Johnson's Russia List
#6606
18 December 2002
davidjohnson@erols.com
A CDI Project
www.cdi.org
[Contents:
1. Boston Globe: Thanassis Cambanis, Prosecutors argue Harvard owes US at
least $34m
in Russia case.
2. RIA Novosti: BY 2020, RUSSIA MIGHT REACH AVERAGE EUROPEAN LIVING
STANDARD LEVEL.
3. Reuters: Sibneft,TNK win Russia's Slavneft auction.
4. AP: U.S. Missile Defense Plan Upsets Russia.
5. www.fednews.ru: REMARKS BY PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN AT A RECEPTION TO
MARK
CONSTITUTION DAY, THE KREMLIN, DECEMBER 12, 2002.
6. Izvestia: BITING HARES: THE SOURCES OF TERRORISM.
7. Luba Schwartzman: TV1 Review.
8. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: Olga Tropkina, GAIDAR STRIDES AHEAD ONCE AGAIN.
Union of Right Forces council will hear Putin's policies for 2004-08.
9. New York Times: Steven Lee Myers, Russia Is Marching Haltingly Toward
Military
Reform.
10. Jamestown Foundation Russia and Eurasia Review: Igor Rotar, MYTHS AND
PREJUDICE
ACROSS THE FSU.
11. Reuters: Russia official quashes proposed PM presidential bid.
12. BBC Monitoring: Plotting seen behind Russian premier's presidential
nomination - analyst.
13. Robert Bruce Ware: Human Rights in the North Caucasus (Re JRL 6603).
14. Profil: Alexei Bogaturov, RUSSIA IN ECONOMICS CLASS. Russia needs a
broader
view of its foreign policy within the CIS.
15. pravda.ru: Our Life Will Be Poor and Quiet. Without Electricity.
Russia no longer land of extremes?
16. Asia Times: John Helmer, Talleyrand and Russian electricity.]
*******
#1
Boston Globe
December 18, 2002
Prosecutors argue Harvard owes US at least $34m in Russia case
By Thanassis Cambanis, Globe Staff
The advice that two Harvard employees with alleged financial conflicts of
interest gave the Russian government in the 1990s damaged US-Russia
relations, undermined Russia's transition to capitalism, and cast doubt on
at least $350 million in US projects, federal prosecutors argued yesterday
in their case against the now-defunct Harvard Institute of International
Development.
In papers filed in US District Court in Boston, prosecutors argued that
Harvard owes the government at least $34 million paid to the institute
between July 1994 and May 1997, when the university was advising the
Russian government on its transition to capitalism. They said the school
could be liable for as much as $102 million.
''A disregard for ethics by the distinguished professor [Andrei Shleifer]
and law school graduate [Jonathan Hay] sent to Russia, funded by the United
States government, to teach the establishment of the rule of law and fair
and open markets teaches a lesson - the wrong one and the exact opposite
from the one Harvard was paid to promote,'' Assistant US Attorney Sara
Bloom wrote.
For the first time, federal prosecutors laid out an explicit argument for
why Harvard should be heavily fined for the allegedly tainted work it did
for the US Agency for International Development in Russia, claiming
conflicts of interest by Harvard employees caused lasting political damage.
Lawyers for Harvard, Shleifer, and Hay have until Jan. 9 to file a
response. Harvard had no comment yesterday.
The government sued Harvard in federal court in 2000, arguing that the
Harvard institute's top two officials, Shleifer and Hay, used their
influential positions as advisers to the Russian government to make insider
investments in Russia's securities market and oil industry - in violation
of federal conflict of interest regulations.
Under the False Claims Act, US District Judge Douglas P. Woodlock could
levy punitive damages against Harvard and the two officials that are triple
the actual damage - a total of $102 million - in order to send a deterrent
message. The judge also has the option of finding Harvard in breach of
contract and ordering the university to pay back the $34 million in fees,
with interest. If he finds for the government on both counts, however, the
most Harvard could be assessed is $102 million.
In court papers and hearings, Harvard lawyers have argued that Shleifer and
Hay did not technically violate USAID's conflict of interest rules. They
also claim the university was not responsible for their investing habits
and that even if the government's allegations prove true, the school is not
liable for $102 million.
Federal prosecutors yesterday presented a litany of injury caused by
Shleifer and Hay's conduct. The two men allegedly invested in Russian
securities and oil companies at the same time they were designing new laws
and regulatory institutions for the Russian government, staining the
credibility of the entire $500 million US effort to help Russia make a
smooth transition from communism to capitalism, according to prosecutors.
''It should not be disputed that this scandal had a negative impact on the
United States' interest,'' Bloom wrote.
After USAID suspended the Harvard project in 1997 because of Shleifer and
Hay's alleged conflict of interest, prosecutors argue, relations between
American and Russian officials ''ruptured'' and institutions set up by the
project, including a new Russian Securities and Exchange Commission, lost
credibility. Harvard fired Hay, while Shleifer remains a tenured professor
in the economics department.
