Johnson's Russia List
#7141
11 April 2003
davidjohnson@erols.com
A CDI Project
www.cdi.org
[Contents:
1. Moscow Times: Victoria Lavrentieva, Fitch Sees Russia's Star Rising Fast.
2. New York Times: Michael Wines, Russia's Economy Seems to Be Starting to
Bloom.
3. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace meeting summary: Lilia
Shevtsova, Putin's Russia: Transformation or New 'Zastoi?'
4. Washington Profile News Service: Looking Ahead: Russian Foreign Policy
in the 21st Century An Interview with Vyacheslav Nikonov.
5. Vremya MN: Yevgeny Bovkun, THREE IN A BOAT, NOT COUNTING THE UNITED
STATES.
Russia will choose its relationship with Washington over Germany and France.
6. Interfax: Source in Russian govt suggests Washington should forgive
debts
of former USSR.
7. AFP: Majority of Russians think US victory in Iraq bad thing for Russia:
poll.
8. Reuters: Anti-war alliance pushes for key UN role in Iraq.
9. RFE/RL: Michael Lelyveld, People Protest Higher Power Costs.
10. Rossiyskaya Gazeta: Latest Developments in Russia's Administrative
Reform
Saga Detailed.
11. Rossiyskaya Gazeta: Expected Use of Internet by Russian Parties in
Upcoming
Election Campaign Seen.
12. Financial Times (UK): Rafael Behr, Russia diary: Broken promises.
13. Help for Siamese twins.
14. Amnesty International Releases Racism in Russia Report.
15. Peter Calder: Misha and Masha.
16. Wall Street Journal: Steve Liesman, Russia's Past Provides U.S. Five
Lessons for Iraq's Future.
17. Reuters: Russian company town thrives on diet of steel. (Cherepovets)
18. Luba Schwartzman: TV1 Review.]
********
#1
Moscow Times
April 11, 2003
Fitch Sees Russia's Star Rising Fast
By Victoria Lavrentieva
Staff Writer
Fitch, the world's third-largest international credit agency, plans to
catch up with rivals S&P and Moody's by upgrading Russia's sovereign rating.
Natasha Page, head of Fitch's Moscow office, told news agencies Thursday
that her agency is currently reviewing Russia and may upgrade the country
"within a few weeks."
Fitch currently rates Russia at BB- with a positive outlook, which is one
notch below Standard & Poor's and Moody's, both of which upgraded Russia in
December to BB and Ba2, respectively -- both of which are just two notches
below "investment grade," a distinction that allows more fund managers to
invest in Russian paper and makes external borrowing cheaper, both for the
country and its corporations.
Fitch said in its latest report on the world's financial markets that high
oil prices and a more manageable debt position has made Russia "the
brightest star in an otherwise lackluster firmament" of emerging markets.
"Concern over a falling oil price [after the war in Iraq] has put some
pressure on the market, but the downside has been limited by Russia's solid
fundamentals," agreed Philip Poole, emerging markets analyst at ING Baring.
Alfa Bank said in a research note Thursday that Russian bonds were boosted
by the Fitch announcement.
"However, price increases were replaced by a decline, as profit taking in
Turkish and Brazilian markets weighed on Russian debt," the bank said.
********
#2
New York Times
April 11, 2003
Russia's Economy Seems to Be Starting to Bloom
By MICHAEL WINES
MOSCOW, April 10 -- Crocus City, a complex of 200 luxury stores rising in a
northwest suburb here, is so immense that patrons get around in electric
carts.
There is lots to get around to: for starters, a stable of European designer
salons, a Ferrari dealer, a wine museum, a tropical forest, waterfalls, a
hotel and exhibition hall, a water ballet and -- for passing yachts -- a
private Moscow River pier and beach.
To anyone who watched the economic panic of 1998 drive this nation to
bankruptcy and ravage its currency in the space of days, Crocus City is
more than a fashion statement. It is a question: could this really be Russia?
The answer is no. It is Moscow, home to most of Russia's wealth, all of its
power and, to the irritation of many, a lifestyle that puts the endless
outlands to shame.
But like the real crocus, something may finally be stirring beneath the
snows that have iced the rest of this country's economy during a dozen
years of capitalism.
If the figures are to be believed, all Russia is on an economic roll.
Officially, domestic output grew by 4.3 percent in 2002, but some private
experts say the true number is above 5 percent. That is the third year of
robust growth and makes Russia the second-fastest-growing nation among
emerging economies, behind only China.
Some question how long that can continue. One big caveat is that growth has
been driven far more by high oil prices -- oil and gas compose half of
exports and a seventh of economic output -- than by manufacturing, the base
of most rebounds. Also, reforms of the banking system and other crucial
cogs in the Russian economy have slowed to a crawl.
While many analysts have been raising their estimates, the International
Monetary Fund lowered its forecast this week, citing prospects for lower
oil prices and falling investment.
The glossiest of optimists nevertheless say the Russian economy, with an
annual gross domestic product of $346 billion, considerably smaller than
that of the Netherlands, is on track to triple by 2010 to a trillion
dollars a year. People are getting happier. Banks are seeing bigger
increases in deposits. Credit is being expended. "We're getting really,
really strong domestic demand," said Al Breach, senior economist at the
investment banking firm Brunswick UBS Warburg and a veteran of the gloomy
late 1990's.
"The financial tenor here," he said, "is just phenomenal."
For now, just how phenomenal still depends on where "here" is. Across
Russia, the average person's income through November of last year was up
8.5 percent from 2001, and 2001 was 16.5 percent better than 2000.
In the city of Moscow, that translates into an average monthly income of
$436, not a princely sum, but more than adequate in a nation where basic
utilities and rents often are still a pittance.
Yet only 5 of Russia's 89 regions, all in sparsely populated Siberian or
Pacific oil and mining areas, approached even half of that.
Tellingly, the average income for Moscow oblast — the Denmark-size
doughnut that surrounds the capital city — was only $115 a month, barely
a quarter of the income in Moscow proper and slightly less than the
national average. Even St. Petersburg, at five million people Russia's
second city, boasts an average income little more than a third of Moscow's.
Much of the nation's growth remains focused in Moscow. While industrial
production nationwide grew 3.7 percent last year, it grew 7.8 percent in
the region including Moscow and 17 surrounding provinces. In Russia's
Pacific Far East, by comparison, it fell 1.7 percent.
Moscow has built-in advantages, like a market of more than 11 million
people, a history as Russia's hub, international connections and the
nation's best-educated work force. Flush with money, the city is remaking
its downtown, rebuilding its highways to Western standards and laying the
base for a modern European city where a crumbling Soviet capital once stood.
Last year, Moscow made payments on a $750-million-plus Eurobond debt used
to finance its makeover. Last week, 300 miles to the east, the city of
Nizhny Novgorod defaulted for the second time on a $40 million Eurobond.
But as much as Moscow dominates the present, there are tantalizing signs
that the future lies elsewhere, in virgin economic territory where labor is
still cheap and demand is skyrocketing.
As Nizhny Novgorod was defaulting, the people who run Krasny Kub -- Red
Cube, a Moscow-based housewares and gift store -- were opening a branch
there. The store is its 17th outside Moscow, and the company plans to open
at least 40 more across the country.
"Were we asked two or three years ago, we would have said that no shop, no
outlet any place in the country could return a profit as good as what we
had in Moscow," Stanislav N. Skachkov, the company's general director, said
in an interview. "Now we know for sure that in the regions we can open
shops that will do just as well or even better than in Moscow."
Or take Aquarius Group, which assembles and distributes its own brand of
computers. Sales last year ballooned 89 percent, with the bulk of the
growth outside Moscow where competition is lower and markets less
saturated, a company spokeswoman said.
Some analysts say such stories hint at basic shifts in the economy. Awash
in oil profits, they say, big Russian companies and banks have begun to
sink money into modernizing farms, financing factories and lending cash to
Russian businesses that could never get it before.
In addition, rising incomes have set off a consumer spending boom in parts
of Russia where until lately, "shopping" meant a trip to the open-air
market or the mom-and-pop store around the corner. With customers opening
their wallets at last, even international retailers like Benetton and Yves
Rocheau are moving into the hinterlands, often to fill new Western-style
shopping malls.
Moscow, which had no such shopping centers in 1997, now has at least 15.
Even Nizhny Novgorod has three. Nationally, retail sales through November
2002 were up 9.1 per cent over the same period in 2001.
But while sales rose a mere 3.3 percent in Moscow, they leapt nearly 13
percent in Nizhny Novgorod. And in somnolent Ryazan, a long-depressed
manufacturing province south of the capital, sales were up fully a fifth
over the previous year.
Of course, a tiny gain in Moscow's vast economy can still outweigh great
leaps in the provinces. Even boosters would concede that much of the
Russian economy, from a half-formed banking system to a stifling
bureaucracy, endemic corruption and a huge reliance on petroleum and
metals, threatens sustained growth throughout the country.
