch of a system of visa-free travel to
the 15-nation bloc.
"There is absolute agreement among member states for no timing on that,"
said the EU official, responding to reports that Russia wanted a target
date of 2007 to be set. "We don't want to deny the possibility in the long
term, but Russia has so much progress to make in a number of areas."
He cited the need for better cooperation with police forces in the EU and
an agreement that would allow for the readmission to Russia of people who
had arrived in the bloc illegally.
The EU will also urge Russia to ratify the Kyoto protocol on global
warming, which aims to curb greenhouse gas emissions.
*******
#12
Report: 1st SARS Case Confirmed in Russia
May 28, 2003
MOSCOW (AP) - A Russian hospitalized in a city on the Chinese border was
diagnosed with SARS on Wednesday, becoming Russia's first official case,
Russian news reports said.
``The diagnosis is unquestionable: this is SARS,'' Gennady Onishchenko,
Russia's chief epidemiologist, was quoted as saying by the Interfax news
agency.
The patient was not identified.
However, Denis Soinikov, who is hospitalized in Blagoveshchensk on the
Chinese border, has been undergoing tests for weeks. He was diagnosed with
SARS earlier this month, only to have health officials later say they were
uncertain.
Onishchenko said a sample of the patient's blood confirmed that he has
severe acute respiratory syndrome, which Russians call atypical pneumonia,
Russia's Interfax and ITAR-Tass news agency reported.
Russian health officials could not immediately be reached for comment.
Soinikov had been living in a hotel in Blagoveshchensk where about half the
residents are Chinese. China has suffered the most cases and the most
deaths from SARS.
Russia, which has a long border with China, has closed some border points
and initiated mandatory medical exams at others.
*******
#13
Date: Wed, 28 May 2003
Subject: New book on Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe from Cambridge
U Press - announcement for listservs
From: Juliet Barnes <jbarnes@cup.org>
Cambridge University Press is pleased to announce the publication of. . .
The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe
by
Marc Morjι Howard, University of Maryland, College Park
"This book is a major achievement: a multi-method, cross-national study of
civil society that demonstrates the decisive impact of Leninist rule on the
post-communist world. . . . Howard's study will surely become a standard
work for students of civil society and democracy."
-Jeffrey Kopstein, University of Toronto
"Marc Howard has presented the most systematic and convincing evidence to
date that the Eastern European 'post-communist' countries, despite their
seemingly diverse trajectories since the collapse of the Soviet bloc,
continue to share deep and abiding cultural similarities rooted in their
common experience of Leninist dictatorship. . . . Anyone interested in the
future of Europe in the 21st century should read this book."
-Stephen Hanson, University of Washington
"In his superb study, Howard manages to link democratization studies,
theorizing on civil society, and the debate on social capital. He blends
quantitative and qualitative data into an end product that will be a 'must'
for students of post-Communist Europe. A rare and enviable success."
-Claus Offe, Humboldt, University zu Berlin
"A wonderful book! Marc Howard has taken a subject we all care about. . .
and written a major account of the problem. . . . I found the argument to be
completely convincing."
-A. James McAdams, University of Notre Dame
Over a decade has passed since the collapse of communism, yet citizens of
post-communist countries are still far less likely to join voluntary
organizations than people from other countries and regions of the world.
Why do post-communist citizens mistrust and avoid public organizations?
What explains this distinctive pattern of weak civil society? And what does
it mean for the future of democracy in post-communist Europe? In this
engaging study, Howard argues that the legacy of the communist experience of
mandatory participation in state-controlled organizations, the development
and persistence of vibrant private networks, and the tremendous
disappointment with developments since the collapse of communism have left
most post-communist citizens with a lasting aversion to public activities.
In addition to analyzing data from over 30 democratic and democratizing
countries in the World Values Survey, Howard presents extensive and original
evidence from his own research in Eastern Germany and Russia, including
in-depth interviews with ordinary citizens and an original representative
survey.
