Johnson's Russia List
#7190
21 May 2003
davidjohnson@erols.com
A CDI Project
www.cdi.org
[Contents:
DJ: An old query: are there JRL recipients who have genuine problems
in dealing with an issue of JRL that is this long? I referring primarily
to computer/e-mail technical problems.
1. AFP: Moscow to join race to host 2012 Olympics: report.
2. ITAR-TASS: Pro-Kremlin One Russia party edges ahead of Communists in
latest poll.
3. BBC Monitoring: Russian MP doubts poll results showing less than
50 per cent support for Putin.
4. Prime-TASS: Survey shows majority of Russians support Putin re-election.
5. Moscow Times: Yulia Latynina, Assessing Presidential Promises.
6. BBC Monitoring: Putin asks government for ideas on implementing national
address.
7. Irish Times: Clouds start to appear on Putin's horizon - The Russian
President is popular, but the people will be demanding more than he has
delivered so far, writes Chris Stephen, in Moscow.
8. Vremya MN: Andrey Ryabov, The Big Game Is Still Ahead. (Russian
Oligarchs'
Plans for Post-Election Period Mulled)
9. BBC Monitoring: Russian party leader denies report on alleged
involvement
in deputy's murder. (Zhirinovskiy re Starovoytova)
10. Financial Times (UK): Russia rules out WTO membership this year.
11. Reuters: EU, Russia heading for difficult summit -diplomats.
12. Reuters: Russia rights activists slam Chechnya amnesty plan.
13. eurasianet.org: Igor Torbakov, CHANGING NATURE OF CHECHEN CONFLICT DIMS
RUSSIA’S STABILIZATION HOPES.
14. Interfax: Russia believes dividing Caspian Sea into equal parts
unrealistic.
15. Der Spiegel (Germany): Beat Balzli, Tracks to the Kremlin? (Details
Emerge
Regarding German Company's Possible Involvement in 'Russian Mafia'(re SPAG)
16. AFP: Glittering anniversary facade hides decay in Saint Petersburg.
17. Rossiyskaya Gazeta: Vitaliy Tretyakov, The Berezovskiy Effect.
(Inept Campaigning of Russian Parties, Politicians Reviewed)
18. US Department of State: Background Note: Russia.
19. Dov Lynch: new publication: Russia Faces Europe.
20. Moscow Times: Andrei Zolotov Jr., A Power Struggle in the
Patriarchate.]
********
#1
Moscow to join race to host 2012 Olympics: report
May 20, 2003
AFP
Russia's Olympic Committee (ROS) President Leonid Tygachev on Friday will
announce Moscow's bid to host the 2012 Olympics, local media reported.
Russia's Olympic chief is expected to make an official bid to host the summer
Games at a special ROC meeting.
Tyagachev said he thought the Russian capital stood a strong chance to win
the race since the city gained experience in hosting the 1980 Summer Games
which
were boycotted by the United States and its Western allies during the Cold
War.
"I'm optimistic about Moscow's chances to win the right to host the 2012
Olympics," Tyagachev told the press. "I think Moscow is one of the hot
favourites
of the Olympic race.
"Moscow already has experience of hosting the Games and I believe that should
seriously raise its chances to win the bid."
Moscow mayor Yury Luzhkov said the city has several venues including the
five-star Luzhniki arena and Europe's biggest indoor Olympic stadium.
Some of the capital's sports grounds would be also able to host events after
minor renovation.
However Moscow will face tough competition from New York, Madrid, London and
possibly Paris, with Mayor Bertrand Delanoe expected to announce the Parisian
bid on Wednesday.
The Germany city of Leipzig is also in the running but, not being a capital
city, is seen as an outsider.
It has yet to be decided whether Rio de Janeiro or Sao Paulo will represent
Brazil's bid, while Toronto was understood to be waiting to see if fellow
Canadian city Vancouver's bid for the 2010 Winter Games was successful before
throwing its hat in the ring.
The deadline for submissions is July 15 when bidding cities have to pay the
IOC 150,000 dollars.
The IOC executive board will decide in May or June 2004 which of the
candidates have been accepted, when bidding cities have to pay another
500,000 dollars
to stay in the race.
********
#2
Pro-Kremlin One Russia party edges ahead of Communists in latest poll
ITAR-TASS
Moscow, 20 May: The One Russia party is slightly ahead of the Communist Party
[of the Russian Federation] in the eyes of the Russian electorate, as follows
from an opinion poll by the Agency for Regional Political Studies, which is a
division of the sociological research company ROMIR-Monitoring.
Of the 1,600 respondents questioned, 23 per cent said they would vote for One
Russia. Twenty per cent would support the Communists. The Liberal Democrats
and Yabloko were placed third with 5 per cent each, with good chances of
clearing the Duma election qualification hurdle.
No other Russian political party has a support level sufficient for being
elected to parliament.
Alongside this the poll has indicated that one in ten Russian voters is
reluctant to participate in the elections, and 7 per cent will vote against
all. Sixteen per cent are still undecided.
*******
#3
BBC Monitoring
Russian MP doubts poll results showing less than 50 per cent support for
Putin
Source: Ekho Moskvy radio, Moscow, in Russian 0300 gmt 19 May 03
About 49 per cent of Russian citizens would have voted for Vladimir Putin if
the presidential election had been held [last weekend], the Public Opinion
Foundation has reported.
The drop to below 50 per cent in the president's rating could be explained as
a misunderstanding, MP from the State Duma Gennadiy Raykov has said in an
interview with Ekho Moskvy radio.
[Raykov] It is a bit unclear, because the president's rating is high enough.
Therefore I cannot understand why the results showed below 50 per cent. They
possibly do not correspond to reality. The president's rating is still
sufficiently high. That is why the fact that the public opinion poll results
showed below 50 per cent should be examined. The issue should be thought
over. I think that it is incorrect. In my opinion, it is a temporary
phenomenon. I do not think that the president's rating is 49 per cent. The
president enjoys quite a high rating in the regions.
[Presenter] It should be noted that according to the same poll, 15 per cent
of the respondents are ready to vote for Communist leader Gennadiy Zyuganov
and five per cent for the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia
Vladimir Zhirinovskiy
[Ekho Moskvy news agency reported on 18 May that the poll was taken among
1,500 respondents in 100 residential areas of Russia.]
*******
#4
Survey shows majority of Russians support Putin re-election
MOSCOW, May 20 /Prime-TASS/ -- Russian President Vladimir Putin would
definitely secure a second term in office if the election were to take place
now, ITAR-TASS reported Tuesday, quoting survey results by Russia's Agency
for Regional Political Studies, a unit of independent Russian public opinion
research center Romir.
Of 1,600 Russians questioned during the survey, 58% said that they would have
voted for the current president.
Only three Russian politicians, Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov,
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia head Vladimir Zhirinovsky and Grigory
Yavlinsky, leader of the liberal Yabloko party, were cited as possible rivals
in the hypothetical election.
Zyuganov led the three, backed by 13% of respondents, while Zhirinovsky and
Yavlinsky managed to line up 3% and 2% of supporters respectively.
About 4% said they would have voted against all candidates, while another 7%
said they are not going to vote at all and the same number were at a loss
when faced with the question.
Presidential elections in Russia are scheduled for March next year.
*******
#5
Moscow Times
May 21, 2003
Assessing Presidential Promises
By Yulia Latynina
The formation of Russia's next government will be "based on the parliamentary
majority" that emerges from the upcoming State Duma election. President
Vladimir Putin dropped this political bombshell in his state of the nation
speech last Friday.
The president's announcement was widely viewed as a victory for United
Russia, the so-called party of power, which has long had its eye on the White
House. If the party wins a majority in the next Duma, it would form the
government and name the successor to Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov.
This may sound logical enough, but it also begs the question: How would a
United Russia majority affect Putin's own political fortunes?
In the current Duma, the Unity faction occupies 18 percent of the lower
house's 450 seats, the Fatherland faction controls 11 percent, and Russia's
Regions owns another 10 percent. Add these up, and the umbrella organization,
United Russia, falls well short of a majority. At present, the party is
loyal, obedient and does what it's told. But why is the Kremlin so sure that
the party will remain loyal if it wins a parliamentary majority?
A battle is raging in Moscow for control of a certain factory. I won't say
which factory so as not to get dragged into the fray. Let's call it the
Moscow Macaroni Factory. The name doesn't matter. What matters is that one of
the principal combatants is a leader of United Russia. This powerful but
utterly unselfish politician is personally knocking on doors in the
presidential administration and various ministries and requesting that the
factory be given to a certain so-and-so. "This is a political decision," he
says.
How about that! Handing a macaroni factory over to someone's grade school
buddy has become a political decision involving the president of Russia. Is
the president personally handing out metro tickets, too?
