Johnson's Russia List
#7141
19 April 2003
davidjohnson@erols.com
A CDI Project
www.cdi.org

[Contents:
  DJ: JRL returns to the normal schedule. 
  1. AFP: Russia liberal lawmaker slaying marks ominous debut to Duma vote.
  2. The Independent (UK) obituary: Fred Weir, Sergei Yushenkov: Defender
of Russian 
Democracy.
  3. Bettina Renz: Interview with Sergei Yushenkov.
  4. Reuters: Russian PM backs pope visit to Russia.
  5. The Globe and Mail (Canada): Lee Hamilton, Now's the time to restore
U.S.-Russian 
relations.
  6. Rosbalt: Over 30 Million Russians Live below Breadline.
  7. Boston Globe editorial: A blind eye on Chechnya.
  8. AFP: "Cuckoo" takes wing at Russian movie Academy Awards.
  9. The Guardian (UK): Andrew Hurst, Russian oil deal in the pipeline.
  10. Luba Schwartzman: TV1 Review.
  11. Reuters: Russia's industrial wasteland chokes on fumes.
  12. Nezavisimaya Gazeta:  Igor Bunin, Alexei Zudin, Boris Makarenko,
Alexei Makarkin,
THE ELECTION OF 2003: A NEW INTRIGUE. New trends may radically change the
correlation 
of political forces.
  13. Interfax: Russian Duma wants UN play central role in postwar Iraq.
  14. Polyarnaya Zvezda: The World is Searching for a New Order: Will the
US Define a 
New Place for Russia? An Interview with Nikolai Zlobin.
  15. Rosbalt: Katherine Ters, Image Problem Impedes Tourism Development in
St. 
Petersburg.] 

*******

#1
Russia liberal lawmaker slaying marks ominous debut to Duma vote
April 19, 2003
AFP

Russians warned that prominent liberal lawmaker Sergei Yushenkov's murder
marked an ominous debut to the country's looming election campaign and
linked it closely to his ties to exiled opposition tycoon Boris Berezovsky.

The State Duma lower house of parliament marked a minute of silence at the
start of a session, with members visibly shaken by the ninth murder of a
deputy in the past nine years.

"We're going on as if nothing has happened. A deputy has been killed, not
for the first time. Let (President Vladimir) Putin tell us who is running
this country: the mafia, the bandits or the president," Communist deputy
Ivan Nikitchuk said.

The head of the Moscow police criminal investigation department said they
were still searching for a motive in the attack and suggested it may be
linked either to "Yushenkov's professional activities or his private life".

Thursday's murder -- which follows a long line of assassinations of the
Russian political elite who are staked out at their home doorsteps by
professional hitmen -- left the country dumbfounded.

Many lawmakers are believed to run shadowy businesses on the side but few
believed Yushenkov, 52, often seen chain-smoking with disheveled hair and
sporting a patched-up jacket, was embroiled in mafia-linked crime.

But his Liberal Russia party -- officially registered for December's Duma
polls just hours before his assassination -- has had close ties to Putin's
political nemesis Berezovsky.

The tycoon, now living in London to escape prosecution from Russian
authorities, financed Liberal Russia before his expulsion from the party
because he contacted the Communists in a bid to fund a two-pronged
offensive against Putin's rule.

Yushenkov was raised to the status of national hero minutes after his
death. Television ran features highlighting his early 1990s involvement in
the fight against Soviet Communism and efforts to prevent the two Chechen
wars.

A retired colonel and lawmaker since 1991, he was also hailed as a champion
of the Russian soldier who sought to introduce desperately needed army
reforms.

He further took a leading role in a Duma committee looking into Russian
security services' role in the 1999 apartment block bombings that Putin
blamed on the Chechens -- and then used to launch a war which boosted his
popularity and guaranteed his election as president in March 2000.

The Kommersant business daily ran a quick poll of top Russian businessmen
and politicians, with most agreeing that Yushenkov's murder was linked to
politics rather than business.

"I think that he could have been killed for his political stance," said
Alfa Bank chief Pyotr Aven.

Meanwhile leading liberal lawmaker Sergei Kovalyov said in an impassioned
open letter to Putin that Yushenko's assassination could only have been
ordered by people close to -- or who were benefiting from -- the current
government.

"The people who ordered Yushenkov's death... are people who are supporting
the current vector of political development in Russia, secret or open
co-authors of this course -- in other words, your supporters, Mister
president," Kovalyov wrote.

The murder serves as an uncomfortable reminder of seething tensions within
the Russian political elite that appeared forgotten in the relative calm
introduced by the dominant Putin administration.

The Duma's pro-Putin forces -- led by the United Russia bloc that leads the
current Duma -- headed opinion polls until recent weeks when a shakeup in
the party's leadership seemed to lower its credibility in the public eye.

Russian politics is also overshadowed by shifting allegiances. Many
legislators jump ship and join more powerful parties once elected to the Duma.

Western businesses here said the murder served as a reminder that Putin's
best efforts to run a "dictatorship of law" were not yet bearing fruit.

"Yushenkov's murder will remain a blot to Russia's image -- and a reminder
of the poisons that run deep," said Christopher Granville of the United
Financial Group in a research note.

A burial has been set for Sunday, which leading liberal lawmakers are
expected to attend.
 
*******

#2
The Independent (UK) 
April 19, 2003
Obituary
Sergei Yushenkov: Defender of Russian Democracy
By Fred Weir

A long-time democratic activist and thorn in the Kremlin's side, Sergei
Yushenkov was the 10th Russian Duma deputy to be murdered since 1994, and
the second leader of the Liberal Russia party to die in a hail of gunfire
in less than a year. He had just won the right for his liberal opposition
party to take part in Russia's upcoming parliamentary elections when he was
assassinated on Thursday night. 

A former lecturer of Marxism-Leninism at a Soviet military academy,
Yushenkov became politically active after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power
in the Soviet Union and launched his campaigns to "restructure" and
"democratise" Soviet society. He was elected to the first Russian
parliament in 1990, and aligned himself with Boris Yeltsin and the hope of
making a radical leap from Soviet Communism to market-driven democracy.
When a group of orthodox Communist Party and military leaders attempted a
coup in August 1991 and surrounded the Russian parliament with tanks,
Yushenkov was prominent among the thousands of Muscovites who mounted
barricades and forced the coup-makers to give up. A member of every Russian
parliament since 1990, Yushenkov became deeply disillusioned with the
corruption, ineptness and authoritarian reflexes of the post- Soviet
Kremlin regimes headed by Yeltsin and, from January 2000, by Vladimir
Putin. "What was Yeltsin, what were all of us fighting for in August 1991?
Was it only for the winners and losers to change places?" Yushenkov told
journalists on the coup's 10th anniversary in 2001. "This is exactly what
has happened. The losers feel like winners. And this is very dangerous." 

He also parted ways with many of his fellow liberals, some of whom he
accused of "social democratic" tendencies and others of selling out their
principles in exchange for Kremlin favours. 

Over the past decade, Yushenkov was a ferocious critic of the Kremlin's two
wars against the small, breakaway republic of Chechnya, which have killed
upwards of 100,000 civilians and reduced the mainly Muslim region to ruin. 

When a series of devastating apartment bombs killed almost 300 Russians in
the autumn of 1999, the Kremlin blamed it on Chechen terrorists, and used
the tragedy to rally support for electing Putin. But Yushenkov and a few
supporters attempted - and failed - to pass a Duma resolution demanding a
full investigation into evidence that the FSB security service might have
played a role in the explosions. 

His disaffection with other Russian democratic movements led him to play a
key role in creating the Liberal Russia party last year. The party espouses
the radical freemarket doctrines of Friedrich Hayek, and aims to create a
state based "solely on the rule of law". But it was beset with
difficulties. Last August, Yushenkov's co-chairman, Vladimir Golovyov, was
gunned down while walking his dog in a peaceful Moscow suburb. Like all
past killings of Duma deputies, Golovlyov's murder has never been solved. 

Then Yushenkov broke with the party's chief financial backer, the exiled
tycoon Boris Berezovsky, who was arrested on a Kremlin-issued warrant in
London last month. Liberal Russia expelled Berezovsky from its ranks, but
Russia's Central Electoral Commission continued - until Thursday - to deny
the party the vital registration needed to participate in the parliamentary
elections in December. 

Yushenkov's last public utterance was "Registration has been completed," as
he held aloft the crucial papers entitling Liberal Russia a place on the
ballot. He was murdered outside his Moscow apartment building shortly
afterwards. 

Members of Liberal Russia say they have no doubt the killing was political.
The party's surviving co-chairman, Viktor Pokhmelkin, said that Yushenkov
was shot to "bring the liberal opposition in Russia to its knees". In a
message of condolence, Vladimir Putin described Yushenkov as "an
outstanding politician of our time. . . who considered the defence of
democratic freedoms and ideals to be his duty." 