But for now, many Russians have at least one bit of good economic news to
talk about, whether a higher salary or a new chain store downtown. Just as
important, they have a bit of hope for the future. "When you go to rural
areas, the change is very spotty," said Aleksandr Zabotkine, a top
financial analyst at the Moscow-based United Financial Group. "It's only
starting. But we think there are good prospects."
********
#3
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
www.ceip.org
meeting summary
On April 3, 2003, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace hosted a
presentation by Lilia Shevtsova entitled, "Putin's Russia: Transformation
or New 'Zastoi?'" Shevtsova, a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment,
is the author of Putin's Russia, just published by the Endowment. Andrew
Kuchins, director of the Russian and Eurasian Program at the Carnegie
Endowment, moderated the session.
Lilia Shevtsova opened her presentation by noting that the Putin presidency
is a work in progress. It remains uncertain whether the Russian president
will transform the way his country is governed, or whether the nation will
revert into a state of stagnation, or zastoi. A complete analysis of
Putin's leadership style, the challenges he faces, and the state of
contemporary Russian society can be found in Shevtsova's recent book,
Putin's Russia. Today, however, Shevtsova chose to focus her comments on
the war in Iraq and its ramifications for the Putin presidency and the
future of Russia. She mentioned that she would outline major trends, but
stressed that due to the speed with which international developments
continue to unfold, she cannot be certain where these trends will lead.
The first topic Shevtsova discussed was the effect of the war on Russia's
foreign and domestic policy. She noted that some analysts have argued that
the situation in Iraq has little impact on Russia, which they see as a
world unto itself. She disagrees with this view, however, and argued that,
above all, the last few months have raised Russia's profile and deepened
its involvement in the international community. Shevtsova maintains that
Putin's decision to side with Jacques Chirac was instrumental in bolstering
France's position and deepening the rift within the West. Should Putin
decide to back Tony Blair's vision for post-war Iraq, Blair's domestic
support and international credibility might likewise increase. Even as
Russia has emerged as a key player in the diplomatic crisis over Iraq,
however, the events of the last few months have halted Russia's democratic
consolidation. Widespread dissatisfaction with the Bush administration's
conduct has allowed Russian hardliners and ultra-nationalists to gain
support. Meanwhile, the West's preoccupation with its own internecine
conflicts have minimized external pressure on Russia to reform its
institutions and strengthen its civil society.
Shevtsova then examined the factors that have influenced Putin's recent
actions. She noted that many in the Russian policy community have been
overcome by anti-Americanism or imperial nostalgia, but argued that Putin's
pragmatism has prevented him from falling victim to this hysteria. Rather,
she believes that his anti-war stance is the result of his "sincere concern
and fear" that the war in Iraq will destabilize the Middle East-and
Russia's immediate neighbors. Second, Shevtsova believes that Putin's
decision to side with "old Europe" demonstrates his displeasure with
Russia's role as America's junior partner; had Colin Powell or Condoleezza
Rice visited Moscow and demonstrated a firm commitment to expanding the
U.S.-Russian dialogue, Putin would have been more likely to support
Washington. Finally, the fact that Russia remains a weak country means that
its leaders are predisposed to support the international system and uphold
its rules.
Unfortunately for all involved, the international crisis leading up the war
in Iraq witnessed the "collective failure of all international players";
Shevtsova argued that the "coalition of the willing" and the anti-war bloc
alike made serious miscalculations. Washington squandered valuable
political capital by misreading-and then ignoring-the Russian leadership.
The Kremlin also blundered by extending too much support to Chirac and the
"old Europe" opposition. Although 95% of the Russian public opposes the war
on Iraq, Shevtsova pointed out, between 45% and 65% view Iraq and North
Korea as serious menaces. In short, the Russian public favors a cautious
but muscular response to these security threats-not outright pacifism or
anti-Americanism. Russia's demand for the immediate withdrawal of all
troops from Iraq therefore makes little sense, and only exacerbates the
tension between the U.S. and Russia. Shevtsova argued that the Kremlin
should continue to push for UN leadership in post-war Iraq, but added that
Moscow's primary objective should be to prevent the further deterioration
of U.S.-Russia relations.
Shevtsova draws six major conclusions from the trends she outlined. First,
Russia-watchers should take nothing for granted; that country's weak
government, foundering economy, and unconsolidated civil society should
discourage long-term prognostication. Second, in the asymmetrical
U.S.-Russian partnership, it is the responsibility of the stronger power to
take the lead in engaging the weaker. Third, the improvement in U.S.-Russia
relations since 9/11 is more the result of the personal chemistry between
Bush and Putin than a convergence in the two leaders' worldviews. Fourth,
the Kremlin now finds itself in a trap: although Russia's role in world
affairs encourages its aspirations to reclaim superpower status, its
post-9/11 partnership with the U.S. has not facilitated domestic
transition. If Russia is ever to become a modern and functional nation, it
must expand its dialogue with Europe and move beyond its preoccupation with
security. Fifth, Putin's understanding of security threats is in many ways
American. Russia's ongoing engagement in Chechnya and Putin's analysis of
the "arc of instability"-the Russian counterpart to America's "Axis of
Evil"-resemble Bush's understanding of security threats and his means of
responding to them. Ironically, though these likenesses have endowed the
Bush-Putin relationship with a certain closeness and intensity, each
leader's preoccupation with security has also bred conflict. Sixth, the
U.S.-Russian relationship needs more substantive cooperation; coordination
on Central Asian policy, the Caucasus, and health and energy issues would
benefit both sides.
Shevtsova then elaborated on the challenges that Putin faces. The chief
foreign policy task at hand is to maintain good relations with both "new"
and "old" Europe, and to mend the damage that has been done to U.S.-Russia
relations. Domestically, Putin faces an even more difficult challenge. The
careers of most European leaders are tied to the outcome of the war in
Iraq, suggested Shevtsova, but most politicians risk losing only their
offices. Putin, by contrast, could lose not only his position, but also his
chance to remake Russia. Even if Putin wins another term, she believes,
daunting choices will confront him. If he maintains the status quo and
continues to appease a variety of interest groups, he risks becoming a
hostage to business interests, Kremlin politics, and the Yeltsin-era
"family." If, on the other hand, he accomplishes a political breakthrough,
realizing his ability to be a transformer-not just a stabilizer-he may,
like Gorbachev, lose his power base. Despite the perils Putin faces,
Shevtsova is not completely pessimistic. With good planning and a lot of
luck, Putin may manage to change the way that Russia is ruled. Especially
if he succeeds in liquidating the connections between big business and the
"vertical of power," Putin may possess the strength and conviction to
revolutionize Russia.
Shevtsova argued that the Russian intellectual elite is increasingly
dissatisfied with the economic and political status quo. She also perceives
growing sentiment that Putin himself is failing, and that his presidency is
built on the unsteady foundation of strong poll numbers and high oil
prices. Indeed, now that 45% of Russians favor a liberal-democratic
transformation, clinging to the status quo might mean political suicide for
Putin. Yet it remains unclear whether Putin will embrace an ambitious
reform program. He continues to rely on the Russian precedent of change
from above, and has discouraged the development of a grass-roots reform
movement. Furthermore, the renewal of the election cycle-particularly when
combined with Russia's apathetic society and a divided West absorbed with
its own problems-will discourage major policy innovations on Putin's part.
Still, Shevtsova noted that her analysis is less critical of Putin than
usual. The Russian president has taken major steps by renewing the
administrative reforms suspended by Yeltsin and by courting the U.S. and
Europe. If Putin does not follow the reformist path which he is fully
capable of taking, he will squander not only an historic opportunity to
change Russia, but also the chance to liberate himself from the constraints
which have bound so many other Russian leaders.
Much of the discussion during the question and answer session centered on
Russian foreign policy. One attendee asked Shevtsova why Putin chose to
move closer to Paris and Berlin rather than Beijing in the days leading up
to the war with Iraq. Another participant asked her to elaborate on the
connection between Russia's relation with the U.S. and Europe and its
internal political developments. With regard to the first question,
Shevtsova pointed out that Putin has not totally abandoned China for
Europe; Foreign Minister Sergei Ivanov and high-ranking delegations have
recently paid several visits to Beijing. It is true, though, that Putin has
not adopted Primakov's sino-centric foreign policy, a development which
Shevtsova views as positive. In response to the second question, Shevtsova
warned once again that a bilateral security dialogue alone will do little
to promote deeper international cooperation or internal reform. Rather,
dialogues on energy policy or politics (such as that in which the EU
engages with potential members) are necessary to promote domestic change.
Should the U.S./EU-Russia dialogue fail to expand, Shevtsova does not
believe that Russia will "punish" the West by opposing its security
interests or proliferating weapons of mass destruction; rather, Russia will
simply stay isolated, and continue its descent into stagnation. But she
warned that Russia's relations with both blocs will be tested when the
international community addresses Iran after the war with Iraq-an
eventuality that has the potential to become the next big international
crisis.
