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#3 - JRL 7064
New York Times
February 16, 2003
Putin's Daunting Choice: Which West to Join
By MICHAEL WINES
MOSCOW -- One has to wonder whether Vladimir V. Putin finds this moment
bittersweet, or simply sweet.
As a young foreign operative of the K.G.B. in the 1980's, Mr. Putin labored
in East Germany for an organization whose raison d'être was to sow discord in
the Western alliance, to scrutinize every nuclear-winter protest and
anti-American march for cracks in the democratic wall. It failed utterly.
Fast-forward 20 years. Mr. Putin is Russia's president, a junior member of
that alliance, trying doggedly for full entry to the club. But instead of
sealing friendships, he must choose sides in a feud that appears to be splitting
the West at the seams.
This is the simple explanation for Russia's labored back and forth in the
global debate over war against Iraq: it is waiting to see whether the West can
stitch itself back together. For most of a month the Kremlin has finessed its
approach to disarming Saddam Hussein, joining France and Germany in a dovish
call for more inspections and negotiations; joining Washington in a hawkish
warning that if jawboning fails, it may back the use of force.
But while the Iraq crisis will presumably pass, Russia's dilemma may not.
Under Mr. Putin's whip, Russia has opted for the West's vaunted security and
shared values. What it has gotten is a place sandwiched between a globally
pre-eminent but increasingly despised United States and a Europe with vast
economic potential and a worldview troublingly centered on its umbilicus.
For Mr. Putin, the question now is whether he can keep the Atlantic rift from
swallowing his dream of a Russia anchored in the West — or, better yet,
exploit the schism to speed up the process.
"They're going to be forced to choose," said Michael McFaul, a
senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. "But they're going to be forced by
both sides. I'd say that gives them more flexibility."
Mr. Putin surely cannot afford to permanently alienate either side in what
could become a fundamental split between trans-Atlantic powers. Russia's
economic and political future is bound to Europe: the bulk of trade and foreign
investment comes from there, and cultural ties are strong.
But Russia needs the United States -- not only for trade, but because the two
nations are often reluctant political partners in the Koreas, Central and South
Asia, the Middle East and virtually everywhere else Moscow claims a strategic
interest. An American partnership gives Russia much of its global effectiveness.
Russian-American relations have been strained in recent months by anxiety in
Russia over American aims in Iraq, where Russian oil companies have a huge
stake, and by the Kremlin's open concern that a war in the Arab world will only
worsen terrorism, an obsession here.
For their part, American officials have privately said they are disappointed
by Mr. Putin's public show of solidarity with Germany and France against the use
of force in Iraq, especially given President Bush's long courtship of the
Russian leader.
But while the Americans have been brutally critical of Germany and France,
they have been publicly silent on Russia. In part, that may be because the
United States has placed a long-term bet on a Russian alliance. In part, it is
because Mr. Putin has conspicuously left open the prospect that Russia will
change its mind on Iraq. And it is partly because Moscow is waiting to see which
position on an Iraqi invasion is most advantageous for the Russian government.
"I think that for now, Mr. Putin tries maneuvering," said Sergei
Markov, a political analyst who heads the Civic Council of International
Affairs, based in Moscow. "His problem, as is the problem with all Russian
diplomacy, is specifics. What, specifically, does Russia get from this
alliance?"
Mr. Putin has ridiculed the idea that Russia's assent for an Iraq war rests
on guarantees of oil rights in Iraq or equally crass trade-offs, and American
officials agree. But Russia has to place its bets — and in supporting or
opposing an invasion of Iraq, the calculus is surely whether alliance with an
American colossus is outweighed by the bad blood spawned by endorsing war.
In the first years of Mr. Putin's presidency, France barely acknowledged
Russia except to castigate its disregard for atrocities against civilians in
Chechnya. In the last three months, French diplomats have all but run a shuttle
to Moscow, and French officials have made media spectacles of alleged
Chechen-led plots to attack Russian interests in Paris.
In Washington, the United States is preparing to label several Chechen
militant groups as terrorist organizations, and has pointedly accused Iraq of
ties to Chechen rebels involved in terrorism.
American officials express confidence that, sooner or later, Mr. Putin will
come around to the White House's view, and many experts abroad agree.
"He's on the American track," said Alexander Rahr, a Russia expert
at the German Council on Foreign Relations in Berlin. Still, Mr. Rahr added, Mr.
Putin also "wants to leave the door open so that if something happens to
the United States, he can return to cooperating with Europe."
It is a vintage Putin ploy -- keeping all options open until the final
moment. In the case of Iraq, it has spawned unrestrained speculation as to
whether Russia will prove to be anti-European or anti-American. The answer is
neither: first and foremost, Mr. Putin is pro-Russian.
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