Johnson's Russia List
#7145
16 April 2003
davidjohnson@erols.com
A CDI Project
www.cdi.org
[Contents:
IMPORTANT REMINDER: JRL is on vacation until the end of this week.
But a few issues may slip through.
1. Reuters: Russia speeds up army reform, analysts skeptical.
2. Christian Science Monitor: Fred Weir, Iraqi defeat jolts Russian
military.
Defense and policy experts said last week that modernizing the Army is a top
priority.
3. AP: Sakharov's Widow Blocks Monument Plans.
4. Luba Schwartzman: TV1 Review.
5. AP: U.S. Ambassador: Russia, Iraq in Contact.
6. RFE/RL: Gregory Feifer, U.S./Russia: Relations In Question Amid Moscow's
Opposition To Iraq War.
7. Wall Street Journal: Pavel Felgenhauer, The Russian Connection.
8. Jamestown Foundation Russia and Eurasia Review: Nikolai Petrov,
THE WAR IN IRAQ AND THE MYTH OF PUTIN.
9. Rossiiskaya Gazeta: Alexander Baranov, WHO LOST AND WHO GAINED FROM THE
IRAQI WAR.
10. Rosbalt: US Ambassador to Russia: People Will See That the Iraqi People
Are Glad about What Has Happened.
11. PRNewswire: U.S. Senator Ted Stevens and U.S. Librarian of Congress Dr.
James H. Billington Announce Expansion of OPEN WORLD U.S.-Russia Exchange
Program.
12. Reuters: EU sees encouraging signs from Russia on Chechnya.
13. Novoe Vremya: SHADOW OF THE CHECHEN WAR. SERGEI KOVALEV COMMENTS ON
SITUATION IN CHECHNYA.
14. UPI: Sam Vaknin, Russia's younger brother. (re Ukraine)
15. Trud: STRAY VOTERS. AN INTERVIEW WITH IGOR BUNIN, PRESIDENT OF THE
POLITICAL TECHNOLOGIES CENTER.
16. Moscow Times: Yulia Latynina, White House Penitentiary For Ministers.]
********
#1
Russia speeds up army reform, analysts skeptical
April 15, 2003
By Maria Golovnina
MOSCOW (Reuters) - Russia said Tuesday it would step up efforts to
modernize its impoverished army and start to modify its mainly conscript
military into a more efficient volunteer force as soon as next year.
Military experts, however, were skeptical about the proposed acceleration
of reform, saying it was part of a wider political campaign ahead of
presidential elections slated for early 2004.
"Units with permanent combat readiness -- ground troops, paratroopers and
marine infantry... -- must be staffed with contract servicemen between
2004 and 2007," Interfax news agency quoted Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov
as saying.
Ivanov, seen as a close ally of President Vladimir Putin, previously said
the long-awaited shift toward a better trained and high-tech army would not
begin before 2007.
Putin, widely expected to win a second and final four-year term next year,
wants to transform the demoralized army, once the pride of the Soviet Union
and victorious in World War II, into a force able to respond to 21st
century threats.
Bullying and desertion are commonplace in the underfunded armed forces,
with the lowest paid conscripts barely earning enough to buy cigarettes.
Analysts said the government was more focused on parliamentary and
presidential elections next winter and spring than on speeding up the
possibly unpopular structural reforms.
"No one is going to seriously implement any such military reform in this
country," said Pavel Felgenhauer, an independent Moscow-based military
analyst.
"This is a pre-election year, and the motives behind (Ivanov's) words are
more than clear. His words will be forgotten in a year, and if not, it will
be announced that the budget did not allocate enough cash for the reform."
Ivanov, however, said preparations for the shift had almost been completed.
The Pskov 76th Paratrooper Division, which expects to be made up of 80
percent professional soldiers by September, has acted as guinea pig for the
reforms.
"This experiment has yielded positive and valuable results which helped us
make necessary changes to our federal program," he told a group of heavily
pro-Putin centrist factions in the State Duma lower house of parliament.
The 2004 budget is expected to give extra cash to fund more volunteer
units, but it is unclear how much money would be eventually allocated. Some
analysts estimate the changes would cost an extra $1 billion a year.
This year's budget spending is set at 2.346 trillion rubles, about $70
billion under the budgeted exchange rate.
*******
#2
Christian Science Monitor
April 16, 2003
Iraqi defeat jolts Russian military
Defense and policy experts said last week that modernizing the Army is a
top priority.
By Fred Weir | Special to The Christian Science Monitor
MOSCOW – In the US's easy defeat of Saddam Hussein's army, Russia sees a
lesson for its own conventional forces.
The Iraqi Army - which was cloned from the Red Army in the final decades of
the Soviet Union - mounted only a feeble defense before falling apart.
"The key conclusion we must draw from the latest Gulf war is that the
obsolete structure of the Russian armed forces has to be urgently changed,"
says Vladimir Dvorkin, head of the Russian Defense Ministry's official
think tank on strategic nuclear policy. "The gap between our capabilities
and those of the Americans has been revealed, and it is vast. We are very
lucky that Russia has no major enemies at the moment, but the future is
impossible to predict, and we must be ready."
The swift victory by mobile, high-tech American forces over heavily armored
Iraqi troops dug in to defend large cities like Baghdad has jolted many
Russian military planners. "The Iraqi Army was a replica of the Russian
Army, and its defeat was not predicted by our generals," says Vitaly
Shlykov, a former deputy defense minister of Russia.
Like its Soviet prototype, Iraq's Army was huge but made up mainly of
young, poorly trained conscripts. Its battle tactics called for broad
frontal warfare, with massed armor and artillery, and a highly centralized
command structure. But those forces were trounced in a few days by
relatively small numbers of US and British forces, who punched holes in the
Iraqi front using precision weapons and seized the country's power centers
more rapidly than traditional military thinkers could have imagined. "The
military paradigm has changed, and luckily we didn't have to learn that
lesson firsthand," says Yevgeny Pashentsev, author of a book on Russian
military reform. "The Americans have rewritten the textbook, and every
country had better take note."
Last week, the independent Council on Foreign and Defense Policy - a group
of top Russian military experts and former policymakers, including Mr.
Shlykov - met to assess the implications of the US triumph in Iraq for
Russia. Their conclusion: The Kremlin must drop all post-Soviet pretense
that Russia remains a superpower, and make rebuilding and redesigning the
nation's military forces a top priority. "We cannot afford to postpone this
any longer," Boris Nemtsov, head of the liberal Union of Right Forces, told
the meeting.
Twelve years after the USSR's collapse, the most unreformed branch of
Russian society remains its armed forces. Though its numbers have been
halved to about 1.2 million personnel, and its annual budget has dropped to
a mere $10 billion, the structure, weaponry, and doctrines of today's
Russian military remain those of its Soviet predecessor. Each Russian
defense minister since 1991 has pledged sweeping reform, yet more than half
of the Army's combat forces remain ill-trained conscripts required to serve
for two years for just 100 rubles ($3) a month. Aside from the strategic
nuclear forces, no branch of the Russian military has acquired significant
quantities of modern weaponry in more than a decade.
According to a Defense Ministry survey in early 2003, cited in the daily
Izvestia, more than a third of Russian officers and their families live
below the poverty line, and fewer than half of the officers want to remain
in the service.
Critics say that military manpower must be at least halved again, and the
draft abolished in order to make reform feasible. "We can afford an army
comparable to those of France or Britain, but hard decisions must be made,"
says Pavel Felgenhauer, an independent defense expert. Adequate spending
for equipment, training, and payment of professional troops is key, he says.
Others say that Russia also must define a clear post-Soviet security
doctrine. "How can we reform our Army when we have not defined the threats
it must deal with?" says Mr. Dvorkin. "We must first identify our national
interests, then we'll know who our enemies might be."
As the US prepared to invade Iraq, many Russian military experts warned
that American forces would come to grief in the streets of Iraqi cities.
Some predicted the battle of Baghdad would resemble the Russian Army's two
assaults on the Chechen capital of Grozny - in 1995 and again in 2000 -
each of which lasted more than a month and cost hundreds of Russian
casualties.
Early in the Iraq war, the Russian online newspaper Gazeta.ru reported that
two retired Soviet generals may have played a key role in designing Iraq's
defenses. The paper published photos of Vladimir Achalov, an expert in
urban warfare, and Igor Maltsev, a specialist in air defenses, receiving
medals from Iraq's defense minister two weeks before the war began. Russian
TV later quoted General Maltsev as saying "the American invaders will be
buried in the streets of Baghdad."
Some in Russia's military establishment still appear reluctant to accept
the sweeping military verdict in Iraq. "I think American dollars won the
war, it was not a military victory," says Gen. Makhmut Gareyev, president
of the official Academy of Military Sciences in Moscow. "The Americans
bought the Iraqi military leadership with dollars. One can only envy a
state that is so rich."