2003/220 pp./14 line diagrams/22 tables
0-521-81223-2/Hb/List: $60.00
0-521-01152-3/Pb/List: $24.00
For information about how to order this book or how to request an
examination copy for course consideration, please contact us at:
Order Dept Cambridge University Press 100 Brook Hill Drive West Nyack,
NY 10994
Toll-Free: (800) 872-7423 / FAX: (914) 937-4712
http://us.cambridge.org/politicalscience/
******
#14
Amnesty International
26 May 2003
Russian Federation
Open letter from a coalition of non-governmental organisations to Vladimir
Vladimirovich Putin, President of the Russian Federation
Open letter
AI Index: EUR 046/2003/12
21 May 2003
Russian Federation: Open letter from a coalition of non-governmental
organisations to Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, President of the Russian
Federation
Russian Federation
103132 Moscow
Pl. Staraya, 4
Kremlin
21 May 2003
Dear Mr President,
We, international and Russian non-governmental organizations listed below,
are writing to express our concern that discriminatory practices and
procedures are preventing many former Soviet citizens in the Russian
Federation from obtaining permanent residency rights and Russian
citizenship.
The introduction of two new laws in 2002: the Federal Law "On Citizenship of
the Russian Federation" and the Federal Law "On the Legal Status of Foreign
Citizens in the Russian Federation" has exacerbated the problems faced by
hundreds of thousands of former Soviet citizens in obtaining official legal
status. These new laws have exacerbated the possibility of applying
citizenship legislation in a discriminatory way, and in many cases the
denial of citizenship and permanent residency rights may be linked to
ethnicity or nationality. We welcome your statement made in the annual
address to the Federal Assembly on 16 May 2003 in which you acknowledged the
shortcomings of the laws adopted in 2002 on citizenship and the status of
foreigners. In particular, you highlighted the problems of acquiring
citizenship for millions of people in the Russian Federation and the need to
facilitate the process of legalisation, especially for former Soviet
citizens. We support the introduction of measures in line with the
recommendations stated in this appeal, and call for the speedy amendment of
the laws on citizenship and the status of foreigners which were adopted in
2002.
The Law on Citizenship of the Russian Federation (2002) provides that
foreign nationals and stateless persons can apply for Russian citizenship
provided that a number of criteria are met. One of these criteria stipulates
that applicants must have permanently resided in the Russian Federation for
a period of five years since being granted a permanent residence permit. In
practice, many former Soviet citizens who have actually been permanently
residing in the Russian Federation for the last 10 to12 years were denied
permanent residence registration by local internal affairs departments for
discriminatory reasons. Under the new legislation and associated enforcement
practices they are therefore unable to get temporary residence permits and
subsequently permanent residence permits. In effect, they are prevented from
exercising their legal right to apply for citizenship.
In addition, former Soviet citizens unable to obtain Russian citizenship
face severe consequences under the Law on the Status of Foreign Citizens. In
agreement with Article 37 of this law, if you do not have documentation to
prove that you are legally and permanently residing in Russia you will be
considered a person temporarily staying in the country and receive a
migration card which limits the term of stay to three months. If you have
not been granted temporary right to reside following this three month
period, by law, you can be deported.
In effect, the impact of these laws is to bring to an end the permanent
residency and citizenship rights of hundreds of thousands of former Soviet
citizens, the majority of whom have been residing habitually and lawfully in
the Russian Federation since the break up of the USSR. Now rendered illegal
migrants, many face imminent deportation.
We urge you to use your authority to ensure that the appropriate steps are
taken to guarantee that the discriminatory elements of these laws, or
discriminatory aspects of their implementation, are effectively redressed.
In particular, we consider the following categories of persons to be
affected by these laws in a discriminatory way:
1) Former Soviet citizens who were permanently residing on the territory of
the Russian Federation prior to the 1991 Law on Citizenship of the Russian
Federation coming into force (6 February 1992)
2) Former Soviet citizens (citizens of Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS) countries and stateless persons) who legally entered the territory of
the Russian Federation after the dissolution of the Soviet Union within the
last 10 to 12 years without a visa, and are permanently residing in the
Russian Federation.