The discussion then moved to domestic developments in Russia. One of the
meeting participants wondered whether Putin is too weak to play the
transformative role that Shevtsova described. Another asked about the
health of civil society in Russia. Shevtsova responded that Putin has
indeed squandered reform opportunities over the last year, and she
reiterated that he is unlikely to take major risks during an election year.
However, she believes that his rapprochement with the West may compel him
to alter Russia's traditionally authoritarian political system. Ironically,
Putin's ties to the KGB provide him additional maneuvering room; as he
moves toward the West in his foreign policy and pursues domestic reform,
the presumption that he is merely playing a tactical game shields his
innovations from criticism. Finally, Shevtsova pointed to Putin's concern
for self-preservation-most notably, his reliance on public opinion polls-as
another factor that may compel him to make important changes. That said,
she noted that civil society remains weak in Russia, therefore precluding a
badly needed push for reform from below.
Shevtsova closed by responding to an inquiry about her views on the recent
referendum in Chechnya. Unlike many analysts, she considers the vote a more
or less positive development. It provides an exit strategy for Putin, and
demonstrates that he understands that there is no possible military
solution to the Chechen conflict. Although the impact of the referendum
itself is limited, it will likely drain power from the military and
increase the leverage of pro-Kremlin Chechen groups. Russia's
reconciliation with the breakaway republic is far from assured, but Putin
is moving in the right direction: toward a general amnesty, compensation
for the war's victims, and a formal division of power between Moscow and
Groznyi.
Summary prepared by Faith Hillis, Junior Fellow with the Russian and
Eurasian Program at the Carnegie Endowment.
*********
#4
Looking Ahead: Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century
An Interview with Vyacheslav Nikonov
Washington Profile News Service
www.washprofile.org
April 10, 2003
Vyacheslav Nikonov is the President of the Polity Foundation.
Q: The conflict in Iraq has led to a cooling off in relations between
Russia and the US. Where do you see the relationship going?
I would hope that this is a temporary phenomenon, and that the current
increase in tension between Russia and the US will not last, that
disagreements over Iraq will not become a start-off point for more
confrontation, but on the contrary, an episode that will lead to
rapprochement. Although it's difficult for me to say if that's how things
will develop. Soon the election campaigns are starting in Russia, and there
is a danger that anti-American sentiment will be exploited and become
institutionalized as a result of the elections. That would be bad.
On the other hand, Russian foreign policy depends on the president, who
doesn't check to see what the Duma and the Federation Council are doing at
every moment. To a great extent, the future of Russian-American relations
will depend on the president's position, even though he's not 100% free to
do as he wishes. When Putin sought to align with the US after 9/11, he was
definitely marching ahead of 90% of the Russian political elite, which is
tainted with anti-Americanism.
Q: Some leaders of former Soviet republics supported the US. Has this
affected their relations with Russia?
It wouldn't be wise to scold your allies or former allies for having a
sovereign foreign policy. In any case this behavior was pragmatic. There
was a conflict in Georgia, over American recon planes that flew too close
to Russia, which made some people in Moscow nervous. But it wasn't directly
related to the Georgian stance on Iraq.
Q: What Russian interests, if any, can Moscow expect to maintain once the
war is over?
I think there's no perspective for that. Russia had one serious trump card,
which is could have used to guarantee its interests in a post-Saddam Iraq -
the Security Council vote. But after that failed, Russia was left holding
all the cards. Which is a shame.
Russia had considered the war prima facie illegal, and did not see a
possibility to bargain over Russian support for the operation. As the
Foreign Ministry is trying to prove, Russian contracts in Iraq were
legitimate, and should be honored after the war. Here we can expect some
disappointment, which could be another basis for dissatisfaction with
America and a worsening in relations. Although, in my opinion, Russia could
have behaved in a much more pragmatic manner. I greatly admire the Chinese
stance - they didn't back away from their principles, they expressed their
dissatisfaction with the US position, but they didn't sour relations with
America.
Q: What has been the Russian response to the appearance of American bases
in Afghanistan and Central Asia?
There's not a single response to anything in Russia. For many in the
foreign policy establishment in Russia, it was a threat. Those who
supported cooperation with the US said: thank God the Americans have
destroyed the Taliban, because we were speculating about a war with them
just a couple years ago. Now the problem has disappeared, the Americans
took care of it. The opponents argued that there was nothing positive about
that, because it weakened the Central Asian governments' dependency on
Russia. The Talibs had Uzbekistan by the collar, so it went along Russia.
Not this pressure is gone, Americans have fortified themselves in Central
Asia, which is a threat to Russian national interests.
My view is that US presence in Central Asia weakens Russian influence -
including in a number of practical issues, having to do with transport
corridors, energy transport etc. On the other hand, Americans stabilized
the region and gave some regional governments to reap the benefits of
globalization, which is a rather good thing. Moreover, if Russia had served
as the defender of Western civilization against the East, as many think,
then now the US has taken up the task, which should be welcomed.
Q: What is Russia trying to accomplish in the Near East and Central Asia?
There are discussions among the politicians of what is the greatest threat
to Russia. One faction thinks the main threat is from the south, the "belt
of instability" from the Balkans to China. That's the source of terrorist
threats and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Another
faction thinks the US is the greatest threat. Therefore, the south presents
an opposition - and possibly even a counterbalance - to the United States.
This is where the wide-spread sympathy for the Iraqis come from. Iraqis
were being perceived, often justly, as victims of aggression. Anti-American
sentiment swells up during US military actions.
Naturally, for those who consider America the main threat, the south is
just a peripheral problem. And for those who view the south as the main
problem, they formulate policy to prevent threats to Russian security from
that region.
Q: Russia is trying to pacify Chechnya, while the US is undertaking similar
actions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Is there a workable mechanism for solving
these kinds of problems?
Of course not, or else these kinds of problems would not arise. There are
approximately 40 countries in the world today that have a problem with
separatism and continuing military actions. These conflicts, especially if
they are steeped in ethnic or religious animosity, can last decades, even
centuries. There are no solutions for them. We can see this clearly in the
example of Great Britain, which still cannot rid itself of the Northern
Ireland problem. Chechnya is another old wound, one that has been bleeding
for almost 200 years with no end in sight. Of course, political
rapprochement is possible, and so is the creation of a power structure
deemed legitimate by the Chechen population, one that can be negotiated
with. But this doesn't mean that incursions by groups of warriors would
cease. Those can go on for many more years.
In Afghanistan, the US did not propose to create an exemplary democratic
government. It's likely such a thing is impossible, in a society that's not
yet even fully feudal. They had very limited goals: to destroy the Taliban,
to take control of Kabul, ad to give a free hand to the regional
commanders, who became the rulers of various provinces.
In Iraq, everything will be different. This is an organized society that
can create an effective center of power. I don't believe in an Islamic
democracy, much less an Arab democracy, but the pre-conditions for a
more-or-less normal society do exist there. And so is the potential for
economic growth, in the form of oil. Iraq has more of it than Russia.
Q: Where do you see the world in 15-20 years? Will things settle?
Things never settle. The world society is always developing. Russia will
likely become an independent center of power. It is, for the most part, not
integrated into the European structures. It's hard to imagine Russia as a
significant member of NATO or the EU. In the East, there is nothing to
integrate into. So Russia, in view of its size and internal peculiarities,
is fated to become an independent and autonomous center of power.
Regarding the global system, it will oscillate from a unipolar domination
by the US to a multipolar world. The US will try to show that they can do
everything everywhere, but this will not turn out to be the case. In one of
my articles I characterized the 21st century system as a return to the
"balance of powers" system at the end of the 19th century, only on a global
scale.
Yes, the US has an advantage in a number of parameters, but this domination
is nothing exceptional. The American economy was a larger fraction of the
world economy in 1945. China's role in the world economy of the 17th
century was greater than America's role today. There will be a certain
balance of power, and I cannot imagine the possibility of a war between the
great powers, if only because they all have nuclear capability. Regarding
the conflicts on the periphery, they will persist. Just like in the 19th
century, when the great powers almost never fought among themselves, but
maintained an active foreign policy. This system is fairly stable; in any
case, during the time of the "balance of power" in late 19th-early 20th
century, Europe enjoyed a period of peace.
*********
#5
Vremya MN
April 11, 2003
THREE IN A BOAT, NOT COUNTING THE UNITED STATES
Russia will choose its relationship with Washington over Germany and France
Author: Yevgeny Bovkun
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
GERMANY DOESN'T HAVE ANY POLITICAL SOLUTIONS TO OFFER TO RUSSIA IN
COMPENSATION FOR DETERIORATING RUSSIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS. TRADE, THE
WAR ON TERRORISM IN THE CAUCASUS, POST-WAR ARRANGEMENTS IN IRAQ:
RUSSIA NEEDS A MORE POWERFUL AND INFLUENTIAL PARTNER IN ALL THESE
SPHERES.