But others are obviously shaken. "Thank God our public has finally begun to
discuss the state of the Army," General Vladimir Shamanov, who commanded
Russian troops in two Chechnya wars, told a Moscow radio station after the
extent of the US-led triumph in Iraq became clear last week. "Maybe our
strategic nuclear forces will protect the country for another decade, but
then what? A strong Russia is impossible without a strong army."
One bright note for Moscow, however, is a report that Iraqi forces used
Russian-made, laser-guided antitank missiles to destroy several Abrams
tanks during the US attack. This could boost profits for Russian
armsmakers, who are already receiving inquiries from Syria and Iran,
according to Shlykov.
The US has complained that Russia supplied Iraq with defense equipment in
violation of UN sanctions. "As a result of the Iraq war and accusations of
illegal Russian arms deliveries, applications for Russian weapons have
soared," Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said last week.
********
#3
Sakharov's Widow Blocks Monument Plans
April 15, 2003
By SARAH KARUSH
MOSCOW (AP) - More than 12 years after Moscow's city council decided to
erect a statue of Soviet dissident and Nobel peace laureate Andrei
Sakharov, a city commission has finally given the green light to the
stalled plan. Now just one person stands in the way: Sakharov's widow, who
says today's Russia is not worthy of her husband's memory.
Yelena Bonner, a prominent human rights activist in her own right, said
honoring Sakharov is hypocritical because Russia has failed to live up to
his ideals.
``It seems to me that putting up a monument to Sakharov today would be a
very big deception,'' Bonner told The Associated Press from her home in
Boston.
A physicist who helped design the Soviet hydrogen bomb, Sakharov became a
staunch promoter of human rights and world peace, and spent seven years in
internal exile for speaking out. He won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1975.
In the years following his death in 1989, Sakharov was widely revered for
his contribution to the democratic changes that swept Russia during
perestroika and the Soviet collapse. In 1990, the Moscow city council
decided to erect a monument to him, but funds were not immediately found
and the plan fell by the wayside.
This year, Moscow officials again expressed support for the plan after
repeated appeals by federal lawmaker Sergei Yushenkov. But Bonner said that
while the idea of a monument made sense in 1990, it no longer is appropriate.
``Back then it was in line with society's mood, but in the past 12 years,
everything has changed. We don't know where Russia is going or whether it
needs Sakharov or not,'' Bonner said.
Bonner has been a harsh critic of President Vladimir Putin, who built his
career in the KGB, the same organization that tormented her and Sakharov.
Since Putin's election three years ago, KGB-style secrecy has increased and
media freedom has slipped, human rights advocates say.
Meanwhile, thousands of soldiers and civilians have perished in the war in
Chechnya. Except for a precarious three-year truce, Russian troops have
battled separatists there since 1994.
``All nine years he (Sakharov) would have been standing at protests against
the war in Chechnya with his hat off'' out of respect for the dead, Bonner
said. ``And this country is going to erect a monument to him?''
Long before Putin became president, a museum named after Sakharov was
established to help teach about the human rights abuses of the Soviet
regime and a Moscow street was named after him. He also has a bust at
Moscow State University.
On Wednesday, the city legislature's commission on monuments approved
Yushenkov's proposal but said it would go ahead only if Bonner approves.
Yushenkov agreed with Bonner that Russia had lost some ground on human
rights over the past years.
``Yelena Georgiyevna's feeling is on the mark,'' he said, referring to
Bonner by her first name and patronymic. ``We are seeing a backlash. But we
can't just silently watch it happen.''
A monument to Sakharov would help remind Russians ``that the outstanding
sons of our country clashed with the government'' over human rights,
Yushenkov said.
Yushenkov and other Sakharov admirers would raise money for the monument if
Bonner changes her mind, he said. Moscow officials told him a monument
would cost about $600,000.
Possible locations for the statue include Moscow's Sakharov Avenue and the
area around the Sakharov Museum. The city commission ruled out the site
originally chosen in 1990: Pushkin Square, where Sakharov was frequently
seen at pro-democracy rallies. The site is off-limits to new monuments,
Yushenkov quoted the commission as saying.
********
#4
TV1 Review
www.1tv.ru
Compiled by Luba Schwartzman (luba_sch@hotmail.com)
Research Analyst, Center for Defense Information, Moscow office
HEADLINES
Monday, April 14, 2003
- Russian President Vladimir Putin met with key government
ministers to discuss the results of his meetings with the French and
German presidents as well as his upcoming meeting with Kazakh
President Nursultan Nazarbaev. Putin and Nazarbaev will pay
special attention to cooperation in the border-regions.
- President Putin met with Transportation Minister Gennady
Fadeev to discuss tariffs on passenger and freight transport. The
Minister promised that there will be no price hikes in the near
future.
- Deputy chief of the Kremlin administration, Dmitry Kozak, noted
that changes will be made to the Tax and Budget codes, which will
allow the introduction of a package of bills on local self-
government.
- A commission has been formed in Chechnya to handle
compensations to Chechen residents who have lost their homes.
Head of the Chechen government Anatoly Popov declared that
every person will receive the cost of 18 square meters of housing,
or 136,000 rubles ($4,250).
- Head of the Central Electoral Commission Aleksandr
Veshnyakov asserted that the next presidential elections in the
Republic of Chechnya could be held as early as in October of this
year. Most likely, he noted, it will be held in December, along with
the elections to the State Duma or in March of next year, along
with the election of the President of Russia.
- Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov will travel to Luxembourg
to attend a meeting of the Russia-European Union Cooperation
Council. At the top of the agenda during the Luxembourg meeting
will be preparations for the May 31 Russia-EU Summit in St.
Petersburg and the introduction of a visa-free regime between
Russia and the member nations of the European Union.
- The First Annual Petr Stolypin National Awards were presented
in Moscow. Organizers will honor Russia's "agrarian elite" every
year, on the birthday of great agrarian reformer, Petr Stolypin.
Categories include "most effective farming enterprise director."
- Russian Ambassador to Iraq Vladimir Titorenko arrived to
Moscow from Damask, Syria. Titorenko's wounded driver,
remains in Damask.
- A secret ammunition cache was discovered in the Samara Oblast.
It contained 4 explosive devices, two detonators, a grenade, a gun
and bullets. Federal security service officers suspect that the
weapons and ammunition were either brought in from Chechnya or
stolen from army arsenals on the oblast territory.
- Renowned Italian opera singer Luciano Pavarotti will perform in
St. Petersburg, during the celebrations of the 300th anniversary of
the city, and then give a solo concert in Moscow.
- Four exposition halls in the Winter Palace will host 1,500 display
items dedicated to the era of Peter the Great.
- Russian surgeons received an award at the International
Exhibition of Inventions of Geneva for a portable "operation room" -- a
briefcase-sized device that makes possible heart operations in
extreme conditions.
- Border guards on the Kamchatka have detained seven poacher
ships over the past few days.
- A young woman who spent 10 days in China has been
hospitalized. Fellow passengers noted that she had symptoms
indicative of the severe acute respiratory syndrome.
- The number of Russian cities affected by spring flooding is
growing. The situation is most serious in the Southern and Volga
federal districts.
- A storm warning is in effect in the Black-Sea region of
Krasnodarsk Krai.
********
#5
U.S. Ambassador: Russia, Iraq in Contact
April 15, 2003
By VLADIMIR ISACHENKOV
MOSCOW (AP) - The U.S. ambassador to Russia said Washington had been aware
of contacts between Russian and Iraqi spy agencies, but added that the
United States needed to gather more facts before coming to a definite
conclusion on the subject.
``We knew that there were contacts between the intelligence services of
Iraq and Russia,'' Ambassador Alexander Vershbow was quoted as saying in an
interview published Tuesday in the Russian daily Vremya Novostei. ``But
it's still too early to make any assessments. We need more facts.''
There was no immediate reaction from either Russia's Foreign Ministry or
Foreign Intelligence Service.
Russian intelligence officials have repeatedly denied having any links with
Iraqi spy services, but several recent British and U.S. newspaper reports
cited documents found at the office of the Iraqi spy service, Mukhabarat,
that showed Iraq was receiving intelligence assistance from Russia.
The British Sunday Telegraph said a report dated March 5, 2002, told of a
Russian official passing information about a conversation between British
Prime Minister Tony Blair and Italian Premier Silvio Berlusconi on Iraq.
Another document apparently signed by an Iraqi agent and dated Nov. 27,
2000, claimed that Russian officials had provided a list of potential
assassins, The Sunday Telegraph reported.
Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), a KGB successor, has said the
``unfounded'' allegations were not worthy of comment.