''It is impossible to measure the shadow cast by these events,'' Bloom
argued.
Lawyers for Harvard, Shleifer, and Hay have argued that the investments in
question had no impact on most of the institute's work in Russia. But
prosecutors have asked Woodlock to impose the highest amount of damages
allowed under law because, they say, Harvard ''refused'' to remove Shleifer
or Hay until after the federal government canceled the entire contract.
********
#2
BY 2020, RUSSIA MIGHT REACH AVERAGE EUROPEAN LIVING STANDARD LEVEL
MOSCOW, December 18th, 2002 /RIA Novosti corr. Yelena Fyodorova, Natalia
Starostina/ -- By 2020, Russia is likely to reach an average European
living standard level, Russian Deputy Economic Development and Trade
Minister Yuri Beletsky reported on Wednesday.
In his words, according to a forecast by the Ministry made for mid-term and
long-term prospects, the tempos of economic growth in Russia will ensure a
substantial increase of the population's living standards. In accordance
with the optimistic forecast, the gross domestic product will grow by 70%
by 2010 as compared to 2000, and by 2020 - by 180-190%, Beletsky noted.
Annual tempos of GDP growth will be 5.4% correspondingly, he added.
According to the pessimistic forecast, by 2010 the GDP will grow by 50%,
and by 2020 - by 130-140%, which corresponds to an average annual GDP
growth rate at 4.3%, said the deputy minister. He stressed that was the
lower verge of growth, below which there can be no normal development of
economy and society.
According to the Economic Development Ministry forecast, the level of
annual inflation is to reduce by 2010 down to 5-7% annually, and by 2020 to
3-5%. The economy's power intensity is also forecast to reduce by 2010 by
29%, and by 2020 - by 47-55% as compared to 2000, Beletsky said.
********
#3
Sibneft,TNK win Russia's Slavneft auction
By Dmitry Zhannikov and Vlasta Demyanenko
MOSCOW, Dec 18 (Reuters) - Two of Russia's biggest oil firms, Sibneft and
TNK, said they had joined forces on Wednesday to pay $1.86 billion for a
controlling stake in Slavneft in the government's biggest privatisation of
the year.
The deal, which gives a healthy boost to the debt-strapped government's
coffers, sent Sibneft's share price surging as investors considered the
price a bargain for Russia's ambitious number five oil firm.
But the selloff left a sour taste for the government, which had touted the
auction as a model of openness after its history of murky privatisation
deals. It said that it would change the rules for future auctions to make
absolutely clear who was bidding.
Sibneft was initially thought to have been the sole winner because the
final bid had been made by its president, Eugene Shvidler, on behalf of an
unknown company Invest Oil.
But later TNK, Russia's fourth-largest oil company, announced that it
jointly owned Invest Oil and was going 50-50 with Sibneft on the purchase.
Sibneft already holds around 17 percent of the selloff target and had been
widely expected to go it alone on the Slavneft bid.
"The joint efforts of Sibneft and TNK on Slavneft's privatisation confirm
the successful development of Russia's oil industry," Sibneft's Shvidler
said in a statement.
NO VIOLATIONS
The state property fund said the auction was legal despite the fact that
the winning bid was placed by two companies and not one as first appeared.
"Of course we do not welcome or support secret deals... but we think there
were no violations of the law at the auction," said Vladimir Malin, head of
Russia's Federal Property Fund.
"(This joint bid) is not a reason to cancel the result of the auction."
However, Malin added that the fund would change legislation to ban unknown
companies with unknown offshore shareholders from participation in future
auctions.
The amount, though only slightly above the state's initial starting price
of $1.7 billion, will help the government pay a hefty $17 billion foreign
debt bill next year.
Sibneft's success in the auction confirms its position as the country's
fastest-growing oil firm, and could catapult it to the top three Russian
producers by 2005.
Initial word of its win cheered the market, sending Sibneft's share price
up nearly five percent at one stage, though by 1146 GMT was it had
retreated to $2.12, unchanged from the previous close.
"The market looks positive because Sibneft made the acquisition at such a
successful price," Oleg Dubitsky of Renaissance Capital said.
Sibneft had looked set for victory in the auction after the surprise
withdrawal of China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC) from the race on Tuesday.
A Russian government spokesman gave no reason for the withdrawal of CNPC, a
late entrant to the race.
Slavneft, the country's ninth-largest oil firm, produces 320,000 barrels of
oil per day (bpd), mainly from fields in western Siberia. It also has
refining capacity of 600,000 barrels per day, with plants in Russia and
Belarus.
Sibneft, seen as one of the driving forces behind Russia's impressive
output growth, produces 530,000 bpd from fields in western Siberia and has
said that by 2010 it expects to boost its output to 1.0-1.2 million bpd.
Analysts have said the acquisition of Slavneft is vital for Sibneft to turn
it into the oil major it aspires to become and secure its long-term output
and refining future.