Sergei Yushenkov, politician: born 1950; deputy, Duma 1990-2003; married
(one son, one daughter); died Moscow 17 April 2003. 
 
*********

#3
Date: Fri, 18 Apr 2003 
From: Bettina Renz 
Subject: Yushenkov

Dear David

I was shocked to hear about the murder of Sergei
Yushenkov on 17 April. Unlike it was the case for many
previous contract killings of political and economic
figures in Russia, financial dealings and corrupt
activities can be exlcuded with a high degree of
certainty as the reason for Yushenkov's murder. Viktor
Pokhmelkin, Boris Nemtsov and other politicians
commenting on this appaling crime pointed out that
Yushenkov has been far removed from the financial
sphere and limited his activities to legislation and
party building throughout his career.

I interviewed Yushenkov last October about several
legislative acts for a research project. This was at a
time when Libral Russia had just been refused
registration and Boris Berezovskii was in the process
of discrediting the party and its leaders in the
Russian media. Yushenkov appeared resigned and
disappointed throughout the interview, but insisted on
telling me about the problems encountered by his
political party in great detail. After the interview,
I thought that Yushenkov's version of events, which is
revealing in many ways, should be made public.
Unfortunately, I never got around to it. So I now send
you an excerpt of the interview as an attachment,
because I thought it might be interesting for the
readers of Johnson's Russia List.

All the best,
Bettina Renz
Research Fellow
Bishop Grosseteste College
Lincoln
LN1 3DY
United Kingdom
Phone: (+44) 01522 527347
Email: bettyrenz@yahoo.co.uk; b.renz@bgc.ac.uk

-------

Interview with Sergei Nikolaevich Iushenkov
Moscow, State Duma, 29 October 2002 

Question: I have read your comments recently that you accused the
authorities of misusing the law on political parties to refuse your party
registration. Can you tell me more about this?

Answer: First of all, the law on political parties in itself contradicts
the norms and articles of our Constitution and also the demands of the
European Convention on the protection of the rights and freedoms of
citizens. This convention defines very clearly the criteria for restricting
the freedom of citizens to unite in political organisations or
associations. And among these restrictions is not a single one that we were
accused of. The only accusations against us only referred to some details
in our regulations (uztav). From our point of view, their demands were
excessive. This is the first point. Secondly, we consciously - being aware
that we are in opposition - used the first part of the regulations of
Edinaia Rossiia as a template, despite the fact that we noticed that there
were some formal errors. We supposed that if they registered Edinaia
Rossiia it would be very difficult to refuse Liberal Russia registration on
the same basis. The Justice Ministry has no doubt… (phone rings).

But we were seriously mistaken, because the bureaucrats had a strong desire
to please the Kremlin and they thought that acting this way they would
please it. Actually, the Kremlin showed this desire through one of the
vice-chairmen of the presidential administration. We were accused that our
regulations are not in accordance with the law. There were even funny
demands. I only have to give you one - no, even two - examples. They were
very revealing examples and it is possible to briefly sum them up.
Following the declared aims of Edinaia Rossiia as presented in their
regulations, we also put it as one of our aims to nominate a candidate for
the presidential elections. This is a normal aim - every party has this
aim. And they said that we cannot have such an aim, because this is the aim
of all voters. It is a crazy thing. But they registered this aim as a
violation of the law on political parties. We said - but how come Edinaia
Rossiia is allowed to have such an aim? They did not say anything, and in
the court, the Ministry of Justice could not explain why the same
regulations are accepted for Edinaia Rossiia. but what is wrong if we write
the same regulations for ourselves. The court was not interested in such
facts. They supported the Justice Ministry. But in the corridors we heard
the following being said: 'It is obvious who is going to be a candidate of
Edinaia Rossiia. But in your case, whom are you going to nominate?' They
were joking, but there was a grain of truth in it. 

We also wrote that every citizen over 18 years can be a member of Liberal
Russia - all people recognising the regulations of the party, and who are
not prevented from being a member of any party according to the Russian
law. And they said: Why did you not write in your regulations that
foreigners cannot become a member of your party? Or why did you not write
that a person who lost the right to become a party member by a court
decision, can also not become a member? We said: But we already wrote that
we do not accept members who are prevented to join a party according to the
law. But they said: No, you should give more details. You should just
specify this point. And we asked the court: Why don't you want us to write
down as well, then, that military personnel cannot become members of our
party, because they are not allowed to according to the law on the status
of military personnel? Or judges, who also are not allowed to become
members of a party according to the law on judges? I did not receive an
answer to this. And I said: the regulations that we have written are more
precise, because all the cases are considered, but what you advice us is to
define our regulations more narrowly. They did not answer this question,
either. Even when we ended up getting emotional and cried out 'why don't
you understand?' they did not understand. 

We had two explanations why they did not register us. Of course, not
officially. The first is connected to the fact that we are a very loud
opposition. The second is that Berezovskii was in our party. Of course
these points are the most significant for our party to be or not to be
registered. We assembled and made a decision: one choice is to insist on
our rights and we could go to the Strasbourg court and wait for its
decision. But the decision will be no earlier than 2005 and we will miss
the elections. But we would get justice. At least concerning two articles
of the law: on restrictions  - because we are not subject to any of them.
And on discrimination. This is obvious, because many parties had the same
mistakes, but were registered. This is obvious discrimination. Even if
their demands are correct. 

So we took the decision to change our regulations. Berezovskii was against
this. He thinks that we should not comply with those in power. That we
should - in the opposite - appeal to even higher levels of justice. And he
suggested that we should choose him as the only chairman of our party. But
we said no, we don't want that. I have to say that when we were making
agreements with him in the beginning, we had a clear understanding that he
will only give us financial support. But then he started to... he was with
us until our aims and tasks no longer coincided with his. Then he started
making demands on us. It all worked out in the beginning. Really, he did
not set any conditions. But then he started speaking about the difficulties
for him to accumulate resources if he is not the chairman of the party. He
said that if he was a co-chairman of the party it would be easier for him
to look for resources. Because he did not spend his own money - he had to
look for it. So we discussed and decided that he could be one of five
co-chairmen. We could sacrifice this position to him. Moreover, his
rhetoric and everything else coincided with our programmes. I should also
note that when we started building our movement, Liberal Russia,
Berezovskii and we were opponents. Berezovskii supported Putin and we were
against Putin. Berezovskii inspired the unity between the Communists and
Edinstvo. We were against this. We were in confrontation on the most basic
political issues. But then Berezovskii started to criticise those in power
more and more. And his criticism coincided with our criticism. He even left
the parliament as a sign of protest against the fact that the Duma was
being turned into an instrument of the presidential administration. And he
just repeated our words at that time. It seemed to us that every person has
a right to make a mistake, and should get the opportunity to correct his
mistakes. And honestly speaking, we thought that this was the case. 

But then he wrote his so-called 'Russian Manifesto'. And in his first
version, this manifesto was 'russkii' (not rossiskii). And we rejected this
manifesto, because we could see that it was some combination of certain
liberal ideas with a part of national-patriotic ideas. With pronounced
left-wing preferences. I told him that this is not for our party. None of
us accepted this manifesto. And now he says that our programme is actually
based on his manifesto. But it is enough to have a look at the programme of
Liberal Russia and the manifesto of Berezovskii to see that they are not
comparable at all. After that, he never stopped his attempts to combine
liberal ideas with some sort of national patriotic ideas. In general, there
is nothing bad about it. Why can a liberal not be a patriot? Actually,
liberals are the real patriots. Because liberals advocate the rights and
freedoms of the individual and put this as the highest priority. To ensure
these rights and freedoms is a real patriotic position. 

Practical steps [taken by Berezovskii] directed at establishing this
consortium between patriots and liberals in our Russian understanding show
that they were attempts at uniting Liberal Russia with various
national-patriotic organisations, including the Communists and even the
Limonovtsy and we could not accept this absolutely. Unfortunately this
situation developed very quickly and it was right before our meeting at
which we were going to change our regulations. Right before that meeting
Berezovskii set an ultimatum. Either you elect me as your only chairman, or
I will leave the party in order to give the party an opportunity to be
registered. According to Berezovskii, in any way, the world should see that
everything depends on him. Even our registration or non-registration. We
told him that we do not like this and we do not want to be hostages of one
figure. And we had never agreed on something like this. 

We expected that at the meeting he would leave the party. But instead, he
made a speech that it was necessary to combine liberalism with patriotism.
taking into account the specific situation in Russia I was strongly against
this idea, and so were other people at this meeting. And there was an
un-pronounced but a very strong polemic, which led some journalists, who
attended the meeting and paid attention to what was going, to conclude that
liberal Russia now is without Berezovskii. But things were coming to this.
We did not want our registration to be dependent to Berezovskii, and we
were waiting for registration. And Minister Chaika said that if we change
the regulation, there are not going to be any problems with the
registration of Liberal Russia. But we were not in a rush to get rid of
Berezovskii. We understood that we are following different lines, but
formally we wanted to break with him only after the registration. 