German politicians are not exactly hopeful about the meeting
between Vladimir Putin, Gerhard Schroeder, and Jacques Chirac in St.
Petersburg today.
According to Reinische Post, "Schroeder, Chirac, and Putin will
have to make an elegant turn towards cooperation within the framework
of European partnership, and substantially mitigate the anti-American
tone of their stance on Iraq, in order to save face and not appear to
be losers."
The chancellor has already made statements to that effect.
Germany wants Saddam Hussein toppled. Dealing with the dictatorship,
and a peaceful life for the Iraqi people, are priorities of the
international community, and Germany doesn't want to be confined to
the role of a spectator. But what does Germany expect from Russia now?
"This sudden shift towards anti-Americanism has not been that
painful for Russia," says a Cologne political scientist. "Firstly,
because Germany and France dragged Russia into their boat at the last
possible moment. Secondly, because even these two countries together
cannot offer Russia what America alone has to offer. Where Russia is
concerned, its vestigial image of a super power gradually building up
its economy makes relations with America much more of a priority than
the status of a third crew member in a leaky boat within the framework
of multipolar policy. I have no doubt that the US Administration will
find a way to make some concessions to Russia which France or Germany
can hardly expect from the United States..."
Indeed, Germany doesn't have any political solutions to offer to
Russia in compensation for deteriorating Russian-American relations.
Trade, the war on terrorism in the Caucasus, post-war arrangements in
Iraq: Russia needs a more powerful and influential partner in all
these spheres. That is why European Unity is now becoming a new slogan
of German foreign policy. Addressing the Bundestag, the chancellor
called for greater consolidation of the Europeans within the framework
of NATO and the European Union, and more attention to security aspects
"with the UN playing the central role." According to Schroeder, the UN
peacekeepers of the future should be from units of a united European
military.
The meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Brussels and
negotiations between US Secretary of State Colin Powell and European
partners (starting with Joschka Fischer, who sent Powell a crate of
beer as a token of reconciliation) successfully fit the chancellor's
new concept. Relying on "multipolar Europe", Germany is in search of
an attractive wrapping for its foreign policy efforts. Its leaders
have borrowed the term from Russia, but replacing trans-Atlantic
relations with multilateral relations is not going to be easy at all.
One of the opportunities involves assistance to post-war Iraq, to
set up a provisional administration and organize an international
conference like the one that took place near Bonn when the future of
Afghanistan was discussed. There is a solution to every crisis, says
Schroeder. Europe must learn to speak a common political language
again. This is a lengthy process, but one to which there is no
alternative.
********
#6
Source in Russian govt suggests Washington should forgive debts of former USSR
MOSCOW. April 11 (Interfax) - An Interfax source said that the logic of the
U.S., which has suggested forgiving Iraq's debts, should apply to all
countries.
"If you follow the logic of U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul
Wolfowitz, who suggested that Russia, France, and Germany forgive Iraq's
debts because they were taken by Saddam Hussein's regime, it would be more
logical to begin by forgiving the debts of the former USSR to Russia," a
source in the Russian government said.
"If U.S. officials have a certain logic, this logic should apply to all
countries," the source said.
*********
#7
Majority of Russians think US victory in Iraq bad thing for Russia: poll
MOSCOW (AFP) Apr 11, 2003
A majority of Russians, 54 percent, think that a victory of the US-led
coalition against Iraq will be a bad thing for Russia, according to an
opinion poll published late Thursday and carried out late last week, the
Interfax news agency reported.Among the reasons supporting this opinion,
respondents cite possible economic difficulties caused by lower oil prices,
the end of Russian business interests with Iraq and the impossibility for
Russia to tap Iraq's vast oil resources.
The poll was carried out by the Public Opinion Foundation on April 5, a few
days before the Iraqi regime collapsed.
Observers have long warned that Russia, which had substantial oil and
business interests in Iraq, will likely be locked out of the post-war
situation -- particularly of participation in Iraq's rich oil sector --
because of its fierce opposition to the US-led war.
However, US ambassador to Russia Alexander Vershbow said in an interview
published Wednesday that Russia could form part of an interim
administration in Iraq once hostilities end.
"In Iraq's interim administration, to be created after the end of the
(military) operation, the Iraqi nation must be represented, and the
coalition allies must take part in it, and the UN must not be left out, nor
must the major world powers, including Russia," the envoy told the Izvestya
daily.
*********
#8
Anti-war alliance pushes for key UN role in Iraq
By Ron Popeski
ST PETERSBURG, Russia, April 11 (Reuters) - Russian, French and German
leaders, who opposed the Iraqi military campaign, gathered in Russia's
second city on Friday to press home calls for the United Nations to oversee
postwar reconstruction.
But all three were up against U.S. resistance to the notion of giving up
authority for rebuilding Iraq after U.S. and British forces secured control
over Baghdad and ousted President Saddam Hussein.
U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell said that had been ruled out. A top
Pentagon official suggested the three would best contribute to
reconstruction by forgiving debts to any new Iraqi government.
Russia added its voice to calls for a central U.N. role in postwar Iraq,
before President Vladimir Putin hosted German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder
and French President Chirac at talks also aimed at mending ties with the
United States.
Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said it was up to the United Nations
to safeguard international peace and security.
"We hope the United Nations will perform this central role, in particular,
in the settlement of Iraq's post-war situation," he told reporters in
ex-Soviet Tajikistan.
"This authority must be used to achieve a political settlement in Iraq
within the shortest time possible. This is in the interests of the Iraqi
people. This is in the interests of the whole region."
Powell has mocked similar appeals from European leaders.
"The suggestion that some of my colleagues would give that now that the
coalition has done all of this and liberated Iraq, thank you very much,
step aside and the Security Council is now going to become responsible for
everything, is incorrect," Powell told the Los Angeles Times.
"And they know it. And they were told it."
In the months preceding the conflict, all three countries stood firm in
joint opposition to any use of force to ensure Iraq held no banned arms,
refusing to back any U.N. Security Council resolution endorsing military
intervention.
Now they have to reckon with a U.S. administration still smarting from
their blocking tactics.
FORGIVING DEBT
U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz said all three states should
consider forgiving debts he said Saddam had used to buy weapons or live in
luxury.
"I think they ought to consider whether it might not be appropriate to
forgive some or all of that debt so that the new Iraqi government isn't
burdened with it," he told the Senate Armed Service Committee.
Most estimates put Iraqi debts to Russia and France at about $8 billion
each, mostly for sales and contracts concluded in the 1980s. Germany's
Finance Ministry said on Friday Iraq owed Berlin a sum just short of four
billion euros ($4.3 billion).
In France, Chirac faced growing calls to put right damage to relations with
the United States.
"France made a bad choice, and a bad move," Alain Madelin, a pro-U.S.
member of Chirac's UMP party told Le Parisien daily. "The lost ground is
huge. I regret that Jacques Chirac is not at the side of (British Prime
Minister) Tony Blair and (U.S. President) George Bush, addressing the Iraqi
people and speaking the language of freedom."
Friday's talks were originally to have been a meeting between Putin and
Schroeder. But Chirac was hurriedly added to the guest list as the
U.S.-British force advanced.
All three appear to lend little credence to statements at a summit by Bush
and Blair that the United Nations would play a major role.
Schroeder said ahead of the talks that Germany would contribute to
rebuilding Iraq only under a U.N. umbrella. Chirac said France wanted Iraq
to be sovereign again "in a region of stability with the legitimacy that
the United Nations gives."
Putin, eager to balance opposition to war with Moscow's post-September 11,
2001, friendship with Washington, has made no comment since U.S. tanks
moved into central Baghdad.
(Additional reporting by Berlin, Paris bureaux)
*********
#9
Russia: People Protest Higher Power Costs
By Michael Lelyveld
The Russian government is struggling with protests over its energy-tariff
policies as regional power prices soar nearly 70 percent. Officials have been
unable to solve the economic and social problems created by the rate hikes,
while international organizations offer seemingly contradictory advice.
Boston, 10 April 2003 (RFE/RL) -- The Russian government has been caught in a
collision between economic and social forces over energy prices as it tries
to cope with conflicting pressures from abroad.
This week, dozens of members of the Unified Russia party crowded into the
Moscow office of the Federal Energy Commission (FEK) with the signatures of
2.6 million citizens, demanding lower electricity tariffs, "The Moscow Times"
reported.
Georgii Kutovoi, chairman of the rate-setting FEK, was forced to agree with
his critics. Kutovoi pledged, "We are going to work with all the regions in
order to restore social harmony and resolve this political and economic
conflict."
The immediate problem is that most of Russia's regions have raised
electricity rates by far larger margins than the 14 percent that the
government authorized for this year. In Ulyanovsk, residential tariffs jumped
66 percent, according to figures from Renaissance Capital, cited by "The
Moscow Times" in February.