********
#4
U.S. Missile Defense Plan Upsets Russia
December 18, 2002
By DEBORAH SEWARD
MOSCOW (AP) - Russia expressed regret Wednesday over the U.S. decision to
begin deploying strategic interceptors to defend the United States from
missile attack, a move Moscow said would destabilize the international
security system and lead to a new arms race.
The Russian Foreign Ministry issued a two-page statement that also
expressed concern that the development of such a system would divert
resources from other real threats, above all the fight against
international terrorism.
Development of missile defense systems was severely limited under the 1972
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which expired in June, six months after
President Bush announced that Washington would withdraw from the 30-year
old agreement.
Marshal Igor Sergeyev, a senior adviser to President Vladimir Putin on
strategic issues, told the Interfax news agency that Washington had not
provided ``any weighty arguments'' that the new system was not directed
against Russia. Sergeyev also said that Russia was worried radar systems in
Denmark and Great Britain could be used to support the new missile defense
system.
The United States maintains that a missile defense system is necessary to
protect the country against possible attack, primarily from rogue states
that could possess ballistic missiles.
``Moscow with regret follows the activation of the attempt by the United
States to create a so-called `global anti-missile defense.' Now, after
taking a political decision to deploy in 2004 several strategic
interceptors with support from space, the realization of these plans has
entered a new destabilizing phase,'' the Foreign Ministry statement said.
Russia, which has fallen behind the United States in the development of
space-based technology that could be used in missile defense systems, is
extremely concerned about this aspect of U.S. weapons' programs.
Moscow consistently has said the ABM treaty should remain in force.
``Consigning its principles to oblivion can lead only to the weakening of
strategic stability, a new senseless arms race in the world, including the
spread of weapons of mass destruction, and diverting resources to counter
today's real challenges and threats, above all, international terrorism,''
the statement said.
The Russian statement came a day after Bush ordered the Defense Department
to begin work within two years on deploying the first interceptors that are
to form the base of the missile defense system.
The Bush administration intends to ask the U.S. Congress to allocate $1.5
billion for 2004-2005, on top of the some $8 billion already budgeted.
The weapons to be deployed include six ground-based interceptors to be
based in Alaska by the end of 2004, with 10 more added by the end of 2005.
Four interceptors would be in California for a total of 20 by the end of
2005. Twenty Standard Missile-3 interceptors would be aboard three Navy ships.
Hundreds of the Army's Patriot PAC-3 missiles would be deployed around the
world to knock down shorter-range missiles in the final phase of their
flight. Part of the extra US$1.5 billion Bush is seeking would buy 346 more
Patriots.
The Russian Foreign Ministry complained that the decision to deploy the
anti-missile program runs counter to the priorities set by Bush and Russian
President Vladimir Putin at their various meetings to cut their respective
nuclear arsenals, fight the spread of weapons of mass destruction and
international terrorism.
********
#5
TITLE: REMARKS BY PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN AT A RECEPTION TO MARK
CONSTITUTION DAY, THE KREMLIN, DECEMBER 12, 2002
[PRESIDENT.KREMLIN.RU, DECEMBER 12, 2002]
SOURCE: FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE (http://www.fednews.ru/)
Esteemed colleagues,
Esteemed Chairman and judges of the Constitutional Court of
Russia, ladies and gentlemen,
I am glad to welcome and congratulate all those present on the
Russian Constitution Day.
As we mark this holiday we invariably single out the main
thing -- the supporting structures -- of the main legal document of
the country. This is above all the democratic principles of
organization of our state, political and economic freedoms of
Russian citizens.
But the main idea of the Constitution is that the state must
serve society, serve the people. It must work for the well-being
and success of each of its citizens.
You know how arduous the path to the Constitution has been. In
effect it has been a path to a new democratic state. For more than
ten years we have used the now habitual words "the new Russia." But
if you think about it we say that about a country with a
thousand-year history, a country which has seen many examples both
of unlimited power of the state and at times its inefficiency and
weakness. We are talking about a country in which democracy and
freedom of the individual have been truly achieved by society
through much suffering. And much of the credit for the fact that
the new Russia exists goes to the creators and drafters of the
Constitution, the Main Law of the State.
At that time, in 1993, the Constitution established clear
rules for all the branches of government. This framework of
constitutional behavior has become an instrument of accord between
different political interests. As a result, they guaranteed us
against a repeat of experiments with society.
The Constitution has cemented the Federation. It ushered in a
new stage in the relations between the branches of government. And
in our day, relying on our own experience, we are completing the
important work of delimiting powers. On that basis we are
strengthening local self-government and the bodies of power in the
subjects of the Russian Federation. Including such complex ones as
Chechnya. I have been approached by the Election Commission of the
Chechen Republic asking me to issue a decree on the procedure of
holding a constitutional referendum. And today, in accordance with
Article 11 of the Federal Law on the Main Guarantees of Electoral
Rights, the Decree on the Procedure of Holding a Referendum in
Chechnya has been signed.