But then Zavtra published an article, where Berezovskii gave an interview
to Prokhanov saying that there are no problems. But generally this was an
overt challenge to us - people started to say that Liberal Russia started
to lose its mind. There were also other publications in other papers, where
they said that Liberal Russia has no principles at all. The next week,
Zavtra published an article - its first publication was an editorial - with
the whole interview. After the first publication we were able to give some
explanations to people, but after the second one there was no chance to
give an explanation. I called Berezovskii and said that we are going to
criticise him sharply on behalf of all the co-chairmen. And that at the
next political council we were going to discuss the issue of his membership
in the party. He said, 'yes, discuss, please'. But he did not believe to
the last moment that the political council can exclude him from the party.
He has no idea about our regulations - he never read them. He thought that
only a meeting can exclude him. Yes, the meeting can exclude him as well,
but so can the political council. But we warned him. We gave him the
possibility to decide the question to leave the party voluntarily. And he
did not want to do that. So we had to exclude him. Yes, there were debates
about this. After his exclusion he said… I suggested to him through the
media - we suggested to him to have a life video link for him to the Duma
so he could participate, but he refused. Generally he is afraid of direct
confrontation. He is afraid, because he understands that he will be caught
out on his tricks and lies. And therefore he refused to have a video
conference with me. But he was recorded with Pokhmelkin and others and the
film was cut on the TV by half. I don't know how they did it. Berezovskii
has several journalists who write for him and the journalists are very
strong and experienced. He pays them. And they give their own
interpretation to provide him with a certain image. We understand all this.
But he said in a private conversation that he has enough resources to
destroy Liberal Russia. And this is exactly what he is doing now. He uses
any means and buys leaders of our regional branches, and he is covering his
actions with the idea that he is restoring justice. He can buy some of them
now, of course, because there are some people in Liberal Russia who joined
after Berezovskii with the hope of receiving some sort of benefits from
this. From 18000 members these are about 1500 or 2000. Now he is making
very funny attempts to call for a meeting that is not legitimate, but he is
using his money and links with the mass media to pretend that this is
Liberal Russia. Of course we are going to have a very serious struggle in
order to maintain the party. However, we are grateful to Berezovskii that
he took these people away from our party, for whom the ideas of liberalism
are just an empty sound. We are grateful to him for this.

********

#4
Russian PM backs pope visit to Russia
By Estelle Shirbon

ROME, April 18 (Reuters) - Russia's prime minister on Friday backed Pope
John Paul's efforts to become the first pontiff to visit Russia and said
his government was doing all it could to heal a rift between the Vatican
and the Russian Orthodox Church.

"I think the efforts that have been made so far and those being made now to
eliminate differences between the two Churches must be crowned with
success," Mikhail Kasyanov told reporters.

"The Russian government is trying in every possible way to help eliminate
the concerns that still exist on the path towards a rapprochement between
the two Churches," Kasyanov said at a joint news conference with Prime
Minister Silvio Berlusconi.

Berlusconi said he had requested a meeting with the head of the Russian
Orthodox Church, Patriarch Alexiy II, and had discussed possible dates for
such a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The Vatican is attempting to include a stop by the pope in the Russian city
of Kazan, 800 km (500 miles) east of Moscow, when he is on the way to
Mongolia in August, Vatican sources said earlier this week.

A stop by the pope in Russia, however brief, would be historic, although he
has already visited other countries that made up the former Soviet Union.

The pope has said he wants to visit Moscow but would not want to do so
without the blessing of the Russian Orthodox Church. It was not clear if
the pope would want to visit Kazan unless the Orthodox Church agreed.

Relations between the Vatican and the Russian Orthodox Church have been
severely strained since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.

The Russian Orthodox Church has criticised the Vatican for allegedly using
new found freedoms in Russia since the end of communism to poach away
believers.

The purpose of a stop by the pope in Kazan, some 800 km (500 miles) east of
Moscow, would be to return the icon of Our Lady of Kazan, one of the most
venerated icons of the Virgin Mary in the Russian Orthodox Church.

The icon, which dates at least to the 16th century, was stolen in 1904 and
was kept in several European cities before winding up at the Vatican.

The pope, who wants to mend ties with the Russian Orthodox Church, has said
several times that he would like to return the icon to the Russian people.

*******

#5
The Globe and Mail (Canada)
April 15, 2003
Now's the time to restore U.S.-Russian relations
By LEE HAMILTON
Lee H. Hamilton, former chairman of the U.S. House committee on
international relations, is director of the Woodrow Wilson Center in
Washington.
 
Relations between the United States and Russia have chilled in recent
months. Warm feelings based upon Russia's co-operation in the war on terror
and the closeness of presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin have been
replaced by disagreement over the war in Iraq. But key threats, such as
global economic stagnation, terrorism and weapons proliferation, make it
clear that U.S. and Russian interests are best served by a speedy return to
visible co-operation.

Russia adamantly opposed using force in Iraq, and provided key support for
France's pledge to veto a second Security Council resolution condemning
Iraq. Even with the war's apparent success, Russia has maintained the view
that the war destabilizes international relations.

The rift over Iraq followed other recent divisions. Russia's sale of
nuclear technology to Iran has drawn repeated criticism from the United
States. Russia has also called for direct U.S.-North Korean talks, rather
than the multilateral framework for negotiation favoured by President Bush.
Meanwhile, Russia's own brutal war in Chechnya continues, despite calls for
restraint from the United States and other Western governments.

President Putin has taken important steps to put Russia on a westward
course, but recent detours reflect a focus on Russia's national interests,
and domestic pressures intensified by upcoming Russian parliamentary
elections. The U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty, and NATO enlargement
into Eastern Europe and the Baltic, has upset Russians, as has our failure
to forgive Russian debt or to support Russian accession into the World
Trade Organization. Russians particularly resent the Jackson-Vanik
amendment, a holdover from the Cold War, that ties Russia's trade status to
its freedom of emigration. The Russian people are questioning what they are
getting out of the Bush-Putin relationship, and are uncomfortable in a
post-Cold War world in which Russia's interests are subordinate to U.S.
hegemony.

Neither the United States nor Russia should be surprised that the other is
pursuing a policy based on national interests. The United States sees
weapons of mass destruction in the hands of regimes like Saddam Hussein's
as a threat to its security, and is pursuing a muscular strategy of
counterproliferation. Russia is interested in economic development, and is
willing to put non-proliferation second to the benefits of doing business
with countries such as Iran.

But let's be practical. The United States and Russia each have an interest
in Russia's economic integration into the West. The United States should
forgive some Soviet-era Russian debt, repeal the outdated Jackson-Vanik
amendment, and support Russian accession into the WTO, in return for
greater transparency and market reform within Russia. A growing Russian
economy tied more to the West would strengthen the global economic
recovery, while reducing Russia's interest in dealing with countries such
as Iran. Developing Russia's vast energy reserves could also increase
Russian revenues, while providing the United States with another major oil
and gas supplier outside of the volatile Middle East.

When it comes to security, the United States and Russia have overlapping
concerns. Russia's acceptance of U.S. bases in Central Asia as well as
intelligence sharing between the two countries has strengthened the fight
against al-Qaeda. While we should speak out vigorously against Russian
human-rights violations in Chechnya, the United States must continue to
work closely with Russia in the war on terror and the stabilization of
Central Asia. The United States should also continue to bring Russia closer
to NATO, as the integration of Russia into Western security arrangements
reduces the likelihood of a return to Russian expansionism and militarism.
If we want Russia to be a partner, we must be willing to treat it as one.

Most importantly, the United States and Russia must reduce the threat of
weapons proliferation. The United States should increase programs to help
Russia secure and dismantle its own weapons of mass destruction, as the
former Soviet Union is a natural destination for terrorists attempting to
steal or acquire dangerous materials. If Washington and Moscow work
together to reduce and secure their arsenals while building strong global
non-proliferation regimes, trust between our nations will grow, and the
world will be a safer place.

******** 

#6
Rosbalt
Over 30 Million Russians Live below Breadline 

MOSCOW, April 19. Over 30 million people in Russia have incomes below the
breadline, according to Russian Deputy Minister for Labour and Social
Development Galina Karelova. The minister was speaking at a round-table
conference in Moscow called 'Social security: the fundamentals of social
policy'. She said that the minimum income needed to survive in Russia is,
on average, about USD 65 per month. 

Karelova stressed that the fight against poverty is currently one of
Russia's most important social tasks, adding that 30 million people is a
significant proportion of the population (currently around 143 million).
'These people are unable to eat normally, buy clothes, study or receive
medical treatment,' said Karelova. 
 
********

#7
Boston Globe
April 19, 2003
Editorial
A blind eye on Chechnya

IN CHECHNYA, Russia's President Vladimir Putin has been getting away with
murder. And ethnic cleansing. And kidnapping rackets run by Russian
officers and criminal gangs. Under the cover of what Putin calls his
contribution to the war against terrorism, the Kremlin has killed or made
refugees of about half of Chechnya's 1996 population of 1 million people. 