Nor is this United Russia's only act of altruism. Last year, a young
businessman named Alexei Guskov managed -- temporarily -- to squeeze out the
owners of the controlling stake in Severo-Zapadnoye Parokhodstvo, a St.
Petersburg-based holding that specializes in shipping and shipbuilding. A
number of top United Russia officials took an active interest in young
Guskov's fate. They introduced him to the right people in government,
including the president, allowing them to claim that handing Severo-Zapadnoye
Parokhodstvo over to Guskov was a political decision by the president.
The result of this is that Putin, who tries mightily to maintain his image as
the only government official not involved in the often nasty business of
redistributing property, finds that macaroni factories are being handed out
on his authority. No one dares employ this tactic with anything bigger than a
macaroni factory, by the way.
Back to the subject of presidential promises.
A system of "divide and conquer" has been created in Russia. The government
does little, but controls the distribution of enormous wealth. United Russia
has little influence in the distribution of property, and desperately wants
to change all that by taking over the government. Federation Council Speaker
Sergei Mironov's Party of Life wants to supplant United Russia. And so on.
If this balance were disturbed, and the whole pie were entrusted to one party
-- even to the pro-presidential party of power -- this would automatically
transform it into an anti-presidential force.
Political parties, especially those not bound by ideology, behave in a
predictable manner. Even if a party's members are obedient and their
aspirations soar no higher than macaroni factories, once it senses its own
power it becomes uncontrollable. At that point the party can no longer be
bought because it feels entitled to all the money.
It seems to me that the president could only have dangled this carrot before
the pro-presidential party certain in the knowledge that it would not win a
parliamentary majority.
Yulia Latynina is host of "Yest Mneniye" on TVS.
********
#6
BBC Monitoring
Putin asks government for ideas on implementing national address
Source: Radio Mayak, Moscow, in Russian 0900 gmt 19 May 03
[Presenter] At a meeting with leading members of the government Vladimir
Putin has suggested that they think and come up with proposals for jointly
implementing the main provisions of the presidential state-of-the-nation
address. Economic Development and Trade Minister German Gref took part in the
daily meeting for the first time since his illness. This is what Vladimir
Putin said as he opened the meeting.
[Putin] Hello, dear colleagues. At the restricted meeting with the government
leadership on Saturday [17 May] we discussed how to implement the
state-of-the-nation address. There are various proposals, and I would also
ask you to think about it and come up with your own ideas regarding joint
work on this issue.
I can say with satisfaction that major projects are being developed in the
Far East, in particular in Sakhalin, in the energy sphere, and the government
is completing preparation of an energy strategy. I think all this should be
taken into account, bearing in mind the positive trends which we now have.
But behind these major, and I have to say, positive trends, to which the
raising of Russia's rating by one of the world's three leading rating
companies may be added, we mustn't forget about the current problems, among
which I would place agricultural issues. We have had many problems here
connected with the delay in the sowing campaign by nearly two or three weeks
- in some regions it's three weeks - and we have had problems with winter
crops.
That's the first thing. Secondly, I don't think I'm saying anything new, this
is primarily a matter for the regions, but I would ask the government to keep
track of this issue, bearing in mind the beginning of preparations for
winter. I spoke with some of the presidential envoys this morning, in some
regions plans are nearly ready for preparations for winter. I would ask the
leadership of the government to bear these problems in mind and maintain
close contact with the regions, with the governors and with the presidential
envoys, and help the regions in organizing this work in the current year.
Well, summer is on the way, so I would also ask you to keep in mind all
issues connected with children's holidays and with prompt payment of
teachers' salaries.
********
#7
Irish Times
May 20, 2003
Clouds start to appear on Putin's horizon - The Russian
President is popular, but the people will be demanding more than he has
delivered so far, writes Chris Stephen, in Moscow
There was a moment, after Russia's President, Vladimir Putin, gave last
Friday's annual state-of-the-nation address, when a TV station ran clips from
previous speeches by both him and his predecessor Boris Yeltsin. The contrast
was stark: while the highlights showed Yeltsin visibly ageing year by year,
the clips of Putin's four addresses showed no change at all.
In each, he appears hard, no-nonsense and brimming with confidence. Something
else is unchanged since Putin (50) swept to power in 2000: his opinion polls
remain in the stratosphere at 81 per cent support.
His popularity comes despite leading a country mired in trouble. Outside
Moscow and St Petersburg, conditions are grim. One quarter of Russians live
below the poverty line. A million children are officially homeless. AIDS, TB
and alcoholism are rampant. Pensioners struggle on (pounds) 20 a month.
And the war in Chechnya is nearly five years old, with last week's twin
suicide bombings a reminder of the once mighty Red Army's inability to crush
the rebels.
Yet Putin enjoys levels of support other presidents can only dream of. He is
already being talked of as a shoo-in for re-election next March. The reason
appears simple. Russians see him as he portrays himself, as a firm hand on
the tiller.
Putin came to office at the end of the Yeltsin era which had become a byword
for corruption and chaos. A population hugely disappointed with the fruits of
democracy was happy to see someone from the security services - he was a
careerist KGB officer - come in to take command.
Putin set about his dream - building a Strong Russia - from day one. First,
champagne-swilling tycoons nicknamed Oligarchs by the rest of the country
were brought into line. The strongest, Boris Berezovsky, was hounded out of
the country and is now facing an extradition case in London.
Next the regional governors, a byword for graft, got the same treatment. So
did Russia's most powerful company, Gazprom.
More controversially, the government silenced NTV, the most critical
television station, causing an outcry among civil liberties groups.
Meanwhile, Putin has shown a sure touch on the world stage. He was not afraid
to clobber Tony Blair during the latter's trip to Russia last month to mend
fences over the Iraq war.
And his opposition to the war was astute. He refused to kow-tow to American
demands while ensuring that his opposition was less vocal than France, which
is taking most of the post-war flak from Washington.
In all of this, Putin's personal style is a paradox. He has installed KGB men
in key government posts, but there has been no police crackdown.
One explanation of the paradox came from the English-language Moscow journal,
the Exile, which suggested that Putin was 'neither an autocrat nor democrat,
but a bureaucrat'.
Certainly, the new Russia follows the priorities of an earnest administrator.
Tidiness and stability are the watchwords. Daring initiatives are distrusted.
Putin has adorned his drive for Strong Russia with a grab-bag of symbols,
drawn from both Russia's Soviet and Tsarist past. The old Soviet anthem has
been restored, though with different words, while there is veneration for
Russia's most successful Tsar, Peter the Great.
This contrast is clearest in the design of the new army flag, a Tsarist eagle
superimposed on the old red flag. And he has added a popular stylistic
flourish of his own: he combines the grandeur of office with personal
modesty. Putin loves state occasions, but dresses in plain suits and avoids
lavish parties. He makes few promises, insisting last week that any immediate
gains will be 'very modest'.
Also, he has been lucky: the oil price is high, giving Russia a valuable
economic cushion. And during his Presidency political parties have imploded,
their leaders consumed with bickering and squabbling, leaving him with no
obvious rival.
Putin's immediate future seems assured because his power rests on his being a
bridge between two power blocs, the FSB and the business community, both of
which support the stability he has brought.
But there are clouds on the horizon: his support, while broad, is not deep.
Having arrived late in politics, Putin has no real power base, and his party,
Unity, formed mostly from independents, has little grassroots support.
Meanwhile, his leadership style is also beginning to fray. He sometimes seems
to run the Kremlin like the Queen of Hearts; issuing sudden instructions and
admonitions on crisis issues, be it the homeless, the Chechnya war, or, last
week, his anger at the state of public housing.
These commands trigger much scurrying around by officials, but little real
action, and in a few weeks the issue is forgotten, with the crisis in
question staying every bit as bad as before.
Then there is chechnya. this is very much putin's war. He launched it while
still prime minister in 1999, but neither military nor political offensives
have subdued the rebels. In a crisis Putin's instinct is to retreat: when the
Kursk submarine blew herself up and sank in 2000, Putin remained on holiday.
He kept a low profile again last year, when security services blundered after
a Moscow theatre was seized by Chechen rebels. A rescue attempt using
immobilising gas killed more hostages than terrorists, but the Kremlin stayed
silent for days afterwards.
And while last week's state-of-the-nation speech was assured, it was short on
detail. Putin called for the economy to double in the next seven years, but
failed to explain how.
In all of this, his biggest problem may be a lack of imagination. Building a
Strong Russia is fine as far as it goes, but it is unclear whether a
lifetime's service in the KGB is suitable to deciding the direction of a
modern economy.
If, as expected, Putin enters his second term next year, Russians will be
expecting more. Plugging the holes of the ship of state is all very well, but
that ship also needs some direction.