Dear friends,
The Russian Constitution has significantly broadened the
horizons of individual freedoms and rights in Russia. But people,
unfortunately, are still frequently confronted with facts of
arbitrariness, lawlessness and callousness. They often are
confronted with the incompetence of bureaucrats.
It is the duty of those vested with power and authority to act
for the good of people. And that means to strictly adhere to the
spirit and letter of the Main Law of our country, the Constitution
of the Russian Federation.
Permit me to offer you a toast:
To the Constitution of our country!
To the prosperity and happiness of Russian citizens!
To the power and dignity of our great Motherland!
*******
#6
Izvestia
December 18, 2002
BITING HARES: THE SOURCES OF TERRORISM
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
A number of leading academics and activists gathered for a round-
table conference yesterday on reasons behind extremism and methods of
overcoming it. Their conclusion was as follows: "The errors of the
state and the apathy of society are to blame for the growth of
extremism. Terrorists are not the problem - it is clear what should be
done with them; the problem is in the influence of their ideas, in the
dissemination of fear."
The specialists offered a detailed analysis of the problem. Emil
Payin, head of the Xenophobia and Extremism Studies Center at the
Sociology Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, was especially
thorough in his approach. He emphasized the "entrepreneurs of
extremism": those who inspire its ideas, and government figures whose
radical statements "are immediately picked up by all the media".
Emil Payin: "In the Krasnodar territory, the idea that people
from the Caucasus are categorically unacceptable for Russians has been
the official doctrine of two governors: the incumbent and his
predecessor."
Academics themselves cannot fight extremism, says Payin, but they
can determine its sources.
Ramazan Abdulatipov, council chairman of the Assembly of Peoples
of Russia, considers that one of these sources is "rebellion with the
aim of liberation from the well-fed". Its overriding idea - in
opposition to the rule of the United States, a superpower without
alternatives - is "Islam according to Osama bin Laden and Movladi
Udugov... Wahhabi fundamentalism, a pretendent to the place of
Marxism-Leninism".
The academics were divided on the question of which factor is
more to blame for the development of extremism: the errors of the
state or the apathy of society.
Emil Payin: "Only society itself can solve the problem of
extremism. The state is the state, but if non-government organizations
- the entrepreneurs of tolerance - don't start fighting, we will have
no solution to extremism."
Svetlana Smirnova, deputy chairwoman of the Duma's federation
affairs and regional policy committee: "In my view, not everything
depends on society. No one is held accountable for the fact that good
laws are not observed. Worse still, we pass laws which exacerbate
conflicts: for example, the law stating that everyone must use the
Cyrillic alphabet - unprecedented, even in Tsarist times."
Ramazan Abdulatipov: "Extremism cannot be justified, but you
can't go around pushing people into a state where they are prepared to
take radical action. People don't get their wages for six months at a
time, and they're told that they can take legal action, but then they
have a frustrating experience with the courts."
The academics concluded that ethnic, religious, and social
conflicts must be prevented from arising. However, judging by the fact
that there are more and more such conflicts around the world with
every passing year, they do not have any prescription for healing the
human race from this disease.
******
#7
TV1 Review
www.1tv.ru
Compiled by Luba Schwartzman (luba_sch@hotmail.com)
Research Analyst, Center for Defense Information, Moscow office
HEADLINES,
Tuesday, December 17, 2002
- A five-alarm fire broke out at the Moscow Conservatory. The area of the
fire covered up to 200 square meters. The fire was extinguished at 8:50pm,
but the danger remains that an area of the roof in the left wing of the
building can collapse. According to the investigation, the fire was caused
by the electrical wiring. One fireman was injured in the fire.
- The chairmen of the Russian and Ukrainian Academies of Science met to
discuss cooperation between Russian and Ukrainian scientists. Chairman of
the Ukrainian Academy of Science Boris Paton awarded the Chairman of the
Russian Academy of Science Yuri Osipov with a medal for his personal input
into the development of scientific cooperation between the two countries.
In turn, Osipov presented Paton with 3,500 books and scientific journals.
- A special commission has been created for the investigation of the escape
of seven servicemen from the Moscow Region Anti-Air Defense division. It
will be chaired by the deputy commander-in-chief of the Air Force, Anatoly
Nogovitsyn. Air Force Commander-in-Chief Vladimir Mikhailov announced that
the soldiers will be sent to different divisions after the questioning is
over. Military Prosecutors expressed surprise at the fact that the soldiers
went to the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers to complain, instead of the
prosecutor's office.
- A group of fifty employees of the Central Electoral Commission have
arrived in Chechnya to help with preparations for the referendum. Their
first task will be gathering the 12,000 signatures of Chechen residents
necessary for the holding of the referendum.
- The Council of the State Duma has voted not to review a package of draft
laws on the reform of the energy sector in the second reading tomorrow; it
will be postponed until the spring session.