The Bush administration's passivity in the face of this catastrophe has
been shameful. There was hardly a murmur of complaint when the Kremlin
staged a sham referendum in Chechnya on March 23, after which it clamed
that Russia's local loyalists had received more votes than there are voters
left in Chechnya. 

Voters were intimidated and bribed into voting the right way. Putin's aim
in staging the referendum was to pretend that the balloting was a valid
local election within the Russian Federation; that it confirmed Chechens
loyal to the Kremlin as legitimate leaders of the republic; that it showed
that Chechens did not really want the independence for which they have
fought for 300 years; and that the Chechen government of Prime Minister
Aslan Maskhadov, elected in January 1997 under the scrutiny of monitors
from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, should no
longer receive international recognition. 

As Ilyas Akhmadov, foreign minister of the Chechen government elected in
1997, said during a visit to the Globe Thursday, Russia's imposition of
last month's referendum ''was like making people in the Warsaw ghetto vote
for the Third Reich.''

Neither the phoniness of the March referendum nor the genocidal crimes the
Kremlin has committed in Chechnya are a secret. Yet this past Wednesday the
UN High Commission for Human Rights in Geneva, stocked as it is with human
rights violators, failed to pass a resolution sponsored by the European
Union that would have deplored systematic human rights abuses in Chechnya
and called upon Russia to take ''all necessary steps'' to conduct or permit
thorough and rapid investigations of abuses such as kidnappings, torture,
and extrajudicial executions.

The Bush administration, appearing to play geopolitics with a flagrant
Russian assault on human rights, refused to cosponsor the resolution.
Fortunately, the administration did decide at the last minute to vote for
the EU's draft. For President Bush to accept Putin's pretense that the
Kremlin's ethnic cleansing of Chechnya is really a war against terrorism is
to give a green light to crimes against humanity. As a director of the
Russian human rights group Memorial, Eliza Moussaeva, said to the Globe
this week, ''Russia wants to look like a democratic state, but what is
going on there can be called fascism.''

It is time for Bush to take another look into Putin's soul and tell him
that he cannot pass for a democratic leader if he does not permit political
negotiations to end his dirty war in Chechnya.

********

#8
"Cuckoo" takes wing at Russian movie Academy Awards
April 19, 2003
AFP

A Russian film made in Finland with a Sami (Lapp) star, Alexander
Rogozhkin's critically-acclaimed "Kukushka" (The Cuckoo), swept the honours
at Russia's annual "Nika" Academy Awards ceremony late Friday.

The film, in which each of the three main characters speaks a different
language, won the "Nika" for best film, while Rogozhkin won the award for
best director and Finland's Sami-speaking Anni-Christina Juuso was voted
best actress.

The event marks the crowning triumph for a low-budget movie that has been
widely praised on the international festival circuit and has been bought up
for US distribution, a rare tribute for a Russian film. 

Set during World War II, "Kukushka" tells the story of two rival soldiers,
one Finnish and one Russian, and the native Sami woman who shelters them
through the northern winter.

The "Nika" for best actor was won by veteran Oleg Yankovsky for his role in
"Lyubovnik" (The Lover), directed by Valery Todorovsky.

Sergei Bodrov Jr., the young actor-director who died in an avalanche in the
Caucasus mountains last September, won the "Nika" for best supporting actor
in the film "Voina" (War) directed by Alexei Balabanov.

The award was accepted by his father Sergei Bodrov, himself a distinguished
film director.

Latvian director Hertz Frank won a "Nika" for the best film from the
Commonwealth of Independent States plus the Baltics (i.e. the former Soviet
Union) for his film "Flashback".

No fewer than three of the five films competing for the best film award --
Nikolai Lebedev's "Zvezda" (Star) was the third -- featured war, a fitting
theme as the Russian movie Academy is currently a house, or rather two
houses, divided.

For the first time since the "Nikas" were created 15 years ago, the awards
ceremony took place in Moscow's spanking new International House of Music,
a sleek spaceship-style construction by the side of the Moskva river.

The change of venue was forced by the fact that the awards' founder Yuly
Gusman was dismissed last year as director of Dom Kino (House of Cinema)
where the event had previously taken place by the head of the Filmmakers
Union, Nikita Mikhalkov.

The ambitious Mikhalkov, best known as the director of such films as "Burnt
by the Sun" and "The Barber of Siberia", has set up a rival awards ceremony
known as the Golden Eagle, staged in January with the clear intention of
taking the wind out of the sails of the "Nikas".

An early casualty of the fratricidal strife was one of Russia's better
productions of 2002, Andrei Konchalovsky's "The Mad House" which won second
prize at last year's Venice Film Festival but whose director happens to be
Mikhalkov's brother.

Despite its obvious qualities, "The Mad House" -- also a film about war --
won only a single "Nika" nomination, and that in a minor category.

"Cuckoo" director Rogozhkin at least had no grounds for complaint, as his
film's three "Nikas" now join the three "Golden Eagles" it won three months
ago for best director, best screenplay and best actor.

Faced with the challenge of its upstart rival, the "Nika" event set out
bravely in its advantageous new home to give a fair imitation of the
Hollywood Academy Award ceremony.

Under a sun auditioning for summer, a crowd of 200 fans cheered and
whistled up a storm as the actors, directors, producers and other movers
and shakers of the movie industry walked the long red carpet into the House
of Music. Even the writers got a cheer.
 
*******

#9
The Guardian (UK)
April 19, 2003
Russian oil deal in the pipeline 
Andrew Hurst in Moscow

Russian oil companies Yukos and Sibneft may be on the verge of combining
their operations to create one of the world's largest energy companies,
investment banking sources said yesterday. One banker, who asked not to be
named, said a deal giving Yukos chief executive Mikhail Khodorkovsky and
his associates more than 50% of a merged company with a market value of
$35bn (£22.3bn) could be announced as early as the beginning of next week. 

Sibneft's shareholders, led by Roman Abramovitch, the governor of Russia's
remote eastern Chukotka region, would have a blocking stake in the enlarged
firm and receive a cash payment of up to $1.4bn under the proposed deal. 

A combined company would be the world's fifth largest oil group, measured
by crude oil production - making it substantially larger than Russia's
present number one, Lukoil, and putting it on a par with France's
TotalFinaElf and America's Chevron Texaco. 

Shares in Yukos, Russia's second largest oil company, and Sibneft, its
fifth largest, have soared in recent days, fuelled by market rumours they
are working on a link-up. 

"I think there is a 60-70% chance it's announced by Tuesday," said the
investment banker. "There is no question something is going on. There is
still a question whether it will happen." 

Officials at Yukos and Sibneft have declined to comment on reports that
they might merge. The two companies tried unsuccessfully to negotiate a
merger in 1998 and analysts said a deal could still founder at the last
minute. 

A Moscow-based analyst, who asked not to be named, said senior managers at
Sibneft had let it be known that they were preparing to make a significant
announcement next week. 

Russian oil firms have been at the centre of takeover speculation since BP
bought a 50% stake in TNK, Russia's third largest oil firm, for $6.75bn,
the biggest transaction in Russia's corporate history. 

"We are hearing a lot of background noise of a substantial deal and the
signs are that something will be announced soon," said Charles Ryan, the
chief executive of Moscow finance house UFG. 

Yukos's chief is probably anxious to secure Sibneft before it becomes a
target for takeover by an international oil player, analysts said. 

*******

#10
TV1 Review
www.1tv.ru
Compiled by Luba Schwartzman (luba_sch@hotmail.com)
Research Analyst, Center for Defense Information, Moscow office

HEADLINES,
Thursday, April 17, 2003
- State Duma Deputy (Liberal Russia) Sergei Yushenkov was
murdered by his Moscow home.  Yushekov is the eighth State
Duma deputy killed over the last nine years.  Duma Speaker
Gennady Seleznev declared that the murder was a political
assassination and noted that it was carried out on the day the
Justice Ministry officially registered Liberal Russia as a party.
Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed his condolences to
Yushenkov's family, friends and colleagues.
- President Putin met with Federation Council Chairman Sergei
Mironov.  Mironov spoke about his trip through Central Asia, his
meetings with the presidents of Kazakhstan and Tajikistan and
with parliamentarians in Kyrghyzstan.
- President Putin also met with Transneft Director Semyon
Vainshtock to discuss the Baltic oil pipeline.
- Light industry was at the top of the agenda of today's meeting of
the Russian Cabinet.  Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov declared
that up to 40 percent of light industry in Russia is part of the
shadow economy.  Ministers also discussed the oil and gas
complex of Russia's Northwestern region and amendments to
customs tariffs.
- An Association of National Organization may be established in
Russia in the near future.  The goal of such an organization would
be the protection of ethnic diasporas in Russia.
- In Volgograd, 26 schoolchildren were poisoned by a cloud
chemicals that rose from hydrogen sulfide discarded at an oil-
processing plant.
- Georgia extradited to Russia one of the fighters from the illegal
band formation of Ruslan Gelaev.  22-year-old Kabardino-Balkaria
native, Amirkhan Ligidov, was delivered to Pyatigorsk by Russian
and Georgian border guards.
- Presidential Advisor Sergei Yastrzhembsky declared that some
people in the West are deliberately exaggerating the human rights
problems in Chechnya, in order to undermine the results of the
recent referendum.
- Deputy Prosecutor of the Southern Federal District Sergei
Fridinsky gave official information on casualties in Chechnya.  730
people have been murdered over the past year.
- Novgorod officials are asking residents to turn in unregistered
weapons.
- 50,000 young men are eligible for recruitment this season, but
only about 5,000 of them are likely end up serving in the Russian
Armed Forces.
- Russian sailors from the Northern, Pacific, Baltic and Black Sea
fleets are preparing for large-scale military exercises.
- The Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the
sentence against Italian citizen Nadezhda Fratti, who illegally
brought out several hundred orphans to families abroad.
- A memorial service was held for scientist Vsevolod Avduevsky.