Former Soviet citizens residing permanently in the Russian Federation before
6 February 1992
Many of the people within this category were forced to flee from other
states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as a result of
conflicts immediately preceding the end of the Soviet Union in 1991. As
provided by Article 13, part 1 of the 1991 Law on Citizenship, those
belonging to this group were entitled to be recognised as Russian citizens
unless they specifically indicated their willingness not to become Russian
citizens.
Interpretation of the permanent residency requirement
Despite being entitled to acquire citizenship, in practice, many of these
people were denied the right to citizenship as provided in this law. The
1991 Law on Citizenship requires that persons applying for citizenship must
be permanently residing on the territory of the Russian Federation. State
bodies processing citizenship applications interpreted the permanent
residence condition as requiring possession of permanent residence
registration or "propiska". Some regional and local internal affairs
departments interpreted the permanent residency requirement as requiring
documentary proof of registration at their place of abode on the day the
1991 Law on Citizenship came into force. Frequently, attempts to obtain such
registration were also unlawfully blocked by the local and regional
authorities through unconstitutional regional laws or practices for
discriminatory reasons on the basis of the ethnic background of applicants.
According to the Presidential Commission on Citizenship of the Russian
Federation, by the end of 2001, fewer than half the people living lawfully
and habitually on the territory of the Russian Federation but without
residence registration at the time the 1991 Law came into force had been
able to obtain Russian citizenship.
However, as you will be aware, the Constitutional Supervision Committee of
the USSR has twice ruled the residence registration system ("propiska") to
be unlawful, in 1990 and 1991. This means that, since these rulings, the
term "permanent residence" does not equate to or require possession of
residence registration ("propiska"). Both of these rulings were made prior
to 6 February 1992, the date the 1991 Law on Citizenship came into force.
Notwithstanding these rulings, which rendered "propiska" unconstitutional,
it is clear that the residence registration system has continued to be a
major factor in the denial of citizenship to former Soviet citizens who
should have been entitled to citizenship under the 1991 law.
Discriminatory application of citizenship laws
The ethnicity of applicants has also played a significant role in
obstructing the acquisition of Russian citizenship; many minorities have
been prevented from obtaining Russian citizenship, and therefore associated
legal rights, on the basis of their ethnicity. Ethnic groups particularly
affected by this are the Meskhetians in Krasnodar Territory, Kurds, and
Armenians. For example, the vast majority of the 11,000 to 13,000
Meskhetians living in Krasnodar Territory are being denied their legal right
to citizenship because of discriminatory legislation and practices specific
to the territory.
Former Soviet citizens (citizens of CIS countries and stateless persons) who
legally entered the Russian Federation after the dissolution of the Soviet
Union and have been residing permanently in the Russian Federation since 6
February 1992
Currently, only those people belonging to this category who possess
residence registration are eligible for permanent residence permits.
Meanwhile, the overwhelming majority of former Soviet citizens in Russia
have been living in Russia with temporary registration or have been
arbitrarily denied any form of registration. Official estimates by the
Russian authorities indicate that persons within this group number from half
a million to just over three million people. This group is of particular
concern as many people who have actually been permitted to reside in the
Russian Federation for a number of years now face the immediate threat of
deportation.
As previously mentioned, the Law "On the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in
the Russian Federation" of 2002 now provides that members of this group will
be eligible for migration cards. Following this, if they wish to remain in
the Russian Federation, they then have three months in which to apply for
temporary residence permits if they wish to remain in the Russian
Federation. However, because the procedure for applying for temporary
residence permits can take up to six months, according to another article of
the law, they may inadvertently be rendered 'illegal' pending the outcome of
the registration procedure. They are as a consequence vulnerable to
discrimination on the basis of status and ethnicity and may face deportation
when the three months expire. Furthermore, these people are deprived of the
right to work or to have any other source of income in Russia.