- Over 820,000 telephone calls with questions have come in to the
presidential hotline.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Yemeni President Ali Abdullah
Saleh at the Kremlin. They signed a declaration on the principles of
friendly relations and cooperation. Russia and Yemen plan to strengthen
their long-term military-technical and economic ties.
- President Saleh will also meet with Russian Prime Minister Mikhail
Kasyanov and representatives of the State Duma.
- A monument to great Russian writer Nikolai Gogol has been dedicated in
Rome. The inscription reads "I can write about Russia only when in Rome,
because only then I see it in all its magnitude. -- Gogol"
- Nine thousand Chernobyl residents rallied at the St. Sophia Square in the
center of Kyiv asking for the Chernobyl power station to be reopened. They
declared that the power station was closed not in the interests of the
Ukrainian people, but to pacify Europe and America.
- Chechnya's Grozneftgas oil and gas company sent 1.3 million rubles to the
Fund for the victims of the Dubrovka Theater takeover.
- Aleksei Volin, the deputy head of the Russian presidential administration,
declared that China's decision not to participate in the contest for
Slavneft shares was absolutely logical. He emphasized that the main goal of
selling the almost 75% of the shares is gaining a private investor.
- The Russian Space and Aviation agency will make two launches in February
of 2003.
- Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Aleksandr Chekalin declared that
Russian drivers have to receive better training. He noted that, according
to statistics, most car accidents are caused by drivers will less than three
years of driving experience.
- President Putin met with Agriculture Minister Aleksei Gordeev to discuss
the sale of grain.
- Russia expressed its willingness to help Portugal clean up the oil spill
caused by the Prestige tanker.
- The Kremlin has been decorated with 8 kilometers of New Year's garlands.
The New Year's tree in front of the Kremlin is 22 meters high, weighs more
than 20 tons, and has about a 1000 decorations on its branches.
- Russian strategic missile forces celebrate their 43rd anniversary.
*******
#8
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
December 18, 2002
GAIDAR STRIDES AHEAD ONCE AGAIN
Union of Right Forces council will hear Putin's policies for 2004-08
Author: Olga Tropkina
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
THIS SUNDAY, THE UNION OF RIGHT FORCES WILL HOLD A COUNCIL. YEGOR
GAIDAR, ONE OF THE URF CO-LEADERS, WILL DELIVER AN ADDRESS ON THE
SOCIO-ECONOMIC RESULTS OF 2002. IN FACT, GAIDAR WILL ESSENTIALLY BE
READING OUT PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN'S POLICY PROGRAM FOR 2004-08.
At a location near Moscow this coming Sunday, the Union of Right
Forces (URF) party will hold a council. This measure might seem like
the usual gathering of party activists, held at the end of the year by
all political movements - were it not for one circumstance which seems
likely to turn this meeting into a first-rate political event. Yegor
Gaidar, one of the URF co-leaders, will deliver an address on the
socio-economic results of 2002. The intrigue in this public
performance lies in the fact that at this party council, Gaidar will
essentially be reading out President Vladimir Putin's policy program
for 2004-08. According to our URF sources, a few months ago the
Transition Economy Institute, headed by Gaidar, received an order from
the Kremlin to develop this program.
The Transition Economy Institute has already developed a program
for Putin: in 1999, during the lead-up to the presidential election.
The results of its efforts, in the form of a large volume, were
delivered to Putin in the Kremlin by Sergei Kirienko. In fact, as the
URF itself claims, the Putin administration adopted 80% of the
suggestions in this comprehensive volume - which emphasized economic
reforms. However, while last time the URF "imposed" its services on
the head of state to some extent, this time the order to develop a
program has been issued officially. Another reason for this was
probably that the Transition Economy Institute, unlike many similar
organizations, is known for being able to combine academic analysis
with political forecasting. This is exactly what the Putin
administration needs right now, in the lead-up to another presidential
election. Moreover, in addition to doing pure and applied research and
providing consultant services to various government bodies, the
Transition Economy Institute is carrying out in-depth studies of
social issues and pension reforms.
In Yegor Gaidar's address - and thus, in Vladimir Putin's policy
program - the greatest emphasis is placed on social reforms.
Particular attention is focused on three aspects: changing the funding
system for health care, migration policy, and education reforms. It is
proposed to increase health care funding by taking money from social
tax revenues, and the social tax rate is to be reduced. The need to
pay attention to migration policy is due to a dramatic rise in the
number of illegal migrants. The Gaidar-Putin program proposes to
legalize the status of migrants as much as possible, and give them
individual tax file numbers so that they can pay taxes in Russia.
Finally, education reforms include retaining the free general
education system while attracting private sector sponsorship into this
area.
Besides Gaidar himself, the following people are listed among the
authors of Purin's program: Vladimir Mau, deputy director of the
Transition Economy Institute; Deputy Economic Development Minister
Alexei Ulyukaev (a senior analyst with the Institute); and Yevgeny
Yasin, director of the Supreme School of Economics.