********

#11
FEATURE-Russia's industrial wasteland chokes on fumes
By Clara Ferreira-Marques

KARABASH, Russia, April 18 (Reuters) - Vast stretches of soot-coloured
wasteland, mountains of black slag and a handful of ailing birch trees mark
the landscape around the Urals town of Karabash, one of the most polluted
places on the planet.

Around the clock, the five chimneys of the century-old Karabash Copper
Smelting Works spew out pitch-black toxic fumes laden with sulphurous waste.

"Nothing grows in our vegetable patches -- everything dies or turns
yellow," said Svetlana, a mother of two who has spent her life in the town.
The soil in and around Karabash is full of toxic metals including lead,
mercury and arsenic.

"Our children have asthma, respiratory diseases, many now suffer from skin
diseases too," Svetlana said.

Karabash, a town of apocalyptic bleakness, is a painful reminder of an
environmental policy that has balked at the huge cost of cleaning up many
of the ailing behemoths left behind by the Soviet Union, including its
metals sector.

The Soviet authorities closed the plant in 1987 because of ecological
concerns. The town was declared an "environmental disaster zone" and plans
were made to resettle some families.

But the cleaner air also threw some 3,500 people out of jobs, plunged the
town into poverty and ripped out a vast company-funded network of social
infrastructure.

The plant was reopened in 1998 to satisfy a town desperate for jobs and
local businessmen wanting the metal.

"There were no legal documents. There should have been an ecological
assessment, but there was nothing," said Maxim Shingarkin, an environmental
campaigner and aide at the Russian parliament.

"They just came and switched on the machines."

CLEANING UP SOVIET MISTAKES

Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev pledged to begin cleaning up the Soviet
Union's gravest ecological mistakes.

But the collapse of communism and the 1998 financial crash have relegated
the environment -- and the hugely expensive overhaul of unwieldy Soviet-era
heavy industry -- to the bottom of the policy agenda.

Like many of its neighbours on the gritty Urals industrial belt, Karabash,
some 1,300 km (810 miles) southeast of Moscow, has seen few of the benefits
from foreign investment pouring into European Russia.

Yevgeny Shram, a local deputy and activist, explained that the city was so
starved of jobs it was obliged to agree to the plant's proposal to reopen
without a major overhaul.

"You must understand there was 24 percent unemployment, a very difficult
situation," Shram said. "The plant was allowed to work for two years
without an environmental inspection. That was five years ago. We are still
waiting."

Only metres (yards) from the smelter's chimneys, children play in a
battered playground coated in grit-speckled snow. According to Russian law,
their homes should long ago been moved further away from the smelter,
within a "sanitary" radius of one km (0.6 miles).

But 1,000 people still live within metres of the plant -- only 50 have been
moved since it began work in 1998. None of those moves was paid for by the
plant itself.

"They won't move us and anyway, I'm not sure I want to," said Margarita
Alexandrovna, a retired teacher, as she watched her grandchildren.

"If they move you, you will only get a pre-fabricated house, and there you
get sick straight away. At least these homes are made of brick," she said,
with a gesture towards the grimy, two-storey blocks.

CHOKING TO DEATH

Even residents outside the area earmarked for immediate resettlement say
they are choking on the plant's fumes.

The town of low-rise blocks and wooden homes numbered 50,000 residents when
mining and smelting works were at their peak. Now, many of the housing
blocks are abandoned, and the population has slid to some 16,000 souls.

"We live here because we have nowhere else to go," said Svetlana, a post
office worker. "The only people who stay here are those who were born and
bred here. The rest have long gone."

"It is a dying town. Only the old and ageing are left."

Svetlana, like other residents in the city, complains that the plant
increases its work at night to camouflage the thick clouds of toxic smoke
which suffocate the city.

"They do their dirtiest work at night," she said. "Then in the morning, you
can scarcely breathe. God knows how our children get to school."

Yevgeny Orlov, responsible for ecology at the Karabash plant, dismisses
accusations that it is working illegally.

He cites a 262 million rouble ($8.37 million) resettlement plan -- still to
be approved by the Moscow authorities -- and efforts to reduce toxic
emissions.

And he shrugs off concerns from residents who say they see little
improvement in air quality.

"I never complained," he said. "I have worked in factories across Russia
and I know that ours is not the worse."

On one point at least both residents and plant agree -- no one can afford
to close the smelter altogether.

"This is not about closing the plant. This is about getting the plant to
fulfil its legal duties," said Shram.

"We let them begin work and they polluted our town for two years, then
another two years, then another two years and so on," he said. "They paint
a picture according to which we helped each other. Now, it is not clear if
anyone is helping anyone. They are a private company. If it is good for
them to work on our territory it should be good for us too."

*******

#12
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
April 18, 2003 
THE ELECTION OF 2003: A NEW INTRIGUE
New trends may radically change the correlation of political forces 
Author: Igor Bunin, Alexei Zudin, Boris Makarenko, Alexei Makarkin
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
UNITED RUSSIA IS BEING REORGANIZED AS A RESULT OF THE KREMLIN'S 
COMPROMISE WITH REGIONAL ELITES - BUT IS NO LONGER THE LEADER IN THE 
RACE. THE COMMUNIST PARTY IS THE LEADER NOW, AND MAY ACTUALLY SECURE 
THIS POSITION. THE KREMLIN AND THE COMMUNISTS ARE FIGHTING FOR THE 
PROTEST VOTE.