At the time, Kutovoi urged a sharp rise in industrial power prices in order
to cut them for citizens. His recommendation came after President Vladimir
Putin blasted the process, saying it was "absolutely going out of control,"
according to RBC News. But despite Putin's comments nearly two months ago,
the high regional charges have not been rolled back.
The process may go beyond the question of controlling the regional energy
commissions at a time when restructuring of the power sector is set to begin.
Many may be raising rates in hopes of drawing investment to the spinoffs of
regional energy companies. This week, the chief executive of the Unified
Energy Systems (EES), Anatolii Chubais, said the power monopoly hopes to
attract $55 billion in investment in the next 10 years.
But the entire concept of monopoly rate hikes is likely to come under fire in
an election year. The government is racing to curb inflation and raise
pensions at the same time to keep citizens from suffering with higher utility
costs. The conflicting forces threaten to pull economic policy apart. Dissent
within the government has erupted in open discord.
Last week, presidential adviser Andrei Illarionov attacked the Economic
Development and Trade Ministry for a growth plan that includes more increases
next year for the electricity, gas, and rail monopolies. Reuters quoted
Illarionov as saying, "According to this strategy, we are to increase the
size of the monopolies, namely through price hikes."
He also blasted the ministry's plans to diversify the economy by raising oil
taxes in order to aid value-added sectors like the "processing" industries.
Illarionov said such shifting would produce "higher costs for the Russian
economy."
Taken together, the debates over the government's plans could have sweeping
economic and social implications, raising political risks at a time when the
government can afford it least.
The government faces similar conflicting pressures on the international
scene, where its efforts to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) have
become snared in energy tariff debates. This week, Russia's WTO negotiator
Maksim Medvedkov said, "As regards problems of a systemic nature, the most
important problem remains with energy pricing."
For the past year, the European Union has been pressing Russia to raise
domestic gas prices to world levels, ending the system of subsidizing Russian
rates at the EU's expense. Russian gas tariffs of about $20 per 1,000 cubic
meters are less than one-fifth of export prices. But the advice of the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) may have added layers of
complexity to an already complicated plight.
The World Bank believes that Russia's prices should roughly double to between
$35 and $40 per 1,000 cubic meters to cover the long-term expenses of
monopoly Gazprom, Christof Ruehl, the bank's chief economist for Russia, said
in March. But that figure is less than half of what the EU wants.
At the same time in March, the IMF's top Russia expert, John Odling-Smee,
criticized the pace of reforms and lowered the fund's economic forecasts for
the country. Odling-Smee said that key reform measures are "being blocked by
a lot of vested interests," Reuters reported. Among them, he said, was the
effort to raise energy prices to "a proper market level," implying tariffs in
line with the EU demands.
But Odling-Smee also urged Russia to keep inflation to within 10 percent, the
lower end of its target range for this year of up to 12 percent. Odling-Smee
said, "If inflation is always going to be above 10 percent, this could
develop into a chronic illness for the country." It was not clear how the
government would meet demands for lower inflation and higher tariffs at the
same time.
The question of gas rates is closely tied to electricity tariffs, since
two-thirds of Russia's power is generated from gas. But working backwards
from the demands of United Russia and its 2.6 million petitioners, the
problem seems even tougher.
If the government is pressured to cut electricity rates before the election,
it may find it impossible to raise gas prices by 20 percent this year and 25
percent in 2004 as planned. The result of such increases would be a squeeze
on EES and its restructuring plan.
Those concerns may be one reason that foreign investors have so far shunned
investments in EES, although shares have been pushed higher by well-connected
Russian investors who are vying for control. This week, Chubais said that
foreigners would soon "regret" the missed opportunity, the RIA-Novosti news
agency reported.
But they may be staying away until Russia's policy conflicts are clearly
resolved.
*******
#10
Latest Developments in Russia's Administrative Reform Saga Detailed
Rossiyskaya Gazeta
8 April 2003
Article by Yelena Lashkina: "Decision Made. First Victims of
Administrative Reform"
In Russia just as in any other country
administrative reform is a permanent process. And if specific results
are not observed this does not mean that nothing is being done.
Nevertheless, it is a wonderful pretext for various kinds of speculative
statements.
For a number of years now the White House has been getting ready to
reform the government structure. All the indications are the basic
scenario presumes "three-level and four-level" ministries. The "upper
level" will comprise political departments in charge of executive
structures responsible for the implementation of mapped out policy.
State agencies and control organs will occupy the "lower" level.
SPS [Union of Right-Wing Forces] leader Boris Nemtsov also expressed his
concern over government reform the other day. He envisions two
scenarios of government reform. According to the first scenario, the
president is simultaneously the prime minister. However, this can
entail "some dangerous consequences when too much power is concentrated
in one pair of hands," Nemtsov contradicted his own statement. "Russia
has gone through this many times," the SPS leader pointed out. He
considers the second scenario -- the forming of a "political government"
based on the results of State Duma elections -- more acceptable. To
ensure that functionaries do not feel bored it is also necessary to carry
out reform of the public service, the key elements of which will be
transfer of functionaries to contract service and selection of candidates
for particular posts based on bidding. "It is time we realized that
good people do not live in St. Petersburg only," Nemtsov pointed out.
All the events taking place at Krasnopresnenskaya Naberezhnaya [Council
of Ministers] these days are being regarded exclusively from the
perspective of administrative reform. Although the government does not
want "to lower work efficiency as a result of structural shakeups," not
only ministries and departments, but also individual functionaries can
fall victim to administrative reform.
"It makes no difference to Russian citizens how many ministries and
departments will function in this country -- 25, 20, or 15," Mikhail
Kasyanov pointed out the other day. According to him, the storm of
emotions surrounding the disputes over the number of ministries is
unnecessary. "The main goal of administrative reform is to free the
state of redundant functions," the prime minister pointed out. In line
with the president's instructions to develop a concept of administrative
reform the government staff jointly with the Ministry of Economic
Development and Trade analyzed 500 regulatory acts and identified more
than 5,000 functions performed by the executive on the federal level
alone. Moreover, ministries and departments obviously have no intention
to give up their redundant or duplicate functions. Moreover, they are
trying to prove they should be granted additional powers. Nevertheless,
personnel cuts are inevitable and, according to head of government staff
Igor Shuvalov, this painful process will last through the end of the
year. Before the concept was submitted to the Kremlin people in the
White House had said reform should start in 2004, at the beginning of a
new fiscal year, but the prime minister made a different decision: It
is necessary to launch reform this year.
However, the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade failed to fulfill
the prime minister's directive: Mikhail Kasyanov was not satisfied with
its report on the curtailment of ministries' functions. Nor was he
impressed with the ministry's proposal regarding administrative reform:
Mikhail Dmitriyev proposed abolition of three small federal agencies with
the total staff of 500 persons, which would allow for annual savings to
the tune of $10 million. People at Krasnopresnenskaya Naberezhnaya were
waiting for normal analysis, whereas Gref's deputy decided to reform the
state apparatus.
Initiative is punishable. Kasyanov signed an order in which he warned
Mikhail Dmitriyev, deputy minister of economic development and trade, of
"partial nonconformity with job requirements in view of improper
performance of official duties." German Gref's deputy was warned in
connection with "repeated distortion of the government's stance on
pension reform issues during public appearances." In particular,
Dmitriyev stated last week that pension reform is threatened and, as a
matter of fact, blamed the government for this. In essence, Dmitriyev's
behavior was incompliant with ethic norms, Rossiyskaya Gazeta's sources
in the White House pointed out: He stated that pension reform was
falling through after he failed to do his job and present the government
with complete documents. For this very reason instead of reprimanding
him severely Kasyanov preferred to punish him more seriously.
*********
#11
Expected Use of Internet by Russian Parties in Upcoming Election Campaign
Seen
Rossiyskaya Gazeta
3 April 2003
Article by Dmitriy Ivanov of www.nethistory.ru: "How the Bear Was
Caught in the Net. Election Campaign Starts on the Internet"
Unidentified persons acting on behalf of United
Russia's Moscow city organization have disseminated a lot of e-mails
"strongly advising" that their recipients join the campaign for
"voluntary mass recruitment" of new party members. Some of the persons
that received this piece of spam (unwanted mail) hurriedly reported back
that they had successfully set up party cells, others expressed their
indignation over rude violation of net etiquette, and some caustically
commented on the content and style of the e-mail message received.
Refutation followed shortly thereafter: Nikolay Nikolayev, deputy head
of the United Russia Moscow Organization Executive Committee, blamed the
incident on "enemies" and stated that "special services have already
received orders and are looking for the culprits." The press expressed
the theory that this kind of brazen operation might have been carried by
the Communist Party of the Russian Federation or the Union of Right-Wing
Forces [SPS]. According to another theory, United Russia itself
organized the dissemination of the e-mails. One way or another, the
provocation triggered a wave of publications in the mass media and stormy
debates on the web, which means that its organizers have every reason to
congratulate themselves on a successful start of election battles on the
Internet.