The San Francisco Chronicle offered more alleged evidence of cooperation
between the Russian and Iraqi spy services. Documents found at the
Mukhabarat office showed that at least five Iraqi agents had graduated in
September 2002 from a two-week course in surveillance and eavesdropping
techniques in Moscow.
The newspaper said it wasn't immediately clear whether the center was a
privately-run firm or a government agency, but cited U.S. analysts saying
it would be highly unlikely that any private Russian company could train
foreign intelligence agents without government permission.
A search through Russian government and commercial business directories
found no company matching the Chronicle's description.
If proven, intelligence cooperation between Russia and Iraq could further
strain Moscow's ties with Washington.
The U.S. administration has accused Russian companies of shipping anti-tank
missiles, night goggles and jamming devices to Iraq, possibly via third
countries - allegations Moscow has vehemently denied.
Despite the strain, Vershbow said President Bush still plans to visit St.
Petersburg at the end of May for a long-planned summit with Russian
President Vladimir Putin.
********
#6
U.S./Russia: Relations In Question Amid Moscow's Opposition To Iraq War
By Gregory Feifer
Washington and London are appealing to critics of the war in Iraq not to
obstruct agreements over Iraq's future. Moscow is currently leading
opposition to U.S. policy over the Middle East country as increasing
evidence emerges of Russia's role in providing arms, intelligence, and
training to Baghdad. With analysts unanimously warning that the current
Kremlin line is leading to a dead end for Russian foreign policy, are there
signs of rapprochement?
Moscow, 15 April 2003 (RFE/RL) -- As plans for Iraq's postwar
reconstruction are set in motion, the United States and Britain are asking
critics of the Iraqi war to help overcome the massive difficulties in
reaching political agreement by playing a constructive role in the matter.
British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw today aimed criticism at permanent
United Nations Security Council members Russia and France, which have
deflated hopes they would set aside their strident opposition to the war.
He spoke to reporters at the U.S. Central Command base in Qatar: "It is a
responsibility of all members of the [United Nations] Security Council, but
particularly those with vetoes, not to play games but to recognize this new
reality [in Iraq] and to move forward, making decisions on their merits for
the benefits of the Iraqis."
While leaders of the so-called peace camp -- France, Russia, and Germany --
have dampened their antiwar rhetoric in recent weeks, Russia has led the
refusal to engage in dialogue over U.S. plans for Iraq's postwar
reconstruction, an issue Moscow says should be returned to the Security
Council for a decision. The United States and Britain insist the UN will
play a "vital" role, but not the central one.
Speaking at a conference on peace and security last week, Russian President
Vladimir Putin called for international cooperation. "I think it is
extremely important to strengthen multilateral international cooperation,
which has been until now the foundation of international stability and
security," he said.
But Putin's calls for a "multipolar" world are primarily seen as a means of
criticizing U.S. global might.
The Russian president has in recent days kept the door open for further
disagreements with Washington over Iraq, saying that in failing to find any
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq so far, the United States had failed to
meet its war objectives. "Then what was being fought for and what were the
goals?" he asked.
But it is practical cooperation with Baghdad rather than rhetoric that
Moscow analysts most fear will pose serious problems for U.S.-Russia
relations.
U.S. troops invading Iraq were surprised by Iraqi forces' use of advanced
Russian-made antitank missiles and other technology. Moscow insists it did
not sell weapons to Iraq, but its assurances do not convince military
experts, who point to a murky illicit arms market involving dealers in
third countries that likely helped provide supplies to Baghdad in violation
of UN sanctions.
Last week, RFE/RL reported from Iraq that U.S. soldiers found a letter in
Baghdad from a Russian weapons firm apparently offering to sell millions of
dollars' worth of conventional arms.
Over the weekend, Britain's "The Daily Telegraph" also reported evidence
recovered from an intelligence service complex in Baghdad showing Russia
cooperated with Baghdad on intelligence. Among the accusations is that
Moscow shared eavesdropped conversations between Blair and Italian Prime
Minister Silvio Berlusconi and provided lists of available assassins in
Europe.
The "San Francisco Chronicle" meanwhile reported evidence indicating Russia
trained Iraqi intelligence agents as recently as last fall. The Russian
Foreign Intelligence Service has lambasted the accusations and refused to
comment further.
U.S. experts are studying the evidence. U.S. Ambassador to Russia Alexander
Vershbow said in an interview in "Vremya novostei" published today that
Washington needs to collect more information before reaching a final
conclusion over the allegations.
Robert Nurick is director of the Moscow Carnegie Center. He said it is
important to separate Moscow's current policy on Iraq's future from
allegations of military cooperation, which could have "very serious
political consequences" for U.S.-Russia relations. "The allegations in the
press about arms sales and intelligence sharing are obviously potentially
explosive, and if proven, could have a very large effect on the underlying
political basis for serious post-Iraq rapprochement," he said.
In terms of reaching agreement over Iraq in the Security Council, Nurick
said Moscow can establish a more constructive relationship with the United
States -- and has indicated it wants to. But he added that Putin has yet to
show signs of doing so, including during a summit last weekend with the
French and German leaders in St. Petersburg.
"What I haven't seen yet is a clear recognition of what I think is going to
be necessary to [establish better ties]. One of those things is to start
talking directly to the United States, talking more quietly to the United
States, and not leaving the impression -- as I think, unfortunately, the
meeting in St. Petersburg seems to have done in Washington -- that what
they're still trying to do essentially is organize and coordinate a set of
positions among those who are opposed to U.S. and British policy," Nurick
said.
One of the means at Moscow's disposal to help repair ties with Washington
is forgiving Iraqi debt. Legislators balked at such a suggestion from the
Pentagon last week, but Putin said on 11 April that Russia would consider
the proposal at a June meeting of the Group of Eight leading industrial
nations in France. He said the matter should be addressed through the Paris
Club of creditor countries.
Iraq owes Russia approximately $8 billion, one of the key justifications
Moscow cited for opposing the U.S.-led war. The Carnegie Center's Nurick
said forgiving some or all of the debt would constitute a useful political
gesture.
Andrei Zagorskii is deputy director of Moscow's Institute for Applied
International Studies. He said Russia will likely agree to reduce its
claims in accordance with decisions made in the Paris Club. "I think it's a
working issue because it would be hard to expect that Moscow would receive
the entire debt -- or at least a decision to honor it -- from the future
Iraqi government. On the other hand, receiving even part of it -- to be
decided in negotiations -- would be a plus for Russia because no one
expected Saddam Hussein would repay the money. The debt has been a dead
weight all these years," Zagorskii said.
Vershbow said U.S. President George Bush still plans to travel to St.
Petersburg for a summit with Putin at the end of next month. Moscow is
meanwhile continuing its criticism, today condemning Washington's warnings
to Syria not to hide former top Iraqi officials.
Russian media also lashed out against Washington on the issue today, with
the respected "Kommersant" daily saying: "Appetites grow in war. The Iraqi
crisis has been transformed into a Syrian one."
********
#7
Wall Street Journal
April 15, 2003
The Russian Connection
By PAVEL FELGENHAUER
Looting in Baghdad seems to be subsiding after a few days of freedom, but
the first real booty of any value has now hit the marketplace: Iraqis are
offering the multitude of journalists stationed in town secret files and
documents they had "found" in government offices. There could soon be a
tide of revelations that may implicate different countries and prominent
figures that contacted or worked with Saddam during the years.
France might well worry about what turns up regarding tight Paris-Baath
Party relations. But the first crop to come up implicates Russia.
Russian military and intelligence services did cooperate closely with the
Saddam Hussein regime before the war to liberate Kuwait in 1991 and the
demise of the Soviet Union the same year. After 1991 the relationship
didn't end. In fact it may have gotten steadily closer during the 1990s.
Now the cloak of secrecy is unraveling and documents implicating Moscow
have gone public, which may reflect the multitude of contacts and the mass
of related documents.
Britain's Sunday Telegraph reports this week on a letter from the Iraqi
Embassy in Moscow which included details of Russian arms deals with Syria,
Kuwait and other countries. The reported information is accurate: officials
have told me that Syria did indeed receive in 1999 "Kornet" guided
anti-tank missiles, some of which, apparently, were later sent to Iraq and
used against U.S. armor in recent weeks. Israel together with Russia did
produce a jointly made AWAC-style plane for China, but Washington pressured
the Israelis to stop the delivery in 2000.
These arms deals are not much of a secret, but if the arms trade file is
authentic other documents in the batch may be genuine too. According to a
pro-Kremlin website, Russia and Iraq signed agreements to share
intelligence, help each other to "obtain" visas for agents to go to other
countries and to exchange information on the activities of Osama bin Laden.
Unnamed intelligence officials have told journalists in Moscow that Russian
contacts with the Saddam regime aimed at combating terrorism, the narcotics
trade and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction were legitimate.