     The campaign hasn't started yet, but Russian voters are already 
being dragged into the electoral process, and the formation of the 
institutional and political outlines of this campaign is entering its 
final phase.
     According to the National Public Opinion Research Center 
(VTsIOM), Russian voters are more determined to participate in the 
election this time. The percentage of respondents who definitely don't 
intend to vote has remained unchanged for two months already (at 16%), 
but the number of those who do intend to vote has risen from 21% to 
28%. Those who have not yet made up their minds number 25%, against 
32% last time.
     Between late February and early April 2003, all major 
participants in the upcoming elections did their best to have the 
rules of the game officially changed. The focus of political 
bargaining has now shifted to informal agreements.
     United Russia's ratings fell in March 2003, and it is no longer 
the unquestioned favorite. According to VTsIOM polls, nationwide 
support for United Russia fell from 23% in February to 21% in March. 
The Communist Party, however, raised its rating considerably and even 
left United Russia behind.
     The latest United Russia congress voted for a new model of the 
party. It may be conditionally described as "mixed". Essentially, this 
is a compromise between two scenarios - a traditional ruling party 
(i.e. a party of regional and federal prominent names) and a party of 
the Kremlin (a new bureaucracy boasting of its closeness to the 
president and his inner circle).
     The new model restored some order in the upper echelons of United 
Russia but failed to solve two major problems - plurality of centers 
and a multitude of important figures in its ruling bodies. The 
functions of operational management are divided among three decision-
making centers - Gryzlov, General Council Secretary Bogomolov, and 
Volkov. Rumored to be fairly close to V. Ivanov, Deputy Director of 
the Presidential Administration, Volkov may - and probably will - 
become the next chairman of the Central Executive Committee.
     The new ideological niche of United Russia forces it to openly 
criticize the government. This criticism is augmented by 
disassociation with what party functionaries call "old ruling parties" 
- the CPSU and the political leadership of Yeltsin's era.
     The policy is quite rational. United Russia is aiming to exceed 
the limits of the conformist vote which usually goes to the ruling 
party, and gather some protest votes as well, the people who voted for 
Unity back in 1999. These voters are estimated to number 10-12%.
     United Russia leaders are making a valiant attempt to ride the 
wave of protests and concentrate all criticism on the Cabinet, in 
order not to have public discontent focus on the president.
     At the same time, criticism of the government expressed by 
Cabinet ministers themselves is not taken seriously by the public. 
According to polls done by the Political Techniques Center right after 
the United Russia congress, it is universally viewed as a pro-
government party - in the worst sense of the term. At least for the 
time being, criticism of the government by United Russia leader is 
failing to overcome negative stereotypes.
     There are two ways of explaining United Russia's inability to 
absorb public discontent, despite all the noise it has been making.
     First explanation: the traits of the party that cannot be stamped 
out. A national leader (Putin) can blend the right-wing and left-wing 
versions of populism - but that is not something a political party can 
do, because ideological consistency is expected of political parties. 
And if United Russia cannot absorb protest moods, its anti-government 
campaign is counterproductive because it plays into the hands of the 
Communist Party, its major political rival.
     Second explanation: populist-tinted criticism of the government 
is not exactly compatible with the party's slogan of "national 
success". In terms of consequences, United Russia's decision to shift 
to the right (the party is clearly aiming to become the pro-government 
majority in the parliament) may turn out to be a mistake.
     The political prospects of other parties close to the Kremlin are 
varied, but Gennadi Raikov's People's Party is believed to have the 
best chance.
     The appearance of a new "window of opportunity" made the 
situation of the People's Party even less clear. The party is 
structured around a nucleus comprised of an autonomous deputy group 
boasting of connections with regional and local elites and close 
contacts with the Kremlin. The elite resources and image of "the 
Kremlin's second party" demanded independent participation in the 
election, but districts (divided with United Russia) remain top 
priority for the People's Party, calling itself a "party of deputies 
from single-mandate districts".
     Difficulties encountered by United Russia and activization of 
protests may pave way for a fully-fledged list from the People's Party 
for the upcoming election. Its image is quite attractive for absorbing 
the non-communist protest vote. On the other hand, the party isn't 
very well known yet.
     When Party of Life leader Sergei Mironov publicly acknowledged 
United Russia's unquestioned leadership, it only confirmed the 
assumption that Party of Life is not going to present its own list of 
candidates for the Duma. It seems that leaders and sponsors of the 
party will be quite content to have some candidates on United Russia 
lists and/or several in single-mandate districts.
     The apparent weakness of Gennadi Seleznev's Russia's Renaissance 
has forced the Kremlin to put Mikhail Lapshin's Agrarian Party on the 
list of its proteges. Permitting these parties to come up with their 
own lists of candidates and supporting them to some degree, the 
Kremlin may restrict communist expansion into the center left. Yet the 
Kremlin fears that all these parties will take votes from United 
Russia rather than from the communists.
     The position of the Communist Party in the 1999 elections was 
determined by two major factors - ratings expansion and stabilization 
within the party itself. Supplementing each other, the factors made 
the Communist Party the leader. According to VTsIOM, the Communist 
Party's rating soared from 24% in February to 31% in March.
     The party successfully handled the consequences of its removal 
from decision-making in spring 2002, suppressed the internal Fronde 
inspired by the presidential administration, and regained its 
traditional positions.
     Viewed against this background, Mikhail Khodorkovsky's statement 
to the effect that some YUKOS shareholders intend to finance the 
Communist Party became the talk of the day. The statement reaffirmed 
the political weight of the party. The attempt to push the Communist 
Party out of the way, made in the course of preparations for the 
election, has failed. Khodorkovsky's statement may actually mean that 
the Kremlin is seriously considering the idea of inducing the 
Communist Party to evolve towards better compatibility with the 
regime.
     The rating of the Union of Right Forces has remained unchanged. 
According to VTsIOM, it held at 6% throughout February and March. Even 
the party's relations with the Kremlin seem to be improving somewhat. 
Boris Nemtsov is back in the spotlight and his activities are once 
again covered by national television networks. The Union of Right 
Forces still enjoys the support of major companies.
     The data compiled by VTsIOM indicates that Yabloko's rating fell 
from 8% in January to 5% in March. However, the party's prospects 
remain favorable. Like the Union of Right Forces, Grigori Yavlinsky's 
party responded to the war in Iraq just as the public did. As before, 
its election campaign is built around a combination of loyalty to the 
Kremlin and criticism of the Cabinet.
     In March and April 2003, the Yabloko faction in the Duma got 
political mileage defending state-sector workers and condemning 
reforms to housing and utilities. Khodorkovsky's public statement of 
his liking for Yabloko was taken as additional confirmation that the 
party was a fine object for political investment.
     The electoral prospects of the LDPR remain the best of all of the 
second-echelon political parties. Its rating remains reasonable, even 
rising slightly on the wave of public distaste for the American 
operation in Iraq. According to VTsIOM, the LDPR rating remained at 6% 
in January and February and rose to 7% in March. Vladimir 
Zhirinovsky's image of a political eccentric shields him from all 
accusations of inconsistency. His 2003 and 2004 campaigns will be 
based on loyalty to the Kremlin, as usual, and the use of some 
segments of protest sentiments in society.
     To summarize: public demands of the authorities are rising as the 
domestic situation stabilizes. Voter mobilization is underway, mostly 
restricted to communist voters for the time being.
     United Russia is being reorganized as a result of the Kremlin's 
compromise with regional elites - but is no longer the leader in the 
race.
     The Communist Party is the leader now, and may actually secure 
this position.
     The Kremlin and the Communists are fighting for the protest vote, 
a details which adds importance to what is called "the Sergei Glaziev 
factor".
     The outcome of the battles for the protest vote remains unclear 
at this point. Changes are mounting, and may eventually destroy the 
paradigm of campaigns centered around rivalry between the Kremlin's 
party and left-patriotic opposition.
Igor Bunin, General Director
Alexei Zudin, Chief of the Department of Political Sciences Programs
Boris Makarenko, Senior Deputy General Director
Alexei Makarkin, Chief of the Department of Analysis
The article is based on materials prepared by the Political Techniques 
Center

********

#13
Russian Duma wants UN play central role in postwar Iraq 
Interfax
 
Moscow, 18 April: The United Nations must play the central role in the
postwar settlement in Iraq, reads a Russian State Duma statement on the
situation in Iraq passed today.

The draft of this document was put on the Duma's agenda for today at the
initiative of the International Affairs Committee. The statement was
unanimously supported by 390 parliamentarians.

The document maintains that the Duma favours the soonest possible
restoration of a political system and the economy in Iraq. "The principal
burden of financial costs for this process should undoubtedly be shouldered
by the active members of the anti-Iraq coalition," reads the statement.

Other members of the international community can rightfully decide upon the
extent and forms of their involvement in the postwar restoration of Iraq,
including the provision of humanitarian aid and the settlement of debts,
which is possible only within the framework of the Paris Club of creditors,
reads the statement.

The UN Security Council must first of all consider the lifting of economic
sanctions against Iraq, the document reads.

As for putting together new Iraqi authorities, the document notes that the
establishment of these bodies with US and British military support
exclusively out of figures who were in opposition to Saddam Husayn's regime
will not promote stabilization in the region. "This approach cannot ensure
nationwide credibility for these authorities and recognition of its
legitimacy by the entire international community," it says.

The Duma confirmed its earlier stance that the USA's and its allies'
military operation against Iraq without UN Security Council approval "was a
gross violation of international law".

The Russian parliamentarians pointed to the fact that the international
community has still not been provided with any evidence of Iraq's
production, storage or use of banned types of weapons.

The statement calls for investigating all civilian deaths, including those
of foreign journalists, and bringing the guilty to justice. In addition,
the deputies insisted that Russia be informed of the results of the
investigation "into the assault on a Russian diplomatic convoy in Iraq by
servicemen from the anti-Iraq coalition".

Remaining critical about the USA's and allies' actions against Iraq, the
State Duma realizes Russia's responsibility for maintaining strategic
stability in the world and considers it necessary to continue
Russian-American interaction in combating common global threats, including
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism.

*******

#14
Polyarnaya Zvezda (The Northern Star)
www.zvezda.ru
April 18, 2003
The World is Searching for a New Order: Will the US Define a New Place for
Russia?
An Interview with Nikolai Zlobin, Director of Russian and Asian Programs at
the Center for Defense Information in Washington DC
nzlobin@cdi.org

Q: What, in your opinion, are the reasons behind the actions of the
American administration and their war against Iraq?

I think the rationale behind American policies is dictated by the necessity
to reconsider the global system of security which, according to the White
House view, cannot safeguard American safety and does not correspond to the
country's national interests. Moreover, the issue of security has come to
the forefront of not just politics, but the national consciousness as well,
eclipsing the traditional American concern with the domestic economy.
American politics were forced to undertake serious changes in their
priorities, and that's why Bush's doctrine, along with the
military-oriented faction of the administration, is now leading the way. 

September 11 showed that there is no sure way to safeguard against
terrorism.  Not one traditional system of international security can
guarantee that, and it is therefore necessary to reconsider the very
fundamentals of these systems. This means reviewing international law and
the structure of international organizations that were created after the
second world war, and have served as the basis of the international
security arrangement ever since.  It's necessary for America to re-examine
the methods of safeguarding national security. I think America attempted to
use this approach with Iraq as its first step. 