The following safeguards and standards are essential to ensure effective
implementation of laws relating to citizenship and the status of foreign
nationals in the Russian Federation, without discrimination in particular on
the basis of ethnicity:
the protection of the rights and legitimate interests of former Soviet
citizens lawfully and habitually resident in the Russian Federation;
the granting of legal status to those lawfully and habitually resident in
the Russian Federation;
compliance with the constitutional and international obligations of the
Russian Federation;
protection against refoulement -- forcible return of persons to a situation
where they are at risk of grave human rights abuses, in accordance with the
international treaty obligations of the Russian Federation and principles of
customary international law;
the right to seek and enjoy asylum from persecution and to a fair and
satisfactory procedure for determining refugee status;
the right to due process, in accordance with international standards, before
steps are taken to expel or deport an individual.
We the signatories to this appeal therefore urge you as President of the
Russian Federation and a constitutional guarantor of human rights, in
accordance with powers thereby conferred upon you, to:
1. Issue a Presidential Decree concerning former Soviet Citizens entitled to
Russian citizenship by the 1991 Citizenship Law:
Recognising as entitled to Russian citizenship [it should be an individual's
choice/decision as nationality/citizenship cannot be imposed] those citizens
of the former Soviet Union who have that right in accordance with Part 1,
Article 13 of the Law on Citizenship of the Russian Federation of 1991. This
concerns those who were permanently residing in the Russian Federation on
the day the 1991 Citizenship law came into force (6 February 1992);
Ensuring that groups such as the Meskhetians, Kurds, Armenians and other
ethnic and national minorities will be guaranteed the right to citizenship
without discrimination;
Making provisions to guarantee that the relevant officials of the internal
affairs department will give due consideration to citizenship applications
for those that fall within the above category, whether or not the applicant
is in possession of formal registration documents
2. Table amendments in the State Duma to the Law on Citizenship of the
Russian Federation of 2002, aimed at facilitating the acquisition of
citizenship for former Soviet citizens.
3. Issue a Presidential Decree concerning former Soviet citizens who have
entered and been permanently residing in the Russian Federation prior to 1
November 2002:
Setting out a simplified procedure to grant legal status (permanent right to
reside) to former citizens of the Soviet Union who were residing in the
Russian Federation on the day that the federal law of 2002 "On the Legal
Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation" came into force (on
condition that they entered the country no later than 1 November 2002);
Stipulating a fixed period in which the above group will be guaranteed the
right the apply for permanent residency status, on the submittal of evidence
(the admissibility of which is recognised by Russian law) of their arrival
on the territory of the Russian Federation and actual residency therein
before November 2002;
Ensuring transparency of the procedure, in particular by making provision
for legal representation and judicial review rights;
Guaranteeing that applicants will not be forcibly deported or compelled to
leave the territory of the Russian Federation pending a final decision on
their applications.
4. Table amendments in the State Duma to federal law of 2002 "On the Legal
Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation" to remove any
restrictions or potentially discriminatory conditions, including
transitional conditions, to access to legal status for former Soviet
citizens residing in the Russian Federation.
The above actions would serve to restore and ensure respect for the rights,
including economic, social and cultural rights, of hundreds of thousands of
people lawfully residing in the Russian Federation who are being denied
access to their legal rights. We believe these issues can be solved swiftly
and effectively by the executive authorities through implementation of the
recommendations contained within this appeal, and we urge you to exert all
appropriate authority as President of the Russian Federation to ensure that
these steps are taken as swiftly as possible.
We look forward to your response.