Although Russian politicians' first websites set up to influence the
electorate appeared in 1996, the Internet was properly used for the first
time during the previous legislative elections. The scriptwriters of
the SPS's election campaign who advertised party leaders Boris Nemtsov
and Sergey Kiriyenko as the most knowledgeable persons in the field of
new technology were the pioneers of political Internet in Russia. The
method of appealing to the opinion of Internet users was used for the
first time back then: Nemtsov advertised the Young Russia movement as
"spontaneous" initiative from Internet users, whereas Kiriyenko proposed
the "Internet Parliament" project to draft a plan for the new Duma's
activities. Few people cared during the campaign that nobody worked
with Young Russia's members "recruited" through the Internet or that
"Internet Parliament" became an ordinary discussion board: What
mattered was that the press deemed Nemtsov and Kiriyenko the main
Internet users among Russian politicians.
[Passage omitted on how various parties used Internet in 1999 election
campaign]
What can we expect from the forthcoming election campaign? Does the
spam recently disseminated on behalf of United Russia mean that in the
coming year Internet users will be attacked with Internet propaganda and
that the Internet market should get ready for large-scale political
investment? Yes, the Internet is listed as a separate item in the plans
of all major players in the election campaign; special teams are already
being set up in election staffs to provide web support for the election
campaign. However, it is unlikely that political technologists'
Internet activity will be in the spotlight again the way it was four
years ago: Campaign conflicts have not come to a head yet, which will
inevitably affect political creativity, whereas the novelty effect cannot
be exploited endlessly. Generally speaking, the widespread opinion
about the Internet as a place frequented by electors evokes doubts:
Most Internet users are apolitical. Apparently, the players
participating in the campaign will present us with the standard set of
official websites, resources supporting particular events, Internet-based
mass media created specially for the elections, and -- to add some spice
-- Internet provocations. There is also another technique widely used
in the West: Fund raising for election campaigns through the Internet.
Having said that, this method of increasing the election fund would be
justly regarded in Russia as mockery of electors.
*******
#12
Financial Times (UK)
April 9, 2003
Russia diary: Broken promises
By Rafael Behr
There are two gentlemen in Nizhny Novgorod who once promised, should they see
me in that city again, to kill me. To be precise, they said they would break
my arms and legs, rape and kill me in that order, I think.
Which means the risk of indiscriminate violence can be added to the list of
things that Nizhny has in common with Baghdad.
Now add taxis to the list. Before the war the transport ministry in Baghdad
ordered 5,000 Volgas from the Gorky Automobile Plant, Nizhny's biggest
enterprise.
The plant, GAZ as it's known by its great Russian acronym, is worried that a
changed regime won't honour the deal. And when you run a sprawling Soviet
monopolistic industrial behemoth with a declining market, contracts like the
Iraqi one don't come along every day.
The Volga, phonetically and aesthetically a cross between a Volvo and a Lada
- with a guttural 'g' in the middle to represent a crunching gear change - is
designed for uneven roads and do-it-yourself maintenance. A friend for life.
That at least is how GAZ wants to re-brand the Volga to compete with cheap
imports. A knocked-off BMW comes at about the same price but is only good for
a couple of years of Russian potholes.
To investigate GAZ's prospects I broke a promise never to set foot in Nizhny
again. A promise stammered to a pair of gold-toothed heavies with an appetite
for sexual violence.
That was in 1994, when Nizhny had only recently lost the status of 'closed
city', meaning a Soviet industrial centre with military facilities of
strategic enough importance that foreigners were strictly banned. Hence the
near-death experience in an insalubrious cafe.
At the time some local gangsters, not yet up to speed with the new migration
rules, refused to believe that a Briton could penetrate the city. Since the
obvious alternative identity for a Russophone with a funny accent was big fat
liar, ergo rival gangster, they decided to take no chances.
To be fair, no one at that time seemed to know that Nizhny was no longer
closed. .
This time round Nizhny was more welcoming.
A trip to GAZ confirms that they have 250 air-conditioned, Baghdad-ready
taxis gathering dust. They haven't bothered starting on the rest. And GAZ is
not the only company with contracts missing in action.
Iraq was Russia's biggest trading partner in the Middle East before the first
Gulf War.
Even after UN sanctions bit, Moscow and Baghdad did good business together.
Of course there's the oil. Russian companies spent years cultivating Iraqi
politicians to get access to those reserves. Only to see Abrams M1s achieving
the same goal in a fraction of the time.
GAZ were planning to sell their range of Gazelle light trucks to Baghdad but
the UN vetoed the deal because the vans have possible military applications.
"So do donkeys if you put weapons on them," said one company official.
Soviet-era clients, it seems, are bad business. Between defunct Iraqi
ministries and Muscovite boy-racers there isn't much of a market for the
middle-ranking Party bureaucrat's favourite cars.
GAZ is doing its best to adapt to market conditions with an austere
restructuring programme and financial backing from a millionaire aluminium
magnate. But how well has the rest of Nizhny adapted to market conditions?
Can a foreigner get a cup of coffee in a sleazy cafe these days without fear?
The high rate at which service outlets change hands in Russia's provinces and
the even higher rate at which they go out of business altogether in my memory
means the scene of the deferred crime was not easily found. One
familiar-looking dive on the main pedestrian street rang faintly alarming
bells, but the clients inside were all respectable.
The only other candidate was a glitzy pizzeria. They expanded the place,
painted it golden-yellow and pink, with murals depicting the Statue of
Liberty, Mickey Mouse and Batman on the walls and called it "Manhattan Pizza".
Give them 10 years and they'll have a chain in Baghdad, with a delivery
service and a fleet of customized Volgas.
********
#13
Date: Fri, 11 Apr 2003
From: "Kevin O'Flynn"
Subject: Help for Siamese twins
This a cry for help i was asked to pass around by a woman named Zoya
Rezakhanova from Kyrgyztan, the mother of two 11-year-old twins Gita and
Zita. The girls were Siamese twins until March 27 when doctors at the
Filatov children' s hospital performed a surgery to separate them and did
it for free. Unfortunately, they decided (or were forced) to stop at that
and now plan to discharge the twins who, though recovering faster than
expected, are still very weak, being only two weeks away from an extremely
complicated surgery in which their many internal organs were affected.
Zoya is really worried that the twins need medical care she won't be able
to provide at home or from a local hospital in Kyrgyzstan. Before the
surgery she was told that the girls would remain in hospital for at least
three months and now she is trying to find a rehab clinic for them in
Moscow. Finding one should not be a problem but she won't be able to pay
for the entire treatment and would be grateful for any amount of money.
Those willing to help the twins can contact Zoya at 215-4101, ext. 1305 or
write to me at oks@imedia.ru
Thank you for reading this,
Oksana Yablokova
correspondent
The Moscow Times
Tel: 7 (095) 937-3399
Fax: 7 (095) 937-3393/ 94
********
#14
From:
Subject: Amnesty International Releases Racism in Russia Report
Date: Thu, 10 Apr 2003
Amnesty International: Report on Discrimination in Russian Federation
Fight Against Racism Essential to End Climate of Impunity
Discrimination on the grounds of race is a reality for many members of
ethnic or national minority groups in the Russian Federation, warned
Amnesty International as it issued its latest report 'Dokumenty!'
Discrimination on grounds of race in the Russian Federation on the eve of
the United Nations International day against discrimination.
"The clampdown on human rights across the world, including the Russian
Federation, after 11 September 2001, remains one of the most pressing human
rights concerns," Amnesty International said. "In situations of increased
tension representatives of ethnic minorities, refugees and internally
displaced persons are the most vulnerable sections of society. The state
must take responsibility to preserve the human rights of all its citizens."
Amnesty International's report gives examples from the numerous cases that
have come to the attention of the organization and which illustrate the
organization's concerns - African students and ethnic Tajiks beaten by
skinheads and left without redress when the police fail to take appropriate
action; Meskhetian Turks being refused registration and arbitrarily denied
recognition as citizens of the Russian Federation, leading to denial of a
whole range of basic human rights like the right of freedom of movement;
ethnic Chechens being subjected to arbitrary document checks and detention;
racist attacks on Jews and Roma.
"Racism is an attack on the very notion of universal human rights. It
systematically denies certain people their full human rights because of
their colour, race, ethnicity, decent or national origin. The right to be
free from racial discrimination is a fundamental principle of human rights
law," the international organization said.
As Amnesty International's document was launched, the UN Committee on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination was preparing to debate
in Geneva its draft conclusions and recommendations on the Russian
government's periodic report. The Russian Federation is a signatory to a
number of human rights treaties of particular relevance to race-related
discrimination, including the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.
Under international treaties the Russian government has the responsibility
to ensure that the country's legislation and institutions address the
causes and consequences of discrimination.
The Council of Europe, The European Union, the Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe and the UN have all raised their concerns about
racism and discrimination in the Russian Federation and have made
recommendations to the authorities.