However, Gaidar's speech at the party council will contain more
than economic analysis. Some other URF leaders have made contributions
to the program. For example, URF leader Boris Nemtsov says in his
notes on the program that the oligarchic regime in Russia is only
growing stronger, while Putin still hasn't managed to convert his
popularity into concrete action. The notes of Irina Khakamada, also
included in Gaidar's report, concern development of medium-sized and
small business, and foreign policy. As for Anatoly Chubais, also a co-
leader of the URF, he declined to write any notes for Gaidar. At the
party council, Chubais will play the role of just another member of
the audience.
(Translated by Andrei Ryabochkin)
*******
#9
New York Times
December 18, 2002
Russia Is Marching Haltingly Toward Military Reform
By STEVEN LEE MYERS
PSKOV, Russia — "Glory to Russian Arms!" declares a sign along a tree-lined
street of the main military base here. "Discipline is the Mother of
Victory," says another. The exhortations echo the beloved slogans of the
Soviet era. They may, someday, reflect the state of the army in Russia.
In Pskov, a proud military town with a central memorial to the fallen
Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan and newer Russian ones in Chechnya, the
paratroopers of the 76th Airborne Division are doing things that would be
unremarkable in any modern military, but are almost unheard of in Russia
today.
They are practicing combat skills instead of doing menial jobs. They work
from 9 a.m. to 7 p.m. and are paid for it. The brutal hazing that corrupts
much of the country's mostly conscript army is said to be less of a problem.
Since September, the 76th Division has begun filling its ranks with
volunteer soldiers rather than draftees, as part of an experiment intended
to propel the country's long, halting efforts to modernize its armed forces.
This is the sort of reform repeatedly endorsed by President Vladimir V.
Putin, who says he wants to turn the Russian military into a professional
force, trained and equipped to face the new threats of separatism and
terrorism. It is an aim that the president, despite his political power,
has so far proved unable to fulfill — either for lack of money, lack of
enthusiasm from entrenched military interests, or both.
No sooner had the experiment in Pskov started, for example, than Russia's
top general, Anatoly V. Kvashnin, cut its $85 million budget by a quarter
and withdrew an initial offer to provide apartments for new recruits. At
least 40 promptly quit, though some were later persuaded to return.
The experiment was also portrayed as a way to study the possibility of
ending Russia's hugely unpopular draft. Then last month, the defense
minister, Sergei B. Ivanov, announced that the military would recruit
volunteers only for the most combat ready units — about 126,000 soldiers
and sergeants in all — and not before 2007.
"There will always be conscription as such," he declared.
Mr. Putin, whose forces remain bogged down in Chechnya, has intensified his
quest for reform with each of the various disasters that have befallen the
country's security and military forces: the sinking of the submarine Kursk
in 2000, the downing of a grossly overloaded helicopter in Chechnya in
August, and the siege of a Moscow theater by Chechen guerrillas in October.
In the 11 years since the Soviet Union collapsed, however, proposals for
reform have resulted in little more than unmet promises. It remains to be
seen whether the experiment here will lead to real change or merely, as one
liberal lawmaker, Boris E. Nemtsov, called it, "Potemkin reform."
Few in Russia dispute the sorry condition of its armed forces. Having
inherited a force of 2.8 million from the Soviet Red Army, Russia now has a
little more than 1.1 million soldiers, sailors and airmen in its main armed
forces, not including those in a dozen other agencies, like the border
guards, the Interior Ministry and the railways.
The Parliament this month increased the official defense budget for next
year to $11 billion, though by some estimates defense spending is in
reality much higher. Although that was an increase from $9 billion this
year, it is still roughly 3 percent of the Pentagon's budget. As a result,
Russia's armed services remain chronically underfinanced and ill-equipped.
"If we don't reform the Russian Army, we can forget about the Russian
Army," said Mr. Nemtsov, one of the most prominent supporters of sweeping
changes. "For the army to survive, it has to become a professional army."
Yet Russia's remains an overwhelmingly conscripted force, with nearly
600,000 draftees serving two-year stints. The draft is so unpopular — and
feared — that nearly 90 percent of eligible young men evade it, relying on
medical or college deferments, often obtained with bribes. By one estimate,
the bribes amount to $50 million a year, making draft evasion a flourishing
cottage industry.
Within the ranks, morale is low and desertion is rampant. In the largest
mass desertion ever made public, 54 soldiers from the 20th Motorized
Infantry Division walked off their post in Volgograd in September,
complaining that a major had severely beaten their colleagues. Just last
week, 16 soldiers deserted from the Second Taman Motorized Division, an
elite division.
The Union of Committees of Soldiers' Mothers, which counsels soldiers,
estimates that thousands desert each year to escape abuse by officers or
the notorious practice of "dedovschina," in which older conscripts haze
younger ones. The union says that nearly 4,000 soldiers die each year from
hazing, suicide, illness or accidents.
The Ministry of Defense disputes such figures, but officials recently
acknowledged that 2,270 soldiers deserted in the first six months of the
year, while Mr. Ivanov said 531 soldiers were killed and 20,000 were
injured in the first 10 months from causes other than combat.