It's not a fact that the operation has been successful from that point of
view, but sooner or later the international community will agree that the
current security arrangement requires reform. No one is debating that - the
discussion has focused on what reforms should be taken, and with what
goals. Under these circumstances of having a fantastic advantage over the
rest of the world, the US can proceed without consulting even its allies in
NATO or Western Europe. The major strategic goal of the American military
campaign in Iraq was to take the first step toward creating a new system of
ensuring America's national security, which in the White House's eyes would
become the new global security arrangement.

Q: How will the war in Iraq affect America's image in the world?

It appears that in the short term, this war will reflect quite negatively
on America's image. When someone does something unprecedented, it always
causes a negative reaction, and even if it turns out later that they were
right, and that it should have been don, the first reaction will be
negative. Any revolution, any dismantling of old laws will always cause a
negative reaction. What the US is calling for is nothing less than a
revolution in international relations and international law. I'm not saying
this revolution is for better or worse, that's not the point. A revolution
elicits a negative reaction from those who are used to living comfortably
and safely under the conditions of an old security arrangement. For Western
Europe, the second half of the 20th century was a golden age. And Russia
had fairly many geopolitical opportunities to influence foreign affairs.
Many countries found their place in the old arrangement, and knew the rules
of the game. That's why any attempt to change the system or reform the UN
is viewed as a negative development by those who stand to lose the most -
France, for instance. So it's natural that the world's reaction to the war
in Iraq should be extremely negative.

Q: What role would Europe, Russia, and the Near East play in this new
geopolitical arrangement?

We are opening a new page in the history of international relations, when
it's very difficult to formulate concepts such as "partners" and "allies".
The principles upon which partnerships were based in the post-war period no
longer apply. Moreover, it's hardly possible to create a bloc of countries
in close proximity to each other, as was the case with Western and Eastern
Europe, and then draw a geopolitical boundary. 

The new arrangement will be formed on the basis of less formal blocs, the
so-called flexible coalitions, which would be formed to deal with specific
problems and disband afterwards. Such a possibility should not be ignored.
Therefore, to say that Russia, Western Europe and the Near East will play a
particular role in the new system of international relations is not
entirely correct, because that role will shift depending on the particular
problem of the moment. 

We've already seen this - the anti-terrorist coalition is one thing, the
Afghan coalition is another, and the anti-Iraq coalition is something else
entirely. Countries don't necessarily belong to all three coalitions. Some
countries have remained US allies, but did not participate in any of the
coalitions. A time is coming when all the major players on the
international arena, (not to mention countries like India, Brazil,
Indonesia, and Japan, which are playing an increasingly greater role in
world politics and economics), will not be able to rely on formalized
partnerships and a clear demarcation of roles. Most likely, politics will
become more reactive, dealing with specific problems, which is actually a
situation fraught with dangers, since today's partners may enter into a
pitched argument tomorrow, and become opponents.

Q: Where do you see the future of the UN?

The UN in its present form, with the functions and duties that it was given
at its creation after WWII, requires very serious reform. First, the
ideology and structure of the UN's major organs should be changed. In part,
the structure of the Security Council is extremely archaic, because the
countries that compose it are there as a result of being victors in WWII.
Although France is only technically a winner - it entered the Security
Council thanks to a compromise, as a country that participated in the fight
against fascism. At the same time, countries that are not permanent members
of the Security Council include Germany, Japan (the world's second largest
economy), India (with its nuclear weapons and billion-strong population),
Indonesia, Pakistan, Brazil and many other countries, which cannot
understand why five countries who won the second world war sixty years ago
continue to resolve global problems within their own narrow circle. 

Moreover, the UN turned out to be poorly designed for dealing with
international terrorism. Naturally, in 1945 no one posed such questions,
and the UN was not as ready as we would have wished for problems of
globalization, environmental protection, etc. Most importantly, the UN was
not ready for dealing with problems that involved not sovereign states, but
non-state organizations like Al-Qaeda, where you cannot sign agreements
with them, or invite them to Security Council debates, or pass resolutions
about them, since they have no formal state-like functions. 

Until the mechanisms for dealing with such problems are developed, the UN
cannot become an effective international organization. The UN's fate is
partially in its own hands - it must reform not from the point of view of
self-preservation, but as an answer to those threats that the world
community faces today.

Q: Do you think the current situation with Iraq is comparable to the
situation in the Balkans of 1999? How would you analyze the behavior of
Russia and the EU in both cases?

I think that in both cases Russia and the EU took a "catch-up" position.
The EU especially could have taken a more proactive, leading role in
solving these problems, instead of waiting for the situation to become a
case of US bombing. Russia and Europe could have stepped in a lot earlier.
We saw this scenario in Iraq. 

The difference between how America sees the situation and how Russia and
the EU see the situation is that while everyone is interested in peace,
each side is interested in a different kind of peace. For the EU in Iraq
and in the former Yugoslavia the peace of the status quo was sufficient,
but for the US, the quality of the peace was also very important - the
country's political structure, transparency, and the behavior of its
government should correspond to international norms, and cannot pose a
threat either to their own people or to other governments. For the sake of
such a peace, they were ready to use force, while Russia and Europe were not.

Q: What changes does the American military doctrine face in light of the
new threats to the country's national interests?

The US military doctrine faces several serious changes. The first is the
idea of a preventive strike, which is not an invention of the US - we might
recall that the practice of using preventive strikes were part of
Brezhnev's doctrine. The Soviet Union used it in Hungary in 1956 and in
Czechoslovakia in 1968. The elimination of a potential threat before it
attacks a country is an idea that has long existed in world history, but
today it is becoming one of the keystones of American military doctrine. 

The second change is that American today feel less bound by international
law, since their viewpoint is that old laws and norms have lost their
meaning after the end of the cold war. A new era of struggle with
international terrorism has begun, and existing international institutions
demand, at the minimum, to be reformed if not replaced. 

The third change is the shift in the stance toward allies. The idea of
allied relations based primarily upon ideological principles is fading. In
its wake comes the idea of temporary alliances and partnerships. 

The changes will be numerous, and they will grow with the development of US
military technology. An important change in US policies is the doctrine of
limited sovereignty. Under the contemporary conditions of globalization,
Americans think that all governments should have full sovereignty and
independence with the exception of three cases: if they do not adhere to
the rules of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, if they wage
a war against their own people, and if they support international
terrorism. In such cases other countries must intervene, regardless of the
state's sovereignty, and take appropriate action. That's the situation we
are seeing in Iraq.

Q: Could the US, which suffered heavy casualties in wars with third world
countries while using only conventional weapons, use nuclear weapons?

It would be very difficult to imagine a situation where Americans would
suffer unacceptable casualties as a result of traditional warfare. Today's
US army is so far ahead of any potential military foe that this question
takes on a purely hypothetical character. But it's worthwhile to consider
the process of miniaturizing nuclear weapons, and the development of
tactical nuclear weapons which could be used to almost the same effect as
conventional weapons. There are big gaps in the international control over
tactical nuclear weapons. In the military doctrine of many countries, this
question is not discussed, and there is a possibility that such weapons may
someday be used.

Q: Should we expect a new anti-terrorist campaign from the US and if so,
against whom?

International terrorism is not represented by any government. It could be
represented by structures like the al-Qaeda, and it could be strengthened
if some government offers it a safe haven and opportunities, if it attempts
to legitimize it or support it with money or armaments. In that case, such
a government will become the next target of American policies, including
military policies. I hope that after Iraq there will not be such a naïve
political leadership that would agree to do that.

Q: Is Syria one of these governments in the eyes of the Americans?

For the American public opinion this is a completely new development. I
don't see Syria as the next military target. There needs to be some proof
that the Syrians are helping Saddam or the remnants of his regime. In any
case, to start a way against another Muslim government is, from the point
of view of securing America's national interests, not very pragmatic.
Therefore Syria will be under a close watch, but at the moment there is a
number of functioning mechanisms, including diplomatic and economic ones,
for bringing this country in line.

Q: What can Iran expect, in light of current events?

With Iran, the issue is how much Iranian society is capable of modernizing,
and to what extent any outside pressures will prevent the liberalization of
Iranian society, which is latently underway. There is an opinion in
Washington that any American attempts to pressure Iran will lead to a
crackdown on any dissident movements and sentiments within Iran, and a
greater centralization of power and further dogmatization of Iranian society. 

Regarding the development of weapons of mass destruction in Iran, including
nuclear weapons - this cannot be solved today without a corresponding from
the Russian side. Here Russian politics are becoming more realistic, but
Russia is still far from becoming an American ally on this issue. If Russia
and America unite and attempt to prevent the development of military
nuclear technology, it's unlikely that any military intervention will be
required.