Russian non-governmental organizations continue to work to counteract
racism, discrimination and intolerance in Russia. They face complicated
problems which require long-term, consistent and careful work. "Although
the anti-racist and pro-tolerance movement is new to the Russian civil
society, it is growing and consists of human rights NGOs, ethnic and racial
minority groups, organisations of migrants, anti-Nazi movements, and social
research groups. They are gradually mastering the methods of monitoring,
strategic litigation, legal and non-legal advocacy and awareness-raising
campaigns, and understand the importance of coordination, shared
perceptions and common strategies," Alexander Ossipov from the Human Rights
Centre "Memorial" said.
"The failure to hold to account those who commit, encourage or tolerate
racial abuse frequently exacerbates the problem and helps create a climate
of impunity for those who commit such acts," Amnesty International said.
More at www.amnestyusa.org.
For a complimentary copy of the report, send a request to
. The report may also be downloaded from
http://www.amnesty.org/russia/racism_report.html
*********
#15
From: "Peter Calder"
Subject: Misha and Masha
Date: Fri, 11 Apr 2003
Let’s just refer to them as Misha and Masha.
Marsha was one of those magnetic and attractive women that you seldom get
to meet elsewhere except in Russia. At 33 she was in her prime and her
startling looks and vibrant personality, set her apart from the rest of the
field.
She was a rare hybrid of Russian birth and American upbringing and the
niece, or cousin sister, of my intended Russian wife. The two of them had
grown up together in Moscow during those difficult and changing times of
the 70’s.
After Masha’s mother had decided that her Russian husband was unlikely to
achieve the high expectations that she had originally hoped of him, she
divorced. Then she managed to find her way to America where her daughter
received her university education and a new set of values.
Masha returned to Russia sometime after 1996, and with her western degree
in psychology, she began a promising private practice catering for local
Americans that had a need for regular, deep and meaningful counselling.
Additionally, she took custom from the New Age Russians that wanted
everything expensive and of American flavour.
In the course of time, she met and married a vacuous, New Russian whose
speciality was the manufacture and distribution of costly, winter proof,
window fixtures. Both the enterprise and the marriage were productive. A
girl child emerged from this liaison and for a time all went well in both
departments. Sadly, at a later date the New Age husband became entranced
and entangled with an emerging local movie star. Thereafter a separation
ensued and Masha got the upmarket flat and the child, plus the mainstay of
her trade, depression.
It was said by some, and by Masha herself, that an excessive fondness for
alcohol significantly contributed towards her mental disquietude. It was
here, I once heard her speculate, that genetics came into play. My intended
wife’s brother was a good and promising man, whose fortunes foundered, in
the uncharted shoals of strong drink.
There were some that recalled that there had been constant and acrimonious
confrontations during this unhappy period of separation, which culminated
in the events of the 23rd of June 2000.
On that night, Irina and I went to Masha’s troubled residence for dinner.
We leisurely dined and wined until our departure at about midnight.
At sometime during the evening, Masha and I had stood together on the 13th
story balcony and smoked together in the harsh winter’s night air. I can
remember that balcony well and how I had leaned over the railings looking
down to the snow covered courtyard so far below. It was not the sort of
balcony that one could easily fall over.
Some hours after our home going Masha had rung her mother who was at that
time in St Petersburg. They had talked together for half an hour and her
mother later recalled that her daughter had been both sober and rational,
despite the hour.
The next day I learnt that Masha had a visit from her estranged husband at
about 4 am and the upshot of this was another confrontation.
He said that Masha was drunk and hysterical.
He said that Masha had threatened to jump from the balcony.
He said that a struggle developed and Masha had over balanced and gone over
the railings.
He said that he had tried to hold onto her but was unable to prevent her
from plummeting into the courtyard below.
What to believe? I cannot judge.
This was on a Wednesday night and on the phone the next morning, I was told
that the funeral would be at 10 am on Friday.
I protested that this could not be. There would have to be police
investigations and an ensuing coronial enquiry and that we would be called
as witnesses as we were the second last to see her alive.
Such misconceptions, as at 10.30 am on the appointed day, I stood in
sub-zero temperatures by Masha’s open grave. Not far from me was Misha,
evidently bowed down with grief.
Masha had a grand funeral by Russian standards. There were masses of
flowers, a large attendance of mourners, a well-heated, modern Mercedes
Benz bus for the transportation of all and sundry, to and from the
cemetery, and a grand wake to follow.
The wake and the toasts that ensued are another story. I have never seen
the like before nor since, but at least there was no blood shed in the
process.
Later after my hangover had eased, I began to ask of myself the probing
questions. What had really happened during those predawn hours? How could
an American passport holder die in such circumstances without the
intervention of some judicial process? Could it really be just another
example of the power of the language of money and how it speaks in Russia?
Days later, I obtained an email address from an American friend and
dispatched a letter briefly outlining the facts and asking the US Embassy
if they had knowledge this citizen’s demise.
I promptly received an acknowledgement, written and signed by a person of
Russian surname, advising that at this time, the Embassy regretted that it
was unable to assist me.
Dissatisfied, I responded with particularised details, adding that the
implication received suggested that at some future date, help might be
forthcoming.
Again, with similar promptitude, the same Russian correspondent replied.
The letter began with an apology for his lack of ability in English
expression but concluded that no assistance could be offered and that I
should contact a certain Mr …[with contact details included] if I was in
need of further particulars.
Mr … was the hapless Misha, erstwhile husband of Masha.
I conclude by stating that the facts recorded above are absolutely correct
in every detail and free from any fanciful journalistic embellishments.
Think about it.
An added postscript could be that Misha seems to have had but a brief
bereavement. He appeared, within an indecently short time, on Russian TV,
in company with his starlet, featuring in one of those crass, western type
programmes that track the trivialities from the lives and pastimes of the
rich and temporary famous.
I wonder what his daughter will make of all of this when she grows up?
**********
#16
Wall Street Journal
April 11, 2003
Russia's Past Provides U.S. Five Lessons for Iraq's Future
By STEVE LIESMAN
I remember empty pedestals.
Arriving in Moscow less than a year after the breakup of the Soviet Union,
I missed the dramatic toppling of the statues of Lenin and Dzherzhinsky.
But day after day, I would pass the empty pedestals and think it equally
dramatic -- sadly -- that the Russians never had anything to replace them
with.
And this should be a lesson to America as it begins to consider
reconstructing Iraq.
Unfortunately, this war lacked Iraqi heroes (even the Russians had Yeltsin,
for a time) and so the Iraqi people begin the post-Saddam era with a void
in the soul of their national identity.
How it will be filled could do much to determine how smooth a transition
Iraq can make from dictatorship and central planning to democracy and
capitalism.
I asked Treasury Secretary John Snow on Thursday morning what dangers lay
ahead for the United States in trying to forge capitalism in Iraq: "They
are the dangers of taking a set of ideas that work in one institutional set
of arrangements, where law and order is understood, where commercial
contracts are respected," and trying to put them to work in a place where
those ideas may be alien. "I think the mistake we made in Russia was going
right to market principles before the foundations were in place."
Here are some of the pitfalls of which America should be mindful:
Do not make enemies of reform: Support for reform in Russia began strong.
Freedom, as Ari Fleischer said, is an unquenchable desire. But only
initially. It is soon overtaken by the need to quench more basic human
needs, like putting food on the table or gaining access to medical care.
By the first parliamentary election in 1993, soaring prices, dwindled
pension funds and widespread unemployment had quickly turned many Russians
against reform. Nostalgia for the old, repressive regime became widespread.
One of the great shortcomings of Western aid was the failure to insist that
Russia accept a social safety net loan of up to $1 billion from the World
Bank that would have provided, among other things, unemployment insurance
for laid off Russian workers.
So as we implement capitalist reforms, we must be careful to watch those
who are dislocated and disenfranchised from Saddam Hussein's paternalistic
system. In a matter of months or years, the Iraqis could be longing for the
stability he provided.
Fill the void: In the centrally planned Iraqi economy, the Baath Party
functions similarly to the Soviet Communist Party; that means it does much
more than just oppress the Iraqi people. It is the fabric that holds
together the country, CNBC's Mideast military analyst Rick Francona told
me. It's responsible for goods moving from one area of the country to
another, holding sway over civic life from the national to the local level.
As Mr. Yeltsin moved to destroy the Communist Party, with American
approval, he underestimated how critical it was to the functioning of the
country. And so, the Mafia moved in to the void, overseeing what businesses
could open where, who would control newly privatized companies, even what
politicians were elected.
The U.S. needs to be mindful that as it moves to destroy the Baath Party it
doesn't also rid the country of the Baath Party bureaucracy that holds the
country together.
"If you get rid of the institutions populated by the Baath Party --
judicial, military and legal -- you will have anarchy and chaos," said
retired Lt. Col. Francona. "You need to de-Baathify, get rid of the senior
leadership and leave middle managers in place."