Perhaps. But why would anyone in Moscow send to Baghdad a transcript of a
conversation held in Rome last year between Tony Blair and Silvio
Berlusconi, obtained through intelligence services? It's harder still to
imagine why the Kremlin would send Saddam a detailed list of prospective
assassins.
People in Moscow well acquainted with the activities of the Russian
intelligence agencies today do not dismiss any accusations out of hand. But
there's a twist. After the demise of the Soviet Union, the state in Russia
has been privatized, including much of the intelligence network. One may
buy any service, if the price is right.
A high ranking government official told me last week that, for half a year
or more, Russian secret services, including military intelligence and KGB
successor agencies, were lobbying the Kremlin and President Vladimir Putin
to back Saddam in the coming confrontation with the U.S.-led coalition. I
was also told that Russian oil companies and other businesses that trade
with Iraq actually contracted Russian spies to do the lobbying.
It's impossible to know for sure at present how true this story is. It's a
fact that Russian military and other intelligence agencies are manned by
people who are genuinely anti-American. Many of them may not need to be
bribed much to get deeply involved in activities that could worsen
relations with Washington and help Saddam.
Cooperating with Iraqi intelligence, selling Baghdad secrets or sensitive
military equipment in violation of sanctions, may be considered by many in
Moscow a patriotic activity: A way to earn a living and serve one's country
at the same time.
It's a fact, for example, that till the last days of combat in Baghdad the
Kremlin was receiving reports that the U.S. military has been bogged down,
its campaign plan is in tatters, and that Moscow together with France might
soon have to be called in to organize a ceasefire under U.N. auspices. The
Russian Navy has even sent a task force with up to 150 marines to the
Indian Ocean to take part in a possible disengagement agreement between
allied and Iraqi forces. (Since it had to come a long way, it will arrive
in the Gulf later this month. Sometimes never is better than late.)
This determined campaign to misinform the Kremlin and Russian public on the
course of the war and the possible repercussions of the liberation of Iraq
was apparently one of the main reasons Mr. Putin took such a resolute
anti-American stand. The sudden collapse of Saddam's regime has not changed
the situation much in one sense: The anti-Americanism of Russian military
and intelligence officials is even more bitter that before.
Russia today does more business with Iran, including nuclear technology,
arms sales and arms production, than it did with Iraq in the 1990s. With
Saddam out of the way, members of Russian intelligence agencies who are
often doing work on the side (like self-employed entertainers, they must
supplement their meager incomes) will be flocking to help deepen the ties
with Tehran and at the same time make the rift with Washington permanent.
In recent years no one has been punished in Russia for illicit arms trade
with Iraq or for cooperating closely with Iran or Syria. This is not a
coincidence: Informed sources say the Russian counterintelligence service
-- the FSB -- was a leading party of the pro-Saddam lobby. Any amount of
disclosure in the Western press will not change their mode of operation.
It perhaps may be too much to hope that, given how woefully inadequate
their intelligence on the situation on the ground in Iraq was, the
political clout of the Russian intelligence services will diminish now. But
we can at least hope.
Mr. Felgenhauer is a Moscow-based independent defense analyst.
********
#8
Jamestown Foundation
www.jamestown.org
Russia and Eurasia Review
Volume 2, Issue 8
April 15, 2003
THE WAR IN IRAQ AND THE MYTH OF PUTIN
By Nikolai Petrov
The war in Iraq has had a strong impact on the domestic politics of many
countries, including Russia. Its influence can be seen, for example, in the
postponement of Vladimir Putin's annual address to the Federal Assembly; in
the demarche of the left and Zhirinovskyites in the State Duma; and in the
latter's refusal to debate ratification of the Strategic Offensive Weapons
Agreement. The war has also driven discussion of the referendum on Chechnya
and attendant hopes for peaceful resolution of the conflict back into the
political shadows.
These developments are particularly important given the approaching
parliamentary and presidential elections, which in Russia are the main
political battles of the four-year cycle.
THE WAR AND THE ELECTIONS
Every Russian election has had its heroes and its wars, domestic and
foreign. In 1999-2000 it was Kosovo and Chechnya; now it's Chechnya and
Iraq. Last time it was Yevgeny Primakov, with his dramatic mid-air U-turn
over the Atlantic, who emerged as the hero of the Balkan war. But this
advantage was checked by the Chechen war, which lifted Putin into the
presidency over the head of Primakov, his most serious potential challenger.
This time around Putin's dominance is indisputable. Positive developments
in either war, such as a demonstration of Russia's foreign policy
"weightiness" in Iraq, or a rebel capitulation in Chechnya, will work to
the advantage of the president. And if something should go wrong--such as
the earlier hostage-taking in Moscow--Putin can shift the blame onto his
ministers and generals. The electorate's perceptions are governed by the
traditional formula of "good Tsar, bad boyars."
Many analysts see a near-mythical "Putin phenomenon" at work. But the
Russian leader has been careful to maintain the Putin myth. Note the
calculated way in which the political arena has been cleared of any real
heroes other than the president himself. Apart from Putin, there are only
his henchmen and villains. Nobody would think of giving credit for the
country's foreign policy to one of the Ivanovs (Sergei or Igor, defense and
foreign ministers, respectively). Or that a hero of the Chechnya conflict
might be ex-mufti Akhmad Kadyrov or one of the generals. Thanks to the
artful use of propaganda, assisted by the government-controlled media,
things that need publicizing are publicized and things that don't are
buried. Sometimes the president is given center-stage. But when it is
convenient, he becomes invisible.
AGAINST WHOM ARE WE MAKING FRIENDS?
Incumbency does bring some risks for the president, a factor that was not
present in the last elections (thanks to Putin's ability to distance
himself from Yeltsin). The president cannot avoid some responsibility for
the course of events in the country, and he has to show some progress with
regard to his pre-election promises on Chechnya, the economy, the
oligarchs, corruption, housing reform and other issues.
There is, meanwhile, a huge gulf between the president's high personal
rating and the public's very critical evaluation of actual results in
practically every area of life, with the exception of foreign policy. And
although his foreign policy successes are acknowledged by the public, they
have had little impact on the life of the ordinary citizen, beyond some
satisfaction that Russia finally has a leader it doesn't need to be ashamed
of and that its voice can be heard around the world. But given the ongoing
dissatisfaction with the domestic social, economic and political situation,
the president may become a hostage to his own popularity. As elections
approach, his rating can only go down, so his freedom of action may become
ever more limited.
In each past election, voters have been mobilized by negative
consolidation: uniting in the face of a common foe. In 1996, the communists
were the enemy. In 1999-2000, that role was assigned to the Chechen
terrorists.
It could be that American imperialism will play this role in the next round
of elections. Society would be happy with this. But Putin is not, since
this would mean wiping out all his foreign policy gains, raising awkward
questions about what Russia got for its friendship with the United
States--except, that is, for new American bases around Russia's borders.
Such a change of course would risk damaging his image and puncturing the
myth.
SOCIETY'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE WAR
At first glance, Russian public reaction to the war in Iraq looks much the
same as elsewhere in Europe, although the protests have been fewer and less
energetic. However, the Russian public's negative attitude towards the war
has quite different roots. It is an explosive mix of Soviet and post-Soviet
phobias and complexes, linked together by the painful experience of loss of
superpower status.
There are elements of the old refrain: "We stand with our brother Arabs
against the American-Israeli aggressor." Such sentiments stand alongside
the new resentment of a fallen superpower facing the American "might makes
right" philosophy. Economic interests are of marginal importance, despite
the fact that the Iraqi debt issue has been endlessly raked over by the
media in recent months.
In fact, the Russian reaction is emotional rather than rational. It is a
question of "us versus them," and while Iraq is not really "one of us,"
America is very clearly "them." It also reflects a sense of justice, and of
the strong picking on the weak. Ordinary Russians relate not to the
Americans, but to the defeated Iraqis. And the slogan "Yesterday
Yugoslavia, today Iraq, tomorrow Russia!" has some resonance. The actions
of the United States are seen as a greater threat to Russia than anything
connected to the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein.
A recent poll by the All-Russian Center for Public Opinion Studies (VTsIOM)
found just 2 percent approve of the U.S. military action, while 83 percent
are opposed. This is not a matter of pro-Iraqi, but of anti-American
feeling. Only 45 percent sympathize with the Iraqis, 46 percent are
undecided and a mere 5 percent back the Americans.
For the time-being, this anti-Americanism is of a spontaneous, grass-roots
nature. It has not been orchestrated by either the authorities or, to any
significant extent, by the opposition (although it has been gently
encouraged by the media). Neither the parties nor the authorities need
protests right now. The opposition senses that there is little capital to
be made from Putin's foreign policy--especially given that Foreign Minister
Igor Ivanov's sharp statements have preempted their own criticism.