Yours sincerely,
Irene Khan, Amnesty International
Valery Abramkin, Centre for Prison Reform, Moscow
Ashot Airapetian, Centre for Interethnic Cooperation, Moscow
Alexander Axelrod, "Tolerance" Foundation, Moscow
Boris Altshuller, Movement without Borders and "The Rights of the Child,"
Moscow Semen Ateev, Kalmyk Human Rights Center, "Elista"
Andrey Blinushov, Ryazan Society "Memorial"
Alexander Brod, Moscow Bureau on Human Rights
Yuri Vdovin, Human Rights NGO "Citizens' Watch," St Petersburg
Alexander Verkhovsky, Information and Analytical Centre "Sova," Moscow
Dmitry Vokhmianin, Committee for Human Rights Protection in the Republic of
Tatarstan, Kazan
Svetlana Gannushkina, Civic Assistance Committee, Moscow
Valentin Gefter, Human Rights Institute, Moscow
Lidiya Grafova, Forum of Migrants' Organisations, Moscow
Eugeny Grekov, Civic Education Club of the Creative Union "Southern Wave,"
Krasnodar
Elena Grishina, NGO "Human Rights Information," Moscow
Dezire Deffo, African Union, St Petersburg
Yuri Dzhibladze, Center for the Development of Democracy and Human Rights,
Moscow
Gavhar Dzhuraeva, Regional Non-Governmental Foundation for Assistance to
Refugees and Migrants "Tajikistan," Moscow
Iosif Dzyaloshinsky, Human Rights Foundation "Commission on the Freedom of
Access to Information," Moscow
Muzaffar Zaripov, Regional NGO "Inson," Moscow
Maxim Egorov, NGO "Nochlezhka," St Petersburg
Sofia Ivanova, Ryazan School of Human Rights
Petrus Indongo, African Students Association, ASSAFSTY, Moscow
Vadim Karastelev, "School for Peace" Foundation, Novorossiysk
Tamara Karasteleva, Novorossiysk Human Rights Committee
Natalya Klochkova, Kaliningrad Regional Youth Migrants' NGO "Youth of the
21st Century"
Alexey Kozlov, Charitable Foundation "For Environmental and Social Justice,"
Voronezh
Tatiana Kotova and Pavel Gostishev, Association "Christian Inter-Church
Diakonic Council of St Petersburg"
Boris Kreyndel, Regional Non-Governmental Institution "Commission on Human
Rights in Tomsk Oblast," Tomsk
Alexander Kuznetsov, Charitable Humanitarian NGO "The World of Childhood,",
Krasnodar Krai
Arkady Leibovsky, Centre for Pontic and Caucasian Studies, Krasnodar
Tanya Lokshina, Moscow Helsinki Group
Rudolph Massarsky, Harald and Selma Light Centre for Human Rights Advocacy,
St Petersburg
Nina Nettova, Centre for Human Rights Protection "Liberty Road," Yaroslavl
Alexander Nikitin, Saratov Human Rights Center "Solidarity"
Oleg Orlov, Human Rights Center "Memorial," Moscow
Nadezhda Pavlova, Karelian Union for the Protection of Children,
Petrozavodsk
Fuad Pepinov, International Society of Meskhetian Turks "Vatan," Moscow
Irina Poduzova, Ioshkar-Ola City NGO "Man and Law"
Georgy Rafailov, Regional Charitable NGO "Association for Assistance to
Refugees," St Petersburg
Yulia Sereda, Interregional Group "Human Rights Network," Ryazan
Olga Smitnitskaya, Kaliningrad Regional NGO Foundation for Support to
Refugees and Forced Migrants "Home"
Nina Tagankina, Nizhny Novgorod Human Rights Society and Nizhny Novgorod
Peace Group
Natalya Taubina, Foundation "For Civil Society" and Russian Research Centre
for Human Rights, Moscow
Sarvar Tedorov, International Society of Meskhetian Turks "Vatan," Krasnodar
Krai
Leonid Teleleiko, Krasnodar regional NGO "Human Rights Center,"
Vladimir Tishinsky, Krasnodar Human Rights Center
Andrey Yurov, International Network - Youth Human Rights Movement (YHRM),
Voronezh
*******
#15
New York Times
May 28, 2003
Putin's Sure Hand Abroad Belies Problems at Home
By MICHAEL WINES
MOSCOW, May 27 When President Vladimir V. Putin meets President Bush in
St. Petersburg on Saturday, more than a few questions will be asked about
how Russia's steely leader opposed a hyperpower over the war in Iraq and
came away unscathed.