********
#8
Russian Oligarchs' Plans for Post-Election Period Mulled
Vremya MN
16 May 2003
Commentary by Andrey Ryabov, columnist: "The Big Game Is Still Ahead"
Although there is just as much interest in the
president's annual message to the Federal Assembly this year as in
previous years, it is significant that few members of the political
community expect the head of state to propose anything revolutionary to
the country on the threshold of the upcoming election cycle. Even fewer
expect to hear any allusions to possible personnel changes in the upper
echelons of government.
Major personnel and policy changes in an election year mean that
something is wrong. This was true in 1996, for example, when Yeltsin,
who had an approval rating almost indistinguishable from zero at the
start of the presidential race, had to launch a thorough personnel
shakeup and move from the pursuit of a stringent budget policy to the
extensive distribution of "carrots." Putin is in a good position as far
his campaign chances are concerned, so he does not need to make any
serious changes. Even the constant conflicts within the government are
unlikely to change anything. Kasyanov and the main members of his
cabinet are too important in Russian politics to be dismissed or
transferred without a preliminary plan of action and without any
particular campaign-related need for this.
All of the plans of the powers that be, at least the ones that have
not lost the desire and the ability to predict the next few moves in the
game, are now focused on the period after the elections. Everyone knows
that the country will be experiencing extremely serious economic and
social problems in the next four years, and that they will require
complicated solutions and firm and purposeful action by government
officials. Under these conditions, people who are contemplating their
position in that era, which is already approaching quickly, have one
important but quite delicate question: What if the president
overestimates the importance of stability as the basis of his presidency
and continues to refrain from making any sudden and unpopular moves that
might harm the interests of various segments of the elite and sizable
segments of the population? What is the proper course of action--to
keep coasting along in the hope that everything will fall into place
automatically or to undertake some kind of action? If the latter course
is chosen, what kind of action should this be?
Judging by all indications, far from all of the oligarchs are willing
to accept the traditional "nonchalance." Some have begun suggesting a
move to a mixed presidential-parliamentary republic by forming a cabinet
accountable to parliament, and not only because this form of government
facilitates the coordination of elite interests and is more effective
than the present super-presidential republic. The fact is that after
this kind of "accountable cabinet" is endowed with some real power, at
least in the sphere of economic and social policy, it will be backed up
by the Duma majority, where the shots will be called by lobbyists of high
caliber from the biggest corporations, irrespective of their factional
affiliations, instead of by lackluster deputies from the pro-Kremlin
factions, standing in a row like tin soldiers. The oligarchs will try
to use this political structure to "calibrate" difficult situations on
their own, with no worries about the procrastination of the federal
bureaucracy or the opposition of all types of pressure groups, which are
always amazingly active in the Kremlin whenever serious decisions have to
be made. In this way, they apparently hope to offer the president
substantial support by transferring part of the political responsibility
for current developments to their minions in parliament and the
government, if not to themselves. Under these conditions, we can assume
that Mikhail Khodorkovskiy's proposal regarding the funding of political
parties virtually across the board will win increasing support among the
representatives of big business.
Before a new political structure can be built, however, Russian
tradition demands an answer to the old question: "Who is to blame?"
This eternal question, judging by all indications, is the reason for the
incessant rumors about the resignation of the Kasyanov government. As
more and more influential members of the political and business
communities start deciding that Kasyanov is to blame, the current
cabinet's chances of survival will keep growing weaker. All of the
controversy surrounding the cabinet, therefore, is not just part of the
awkward campaign PR games of United Russia, which does not know how and
by what artful means it can win the voter's affection, but an element of
an extended political game with currently uncertain results.
Incidentally, we have to assume that the prime minister, an experienced
bureaucrat, is aware of the intricacies of the present situation and will
come up with his own suggestion of the parties responsible. In line
with this assumption, Minister Gref and his chief deputies are the main
contenders for this role. In short, the dramatic intrigue is just
beginning. We will have to wait for the culmination and the finale,
however. Big things are not done impromptu in Russian politics today.
*******
#9
BBC Monitoring
Russian party leader denies report on alleged involvement in deputy's murder
Source: Radio Russia, Moscow, in Russian 0700 gmt 19 May 03
The leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy,
has denied a report on the alleged involvement of a former State Duma deputy
from the Liberal Democratic faction in the murder of Duma Deputy Galina
Starovoytova in November 1995. Zhirinovskiy described the report as a
"pre-election political canard".
"I consider it a political provocation connected with the start of the
election campaign. It is already May and the election will begin in only six
months. The 209th electoral district is the most dangerous one in St
Petersburg," Zhirinovskiy said. There were many assassination attempts in the
electoral district, he said.
"They are now starting a political canard in order to attract attention to
this electoral district that former deputies from the LDPR faction were
allegedly involved in ordering the murder of deputy Galina Vasilyevna
Starovoytova. I was always on good terms with her and she also took a liking
to me," Zhirinovskiy said.
"I consider it a purely pre-election political canard and it looks like a
provocation. Neither former nor present deputies from the Liberal Democratic
Party of Russia have anything to do with the murder," Zhirinovskiy added.
Galina Starovoytova's sister Olga Starovoytova had said that a former State
Duma deputy from the Liberal Democratic faction might have been involved in
the murder.
********
#10
Financial Times (UK)
May 21, 2003
Russia rules out WTO membership this year
By Andrew Jack and Arkady Ostrovsky in Moscow
Russia on Tuesday formally ruled out joining the World Trade Organisation
this year, dealing a blow to hopes for its tighter integration into the
global economy in the run-up to parliamentary elections in December.
Maxim Medvedkov, Russia's chief negotiator and a deputy trade minister,
said agreement had been reached on 75-80 per cent of items, but that
"serious demands" remained, notably on re-balancing energy tariffs and on
agriculture.
Russian and EU officials have always refused to be too specific on the
timing of Russia's entry, but WTO membership has been a long-standing
policy goal of President Vladimir Putin as part of his efforts to integrate
Russia with the west and international organisations.
The delay will make it more difficult for Russia to influence the outcome
of the new Doha trade round, although a senior EU negotiator said on
Tuesday that entry within the next 18 months should still provide Moscow
with considerable say.
Mr Medvedkov's comments came the day after German Gref, Russia's minister
for trade and economic development, returned to work from a long period of
illness, and ahead of an important meeting on WTO accession in Geneva in
early June.
His remarks that most technical issues had been resolved could still pave
the way for rapid Russian accession next year, creating the possibility of
an early post-election success for Mr Putin if he wins a second term in
spring 2004.
Aleksei Mordashov, head of Severstal, Russia's leading steel producer, and
WTO negotiator for the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs,
said: "The fact that we will not enter the WTO this year is not a disaster.
The negotiations themselves have created a powerful impetus for Russia's
domestic economic reform.
"We must continue our preparations for the membership of the WTO, but the
intensity and tone of the negotiations are likely to change: we no longer
have to rush to a specific deadline."
Peter Boone, chief strategist at Brunswick UBS Warburg, played down the
significance of the delay and dismissed the influence of lobbying against
rapid WTO membership by some Russian businesses as negotiating strategies.
"There is no damage but no great advantage to going ahead now," he said.
"WTO membership is somewhat abstract and Mr Putin does not need it now as
he is standing up for Russia's place in the world.
"It obviously matters in the medium term, but there are huge gains from
restructuring in the economy already taking place, so there is no need to
rush."
********
#11
EU, Russia heading for difficult summit -diplomats
BRUSSELS, May 20 (Reuters) - Diplomatic disagreements, including the vexed
issue of Chechnya, threaten to spoil a summit next week between the European
Union and Russia, EU diplomats said on Tuesday.
The EU wants to include a mention of the war in the rebellious Russian region
in a final communique after the summit, to be held in St Petersburg on May
31, but Russia opposes this.
"It means there might be no communique, which looks bad as it shows a lack of
agreement," one EU diplomat said.
Russia launched its second war in Muslim Chechnya in 1999 after a series of
apartment blasts in Moscow which the authorities blamed on Chechen rebels.
The EU has taken Moscow to task for alleged violations of human rights in
Chechnya, which Russia denies.
The diplomat said the EU wanted to say in the communique, traditionally
issued after summits, that progress had been made in Chechnya but that there
were still issues to be solved.
Russia was against any mention and would not sign up to a joint communique if
Chechnya was in there, the diplomat said.
"This will be a lightning summit of two hours, a simple ceremony where each
of the leaders will say something for three minutes before leaving," said
another EU diplomat.
The summit is being held with celebrations for the 300th anniversary of the
founding of St Petersburg as a backdrop. For the first time, the 10 mostly
ex-communist states set to join the EU next year have also been invited to
the talks.
An EU-Russia summit last November also proved difficult.
President Vladimir Putin, whose tough language became a winning trademark at
home after he pledged to "wipe out the (Chechen) rebels in the shithouse,"
ruffled EU feathers when he used what were regarded as unacceptable comments
at a news conference when asked a question about Chechnya.