Valentina D. Melnikova, a leader of the mothers' union, said the core
problem facing the army was the lack of respect for soldiers, who are often
treated as little more than chattel. Many, she said, are forced by officers
to beg in the street or to work as guards or builders, with their salaries
turned over to their commanders.
Since 1992, the military has recruited some soldiers on a contract basis.
Today there are roughly 130,000 "contractors," most of them serving in the
elite forces like the submarine fleet and the strategic nuclear forces.
Others serve on special deployments abroad, like the 201st Division in
Tajikistan.
The 76th Division is to be the first regular army unit made up entirely of
contract soldiers. By next year, the entire division — 7,000 soldiers and
officers in all — is supposed to be made up of volunteers, in time for a
deployment to Chechnya, where its increased training and professionalism
will be put to the test.
At first, soldiers were offered 2,800 rubles — or roughly $90 — a month, as
well as the promise of free apartments. In November, with the division
struggling to find recruits, the salary was increased to 4,000 rubles, or
$125 a month. Still, three months into the experiment, only 1,200 of the
division's roughly 4,000 enlisted soldiers are contractors.
As part of the experiment, the division has also focused more on training,
especially for the kind of partisan warfare that troops face in Chechnya.
As a result, the division will soon have to find others to carry out the
necessary work of supporting a military unit. At the mess hall the other
day, for example, fresh-faced conscripts were still serving and clearing
lunch (milk soup, potato salad, meat patties over barley). For civilians to
be hired in their place, money will be needed.
"The biggest problem in the Soviet Army and the Russian Army has always
been the `unit on duty in the canteen,' " said Lt. Col. Vitaly N.
Zamekhayev, another deputy division commander. "If we solve this, we would
solve 60 percent of the problem in the army today."
Most soldiers and officers here also said that only a higher salary — at
least double today's — would attract enough qualified young men. "Maybe
realistically, people understand there's no money for this," said Lt. Col.
Konstantin V. Burlokov, commander of the division's parachute training.
Mr. Nemtsov said the answer was to free up funds by reducing the force — to
perhaps 800,000 troops. Others say the problems are more fundamental than
money or the draft.
Vitaly V. Shlykov, a former military intelligence officer and deputy
defense minister who is now an analyst with the Council on Foreign and
Defense Policy in Moscow, said the military suffered from a top-heavy
command, a lack of professionalism among officers and the failure to create
a class of noncommissioned officers, the sergeants who instill skills and
discipline.
Those phenomena, he said, have created an environment that nurtures abuse
and corruption.
"This ridiculous army, it is certainly not reformable," he said. "It can't
reform. It doesn't know how to do it."
*******
#10
Jamestown Foundation
www.jamestown.org
Russia and Eurasia Review
Volume 1, Issue 14
December 17, 2002
MYTHS AND PREJUDICE ACROSS THE FSU
By Igor Rotar
Igor Rotar represents the Keston Institute (UK) in Central Asia.
An interesting paradox has emerged across a number of the former Soviet
republics: an unexpected anti-Semitism in people who have often never even
met any Jews. And along with this, a distorted sense of history is sometimes
apparent, one not uncommon in a people or nation in crisis.
FUNDAMENTALISM
Before the war Chechens were relatively benevolent towards the Jews who lived
among them, but today the situation is very different. Time and again I have
heard Chechens from varied backgrounds referring to themselves as "victims of
an international Zionist conspiracy," saying that "the Jews are using stupid
Russians to kill the Muslims for them." After the 1999 incursion of Chechen
militants into Dagestan, the republic's chief ideologist, Movladi Udugov,
declared that the Chechens were fighting not the Russians but international
Zionism, and that the ultimate objective of the current war was the
liberation of Jerusalem. Tellingly, as soon as the mufti of Chechnya, Ahmad
Kadyrov, agreed to collaborate with the federal authorities, an article
appeared on the separatist website, Kavkaz.org, in which it was
"conclusively" proven that the teip [clan], of this "traitor" had accepted
Jews from the mountainous regions into its community and was therefore no
longer truly Chechen.
The most fervent anti-Semites in Chechnya are the so-called Wahhabis
[fundamentalists]. This is how the Georgian politician, Giorgi Zaalishvili,
who was held hostage by the Chechens for a year, describes their attitudes to
the Jews: "More than anything else, the fundamentalists for some reason hated
not the Russians but the Jews. They gave me literature that was practically
indistinguishable from material published in Moscow by the Pamyat group [a
Russian radical nationalist organization] and other similar organizations.
The Jewish-Masonic conspiracy was one of their favorite subjects for
discussion."