Apart from gestures from the likes of Vladimir Zhirinovsky (a trip to
Baghdad) or Gennady Zyuganov (a protest outside the American embassy),
Russian politicians have shown considerable restraint in their
anti-Americanism. All have condemned the war. The Federation Council issued
a declaration condemning U.S. "aggression," but nevertheless wanted to call
on the Duma to ratify the Strategic Offensive Weapons Agreement, until
Ivanov persuaded them to drop it for the time being.
The military has adopted a low-key posture, apart from some technical
commentaries by currently serving generals. Some retired "Soviet hawks",
such as Valery Manilov and Leonid Ivashov, are back in action, however.
CONCLUSIONS
The reaction of ordinary Russians to the war has been very negative, while
the political classes have, for once, been rather restrained.
The approaching elections could amplify the public discontent and put Putin
in an increasingly difficult position--between the hammer of American
pressure and the anvil of public hostility to the war. In a sense, he has
become another casualty of the war in Iraq. He cannot support the Americans
for the one simple reason that this would be seen as a sign of weakness and
destroy his myth. And he cannot come out strongly against the war for a
different reason: It would be tantamount to admitting that he had been
wrong to cooperate with the United States in the war on global terrorism.
And given the Putin-centric character of the Russian political system, a
threat to Putin is a threat to the much-vaunted stability of the system
itself.
By reviving old complexes and phobias among the population, the war
strengthens the "hawks" and the country's security elite. It confirms their
embattled outlook on the world and their belief in strengthening the state
by military and police methods. (A logic that is already firmly buttressed
by the war in Chechnya.)
If this trend continues, then the next elections may be deluged by a
torrent of militaristic rhetoric, myths and symbols. What Russia really
needs--and what no election has yet managed to engender--is a full and
constructive discussion of the political and economic options for the
country's future development. Yet both government and opposition may prefer
militaristic rhetoric over socioeconomic reality.
Washington's global role is also shifting dramatically. The United States
is moving from being a model of democracy to the world's policeman, and
from an exporter of democratic values and institutions to one purveying the
philosophy of force. The Soviet Union is viewed differently in this respect
too. Previously, nostalgia for Soviet times was based on its stability and
socioeconomic guarantees. Few people saw much value in the Soviet Union's
global ambitions. But now, Russians are newly aware of the Soviet Union's
claims to stand for global justice and political protection for the
oppressed. This can only increase the pressure on Putin to take a more
assertive stance in foreign policy.
Nikolai Petrov is head of the Center for Political Geographic Research and
is a leading research associate with the Institute of Geography at the
Russian Academy of Sciences.
********
#9
Rossiiskaya Gazeta
No. 71
April 2003
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
WHO LOST AND WHO GAINED FROM THE IRAQI WAR
By Alexander BARANOV, economist
Not long ago US Secretary of State Colin Powell accused
Syria and Iran of attempts to acquire weapons of mass
destruction and of supporting terrorism. He hastened to add,
though, that his statement did not amount to US preparations
for a war against these countries. But the target was chosen
with top precision:
Iraq is one of the three world leaders in oil resources, while
Iran has the world's second largest gas resources.
As it is, Iraq-related collisions are more than enough now.
The more so that financiers and businessmen across the world
are waiting for a global re-division of the oil market and
re-distribution of investment resources provoked by the war.
US Economy: the Locomotive of Aggression
Unemployment in the USA still amounted to 5.8% in March
and American companies are not in a hurry to hire new staff.
Negative dynamics on the labour market for a long time may
result in yet another fall in consumption in the USA and
backfire at the GDP.
However, this situation cannot be explained by the Iraqi
war. Rather, the financiers believe that the reverse is true:
one of the main tasks of the US administration, which launched
the Iraqi war, was to draw the attention of the global public,
notably investors, from fundamental problems in the US economy.
However, the dynamics of the US stock indicators shows that the
USA has not attained this goal yet. Structural problems persist
despite positive news from the Gulf zone. The Americans clearly
wanted to exploit the situation of 18 months ago, when the
gung-ho spirit of the victorious operation in Afghanistan fed
the US stock market growth for nearly six months and all
structural problems of the US economy were explained by the
September 11, 2001 terrorist action.
But Iraq is not Afghanistan. If the USA gets a hold in the
region, it would acquire a new market for its commodities and
services in return for cheap energy resources.
What Will Russia Get?
The Iraqi war has damaged those Russian companies which
had business contacts with Baghdad. The winners' plans of
distributing contracts on the rehabilitation of Iraq, worth 900
million dollars, among American companies have made Russian
firms ponder the probability of further cooperation with Iraq.
Some of the victims intend to institute proceedings against the
USA, though in most cases they did not lose but their profits
declined. Only very few companies sustained direct losses.
Speaking about indirect Russian losses, experts focus
their attention on the expected oil prices following the
invasion of Iraq by the coalition forces and the overthrow of
Saddam Hussein's government.
We'll Start Worrying at 17 Dollars per Barrel
Experts say that the macroeconomic stability of Russia
will not be endangered unless Brent oil prices are kept below
15 dollars for 12 months. But this is an improbable scenario,
as it will clash with the interests of most oil producers who
can influence the oil market.
The speed of rouble devaluation and changes of other
macroeconomic indicators will largely depend on what the
Russian government and Central Bank do. If Brent oil prices are
kept up above 20 dollars per barrel, changes in macroeconomic
forecasts for 2003 will be insignificant and limited to mostly
the GDP growth rate (3.5% as against 4.5%) and the inflation
level. If oil prices fall to 20 dollars, budget surplus may
give way to budget deficit. And yet, unless prices drop to 17.5
dollars per barrel, the Russian government will not have to
search for additional sources of money, using instead its
financial reserve fund.
Winners and Losers
So, only two countries - the USA and Britain - directly
benefited from the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. First, they got
dividends of winners, and second, they got markets for their
companies and guaranteed delivery of cheap energy resources.
Israel has a good chance of getting direct benefits from this
war. It is studying the possibility of restoring and expanding
the 600 km-long oil pipeline from Mosul (Iraq) to Haifa
(Israel).
China and Germany will get indirect benefits from the
victory of the Anglo-American coalition. Their economies badly
need the prices of energy resources to go down. China's
pragmatism became evident even before the invasion, when the
Chinese Foreign Ministry hinted that Beijing would take a
neutral stand in the UN.
The biggest losers are France and Russia. No wonder that
the French government actively criticised the military solution
to the Iraqi problem and Russia's stand was maximally close to
that of France. To them, Iraq was a market; both Russia and
French companies are Iraqi creditors. Their oil companies had
business in Iraq and their corporations worked energetically
within the framework of the UN Oil for Food programme.
*******
#10
Rosbalt
April 15, 2003
US Ambassador to Russia: People Will See That the Iraqi People Are Glad
about What Has Happened
US Ambassador to Russia Alexander Vershbow happened to be in Saint
Petersburg during the recent international summit between leaders of
Russia, Germany and France. As a result, there was some speculation that
the US might in fact play a secret role in the meeting between Vladimir
Putin, Gerhard Schroeder and Jacques Chirac. While he was here, Mr Vershbow
answered some questions asked by Rossiya television channel. Rosbalt has
decided to publish this interview.
Is it a mere coincidence that you are in Saint Petersburg at the same time
as a top-level meeting between the leaders of Russia, Germany and France?
It is just a coincidence. I am opening two exhibitions here, connected with
the city's anniversary. Of course we hope that the meeting of heads of
state here will be a step towards global consensus. It's a shame that we
were unable to form a united front against Saddam Hussein before the war
and that the UN Security Council was split. However, this is all in the
past and now we have an opportunity to find a common approach to the
post-war situation in Iraq. It is extremely important, in my opinion, that
the Security Council does not repeat its recent mistakes.
What mistakes do you mean?
Members of the Security Council failed to agree on resolution N1441. Saddam
Hussein saw this lack of unity and refused to comply.
Is it possible that while US troops are in Iraq Europe could decide to form
a different organisation?
We already have a good security organisation in the UN Security Council.
Without unity and consolidation though this forum will not function in
future crises and that will be bad for all concerned.
Hasn't the UN Security Council become redundant?
I think we simply need to improve the existing format of the Security Council.
There has been a lot of talk recently that George Bush may not come to
Russia on the anniversary of Saint Petersburg as a result of the situation
in Iraq...
As far as I am aware, he is still planning to visit Saint Petersburg.
What will be the topics of discussion during this visit?
I think there will be a lot of ceremonies. Afterwards there will be a G-8
summit in France, where they will discuss any necessary action in Iraq and
also the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran. In addition, the war on
international terrorism remains on everyone's agenda.