He said that if the correspondent wanted to come to Moscow to become a Muslim
radical, he could arrange for a circumcision after which nothing would grow
back.
EU diplomats said Moscow's request for talks on a visa-free zone between
Russia and the wealthy bloc could also mar the mood in St Petersburg. Many EU
states are resistant to such an idea as they fear a flood of Russians seeking
jobs.
Russia has also raised the issue of compensation for the trade losses it
believes it will suffer once the EU enlarges to 25 by taking in the 10 new
states, mostly from eastern Europe, but the EU sees Moscow as only benefiting
from enlargement.
The diplomats said the EU wanted Russia to commit itself to ratifying the
Kyoto Treaty on climate change as Moscow's approval is vital for the
agreement to come into force.
It also wanted progress on a deal for the EU to be able to repatriate illegal
immigrants who come from Russia.
********
#12
Russia rights activists slam Chechnya amnesty plan
May 20, 2003
By Jeremy Page
MOSCOW (Reuters) - Russian human rights activists said Tuesday President
Vladimir Putin's offer of a limited amnesty for separatist guerrillas in
Chechnya would not bring peace to the troubled region.
The pardon offer, to be voted on by the State Duma or lower house of
parliament Wednesday, did not cover those guilty of serious violence, nor did
it give enough reassurance to those who had fought but had not committed
graver crimes, they said.
"It doesn't cover such crimes as murder, robbery, terrorism and taking
hostages. So what does it cover?" Oleg Orlov, head of the Moscow-based group
Memorial, told a news conference.
"This amnesty is likely to apply only to those people who cooked for Chechen
fighters," he said. "If we want people who took part in fighting to come to a
peaceful life, we should guarantee that they should have a chance to live in
peace."
Putin formally proposed the amnesty on May 15 after two suicide attacks
killed more than 70 people in the region and dealt a blow to Moscow's plans
to end a decade of conflict.
It will pardon all Chechen guerrillas who hand in their weapons and stop
rebel activity before August 1, but foreigners and those guilty of serious
violent crimes will not be eligible.
Foreign guerrillas, many of them Arab, have been fighting alongside Chechen
rebels since Russian troops were first sent into the region at the end of
1994.
Interfax quoted pro-Russian Chechen leader Taus Dzhabrailov, deputy head of
the regional administration, as saying the amnesty would apply to "several
hundred or even more militants."
He said the bulk of rebels, "except infamous warlords, Arab mercenaries who
have blood on their hands or who were involved in the abduction or murder of
people," could expect reprieve.
But Lev Levinson of the Human Rights Institute said Russian authorities would
not be able to distinguish between serious criminals and those who simply
fought against federal forces.
"It is impossible to check if someone committed serious crimes or not," he
said.
Sergei Kovalyov, a State Duma deputy and veteran rights activist, said the
amnesty was part of a broader strategy to stamp Moscow's control over the
region.
Putin has vowed to press on with plans to stage elections for a Chechen
president and assembly after securing overwhelming support for continued
Russian rule in a March referendum, according to official results.
Kovalyov said those results were rigged.
"We cannot talk about a peaceful settlement in Chechnya," he said. "All these
steps -- the referendum and the amnesty -- are to make Chechnya more
dependent on the federal authorities."
********
#13
eurasianet.org
May 20, 2003
CHANGING NATURE OF CHECHEN CONFLICT DIMS RUSSIA’S STABILIZATION HOPES
By Igor Torbakov
The Chechen conflict started out as a separatist struggle pitting Chechen
rebels against Russian federal forces. Over time, however, the conflict has
evolved into a largely internecine struggle among Chechens themselves,
political analysts say. The changing nature of the war is the result of
Kremlin policy that aims to "divide and rule," some observers contend. They
add that the two recent suicide bombings in Chechnya indicate the policy is
counterproductive and is fostering growing instability.
In recent months, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s administration has
seemed eager to promote "the process of normalization" in Chechnya. The
centerpiece of Putin’s stabilization efforts so far is the constitutional
referendum last March. In that vote, 90 percent of those casting ballots
approved a new basic law, which calls for Chechnya to remain a constituent
part of the Russian Federation.
In his May 16 state-of-the-nation address, Putin argued that the
lawlessness in Chechnya was coming to an end. He particularly praised the
constitutional referendum, saying it "has shown that Chechens rightfully
consider themselves an integral part of Russia’s united, multiethnic people."
Another important element of Putin’s stabilization tactics is an amnesty.
Submitted for parliamentary approval on May 15, the amnesty would pardon
all those who have engaged in hostilities since August 1993, and who
voluntarily lay down their arms by August 2003. Those accused of criminal
acts during the conflict -- including murder, kidnapping and rape – would
not be eligible for amnesty. "The amnesty in the first place is aimed at
creating additional conditions for normal life in the Chechen republic,"
Putin said in a letter to parliament speaker Gennadii Seleznev, released
May 15.
Putin’s desire for peace is better understood when viewed through the prism
of Russian politics. The second Chechen war helped propel Putin to the
presidency in 2000, but now risks marring his upcoming reelection bid.
Initially planned by Putin’s strategists as a "little victorious war," the
"anti-terrorist operation" in Chechnya is now entering its fourth year, and
has emerged as a source of broader instability in the Caucasus. [For
background see the Eurasia Insight archives].
The new constitution and the amnesty proposal are unlikely to have a
significant impact on ending the violence in Chechnya, experts now suggest.
Two suicide bombings in May, in which at least 75 people were killed,
indicate that the conflict, instead of winding down, may be escalating.
[For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. At the very least, some
experts say, the bombings demonstrate the illusory nature of Moscow’s
statements about growing security in the republic.
Representatives of anti-Moscow Chechen forces already have rejected the
amnesty offer. "It is the federal [forces] who have been destroying the
civilian population that should seek a pardon, and not us," the
separatists’ "deputy foreign minister," Usman Ferzauli, said in an
interview published by the Moscow daily Kommersant.
The bombings have helped fuel a debate in Moscow over the grand strategy
governing the conflict – dubbed Chechenizatsiya. One faction of the
policy-making elite maintains that Chechenizatsiya offered the only viable
approach for Putin. The other, smaller faction asserts that Chechenizatsiya
makes resolving the conflict more difficult, and may heighten the security
risks for Russia.
When Russia’s initial blitz in Chechnya failed to subdue the separatists,
the Kremlin was confronted with a tough choice: either start negotiating a
peace settlement with the separatist leader Aslan Maskhadov, or promote
Chechenizatsiya. The bulk of the policy-making establishment, including
Putin, opted for Chechenizatsiya, which called for the installation of a
proxy government in the region, followed by efforts to promote its
legitimization.
"The only way out [of the Chechen conflict] is the dramatic increase in the
‘critical mass’ of the Chechens who are loyal to the federal authorities…
This peculiar Chechenizatsiya, if you wish, is, in fact, the only correct
strategy," recently argued Yakov Gordin, the St.-Petersburg scholar and
authority in the history of the Caucasus wars.
Under Chechenizatsiya, the Kremlin’s front man for Chechnya’s stabilization
is Akhmat Kadyrov, the head of the region’s pro-Russian administration.
Officials in Moscow are counting on Kadyrov to manage Chechnya’s
reintegration into the Russian Federation, overseeing implementation of the
new constitution and the conduct of elections. An indication of Kadyrov’s
importance is the fact that shortly after the March referendum, Putin met
with him to start laying the groundwork for the amnesty proposal.
Political analysts are becoming increasingly critical of Chechenizatsiya.
Some compare it with the classic imperial strategy of divide et impera –
divide and rule. The divide-and-rule premise holds that the imperial power
intentionally splits the indigenous society, assisting its proxy forces in
a civil war designed to forcefully stamp out local resistance to its rule.
Such a policy produces a particularly deleterious effect when applied to
traditionally structured and clan-based ethnic groups like Chechens. The
recent terrorist attacks demonstrate "a growing and violent schism in
Chechen society, where ethnic solidarity and fear of a blood vendetta
traditionally restrained violence for centuries," the Moscow Times said in
an editorial. "Now this Chechen solidarity has fallen victim to Moscow’s
imperial approach of divide and rule."
Moscow’s decision to back Kadyrov, some analysts add, may exacerbate
divisions within Chechen society. Kadyrov has never enjoyed a nation-wide
authority and represents the interests of just one small clan. His power is
contested by many influential pro-Moscow Chechen groups, analysts say.
The approach of presidential elections could cause the intra-Chechen
struggle to intensify. "After the [constitutional] referendum, in addition
to the customary war between the Chechen fighters and the federal forces we
are having another war – a civil war between the Chechens themselves,"
political analyst Vitaly Portnikov said in a recent commentary posted on
the Politcom.ru web site. "As Kadyrov’s position becomes stronger, the
intensity of this war will grow. This new conflict is a war of all against
all."