The answer lies somewhere between Mr. Bush's evident personal regard for
the Russian leader and Mr. Putin's skill in playing his hand on the world
stage. Yet for all his stature abroad, Mr. Putin is looking increasingly
vulnerable at home, facing growing fears that his dominance of the state
machinery has peaked.
As parliamentary elections loom in December and the presidential vote
follows next March the more important question may not be how Mr. Putin
managed to go against the policy of Mr. Bush, but why he has been unable to
face down the likes of Yevgeny Nazdratenko, the pugnacious former governor
of the Primoriye Province on the Pacific in Russia's Far East.
Early in Mr. Putin's rule, Mr. Nazdratenko tested the new president's vow
to rebuild a strong Russian state and impose a "dictatorship of the law"
over a society without rules. Back then, Mr. Nazdratenko headed a corrupt
Primoriye government, which, many critics say, preyed on Russia's lucrative
Pacific fishing industry.
Mr. Putin fulminated, threatened Mr. Nazdratenko through aides with
prosecution and, in 2001, removed him from office by appointing him
fisheries minister.
Two years later, the fisheries ministry is mired in a corruption scandal
and savaged for mismanagement. This month, Mr. Putin finally got rid of Mr.
Nazdratenko by making him deputy secretary of his national security
council.
Acerbic and decisive in public, able to hold his own with world leaders of
all stripes, Mr. Putin has proven mystifyingly unable to marshal his global
stature and his personal popularity to dispense with the Kremlin's
Nazdratenkos, much less carry out the painful social changes he says Russia
still needs to make.
Three years into his rule, many experts have concluded that Mr. Putin's
outward show of authority masks a careful balancing act among competing
interests, from tycoons to political kingpins, who helped create his
amazing success and benefit from it.
In most democracies, there is a word for that: politics. But Russia's
masses remain all but oblivious to how politics is played and policies are
made. Who makes Russia's key domestic and foreign-policy decisions today is
opaque even to experts, including American government analysts.
"This system is not stable," Masha Lipman, a Moscow political journalist,
said in a recent interview. "Its secret, the pivot of its stability, is
Putin's popularity and the passivity of the public. The rest is warring
interests, no matter how much Putin has tried to strengthen it."
On its face, this is an odd time for doubts. Mr. Putin has won general
acclaim for transforming Russia from skid row deadbeat to sober, even
respected, nation-state. Public opinion polls routinely accord him the
approval of 7 in 10 Russians, and he seems well set for another four-year
term.
This week's St. Petersburg festivities, ostensibly a glittering celebration
of the city's 300th anniversary, are a barely disguised metaphor for
Russia's re-emergence as a global force. The official laying on of hands
comes next week in Evian, France, when the seven major industrial powers
will grant Russia full membership and equal status.
Moreover, thanks to the reordering that followed the 1998 crash of the
ruble and to high oil prices Russia's economy has recorded five straight
years of growth at a time of worldwide stagnation and Mr. Putin himself
set a goal this month of doubling the country's gross domestic product
within a decade.
Mr. Putin's language remains as tough as ever. Not two weeks ago, in his
annual address to Parliament, he recommitted himself to creating a
"sustainable democracy where human, political and civil rights will be
fully ensured," and suggested opening political party finances to public
scrutiny and giving the Parliament a greater say in forming the government.
The problem, analysts say, is with performance. After pushing a sweeping
overhaul of the tax system and new legal codes through Parliament in his
first two years, Mr. Putin has been unable to press much more of his
economic and social revolution through a government he supposedly dominates.