Is it possible that the US will attack other countries?
I think it will be better next time. I hope the UN Security Council will be
able to persuade North Korea not to develop nuclear weapons.
What happens though, if the Security Council is again unable to reach a
consensus?
In that case the US would have to reconsider its position.
Recent surveys show that Russians' opinions of the US went down after the
start of the military campaign in Iraq. There is probably a similar
situation in those countries which are not a part of the anti-Iraq
coalition. What are your thoughts on this?
Of course it is not pleasant. On the other hand, it is not surprising that
public opinion turned against us during the war. I hope that people will
soon see that the Iraqi people are genuinely glad about what has happened
and that we are making every effort to create a democratic state in Iraq
and provide some economic growth for the country. When people realise this
they will understand our reasons for invading Iraq and their attitude to
the US will change.
The post-war plan for Iraq is now the most important issue and many people
are wondering what will happen to Iraq's debts to other countries,
including Russia:
That is a difficult question. We intend to organise a conference of
creditors in order to discuss ways of finding a balance between the rights
of the creditors and the rights of the Iraqi people to develop their
economy. In my opinion, it would be unwise to immediately demand large sums
of money from the new Iraqi government.
The interviewer was Alexander Korennikov
Translated by Nick Chesters
********
#11
U.S. Senator Ted Stevens and U.S. Librarian of Congress Dr. James H.
Billington Announce Expansion of OPEN WORLD U.S.-Russia Exchange Program
U.S. Legislative-based Program to Include Russia's Emerging Cultural Leaders
ST. PETERSBURG, Russia, April 15 /PRNewswire/ -- In a major expansion of an
exchange program that has brought 6,265 emerging Russian political leaders
to the U.S., the OPEN WORLD program announced a new initiative to bring
Russia's cultural leaders to the U.S. for extended visits in 2003. OPEN
WORLD program founders U.S. Senator Ted Stevens, and U.S. Librarian of
Congress Dr. James H. Billington made the announcement at a press briefing
in St. Petersburg.
The OPEN WORLD program, managed by the Open World Center at the Library of
Congress, is the only exchange program housed in the U.S. Legislative
Branch. For nearly five years, OPEN WORLD has brought emerging Russian
policymakers and opinion-leaders from all of Russia's 89 regions to all 50
U.S. states for a firsthand look at the U.S. democratic process and to
exchange ideas with their American counterparts.
"The OPEN WORLD program's purpose -- to forge a better understanding
between citizens of the U.S. and Russia -- has never been more important
than it is today," stated Senator Stevens, who authored the Senate
legislation creating the OPEN WORLD program in 1999. "The friendships and
relationships between Russia and the U.S. created by OPEN WORLD will prove
stronger than any short term disagreement between our two countries on
global issues."
Stevens, who serves as Honorary Chairman of the Open World Center's Board
of Trustees, announced that the 2003 OPEN WORLD program will bring an
estimated 1600 political leaders from across the Russian Federation to the
U.S. The U.S.-based programs will continue to focus on such key themes as
rule of law, economic development, women in society, health, education
reform, environment federalism and youth issues.
In addition, for the first time, up to 100 cultural leaders will be invited
to the U.S. under the auspices of OPEN WORLD for extended stays of up to 30
days, where they will be hosted by major American cultural institutions
throughout the U.S.
"There is no better place than St. Petersburg, Russia's cultural heart and
soul, to announce the expansion of the OPEN WORLD program to include
Russian cultural leaders," stated Dr. Billington, who is the co-founder of
the program and Chairman of the Open World Center's Board of Trustees.
"We will work closely with Russian Minister of Culture Mikhail Shvydkoy to
bring emerging Russian cultural leaders to the U.S. The visits will focus
on the vitality of the arts in both countries and the means to sustain
them. The Russian visitors will observe first hand how their American
colleagues work with the government, business community and educational
institutions on management, economic and programmatic issues," stated Dr.
Billington.
Continued Dr. Billington, "Americans will have the wonderful experience of
working with the next generation of Russian cultural leaders in the visual
and performing arts, literature, music, folklore, dance, and film."
U.S. Ambassador to Russia Alexander Vershbow hailed the program as an
exciting new addition to the broad array of academic and professional
exchanges with Russia supported by the U.S. Government. "We are delighted
that the OPEN WORLD program will now provide opportunities for the vibrant
cultural and artistic sector of Russian society to work with Americans who
share their dedication to the arts. Both Russia and the United States have
rich cultural traditions that have often intertwined to produce
extraordinary results. This program will nurture future cultural
innovators and strengthen the bonds between our two countries."
The OPEN WORLD Program will consult with the Russian Ministry of Culture
and Russian cultural institutions, as well as U.S.-based organizations with
extensive experience in cultural exchanges with Russia to identify
candidates to be nominated for the program. Traditional "high-culture" and
"popular culture" in the U.S. will be explored, as will the rich and varied
folklore traditions in Russia.
Dr. Billington concluded, "It is imperative that we continue to share our
experiences and ideas and discover our commonalities. Through OPEN WORLD,
the U.S. and Russia will foster the cooperation and understanding needed to
meet the challenges of this new century."
The OPEN WORLD Program at the Library of Congress brings emerging political
and civic leaders from all 89 regions of the Russian Federation to
communities across the United States to experience American community and
cultural life, as well as to learn about the responsibilities of and
interrelationships between the three branches and different levels
(federal, state, and local) of the U.S. government. The program
participants also explore how the U.S. private and nonprofit sectors help
meet social and civic needs. Participants engage in hands-on experiences,
direct observation, and substantive exchange with their professional
counterparts.
In 2002, 2,530 OPEN WORLD Russian participants were hosted for intensive
ten-day visits focusing on economic development, education reform,
environment, federalism, health, rule of law, women in society, and youth
issues.
The Russian Leadership Program in 1999 was authorized by the U.S. Congress
as a pilot program by U.S. Public Law 106-31. In 2000, the U.S. Congress
authorized the creation of the permanent Center for Russian Leadership
Development to manage the program, now known as the Open World Program. In
2003, the U.S. Congress expanded the activities of the OPEN WORLD Program
to include an exchange for Russian cultural leaders and an expansion into
new countries in the former NIS and the Baltics. In accordance with this
new legislation, the OPEN WORLD Program will be managed by the new Open
World Center. Total funding appropriated by the U.S. Congress for the
program from 1999 through FY 2003 is $51 million.
Other members of the OPEN WORLD Program Board of Trustees include Senate
Majority Leader Bill Frist, Senator Carl Levin, Representative Amo
Houghton, Representative Robert E. "Bud" Cramer, former Representative
James W. Symington, Mr. George Soros, and former U.S. Ambassador to Russia
James F. Collins.
For more information, visit the OPEN WORLD website at
http://www.open-world2003.gov/.
SOURCE Open World Center at the Library of Congress
******
#12
EU sees encouraging signs from Russia on Chechnya
LUXEMBOURG, April 15 (Reuters) - The European Union told Russia on Tuesday
it saw signs of progress in Moscow's policy towards Chechnya but wanted
more action to improve human rights in the separatist region, EU sources said.
"We are seeing some positive signs, such as the high participation in a
recent referendum and the proposal for a new constitution," one source said
following talks between senior EU officials and Russian Foreign Minister
Igor Ivanov.
"But there is still work to be done, especially on human rights issues,"
the source added.
Chechens voted overwhelmingly to approve a new constitution entrenching the
region within Russia in a referendum at the end of March. Separatist rebels
have dismissed the poll as a farce.
On Monday, monitors from U.S.-based Human Rights Watch said raids by masked
soldiers, illegal arrests and disappearances were still frequent in
Chechnya despite the vote, which Moscow said had isolated rebels and paved
the way for peace.
EU and Russian officials also discussed a request by Moscow to set up a
joint forum to debate developments concerning the future European Security
and Defence Policy (ESDP).
The European Commission said it was too early to define how to shape
increased cooperation with Russia in this field.
"For the moment, we are still at the exploring stage, particularly on the
ESDP where we note the Russian request," Commission spokeswoman Emma Udwin
told reporters in Brussels.
Ivanov also discussed the Iraq situation with EU officials, but sources
declined to give details and Ivanov left Luxembourg without talking to
journalists.
*******
#13
Novoe Vremya
N 15
April, 2003
SHADOW OF THE CHECHEN WAR
SERGEI KOVALEV COMMENTS ON SITUATION IN CHECHNYA
Author: Andrei Grachev
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
RUSSIA SHOULD NOT EXPECT THE WAR IN IRAQ TO PERSUADE THE
PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY TO PUT UP WITH THE STATE OF AFFAIRS IN
CHECHNYA.