Some observers argue that not only are pro-Maskhadov rebels interested in
Kadyrov’s discreditation, so are rival pro-Moscow Chechen clans. These
rival groups fear they might lose control over lucrative "reconstruction
projects" and federal "Chechen money" flows if Kadyrov manages to
consolidate his authority.
In addition to alienating some pro-Moscow groups, there is the danger that
Chechenizatsiya is pushing anti-Moscow forces in the direction of radical
Islam, some observers caution. [For additional information see the Eurasia
Insight archive]. Russian officials have also expressed concern about
expanding links between Chechen forces and foreign radical Islamic groups.
Putin has claimed that a connection exists between the perpetrators of the
May 12 suicide bombing in the Chechen town of Znamenskoye and the terrorist
attack the same day in Saudi Arabia. A statement issued by Russia’s Federal
Security Service characterized the Saudi and Chechen attacks as "links in
the chain of international terrorism."
Editor’s Note: Igor Torbakov is a freelance journalist and researcher who
specializes in CIS political affairs. He holds an MA in History from Moscow
State University and a PhD from the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. He was
Research Scholar at the Institute of Russian History, Russian Academy of
Sciences, Moscow; a Visiting Scholar at the Kennan Institute, Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington DC; a Fulbright
Scholar at Columbia University, New York; and a Visiting Fellow at Harvard
University. He is now based in Istanbul, Turkey.
*******
#14
Russia believes dividing Caspian Sea into equal parts unrealistic
Interfax
Moscow, 19 May: Russia believes that the idea of dividing the Caspian Sea
into equal parts among the five bordering countries (Russia, Kazakhstan,
Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Iran) is unrealistic.
"At this time, it is unrealistic to divide the Caspian Sea among all the
countries into five equal parts. Although this would be advantageous for
Russia," Russian presidential envoy for Caspian issues Viktor Kalyuzhnyy told
a news conference on Monday [19 May].
The division of the Caspian Sea into equal parts is not possible as an
agreement to divide the seabed of the northern Caspian along the median line
was signed by Russia and Kazakhstan in 1998.
Iran, which currently has 14 per cent of the floor of the Caspian Sea, is
seeking a division of the sea into five equal parts.
The ninth session of the working group in charge of developing a convention
on the legal status of the Caspian Sea was held in Kazakhstan on 12-14 May,
Kalyuzhnyy said. "The meeting had a positive atmosphere and was held in a
spirit of understanding and compromise," he said.
"The next meeting of the group will be held in Moscow on 20-25 July," he
said. At the same time, Kalyuzhnyy acknowledged that a new meeting between
the presidents of the states bordering the Caspian is needed because "the
initiatives voiced by Vladimir Putin at the Asgabat summit in 2002 did not
get the support we wanted".
Speaking about Russia's contacts with Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan
on the Caspian issue, Kalyuzhnyy said that "Russia gives priority to working
in a five-sided format". At the same time, "several new countries
(Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan) cannot wait for all five countries
to agree on the division", he said. For this reason, Russia has agreed to bi-
and trilateral contacts, he said. The documents signed by Russia with each
individual country do not contradict or hinder the signing of a convention
concerning all five states, he said.
"We have said many times that Russia will be ready to sign the convention as
soon as possible," Kalyuzhnyy said.
Speaking about the demilitarization of the Caspian Sea, Kalyuzhnyy said that
"the Caspian flotilla will exist for as long as needed to normalize the
situation in the North Caucasus".
"In any case, it is not an issue to be addressed by the working group, but an
issue that should be resolved by the presidents," he said.
The negotiating parties are scheduled to have a series of contacts on the
Caspian issue, Kalyuzhnyy said. In particular, a group of Iranian specialists
is scheduled to visit Moscow soon to discuss the method of calculating the
median line in detail, he said.
In addition, a framework convention on environmental protection of the
Caspian Sea could be signed in Tehran on 14-15 July, he said.
Source: Interfax news agency, Moscow, in English 1248 gmt 19 May 03
********
#15
Details Emerge Regarding German Company's Possible Involvement in 'Russian
Mafia'
Der Spiegel (Germany)
19 May 2003
Report by Beat Balzli: "Tracks to the Kremlin?"
The German real estate company SPAG is said to
have served as a money-laundering scheme for the Russian mafia. Now
local investigators struck for the first time. The network extends to
Moscow.
Lawyer Markus Rese was flabbergasted. After having done good
business with Commerzbank in Heidelberg for 15 years, the atmosphere
suddenly became frosty. The large bank told him last year that it
would discontinue business relations with him immediately.
Meanwhile, Rese knows why the bankers removed him from the customer
file without prior notice. As president of the St. Petersburg
Immobilien und Beteiligungs AG [St. Petersburg real estate corporation]
(SPAG), he has been in the sights of the Federal Office of Criminal
Investigations (BKA), the Customs Criminal Office, as well as the
Darmstadt Public Prosecutor's Office since August 2001.
For months, accounts with several banks in Germany have been
searched, telephones tapped, and requests for legal assistance evaluated.
Last Tuesday [13 May], at 0900 sharp, the investigators struck.
Apart from the SPAG headquarters in Moerfelden, Hesse, in a
nation-wide action, 200 police officers searched in total 27 companies
and apartments. Because of its role as a major shareholder, Baader
Wertpapierhandelsbank [Baaden securities trading bank] had to open its
filing cabinets. In Hamburg, an asset management company
[Vermoegensverwaltungs GmbH] was the target.
Proceedings have been started against "nine persons accused," Public
Prosecutor David Ryan Kirkpatrick confirmed. In addition to Rese and
Chairman of the Board Klaus Peter Sauer, a former president, as well as
former members of the board might be involved, among them the manager of
an investment bank.
The investigators have the same suspicion as the Federal
Intelligence Service (BND) already had long ago: for years, the real
estate company, which has been listed on the stock exchange since 1997,
has been suspected of having served the St. Petersburg mafia as a
money-laundering scheme. According to Kirkpatrick, "members of the
group who are known by name" can be associated with SPAG.
The affair is politically explosive: Russian President Vladimir
Putin, former deputy mayor of St. Petersburg, was a member of SPAG's
advisory board until March 2000. Later, there were direct contacts to
the Kremlin. Vladimir Smirnov, until one-and-a-half years ago, a
high-ranking member of Putin's economic administration, had been director
of one of SPAG's affiliated companies. Presumably he is still holding
stocks of the corporation via an offshore company.
According to the assessment of the investigators, an international
network was used for money laundering. Profits from human trafficking,
alcohol trafficking, extortion of protection money, and car trafficking
are said to have been transferred via foreign accounts, Liechtenstein
foundations, and bogus companies in Finland and on the Channel Islands.
Finally, via capital stock increases, they are suspected to have found
their way back into the books of the company in southern Hesse.
Among others, the Oy Legrus Trading in the Finish town of Espoo, the
EC Experts Ltd. on the Isle of Man, and VS Real Estate Ltd. on Jersey
belong to the circle of ominous shareholders. "The three companies are
said to belong to alleged members of the criminal association in St.
Petersburg," it was reported from the Public Prosecutor's Office.
In addition, the investigations focus on three companies with
connections to Liechtenstein: Euromerkur, IC Deposit & Holding, and
McKenzie Foundation, which has meanwhile been dissolved.
With the help of the confiscated files, the authorities are now
trying to track down the financial transactions and their criminal
sources without gaps. The indications that have existed so far are not
enough.
Hence, President Rese is confident of victory, saying, "The
accusations are old and they have been wrong from the start. Not a
single piece of evidence has been presented to us." In addition, Putin
was only an honorary member of the advisory board and had nothing to do
with the actual business.
In fact, Public Prosecutor Kirkpatrick is "not yet able to determine
the exact amount" of the total sum of money that has allegedly been
laundered. The investigators presume that from the capital increases
"at least DM32 million" might have been transferred back to the St.
Petersburg criminal association. There are indications that the
transferred amounts "have been misused with the help of the German
perpetrator's side."
In this connection, Rese's team is accused of even having lined
their own pockets "via consulting and commission contracts," thus having
outmaneuvered unsuspecting investors. The fact that the Federal
Financial Supervisory Authority is currently examining the suspicion of
insider trade and exchange rate manipulations puts additional pressure on
the company, whose history dates back to the 1990s.
At that time, shortly after the changes in the Soviet Union, a
delegation from St. Petersburg traveled to Frankfurt-on-Main upon
invitation by a large German bank. Putin, who had been a local
politician at that time, was also among the group of people seeking
foreign capital. However, despite many talks with bankers, this did
not bring about any results. No one wanted to invest money in St.
Petersburg. Instead, in 1992, the SPAG was founded -- with
participation of the municipal authorities of St. Petersburg.
Sauer was the driving force, who met Putin several times. The
educated auditor has been a member of SPAG's supervisory board until
today. In the ongoing investigations he is regarded as an important
figure.
