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#8
Moscow Times
April 1, 2003
Kadyrov Won in Chechnya
By Boris Kagarlitsky
Chechnya held its referendum last week, and the Kremlin once more declared
victory. According to the official government line, fighters who attack Russian
forces from now on will be acting in violation of the law -- the republic's
newly adopted constitution, that is -- and against the will of their own people.
Following this logic, previous attacks on Russian soldiers were lawful and
reflected the will of the people. Following it further, the federal government's
actions in Chechnya before March 23, 2003, were entirely out of line.
Human rights watchdogs noted numerous violations over the course of the
referendum. Polling stations were not where they were supposed to be. Opponents
of both the referendum and the proposed constitution had no opportunity to make
their views known. No one actually read the constitution itself.
Salambek Maigov, Chechen rebel leader Aslan Maskhadov's spokesman in Moscow,
dismissed the referendum results as "vote-rigging in the best Soviet
tradition." The results announced by the Central Election Commission did
have the ring of Stalin-era reports of elections to the Supreme Soviet of the
Soviet Union: 95 percent of the electorate cast their ballots, and nearly all of
them voted "Yes." Polling stations located in areas controlled by the
fighters outdid themselves, delivering up to 99.5 percent of the vote in favor
of the constitution. The only way to explain the official tally is to assume
that the fighters, including the Arab volunteers in their ranks, answered
Moscow's call and backed the government's initiative.
The liberal press warned that the referendum in Chechnya was the image of
Russian elections to come. But this was not the first war-time election in
Chechnya. The 2000 presidential election produced a similar landslide in favor
of Vladimir Putin. And the last presidential election in Ingushetia was so
plagued by violations that it made the Chechen referendum look almost
respectable.
In short, the Chechen referendum surprised no one and changed nothing, but it
did make one thing clear -- something even the most zealous Chechen separatist
couldn't have dreamed of. The leadership in Grozny not only won independence
from Russia and its laws; it also put the Kremlin in its pocket.
Did the Kremlin really need the referendum? Of course not. It won't stop the
war. What it offers in the way of positive propaganda is canceled out by much
more serious political costs. Justifying the farce is more complicated than
doing nothing. It made the Chechens all sorts of promises fully aware that it
cannot follow through on them. And after all that, the situation in Chechnya
didn't change one iota.
The "head of the republic," Akhmad Kadyrov, on the other hand,
desperately needed the referendum. His authority has now acquired a semblance of
legitimacy. The next step is to hold a presidential election in the republic,
barring all serious claimants to Kadyrov's throne from running. Within the next
few months, he will go from being the head of the temporary administration in
Grozny to the democratically elected leader of Chechnya, whom the Kremlin can no
longer get rid of.
The Kadyrov clan runs Chechnya like a feudal fief. Chechen sources say that
no less than 90 percent of funds from the federal budget earmarked for Chechnya
are stolen, making Moscow's embezzlers look like angels. The government's
program for rebuilding the war-ravaged republic has already yielded concrete
results: the construction of luxurious mansions and the purchase of expensive
apartments in Moscow and other favored spots far from the front. Rather than
going to rebuild Chechen villages, federal funds are being invested in real
estate elsewhere. The Prosecutor's Office, oversight agencies and even the
Russian military have no sway over Kadyrov and his cohorts because of their
direct access to the Kremlin.
In the first Chechen war, Kadyrov fought for independence; in the second war
he achieved it -- as he understands independence, that is. Russia is watching
the rise of yet another dictator, just like those in Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan. He controls less territory, but he can do what no one else, even the
Turkmenbashi, can: Impose his will on the Kremlin, knowing that Putin will
obediently follow orders. Eighty thousand Russian soldiers risk their lives
every day in order to keep his regime in power in Grozny.
Soon the federal government will allocate around $1 billion for Chechnya. And
a new stage in the Chechen reconstruction program will get underway somewhere on
the French Riviera.
Boris Kagarlitsky is director of the Institute of Globalization Studies.
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