This was the first time in years that the Russian parliamentary
delegation was going to Strasbourg in an elevated mood. Success of the
referendum in Chechnya and the American-British intervention in Iraq
persuaded Russian lawmakers that instead of another round of debates
at the Parliamentary Assembly session over human rights abuses in
Chechnya it would be able to finally close the Chechen issue in
Strasbourg and do away with all lie-mongers beginning with Lord Judd.
It stands to reason to assume that Dmitry Rogozin, Lord Judd's former
pal and a chairman in the "Chechen commission", felt particularly
vindictive. After all, it was on the basis of Lord Judd's more then
skeptical report that the previous session was so doubtful of the
upcoming referendum in Chechnya.
Russian lawmakers were severely disappointed. Putting the matter
to vote, the Parliamentary Assembly adopted a resolution on human
rights in Chechnya (97 votes aye, 27 nay, and 10 abstained). Unless
something was done about the existing "atmosphere of impunity" with
regard to human rights abuses in Chechnya, the resolution asked the
international community to contemplate establishment of an
international trial for war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Rudolf Binding of Germany made the report in Strasbourg this
time. It is possible of course to say that the European parliament
counterbalances its stiffer position on Chechnya with anti-Americanism
of the mass demonstrations against the war in Iraq. It is impossible,
however, to fail to see the latest developments as a signal to Moscow
that it should not expect to have the Baghdad fire chalk off Russia's
Chechens debts.
Comments by Sergei Kovalev
Kovalev: I applaud Binding's proposal. If it is acted on, it will
push our global legal civilization far ahead because it will become an
example of the responsibility a large and strong country has
shouldered (the responsibility it shirks now).
As a matter of fact, however, this is just a demarche, although a
helpful one. Unfortunately, it does not stand a chance. At least
because there is the cabinet of foreign ministers above the
Parliamentary Assembly, and the cabinet decided everything on a
consensus basis. Russia is a fully-fledged member there and I do not
expect Igor Ivanov to vote for the international trial on Chechnya.
Actually, I have serious doubts that the Caucasus may form some
bodies of justice like the trial on Yugoslavia, etc. The suggestion
should be backed up by a whole number of international organizations.
All the same, benefits of the suggestion are apparent. It may be a
mere declaration, but Europe has the guts to announce that criminals
should be tried regardless of what side they fight on.
Attitude of the European parliament towards Russia is somewhat
ironically condescending. As I see it, their logic runs as such: the
country has been in such a situation that demanding everything at once
from it is pointless. The country is not yet used to not being rude,
to not using threats or blackmail. On the other hand, the majority of
Parliamentary Assembly members do not have any attitude towards us at
all. Merely because a parliament is a parliament and the desire to
talk there outweighs the eagerness to solve the problem (of Chechnya,
in this case).
No other European country has a problem even remotely resembling
our problem with Chechnya. At the same time, the Europeans are used to
comfort, they are used to talking and writing with tact. That is why
they permitted the Russian delegation to feel so comfortable in
Strasbourg. When the Parliamentary Assembly adopted the stiff
resolution demanding to expel Russia, there was a scandal. Rogozin and
the Russian delegation stalked out of the conference hall...
Everything was smoothed out afterwards, and Rogozin and Lord Judd
became pals. It even seemed that we were on the same wavelength
finally. That was how Lord Judd made his reports on Chechnya: yes,
human rights abuses in Chechnya continue, bodies with traces of
tortures are found still, but we cannot oversee some noticeable but
nevertheless gradual progress. It may be added here that Rogozin
talked of the same things, but changed positive and negative theses...
Paradoxical though it may seem, the referendum has played its only
positive role here because no European politician can feel but shame
in the face of such blatant falsifications. Official Moscow might have
ordered 60% support or 70%, but 90% is too much. It became the factor
that forced the Parliamentary Assembly to realize that "they are not
the guys to have dealings with."
(Translated by A. Ignatkin)
*******
#14
Analysis: Russia's younger brother
By Sam Vaknin
UPI Senior Business Correspondent
SKOPJE, Macedonia, April 14 (UPI) -- Ukraine's long-predicted economic
revival is at hand. After a long hiatus, both the International Monetary
Fund and the World Bank are expected to make new commitments in their
forthcoming visits in June or July. Finance Minister Mykola Azarov is
hoping for $600 million to $800 million in fresh funds. Debt repayments
amount to $1.6 billion this year and the next. Ukraine is even considering
a bond issue.
Concurrently, NATO will be holding in the country a massive one-week
military exercise under the aegis of the "Partnership for Peace" -- its
collaborative program with the countries of East and Southeast Europe. It
will involve army units from Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria,
Germany, Georgia, Italy, Canada, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Moldova, Norway,
Poland, Romania, France, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and the United States.
The United States just canceled financial sanctions it had earlier imposed
on Ukraine on the recommendation of the Financial Action Task Force.
Ukraine is no longer a center of money laundering, said the international
watchdog. It may be removed from the agency's blacklist by yearend and is
planning to join the EGMONT group of the financial intelligence units of 69
countries.
There are other signs of thawing. A 16-month ban on $11 million in U.S.
poultry imports was terminated last week with the signing of a revised
veterinary certificate protocol. Ukrainian officials are holding talks with
their European Union counterparts to integrate the two space programs. The
country has expertise in launch vehicles, satellites and payloads. And
Volkswagen inked a letter of intent regarding the assembly of its Passat,
Golf, Bora and Polo models in Ukraine.
According to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, last month, the EU offered
Russia, Ukraine, and Moldova -- its future neighbors following enlargement
-- "preferential trade terms, expanded transport, energy, and
telecommunication links, and the possibility of visa-free travel to the
EU." The door to future accession was left ajar, though the inclusion of
North African nations in the "New Neighborhood Policy" bodes ill for
Ukraine's future membership.
Long-stalled negotiations between Ukraine and the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development over the $215 million financing of two
much-disputed nuclear power plants to replace the smoldering Chernobyl
reactor have mysteriously restarted last week. The bank's president, Jean
Lemierre, promised positive results by summer -- despite environmental
concerns and studies, financed by the EBRD itself, which cast in doubt the
project's feasibility.
Quoted by Interfax-Ukraine, Foreign Ministry spokesman Markijan Lubkivskyy,
announced last Tuesday, that "the U.S. may subcontract Ukrainian companies
(for postwar reconstruction in Iraq), particularly those that have
experience in working with firms in the Persian Gulf."
There is good news from the East as well.
Turkmenistan and Russia proposed to Ukraine -- a major gas importer -- a
tripartite 25-year agreement to exploit and export Turkmen natural gas with
prices frozen throughout at current levels, well below the market. In
return, Ukraine is supposed to co-finance the construction of a $1 billion,
665-mile-long pipeline, with a capacity of 8 trillion to 10.5 trillion
gallons a year, mostly on Kazakh territory, along the shores of the
energy-rich Caspian Sea.
Inevitably, not all is rosy.
In contravention of all prior measures of liberalization, President Leonid
Kuchma intends to halve, administratively, grain exports to 1 million tons
a month, due to a weak harvest in the first quarter of this year and rising
domestic grain prices. The Crimean Agricultural Ministry announced that one
is 7 hectares of winter crops -- mostly barley -- are lost due to the harsh
weather.
This is half the average ratio in other parts of Ukraine. According to
AgWeb.com, "the country's milling wheat crop (this year) may be only 10
million metric tons to 12 MMT, down sharply from 22 MMT in 2002 and 26 MMT
in 2001." Domestic consumption, at 7 million tons, now equals inventories.
The country -- formerly Europe's breadbasket -- lacks modern infrastructure
and grain storage facilities. Its extempore export policy is muddled.
Agricultural imports are surging. Ukraine bought 70,000 tons of -- mainly
Brazilian -- sugar in February alone.
In the worst of Stalinist traditions, the former Deputy Prime Minister for
Agriculture Leonid Kozachenko, a reformer, was promptly arrested for
"bribery and tax evasion." Grain merchants, foreign investors and
multinationals included, are under official scrutiny.
In an unusually strongly worded letter to Ukraine's Ambassador to the
United States Kostyantyn Hryshchenko, president of Ukraine-U.S. Business
Council, Kempton B. Jenkins wrote: "We hope that this effort to turn back
the clock to Soviet-style management of Ukraine's critical sector will soon
disappear and allow Ukraine's dramatic march to productivity and prosperity
to resume."
Nor has Ukraine forsaken its erstwhile clients, frowned upon by an
increasingly assertive United States. According to IRNA, the Iranian news
agency, a Ukrainian delegation is in Iran to discuss the construction of
Antonov An-140 aircraft. This week, Pakistan and Ukraine are slated to
negotiate a free trade agreement.
Standard and Poor's, the international rating agency, concluded, in a
report it released earlier this month, that "despite some early successes,
the political environment in Ukraine remains difficult and financing
uncertainties continue."