In the 11 years of the company's history, Sauer and company could
gather almost 25 million euros via several capital increases, part of
which was from completely unsuspicious sources.
Officially, the management has invested money in two real estate
projects, which, in turn, are managed by two affiliated St. Petersburg
companies. In this connection, the investigators came across a
complicated, but very interesting transaction: for a long time, the local
affiliated companies did not belong to SPAG to 100 percent. In the
safes of the suspicious offshore companies, considerable minority shares
were stored. Only in the course of a factual capital increase did they
hand over their packages to the Germans, thus further increasing their
shares in the SPAG.
However, the real estate business has run far less smoothly than was
promised to the investors in a full-bodied way. While there are a few
tenants in the Tambovskaja Business Center, the planned shopping center,
Nevsky International Center, seems to be doomed to failure before it is
built at all.
Actually, Stockmann, the Finnish department store, intends to move
in later. However, the construction start for the excellently located
100-million euro shopping paradise has been deferred again and again.
Ultimately, President Rese promised to pull down the old building by the
end of 2002.
Five months later, however, there are still no dredgers in sight.
According to the people responsible, there are financing problems.
Talks with several banks have been unsuccessful, it was reported. The
exchange rate fell to a historic low, which resulted in heavy losses, not
only for Baader Bank as a major shareholder.
The endless story of announced construction starts is an indication
for the German investigators for the virtual character of the whole
concept. The theory of the pseudo project fits in the picture of the
unscrupulous money launderers, which the BND drew already three years
ago.
At that time, the investigators started a frontal attack on the
Principality of Liechtenstein. In a controversial dossier, trustee
Rudolf Ritter was mentioned. His role at that time as a member of
SPAG's supervisory board was especially interesting for the agents.
The fact that, at the same time, Putin was a member of the advisory board
had a particular charm.
Meanwhile, the Liechtenstein legal authorities have brought charges
against Ritter. He is accused of having laundered more than 1 million
euros for the Colombian Cali cartel. In addition, he is charged with
fraud, having sold SPAG stocks too expensively. He denies both
accusations.
However, according to Kirkpatrick, it has "not" been possible so far
to "ascertain" whether the Russian mafia contributed to SPAG's capital
increases via Liechtenstein. What is known at present is only that
various sponsors invested "about DM3.5 million" in the SPAG via
Liechtenstein companies and foundations. Some of them were under
Ritter's control. The money was transferred via Vaduz banks.
In the SPAG affair, meanwhile, there are many open questions, not
only as far as Ritter is concerned. The exact role of Vladimir
Smirnov, whose weekend dacha was next to Putin's, remains dubious, too.
The former Kremlin man, who is trading in nuclear material today, held
the reins in the past.
An earlier company study by the [Stuttgart-based bank] Ellwanger &
Geiger enthusiastically praises SPAG's political contacts. Smirnov
followed Putin to Moscow, it says, working in the administration of
national foreign assets. "Thus, the good contact that has been
established also through Putin's membership in the advisory board is
further stabilized," the Stuttgart private bankers concluded. By now
SPAG still carries a current account with them, that is why the bank is
"in contact with the BKA," a spokesman confirmed.
Last week, Smirnov was not available for a statement. However, he
would no doubt deny the accusations. The investigators presume that
the criminal money has its origins in the infamous Tambov group.
Suspected head of the gang is Vladimir Barsukov, who today calls himself
Kumarin. According to findings by the BKA, he is even in the
management of a company that is affiliated with the SPAG. But is this
really true?
Sauer, the chairman of the board, who regards all the accusations as
"absurd," is hardly able to restrain himself also on this issue.
Barsukov "has never had any managerial functions," he said. "I only
met him in St. Petersburg a couple of times together with Mr Smirnov.
But this was not on business."
*******
#16
Glittering anniversary facade hides decay in Saint Petersburg
May 20, 2003
AFP
As a showcase for a glittering summit of world leaders hosted by Russian
President Vladimir Putin, Saint Petersburg has been spruced up for its 300th
anniversary, but residents complain that their city is as shabby as ever.
Putin, a native of Russia's second city, has invited more than 40 heads of
state, including from the G7 club of leading industrialised nations, for
three days of celebrations, from May 30, marking the city's foundation by
Peter the Great in 1703.
Moscow has allocated 40 billion rubles (1.3 billion dollars, 1.1 billion
euros) from federal funds for an ambitious renovation program destined to
provide a proper welcome to the visiting VIPs and thousands of tourists
expected to flock into the city for the anniversary.
Built on marshland dredged with serf labour at the cost of thousands of
lives, Saint Petersburg in the 18th and 19th centuries became an elegant city
criss-crossed by canals with buildings designed mainly by European
architects.
Once dubbed the "Venice of the North," and Russia's "Window on Europe," the
city has been dying for years, starved of finances to restore its historical
monuments long since fallen into disrepair.
Anxious to impress his guests, Putin ordered that all of the city's
historical downtown landmarks and tourist attractions be restored to their
original glory.
The riverside Winter Palace, housing the world-famous Hermitage museum, is
once again aglitter with vivid green, white and gold, and the famed
equestrian monument to Peter the Great is resplendent after a thorough
face-lift.
But out of 21 historic buildings earmarked for priority under a presidential
list personally approved by Putin, repairs at 18 of them have not been
completed on time.
Work is still continuing at the Peter and Paul Fortress, resting place for
the tsars on the Neva river.
The bell, the surrounding buildings and gates are sheathed in scaffolding,
and workers in blue overalls can be seen scurrying around the inner
courtyard, on the rooftops and climbing up the outside of the cathedral.
"Of course the fortress will not celebrate the tricentenary covered in
scaffolding. But the renovation work will continue afterwards. You can't put
everything in order so quickly," conceded Boris Arakcheyev, director of the
fortress, Saint Petersburg's earliest stone building.
The Admiralty building, on a vantage point on the Vasilievsky island opposite
the Peter and Paul fortress, is also still under renovation.
And even on Nevsky Prospect, Saint Petersburg's main thoroughfare, decaying
facades have been plastered over by giant advertising screens.
"We are doing all we can, but you cannot restore a city that has been
neglected for so long in such a short time," a city hall spokesman insisted.
But critics complain that quite apart from the delays in the renovation, no
extra funds have been allocated to resolve the city's festering problems.
Unlike the booming Russian capital Moscow, Saint Petersburg remains backward,
its streets riddled with potholes.
Tucked away behind the historic architecture, thousands of the five million
inhabitants live in grim blocks of communal apartments, where several
families share a single kitchen and bathroom.
Meanwhile, 2,000 workers have been toiling for months to lavishly restore the
Konstantinovsky Palace, a vast tsarist residence on the Gulf of Finland, at a
cost of 330 million dollars to accommodate the foreign heads of state.
"The only places you can see a real improvement are those which are on public
display," complained Marina Badkhen, a 47-year-old interpreter.
Irina Potapova, who lives in the historic Petrogradskaya district, at the
foot of the Peter and Paul fortress agreed: "Nothing has changed in this
area. The buildings are still greying and dilapidated."
To add to the discontent, Russia's financial watchdog, the audit chamber,
recently issued a critical report saying that city authorities had not
accounted for 32 million dollars destined for road improvements and two
million dollars for the renovation of the historic centre.
The scandal is bound to be used as a weapon against current governor Vladimir
Yakovlev, who has fallen out of favour at the Kremlin and abandoned plans to
run for a third term next year after a Putin loyalist was appointed to
oversee him.
"As far as the use of funds for unintended purposes, we'll return to this
question after the anniversary. The audit chamber is conducting the necessary
checks," said the Kremlin's representative for the north west, Valentina
Matviyenko, who is tipped as a potential successor as mayor.
********
#17
Inept Campaigning of Russian Parties, Politicians Reviewed
Rossiyskaya Gazeta
15 May 2003
Commentary by Vitaliy Tretyakov: "The Berezovskiy Effect"
No one in Russia has mastered all of the
methods of successful campaigning.
I have already predicted in this series of articles on the upcoming
election (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 12, 17, and 24 April and 8 May this year)
and even earlier, last year, that the 2003 campaign battle will be
extremely serious and intense: The stakes are so high for the society
in general and for each party (as well as the political groups behind
them) in particular.
I would still describe it as "serious," but I have grave doubts about
the "intensity" of the battle. It seems to me that all of the parties,
including the Communists, who have the best chance of winning, are in a
daze. The Communists, however, have no particular cause for worry,
because they still seem to be heading for an automatic victory.
To attain their desired goal, however, each of the parties will have
to jump higher than their heads in the literal sense.