Translated by Seva Gunitskiy

********

#15
Rosbalt
April 19, 2003
Image Problem Impedes Tourism Development in St. Petersburg
Katherine Ters contributed this article to Rosbalt. 

Despite the hype surrounding St. Petersburg's 300-year jubilee
celebrations, a serious image problem is impeding the development of the
northern capital's arguably most-important industry.

St. Petersburg's international tourism professionals say more needs to be
done to create a positive image of the city overseas. They say if tarnished
Soviet Intourist stereotypes are to be vanquished forever, it's vital that
politicians address the fundamental issues which make life difficult for
tourists in Russia, including complicated visa processes, the lack of
tourist information, poor service and crime and harassment.

St. Petersburg was declared one of the world's top-ten tourist
destinations, according to a UNESCO report, last year, which said that 30
million people wanted to visit Russia's cultural capital. St. Petersburg
competes with Prague, Vienna and Paris, and yet has drastically lower
visitor numbers than all three. 

Russia's Northwest Federal District - where St. Petersburg is located - is
about the same size as Eastern Europe. In terms of population, it can be
compared to the Czech Republic. In 2001, the Czech Republic received 103
million foreign visitors - whose spending was estimated to account for 5.3
percent of the country's GDP. In 2001, Northwest Russia had 2.8 million
foreign visitors, of whom 2.7 million visited St. Petersburg - according
the St. Petersburg city government. 

International and domestic visitor numbers have been growing at between six
and eight percent per year over the past five years, but local hoteliers
say these numbers would be higher if life was made easier for tourists. 

'St. Petersburg has very good potential as a major tourist city,' said
Lindsay Ellwood, Managing Partner at the local branch of KPMG. 'And there
is a growing realization that tourism - as an industry - can offer the city
a lot, but a whole process needs to occur for St. Petersburg to be able to
fulfill its tourism potential. That involves hotels, transport - making
transport more accessible for foreigners - and the general improvement of
the city's infrastructure,' he said.

While hotel development may take some time, at a more most basic level,
street and metro signs in the city center need to be in Roman script, as
well as Cyrillic. In 2002, some streets signs with bilingual script went up
on key streets around Nevsky Prospect, but, over the last month, a new
batch of Russian-only signs have appeared - ironic, considering the city is
expecting an unprecedented number of foreign guests from 60 different
countries during the jubilee.

Currently, detailed, multi-lingual information about the city's public
transport system is not readily available, and one of the city's
most-visited suburbs: Pushkin, does not even have a tourist information
office. 

The city authorities seem unaware that, unlike most Russian tourists, a
large number of international tourists prefer to sightsee independently and
may, in fact, abhor tedious Russian tours with their reverberating
loudspeakers. Several local hotel owners said that their guests frequently
complained about the lack of practical information in English about how to
get around the city. The Russian practice of closing tourist-information
centers on weekends and holidays, is not a great help either.

Despite the lack of multi-lingual resources in St. Petersburg's cultural
institutions, foreign tourists are still expected to pay through the nose
in most palaces, museums and theaters.
Foreigners at the Mariinsky Theater usually pay six times the Russian
price, while at the Hermitage, Russians pay 50 cents, while foreigners pay
USD 10 for entrance.

'There is a significant difference in income between most tourists and most
locals,' said Steven Caron, the director and owner of travel agency Sindbad
Travel and St. Petersburg's first international youth hostel. 'I can
appreciate that, but foreigner-prices leave a bad taste in the mouth of
tourists,' he said.

Rachel Shackleton, the owner and director of local training-company
Concept, said that she didn't have a problem with the idea of a structured
pricing policy.
'I think it's wonderful that Russians are so knowledgeable about their
culture, and that it is so accessible to them, but I don't think that
foreigners should be ripped off and we are ripped off.' 

Shackleton also said that if a theater was going to have western prices,
then it should have western standards. 'People have said to me that you pay
the same price in the Mariinsky as you pay in Convent Garden - and you do,'
she said. 'But at Convent Garden, you have a decent seat - with no-one
pushing into your box during the performance, and there aren't any
babushkas shouting at you.'

Angry babushkas are not an uncommon sight in Russia's cultural
institutions. Shackleton added that some customer-service training wouldn't
go astray at the Mariinsky or the Hermitage.
'Four years ago, Russia abolished foreigner prices on public transport,'
said one hotelier. 'The same approach should be taken with cultural
institutions and hotels because the vast majority of foreigners see the
two-tiered pricing policy as backward, exploitative and blatantly
discriminatory.' 

The wide-held belief in Russia that all foreigners are rich also makes
tourists a target for crime and harassment. People 'dressed as police'
routinely harass and rob foreign tourists. Last year, there were more than
300 reported cases of this kind of violence against foreigners in St.
Petersburg. Shackleton said that this problem is not being taken seriously
enough by the authorities. The city has set up a police help-line
specifically for foreigners, although one hotelier reported that the line
seemed to be rarely attended.

Russia is not known for its service, but in a tourist city like St.
Petersburg, it's surprising how rude and unhelpful people in the
customer-service and tourism industries often are.
'Russians sometimes associate the concept of service, or 'obsluzhivanie,'
with being servile, or less than the client,' said Caron. 'It's not about
that, it's about caring about your client and giving them the best
experience possible.'

'There is no history of customer service in Russia,' said Shackleton. 'So
you can't expect people to instantly become customer-oriented. It's not
natural. It's particularly difficult for people to understand the concept
of service when they have a limited experience of it themselves.'
Shackleton said that as more Petersburgers travel and experience good
service first-hand, the city's service levels would also improve.

While foreigner prices and bad service certainly annoy tourists, the red
tape associated with getting to Russia in the first place is probably the
most serious impediment to the development of St. Petersburg's tourism
industry. 
'The visa issue needs to be resolved,' said Paul Edwards, the manager at
St. Petersburg's Taleon Casino - which frequently brings international
groups to St. Petersburg. 'It's costing Russia millions in tourist dollars
every year.' 

New immigration laws - passed last July - did nothing to simplify the
immigration process. Foreigners are still required to obtain invitations
before they can apply for tourist visas, and to register their visas in
every town they visit for more then three days - two seemingly redundant
processes. 
'The new visa regulations are disappointing,' Caron said. 'The Ministry of
Foreign Affairs isn't considering the tourist economy.' 

In accordance with the new laws, tourist visas can only be issued for one
month. When backpacking and eco-tourism are among the fastest-growing
tourist sectors in western countries, it's surprising that the Russian
Government didn't consider that some tourists may want to stay in Russia
longer than a month, and in doing so, may inadvertently bring much-needed
foreign investment to Russia's impoverished regions.

The Federal Government needs to stop its tit-for-tat immigration policies
and look at ways to use tourism to really forward the country's economic
development. Slow, difficult and expensive visa processes mean that
tourists who are traveling on impromptu or short-notice trips, will simply
choose to go elsewhere.

One local tourist operator, who preferred to remain unnamed, said that St.
Petersburg was completely missing the weekend holiday market because of
scheduling issues at local airport Pulkovo. Government-owned Pulkovo
Aviation Enterprise operates the airport and runs an airline with the same
name. 

'To get the weekend market back, first, we need to be take the monopoly off
the airport,' she said. 'Scheduling limitations on international carriers
are making it difficult for people to come here for short trips on the
carrier of their choice. That, combined with visa hassles, means that most
Brits and Europeans just can't be bothered to come here,' she said.

Pulkovo's reputation hasn't improved any since the announcement in
mid-March that the airport would be closed to commercial flights during the
jubilee: from 30 May to 1 June.
International carriers will incur significant losses as a result, and many
individual tourists have had to purchase new visas with new departure dates
as airlines have announced they will delay their flights until after the
jubilee, rather than re-routing them through Helsinki, as the city
government suggested. 

Several hoteliers also said that St. Petersburg needs better marketing
strategies and more federal funding for regional tourism promotional
activities.
'The city government needs to determine their target markets and develop a
legitimate advertising campaign - particularly for winter,' Caron said.
'The UK, Germany, France, Scandinavia and the US are the most likely
targets,' he said.

Shackleton said that she thought that the city's cultural institutions
needed to cooperate better and focus on city promotional campaigns, rather
than just their own.
'Even just within the government, they need to start talking to one another
and developing a joint plan,' she said.

Thomas Noll, the general manager of the Corinthia Nevskij Palace Hotel on
Nevsky Prospect, thought that the city government's marketing efforts were
improving. 'The city government recognizes the importance of tourism and
they are starting to work together with the hoteliers of the city; they're
even asking our advice,' he said. 

'I also think the PR-effect of the 300-year celebrations, with thousands of
journalists coming to the city, will significantly uplift St. Petersburg as
a tourist destination.' 

Let's hope so.

********

Web page for CDI Russia Weekly: 
http://www.cdi.org/russia
Archive for Johnson's Russia List:
http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson
With support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and 
the MacArthur Foundation
A project of the Center for Defense Information (CDI)
1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW
Washington DC 20036