Give Iraq Space: America is not God. We cannot recreate a nation in our own
image. We can offer it the best of what we have, but cannot transplant our
nation and its laws thousands of miles away. The Iraqis must be trusted to
find within their cultures that which the Iraqi people can rally around and
embrace as their own to form a lasting basis for law and civil society.
In our hubris in Russia , we attempted to transplant a judicial and civic
code that didn't belong to the country. Parts of it were never accepted.
Give Iraq Time: This may be the most difficult. The clock of American
politics ticks with a ceaseless beat, demanding results on an electoral
cycle. Nations change slowly. One of our biggest errors in Russia was to
impose annual deadlines for change that sometimes required generations. In
successive agreements, the International Monetary Fund required Russia to
adopt fiscal budgets in a nation that had never known them, or to open its
borders to goods when domestic industries were struggling. Some of this was
accomplished eventually; none of it on the timetable imposed by the IMF.
This will be a particular challenge to the Bush administration, which is
anxious to show America and especially, the Arab world, that we have
brought peace and prosperity to Iraq. The Russian example is that political
exigencies and nation building work in opposition.
Go Slow on Oil: A look at the world's leading oil producers finds black
crude as much a curse as a blessing. Sure, it brings in hard currency, but
it badly distorts the value of a nation's currency to the detriment of
other domestic industries. If we go slow in redeveloping Iraq, and go slow
in developing oil fields, we can give other industries time to develop
before they are overrun by the petroleum business, allowing the nation to
develop a mixed economy that isn't wedded to the price of oil.
Russia and Iraq are different in many ways. (Religion clearly seems to be
more of a factor in Iraq than it was in Russia .) But one thing they share
are those empty pedestals at the dawn of their freedom. President Bush has
said he wants the Iraqis to choose what statues fill them. It might be
harder than he thinks to really let that happen.
********
#17
FEATURE-Russian company town thrives on diet of steel
By Andrew Hurst
CHEREPOVETS, Russia, April 11 (Reuters) - So you thought Detroit was the
ultimate one-industry town?
That's because you may never have been to, or even heard of, Cherepovets,
500 km (310 miles) northeast of Moscow and home of Severstal, Russia's
biggest privately owned steel company.
The company and its subsidiaries employs 60,000 in Cherepovets -- some
two-thirds of the working population -- owns the town ice hockey and volley
ball teams and local radio and television stations.
And if you cannot face a night rattling by train across Russia's flat
expanses to reach Cherepovets, try flying in on the local airline -- Air
Severstal.
Drop in on a piano recital at the local concert hall or take painting
classes at evening school, and it too will all be courtesy of Severstal,
which literally means Northern Steel.
The top local hotel does not belong to the company. But it leaves you in
little doubt about the metal bashing traditions of this city of 320,000
people. It's called "The Metallurg."
Despite first appearances, Cherepovets -- set at the mouth of a huge
two-pronged reservoir -- is no Russian rustbelt town. Nor is it a fading
shadow of its former industrial self, like Sheffield in England or
Pittsburgh in the United States.
Against all the odds, it is thriving.
Severstal's British-trained management team is transforming the company
which drives the local economy into a dynamic export-oriented firm which
has forged joint ventures with foreigners and plans to list on Wall Street.
The dark beating heart of Cherepovets is a soot-blackened 47-hectare
(116-acre) complex of blast furnaces, steel mills and towering chimney
stacks built on the orders of the Soviet dictator Josef Stalin in the
aftermath of World War Two.
MODERNISING PLANT
After surviving the turbulence of the 1990s when many Russian companies
went to the wall as the Soviet command economy crumbled, Severstal has
modernised its plant and turned itself into a flourishing company since it
was privatised in 1993.
Producing some 9.3 million tonnes of steel annually, around half of it for
export, Severstal is ranked as one of the world's top 20 steel companies
and is Russia's 10th largest company measured by stock market capitalisation.
The air in the steelworks is thick with the smell of graphite and railway
lines criss-cross a landscape of slag heaps, giant pipes, coking ovens and
steel rolling mills.
The centrepiece of the plant is a 300-foot (91 metres) high blast furnace
-- said by Severstal to be the world's largest -- built in the dying years
of the Soviet Union.
Look more closely and much of the equipment in the sprawling complex is
modern machinery brought in from Germany and Italy.
Work has started on a joint venture between Severstal and French-based
Arcelor, the world's largest steel maker, to make galvanised steel at
Cherepovets for the Russian car industry.
Severstal, which also owns a car engine plant and a company called UAZ
which manufacturers four-wheel drive cars, sees big market potential
supplying foreign and home grown car makers in Russia.
Severstal's chairman Alexey Mordashov, one of the country's small band of
youthful billionaires, firmly believes the company's success is powerful
evidence that industry can flourish in post-Soviet Russia.
"We have low cost of factors (labour and capital) and very good
technology," Mordashov said in an interview. "And we do have a growing
domestic market." He added that per capital steel consumption is still far
lower in Russia than in most European countries.
MODERN MANAGEMENT
Applying western management techniques has also helped speed the company's
modernisation.
Many of Severstal's top managers, including Mordashov, have attended a
Master of Business Administration programme at Britain's University of
Northumbria.
The success of steel making has spared Cherepovets from the social
dislocation and economic decline that have marred many Russian factory
towns where entire industries were wiped out when market forces let rip in
the 1990s.
Unemployment in Cherepovets is less than one percent, well below the
national average of 8.5 percent.
Although there are few signs of the conspicuous consumption and the
expensive foreign limousines that dominate the streets of central Moscow,
Cherepovets appears to have retained a strong sense of community.
"They have struck a balance between market economics and the old Soviet
social support system," said Irene Commeau, managing director of the
European Business Club -- funded by foreign companies based in Russia --
who travels widely in Russia.
On a recent evening, scores of youths gathered for a dancing class at the
"House of Culture," a monolithic art and leisure complex in the town centre
which Severstal sponsors. In a nearby room pre-school children attend a
reading class.
At the local sports hall, the local ice hockey team, Severstal, gathered
for a match against a team from a rival steel town, Magnitogorsk, where
steel making is still under state ownership.
Severstal won 3-0.
*********
#18
TV1 Review
www.1tv.ru
Compiled by Luba Schwartzman (luba_sch@hotmail.com)
Research Analyst, Center for Defense Information, Moscow office
HEADLINES,
Thursday, April 10, 2003
- In Makhachkala, Daghestan, a fire broke out in the middle of the
night at a special home for children with hearing problems. The
fire spread quickly, but many of the children could not hear the
noise and screams. As a result, 28 children died and over 142 were
hospitalized. Some of the burn victims will be transferred to the
Speransky Clinic in Moscow for treatment.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed his condolences to
the people of Daghestan and ordered the government to "do
everything possible to help the families of those killed or injured."
- Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov reported that the experts from
the Emergencies Ministry and the Ministry of Health are working
to help the victims of the fire in Makhachkala. The two ministries
are also preparing a joint order on increasing fire safety measures
in schools.
- The State Duma opened its meeting with a moment of silence for
the children who died in the fire in Makhachkala.
- "Russia will guarantee the security of South Korea if its nuclear
program is terminated," declared Russian Defense Minister Sergei
Ivanov, currently on a visit in Seoul. Ivanov also expressed
concern about statements by US and North Korean officials on "the
possibility of the standoff growing into an armed conflict."
- Turkmen President Saparmurad Niazov is in Moscow on a
working visit. He met with President Putin to discuss the
development of bilateral relations. In particular, the leaders spoke
about cooperation in the energy sector, the development of the
Caspian Shelf, and the fight against international terrorism.
- Russian Ambassador to Iraq Vladimir Titarenko will return to
Moscow on Monday, along with his driver, who was wounded
when a convoy of diplomatic cars came under fire 60 miles away
from Baghdad.
- Russia's Head State Sanitary Inspector Gennady Onishchenko
recommended banning business and tourist trips by Russian
citizens to certain areas of China to prevent the spread of infectious
diseases.
- Experts from the Center for Flight Control corrected the orbit of
the International Space Station. The Russian Progress-47 freight
spacecraft raised the Station by about 5 kilometers to prepare it for
docking with the Soyuz TMA-2 spacecraft.
- The United Russia Party announced the start of a contest for
small-scale humanitarian programs. A special endowment fund has
been established to sponsor winning projects. Eligible programs
range from help to invalids to the improvement of playgrounds.
- The Russian-German "St. Petersburg Dialogue Forum" opened in
St Petersburg. Participants discussed the international situation as
affected by the war in Iraq and Russia's and Germany's roles in the
new configuration of Europe.
- The number of illegal immigrants in the Jewish Autonomous
Oblast is growing. Most are Chinese citizens.
- Spring flooding is affecting many areas of Russia. The situations
is worst in the Volgograd Oblast, where over 7,000 people have
been forced to leave their homes. Thousands of homes have also
been flooded in the Rostov and Voronezh oblasts.
********
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