At this time, of course, party ideologists and political experts are
mapping the trajectory of these jumps. The SPS [Union of Rightwing
Forces] even rented a "retaliatory weapon" (Alfred Kokh), hoping to do
the impossible with his help. The experience of past campaigns, and the
start of this one as well, has not been inspiring. There are no
intriguing and ingenious campaign strategies to be seen. In fact, at
this time we see only the herd mentality at work (all of the parties
suddenly started demanding the resignation of the government: The CPRF
and Yabloko did this openly, and United Russia did it covertly) or the
primitive use of the now familiar populist tools from the old supply (the
SPS keeps trying to reform the army). It is indicative that even the
biggest international event of spring, and perhaps of the whole year, the
U.S. operation in Iraq, did not evoke any original statements or actions
from any of the parties--and yet, this is an election year!
We may not believe everything Berezovskiy says about himself, but he
is known as a "campaign genius" in our political community. There
certainly is good reason for this description. At any rate, he already
managed to come up with the ingenious plan for the "union of opposition
forces" (Communists and consistent liberals) in the current election
campaign. We have not seen anything comparable from anyone else. For
this reason, I will streamline my narrative by calling the ability to win
elections with the use of new and unexpected ideas the Berezovskiy
effect. All of the other participants in the election campaigns of
summer 1996 and fall 1999, when this effect was fully apparent, will
understand my choice of words.
I am saying, therefore, that United Russia, the SPS, and Yabloko will
not attain their election goals unless they can produce the Berezovskiy
effect. Even the CPRF will have difficulty winning a landslide victory
without this. Only the LDPR has no need for the Berezovskiy effect,
because it was founded on the Zhirinovskiy effect. Incidentally,
Vladimir Volfovich, in view of the decreasing support for him with each
new election, cannot relax completely either.
Ingenious ideas are only an outward sign of the Berezovskiy effect.
The basis consists of standard elements--the universal methods of
political campaigning.
What are these methods? In other words, what does Berezovskiy do to
win? Hereafter, I will abbreviate his name to just one letter--B. I
will do this primarily because Berezovskiy, of course, did not invent or
discover these methods. They were known long ago. In fact, they were
employed most actively in Russian history, for example, by the
politicians most likely to succeed in the public struggle for power.
Above all, they include Lenin at the beginning of the 20th century (it
might have been more accurate to call this article "The Lenin Effect,"
but I was afraid that this archaic term would have reduced the appeal of
what I am calling the B effect). Another politician who used these
methods (apparently just intuitively) quite successfully, but at the end
of the 20th century, was Yeltsin when he was still rising to the highest
office (i.e., before January 1992).
Now we can move on to the methods. There are only six main methods.
1. The highest possible goal must be set, often surpassing the
actually attainable level. Forces and resources must be concentrated
accordingly--in seemingly excessive quantities.
2. The goal must not be kept confidential. On the contrary, it
must be declared openly. This will have the effect of a psychological
attack on opponents and usually will arouse either fear or even a sense
of futility and the expectation of defeat.
Incidentally, this method recently has been used more frequently by
the United States in its foreign policy (we saw this quite clearly during
the preparations for the military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq).
I should explain that the certainty of victory implied in the
statements of some of our parties does not produce this effect. The
reason is that the leaders of those parties have no inner conviction that
they will get what they want or--and this is the main thing--no intention
of making the maximum effort. Why? They all have something to fall
back on--administrative clout, television, or Putin's approval rating.
3. Effective strategy presupposes not only the public declaration
of the goal and even the content of this strategy, but also its pursuit
as publicly as possible. The exact proportions are difficult to define,
but there must be at least 70 percent public action to 30 percent action
behind the scenes (the latter is essential, of course). The absolute
majority of our politicians do the exact opposite: They let the public,
their constituents, and their opponents see no more than 30 percent of
what they do, while hiding all the rest from outsiders. In other words,
they essentially act like conspirators instead of public politicians, and
they are doing this during a battle for the support of voters!
4. The use of the three previous methods results in the fourth--the
willingness and ability to take risks. I am referring, obviously, to
personal risks, risking one's own present and future, and not the present
and future of others. We have many experts at taking the latter type of
risk, of course, in our country.
5. The most extraordinary, and therefore the most shocking, of the
methods producing the B effect is the willingness to form an alliance
with anyone whatsoever for the attainment of the announced goal. I was
not at all surprised by Berezovskiy's willingness to form a campaign
alliance with the Communists, and precisely because the ability to form
these alliances is one of the most effective methods of gaining power.
We commonly describe the willingness to form this kind of alliance as
opportunistic or unprincipled behavior. This is a valid assessment from
the standpoint of everyday morals, but the morality of politics is highly
specific. In essence, it is always goal-oriented, and this is always a
long-term goal. Actually, these opportunists also demonstrate the
escape from the moral snare in which they are caught--for themselves and
for the general public. This purpose is served (although it is only a
side effect) by the sixth and final method, which is not aimed mainly at
justification or self-justification, of course.
6. The sixth method consists in convincing oneself and--more
importantly--convincing others of the disastrous consequences of making
the "wrong" choice--i.e., the one the politician does not want people to
make. Furthermore, it has to be portrayed as a complete, unconditional,
and universal disaster. Otherwise, there could be doubt--the opponent's
best friend.
That is all. Show me a party or politician in present-day Russia
capable of using these methods, and I will tell you the names of the
country' future president and the future ruling party.
It is unlikely, however, that anyone could come up with these names!
Some are too ethical, but they are also too timid. Others are too
bold, but only behind the scenes. Still others are masters of
intimidation, but never want to take risks themselves.
********
#18
excerpt
US Department of State
Background Note: Russia
May 2003
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3183.htm
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS
In the political system established by the 1993 constitution, the president
wields considerable executive power. There is no vice president, and the
legislative is far weaker than the executive. The president nominates the
highest state officials, including the prime minister, who must be approved
by the Duma. The president can pass decrees without consent from the Duma. He
also is head of the armed forces and of the national security council.
Duma elections were on December 19, 1999 and presidential elections March 26,
2000. While the Communist Party won a narrow plurality of seats in the Duma,
the pro-government party Unity and the centrist Fatherland-All Russia also
won substantial numbers of seats in the legislature. In April 2002, the
Communist Party lost eight top posts when the State Duma voted to reassign
the chairmanships of nearly one-third of its committees, leaving greater
power in the hands of centrist and liberal factions. In the presidential
election of March 2000, Vladimir Putin, named Acting President following the
December 31 resignation of Boris Yeltsin, was elected in the first round with
53% of the vote. Both the presidential and parliamentary elections were
judged generally free and fair by international observers.
Russia is a federation, but the precise distribution of powers between the
central government and the regional and local authorities is still evolving.
The Russian Federation consists of 89 components, including two federal
cities, Moscow and St. Petersburg. The constitution explicitly defines the
federal government's exclusive powers, but it also describes most key
regional issues as the joint responsibility of the federal government and the
Federation components.
Judicial System
Russia's judiciary and justice system are weak. Numerous matters which are
dealt with by administrative authority in European countries remain subject
to political influence in Russia. The Constitutional Court was reconvened in
March 1995 following its suspension by President Yeltsin in October 1993. The
1993 constitution empowers the court to arbitrate disputes between the
executive and legislative branches and between Moscow and the regional and
local governments. The court also is authorized to rule on violations of
constitutional rights, to examine appeals from various bodies, and to
participate in impeachment proceedings against the president. The July 1994
Law on the Constitutional Court prohibits the court from examining cases on
its own initiative and limits the scope of issues the court can hear.
In the past few years, the Russian Government has begun to reform the
criminal justice system and judicial institutions, including the
reintroduction of jury trials in certain criminal cases. Despite these
efforts, judges are only beginning to assert their constitutionally mandated
independence from other branches of government.
The Duma passed a Criminal Procedure Code and other judicial reforms during
its 2001 session. These reforms help make the Russian judicial system more
compatible with its Western counterparts and are seen by most as an
accomplishment in human rights. The reforms have reintroduced jury trials in
certain criminal cases and created a more adversarial system of criminal
trials that protect the rights of defendants more adequately.
Human Rights
Russia's human rights record remains uneven and worsened in some areas.
Despite significant improvements in conditions following the end of the
Soviet Union, problem areas remain. In particular, the Russian Government's
military policy in Chechnya is a cause for international concern. Government
forces have killed numerous civilians through the use of indiscriminate force
in Chechnya. There have been credible allegations of violations of
international human rights and humanitarian law by Russian forces. Chechen
groups also have committed abuses as well as acts of terrorism. Although the
government has made progress in recognizing the legitimacy of international
human rights standards, the institutionalization of procedures to safeguard
these rights has lagged. Implementation of the constitutional provisions for
due process and timely trials, for example, has made little progress. There
are indications that the law is becoming an increasingly important tool for
those seeking to protect human rights; after a lengthy trial and eight
separate indictments, environmental whistleblower Alexander Nikitin was
acquitted of espionage charges relating to publication of material exposing
hazards posed by the Russian Navy's aging nuclear fleet. On September 13,
2001, the Presidium of the Supreme Court dismissed the prosecution's last
appeal against the December 29, 1999 acquittal of Nikitin. Nonetheless,
serious problems remain.