The Sovietologist John Armstrong dubbed the Ukrainians the Russians'
"smaller brothers." This is no longer true. Unlike Russia, Ukraine aspires
to NATO membership, but it is far less pro-American. It seeks Russian
investments but is wary of the imperial intentions of its neighbor. Despite
Russian coaxing, Ukraine hasn't even joined the Eurasian Economic
Community, a pet project of the Russia-dominated Commonwealth of
Independent States.
In the meantime, Ukraine is bleeding both its least-skilled, menial
workers, and its most highly educated brains. Ukrainians are welcome
nowhere and abused everywhere. Israel has just deported 300 illegal
Ukrainian aliens. Others -- notably Turkey, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and
Italy -- are likely to follow suit.
Ukrainian ombudswoman Nina Karpachova pegs the number of economic exiles at
between 2 million and 7 million. At least 5 million -- one-fifth of the
workforce -- seek seasonal employment abroad. Remittances amount to between
$2 billion and $3 billion a year.
One-quarter of all Ukrainians barely survive under the wretched poverty
line. Official unemployment -- at 11 percent -- underestimates the problem
by half. A low birth rate conspires with elevated mortality to produce a
self-induced demographic genocide.
Capital flight is on the rise and equals half the foreign direct investment
in the economy. The governor of the national bank, Sergiy Tyhypko,
estimated this February that as much as $ 2.27 billion fled Ukraine in
2002, compared to $898 million in 2001 and $385 million in 2000. This is
the reflection of a thriving informal economy, half the size of its formal
counterpart, by some measures.
Appearances aside, ubiquitous corruption, tottering banks, clannish
institutions, compromised leadership, illicit deals and barely contained
xenophobia are entrenched in Ukraine's criminalized economy. As the 2004
presidential elections near, the oligarchs are augmenting their war chests
abroad. Kuchma may try to postpone the elections to 2006 or 2007. The
opposition vows to oppose such chicanery aggressively.
Ukraine may be in for a bumpy ride ahead.
********
#15
Trud
April 15, 2003
STRAY VOTERS
AN INTERVIEW WITH IGOR BUNIN, PRESIDENT OF THE POLITICAL
TECHNOLOGIES CENTER.
Author: Vladimir Ignatov
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
POLITICAL SCIENTISTS HAVE REPORTED WEAKENING OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY
IN PROBLEMATIC REGIONS SINCE THE 1990'S
Political scientists have reported weakening of the Communist Party in
problematic regions since the second half of the 1990's. On the other
hand, there are great deals of oppositionist voters in the said
regions.
Question: Whom do you think the protesters disappointed in the
Communist Party will cast their votes for?
Igor Bunin: Every region has its own specifics. Everything
depends on candidates. Outcome of the gubernatorial race in
Krasnoyarsk is a vivid example. Glaziev turned up and polled so many
votes as to leave local communist chieftains far behind. The problem
is, he fits the mood of local non-communist protesters much better
than any textbook. Glaziev canvassed for votes so successfully because
he went under the aegis of the major oppositionist party on the one
hand, and was not a communist on the other. A young, well-educated
candidate with modern language - that's the ticket. In short, voters
saw him fit the picture of the modern world.
And yet, communists do not want to put Glaziev within the three
top slots of their party list. Zyuganov does not want a modernized
Communist Party. He probably expects that he will be able to use
orthodox hard-liners all his life. Communist leaders' vocabulary and
party program are archaic, far behind real life in Russia these days.
That is why if non-communist protesters in some region may vote for an
"advanced" representative of the Communist Party, communists cannot
hope to attract voters on the federal level since these voters wander
between parties.
Question: How many of these wondering or stray voters are there
in Russia, do you think?
Igor Bunin: I think that they number between 10% and 15% of
voters, quite a sizeable voter bloc. As a rule, they are callous men
aged 30 to 50, trustful but pessimistic, enraged by communists no less
than by Chubais. As a rule, they voted for Unity in the last
campaign...
Question: Why would they. Unity never positioned itself as a
party of the opposition...
Igor Bunin: Protesting voters were looking for a leader, and the
trio came in very handy. Remember the trio of 1999? Three fighters
topped the Unity list: Sergei Shoigu (fighter against ecological
disasters), Alexander Karelin (an athlete), and Alexander Gurov
(fighter against crime). Save for Shoigu known in all sorts of
emergencies, the other two were utterly unknown to general public. The
words they mouthed were unknown too. What counts is that Putin backed
them up. That was a brilliant find on the part of political
technologists.
Question: Will United Russia as Unity's inheritor keep up the
level?
Igor Bunin: Generally speaking, no. United Russia 2003 is
different from Unity 1999. Mankind knows a lot of examples when the
conqueror assimilates with the conquered. Approximately the same thing
happened after formation of United Russia. "Conquered" high officials
and regional bosses from Fatherland - All Russia have forced on others
their "ideology of bosses", their values, and their image.
Where are Karelin and Gurov now? They do not fit the "party of
bosses". No matter how many protesters United Russia amasses, voters
know that a party with an administrative resource like that cannot be
in the opposition by definition.
(Translated by A. Ignatkin)
*******
#16
Moscow Times
April 16, 2003
White House Penitentiary For Ministers
By Yulia Latynina
At the end of the 14th century, Chu Yuan-chang, first emperor of the Ming
dynasty, decided to root out bribery in China. Guilty officials were beaten
with sticks and put in stocks. Before long the entire civil service was
locked up, leaving no one to run the country. This problem was solved by
carting the officials back to their offices and forcing them to do their
old jobs with thick, heavy boards around their necks.
You get the impression that we're going to see something similar in Russia
soon. The White Swan prison camp will soon be joined by a new facility for
crooked and bungling government officials. All the usual amenities will be
provided on site. They'll just enclose the White House with barbed wire and
start handing down sentences. For failure to implement reforms: five years.
For embezzlement: four years. Sentence to be served in your office.
Judge for yourself. First Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov publicly
castigated Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin for dragging his feet on tax
reform. Next he laid into German Gref. Then Deputy Prosecutor General
Vladimir Kolesnikov announced that Kasyanov was wanted for questioning in a
crab-fishing scam.
Scandals. The war on corruption. Just like in developed democracies.
Investigators' revelations, a storm in the press, millions in bribes.
There's just one thing missing. No one was fired, no one stepped down. The
dog barks and the thief carries on.
What's going on? Will Kasyanov get the axe?
To answer that question, you need to ask yourself another. Is it
conceivable that Kasyanov would publicly and harshly criticize two Cabinet
members -- both of them part of the St. Petersburg clan to boot -- entirely
on his own initiative?
Somehow I don't think so. It's much more likely that Kasyanov was given the
green light. Not in writing, not even in words. Just a wink and a nod. A
sympathetic look. Kasyanov explains: "It's really not my fault, you know.
Kudrin dropped the ball on economic reform." His listener nods, as if to
say: "I hear you." Encouraged, Kasyanov hops up on his soapbox. And? And
nothing. Did they sack Gref and Kudrin? No. Kasyanov's words fell flat, but
he wasn't sacked, either. Why would he get the sack if he had already got a
wink and a nod from on high?
Now ask yourself another question. Is it conceivable that the Prosecutor
General's Office got the idea of trying to reel in Kasyanov on its own?
Somehow I don't think so. It's much more likely that Kolesnikov was given
the green light. Not in writing, not even in words. Just a wink and a nod.
A conversation in passing: "The prime minister has gone too far, dressing
down ministers as though he were in charge." His listener nods, as if to
say: "I hear you." Encouraged, Kolesnikov calls a press conference. And?
And nothing. Did they interrogate Kasyanov? No. Kolesnikov's words fell
flat, but he wasn't sacked either. Why would he get the sack if he already
had a wink and a nod from on high?
The principle at work here is one that replaces the democratic separation
of powers with authoritarian clan feuds. A similar atmosphere reigned
within the KGB. Everyone spied on everyone else. Everyone ratted on
everyone else. And the boss was neither here nor there. He just nodded,
saying nothing. This is not a principle of governance, because governance
implies forward motion, and you can't get far with all this backbiting
going on.
It is a principle of exercising control. The ruler's potential rivals are
dispatched without the ruler's involvement, far from the center of power.
And theft is built into the system. There's simply no way to manage those
who don't steal.
Which brings us back to our original question: Is Kasyanov's head on the
block? No. That would mean that the prosecutor general is in charge. And in
Russia, the president is in charge.
But something is bound to happen. In practice, scandals like these usually
serve as diversions. A feint is made on one flank, and a breach is opened
on the other. The last time rumors about top-level government resignations
got everyone this worked up, the Gazprom board was overhauled instead.
Yulia Latynina is host of "Yest Mneniye" on TVS.
*******
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