The problems begin in Chechnya, the breakaway province where Mr. Putin,
then still prime minister, engaged in a war in 1999 that catapulted him to
the presidency. Almost four years later, Chechnya has become a quagmire and
a painful exposition of Russia's military shortcomings. Kremlin proposals
to professionalize and shrink the armed forces are moving glacially, if at
all.
Banking reform, a linchpin of further economic growth, is moribund.
Standard and Poors estimates that at least half of all loans in the Russian
system are potentially problematic. Other experts say that no more than 15
Russian banks are true financial institutions, while the rest are
essentially slush funds for conglomerates, much as before Russia's 1998
financial crisis.
Reforms of the national gas and electricity monopolies have faltered,
mostly due to opposition from big business or politicians who fear higher
rates. Discussions on overhauling Russia's corrupt and bankrupt communal
housing system have just begun.
Mr. Putin's vow to slash into Russia's Gordian bureaucracy a major theme
of his address to Parliament this month has been met, in echoes of
similar Soviet-era schemes, by a government plan to wipe out 250 duties of
government ministries and agencies.
Some 4,750 others would remain intact.
Liliya Shevtsova is a domestic political scholar at the Moscow Center of
the Carnegie Endowment whose new book, "Putin's Russia," analyzes the
president's first three years. "I have an image of Putin sitting in the
bunker constantly pressing buttons," she said in an interview, "and until
recently, he didn't know that the bunker isn't connected to reality, that
all the ties are cut."
If that seems harsh, the growing consensus among outside analysts is that
Mr. Putin is hardly the all-powerful figure his poll ratings and global
reputation would suggest.
Kremlin machinations are closely guarded. Yet it has become conventional
wisdom that Mr. Putin remains somehow indebted to the group of tycoons and
political kingpins who controlled President Boris N. Yeltsin's final years
in office, and who presumably engineered his own swift rise to the
presidency.
Mr. Putin moved early in his rule to curb the broad influence those tycoons
wielded under Mr. Yeltsin, and reached a grudging nonaggression pact with
most of them in 2000.
But key Yeltsin figures continue to hold important Kremlin jobs. The
tycoons have reasserted themselves in Russia's 89 provinces, using their
money and clout as major employers to wield effective control over politics
in vast provinces like Krasnoyarsk and Chukotka.
"Probably about a quarter of Russia's governors are to some extent involved
in their business, and many governors are just agents of the oligarchs,"
said Rostislav Turkovsky, an economist and independent political consultant
for the private Regional Studies Agency. "And if Putin wants to ensure that
a certain governor is loyal, that means he has to go, not to the governor,
but to the oligarch and talk with him."
Mr. Putin, the experts say, has sought to offset those influences by
peppering his government with trusted friends from Russia's intelligence
and security services, where he spent his career before entering politics.
But the principal effect, they say, may have been to give Russia's civil
liberties and military policies an even more conservative cast.
Always the targets of suspicion by the police and intelligence agents,
foreign social activists and technical experts have come under renewed
scrutiny and, in some cases, have been ejected from the country. The Peace
Corps mission here was abruptly ended last year amid accusations that the
young volunteers were spies.
"Most people would agree that on the basic institutions of democracy, Putin
has weakened Russia, not strengthened it," said Michael McFaul, an analyst
with the Hoover Institution who is one of the leading scholars on
post-Soviet Russia.
Among other glaring problems, Mr. McFaul lists the unequal rights granted
ethnic Chechens, frequent rigged elections, harassment of social activists,
the effective end of independent television networks and a shift away from
direct elections to Parliament.
But like many others, Mr. McFaul is reluctant to blame Mr. Putin for all
that, or to declare the democratic experiment over. Rather, he said, it is
stalled, waiting for a breeze to carry it either forward or back.
"It's democracy by default, which is to say that they're not strong enough
to have an autocracy," Mr. McFaul said in an interview. "It's like the vast
majority of regimes which have gone into the transition from Communist
rule. We always thought there was a continuum, from autocracy to democracy.
But it turns out that you can get halfway there and just stagnate. And
that's where Russia is."
*******
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