The judiciary is often subject to manipulation by political authorities and
is plagued by large case backlogs and trial delays. Lengthy pretrial
detention remains a serious problem. Russia has the highest prison population
rate in the world, at 685 per 100,000. There are credible reports of beating
and torturing of inmates and detainees by law enforcement and correctional
officials. Prison conditions fall well below international standards. In
2000, human rights Ombudsman Oleg Mironov estimated that 50% of prisoners
with whom he spoke claimed to have been tortured. Human rights groups
estimate that about 11,000 inmates and prison detainees die annually, most
because of overcrowding, disease, and lack of medical care. In 2001,
President Putin pronounced a moratorium on the death penalty. However, there
are reports that the Russian Government might still be violating promises
they made upon entering the European Council, especially in terms of prison
control and conditions.
Human rights groups are very critical of cases of Chechens disappearing in
the custody of Russian officials. Russian authorities have introduced some
improvements, including better access to complaint mechanisms, the formal
opening of investigations in most cases, and the introduction of two decrees
requiring the presence of civilian investigators and other nonmilitary
personnel during all largescale military operations and targeted search and
seizure operations. Human rights groups welcome these changes but claim that
most abuses remain uninvestigated and unpunished.
Efforts to institutionalize official human rights bodies have been mixed. In
1996, human rights activist Sergey Kovalev resigned as chairman of the
Presidential Human Rights Commission to protest the government's record,
particularly the war in Chechnya. Parliament in 1997 passed a law
establishing a "human rights ombudsman," a position that is provided for in
Russia's constitution and is required of members of the Council of Europe, to
which Russia was admitted in February 1996. The Duma finally selected Duma
deputy Oleg Mironov in May 1998. A member of the Communist Party, Mironov
resigned from both the Party and the Duma after the vote, citing the law's
stipulation that the Ombudsman be nonpartisan. Because of his party
affiliation, and because Mironov had no evident expertise in the field of
human rights, his appointment was widely criticized at the time by human
rights activists. International human rights groups operate freely in Russia,
although the government has hindered the movements and access to information
of some individuals investigating the war in Chechnya.
The Russian Constitution provides for freedom of religion and the equality of
all religions before the law as well as the separation of church and state.
Although Jews and Muslims continue to encounter prejudice and societal
discrimination, they have not been inhibited by the government in the free
practice of their religion. High-ranking federal officials have condemned
anti-Semitic hate crimes, but law enforcement bodies have not effectively
prosecuted those responsible. The influx of missionaries over the past
several years has led to pressure by groups in Russia, specifically
nationalists and the Russian Orthodox Church, to limit the activities of
these "nontraditional" religious groups. In response, the Duma passed a new,
restrictive, and potentially discriminatory law in October 1997. The law is
very complex, with many ambiguous and contradictory provisions. The law's
most controversial provisions separates religious "groups" and
"organizations" and introduce a 15-year rule, which allows groups that have
been in existence for 15 years or longer to obtain accredited status. Senior
Russian officials have pledged to implement the 1997 law on religion in a
manner that is not in conflict with Russia's international human rights
obligations. Some local officials, however, have used the law as a pretext to
restrict religious liberty.
The constitution guarantees citizens the right to choose their place of
residence and to travel abroad. Some big-city governments, however, have
restricted this right through residential registration rules that closely
resemble the Soviet-era "propiska" regulations. Although the rules were
touted as a notification device rather than a control system, their
implementation has produced many of the same results as the propiska system.
The freedom to travel abroad and emigrate is respected although restrictions
may apply to those who have had access to state secrets. Recognizing this
progress, since 1994, the U.S. President has found Russia to be in full
compliance with the provisions of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment.
*********
#19
From: "Dov Lynch" <d.lynch@iss-eu.org>
Subject: publication announcement
Date: Tue, 20 May
Dear David,
This may be of interest to DJL readers. The most recent Chaillot Paper
monograph, published by the EU Institute for Security Studies, an autonomous
EU agency in the service of CFSP, is now available.
It is entitled 'Russia Faces Europe,' and is an analysis of Putin's policy
towards European security organisations, and key states, with a heavy focus
on EU-Russian security dialogue.
It can be found on the EU ISS website:
www.iss-eu.org and in PDF at: http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai60e.pdf
Thanks and all best,
Dov
Dr Dov Lynch
Research Fellow
EU Institute for Security Studies
43 Avenue du President Wilson
Paris, 75775 cedex 16, France
Tel: 33 (0) 1 56 89 19 56
Fax: 33 (0) 1 56 89 19 31
********
#20
Moscow Times
May 21, 2003
A Power Struggle in the Patriarchate
By Andrei Zolotov Jr.
Staff Writer
The subject is off-limits for official comment. But the obvious worsening
of Patriarch Alexy II's health has intensified a power struggle in the
upper echelons of the Russian Orthodox Church.
A reshuffle of church leadership by the Holy Synod earlier this month has
left Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad as the leading
candidate to become the next patriarch.
"Yes, indeed, the holy patriarch has been hospitalized because of a
lingering cold," the deputy head of the Moscow Patriarchate's external
relations department, Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin, said Tuesday. "But he is
feeling better, and his condition isn't causing concern."
Chaplin refused to say where Alexy, 74, is hospitalized but said he is in
Russia.
The source at the Moscow Patriarchate said the patriarch, who has long had
heart and lung problems, appears to be suffering from a weakened immune
system.
Alexy's last public appearance -- at a short Easter afternoon service on
April 27 after unprecedented no-shows at Holy Week and Easter night
services -- was limited to a 10-minute speech in which he spoke mainly
about his poor health and thanked church members for their prayers.
Eyewitnesses said the short speech appeared to have left the patriarch
exhausted.
"No matter how sad it is, talk about a successor in such a situation is
inevitable," said the Moscow Patriarchate source, speaking on condition of
anonymity.
At a landmark session May 7, the church's ruling 12-member Holy Synod made
an unusually large number of personnel shifts that propelled Metropolitan
Kirill to the front as the likeliest candidate for the patriarchal see.
Kirill has led the Moscow Patriarchate's influential department of external
relations since 1988 and, in this capacity, is the church's representative
abroad and in the Kremlin.
Although the church never comments on the synod's personnel decisions, they
are closely watched as an indication of what internal maneuvering is going
on and how the balance of power is shifting between leading bishops.
The May 7 session marked a serious defeat for Metropolitan Kirill's
arch-rival of many years, Metropolitan Mefody. Mefody has run the diocese
of Voronezh and Lipetsk in central Russia for 21 years and has a reputation
of being a tough, wealthy and ambitious church leader with high-level
connections in Moscow. He also is believed to have been behind damaging
media reports in the mid-1990s linking Kirill to the duty-free import of
millions of dollars in tobacco and alcohol.
The synod decided to send Mefody to Kazakhstan, where he will lead a newly
founded district of three dioceses as the Metropolitan of Astana and
Almaty. He was stripped all of his positions in Moscow -- even his post as
the head of the St. Makary Foundation, which he had organized together with
the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Moscow city government to grant
prizes to church and secular scholars.
Mefody's old diocese was split into two -- along the borders of the
Voronezh and Lipetsk regions -- and another rival of Kirill's, Moscow
Patriarchate Chancellor Metropolitan Sergy, was appointed to Voronezh.
Sergy was allowed to keep his Moscow position.
Previously, Sergy effectively was a church bureaucrat without a diocese of
his own. Now he is in position to possibly become a candidate for the
patriarchal post.
"While Mefody was done away with harshly, Sergy will be temporarily stuck
into a buffer zone," the Moscow Patriarchate source said. "But Mefody
shouldn't be written off completely."
The synod also decided May 7 to transfer several former officials from
Kirill's department to prominent dioceses in Stavropol, Ryazan and Vienna
-- a move that strengthens Kirill's position in case of patriarchal elections.
When it finally comes time to elect a new patriarch, the outcome will be
difficult to predict. Kirill's strong disadvantage is his reputation of
being a liberal in conservative church circles and his independence, which
may be problematic with the Kremlin.
Another potential candidate is Metropolitan Filaret of Minsk, whose
reputation as a liberal is offset in nationalist circles by his good
relationship with Belarussian President Alexander Lukashenko.
According to the Russian Orthodox Church's charter, should a patriarch die
or retire, the Holy Synod must elect a Locum Tenens (interim head) from
among its members.
The Local Council, comprised of all bishops and elected representatives of
clergy and laity, must then be called within six months to elect a new
patriarch in a closed session.
The procedure for the election is not spelled out in the charter and is
defined by the council itself before the vote.
********
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