With the appearance of a fundamentalist underground in the Central Asian
republics, anti-Semitism became popular with elements of this region's
indigenous population as well, though most people have never met a Jew. For
example, in a leaflet published by the banned Hizb-e Tahrir party (an
international organization calling for the unification of the world's Muslims
into a single Caliphate), Uzbek President Islam Karimov is referred to as "an
evil being, a Jews' Jew, who detests Islam with all his body and soul, and is
hostile to the Koran and Mohammed (blessings and peace be to him)." In
conversations with Central Asian members of Hizb-e Tahrir, I heard the view
that "the Jews are the chief enemies of Muslims the world over." One Hizb-e
Tahrir member even told me that he greatly regretted that "Hitler had failed
in his time to eliminate all the Jews."
ETHNIC RIVALRY
The various ethnic groups that make up a single nation also often portray
each other in a persistently negative light. During the civil war in
Tajikistan, several opposition leaders declared that their enemies were
"impure" Tajiks. In a conversation with me, for example, the chairman of the
republic's Democratic Party, Shodmon Yusuf, claimed that "the so-called Tajik
people do not boast even a single anthem that all the regions like. Tribal
thinking recognizes the right to existence of none but members of one's own
tribe. The purely Farsi-speaking Tajik tribes are distinctive for their
greater spirituality." At the same time, Yusuf explained that the "inhuman
acts" of the Leninabadi and Kulobi (ethnic groups of Tajiks) are the result
of their "intermingling with Turkic tribes and the remnants of the Mongol
conquerors." The Pamiri tribes also had theories about their exclusiveness,
maintaining that of all the Tajik ethnic groups they alone were the direct
heirs of the ancient Aryan culture and (simultaneously!) the descendants of
Alexander the Great.
As a rule, such exaggeration of one's role in history to the point of
absurdity is highly characteristic of peoples who have experienced some
national catastrophe.
HISTORIOGRAPHY
After the armed clashes with Ossetians, for example, a group of Ingush
intellectuals wrote an open letter to the Russian leadership in which they
claimed that "for 5,000 years the Ingush people have been the most
discriminated against people in the world." Where the figure of 5,000 years
came from, or exactly why the Ingush people should have been the world's most
discriminated against people was not explained.
Similar historical sensations have been circulating in Northern Ossetia. A
book has been published in Vladikavkaz that seeks to prove that eleven of
Christ's apostles were Ossetians and only one--Judas, naturally--was a Jew.
But absurd historiographical treatises probably appear most often in
Chechnya. Djohar Dudaev maintained that the Chechens are the founders of the
Muslim faith. In his opinion, a religion as great as Islam could not have
developed in the barren Arabian desert, in a community of nomads, but in some
paradise on earth, amongst the people of a highly cultured and mutually
respectful society. The Chechens' first president considered that his country
was just such a place. According to contemporary Chechen historiography,
Noah's Ark came to rest on the summit of a Chechen mountain and its eight
occupants, including Noah himself, were the ancestors of today's Chechens.
Further unusual historical findings have emerged. For example, it is claimed
that Chechnya's traditional towers are modeled on alien spaceships that
visited many centuries ago. Contacts between the Chechens and aliens are
given as conclusive proof that the Chechens are a chosen people.
Interestingly, exclusivity theories are also popular with peoples that have
been assimilated into other nations. Thus in Bashkiria a historiographical
study has been published that relates how the Sumerians in fact came from the
ancient Bashkiri tribes, but migrated in the 3rd century BC to Mesopotamia,
where they founded their own state. According to yet another sensational
theory by authors in Ufa, the Bashkiris have common origins with the English.
However, even quite controversial theories are often incorporated into the
official historiographies of the independent states which have emerged on the
territory of the former Soviet Union. For example, according to contemporary
Ukrainian historiography, the Ukrainian nation was established in the 9th
century and not in the 16th century, as Soviet historians maintained. In line
with this theory, the first Ukrainian state was in fact Kievan Rus (from the
9th to 12th centuries).
According to contemporary Uzbek historiography, the founder of the new Uzbek
state was Timur (Tamerlane), who is known there as none other than the master
of the three corners of the earth--Europe, Asia and Africa. In the recently
constructed and astonishingly pompous Timur Museum, there is a map of the
great ruler's areas of influence (those territories from which he levied
tribute), embracing not only Northern Africa and Northern India but also a
significant part of modern Russia, including its present-day capital.
Teachers at local colleges explain to their pupils that it was Timur who
saved Russia from the Mongol Horde. In fact, Tashkent aspires almost overtly
to regain this superpower status today. In the central square of the Uzbek
capital an unusual monument, nicknamed "the globe of Uzbekistan" by the
locals, is being erected. Mounted on a pedestal is a stone globe, on which
are carved the contours of just one state--Uzbekistan--which covers almost
half of the planet. Similar monuments are going up in front of administrative
buildings in other cities of Uzbekistan.
In Uzbekistan, the term "Soviet" is now banned and, in line with a decree
from the state's cabinet of ministers, schools and libraries are having to
remove textbooks and training manuals printed prior to 1993. This decree has
had most impact on school and municipal libraries. Yet it is not only
ideological literature that is being confiscated, but also foreign language
and medical textbooks. The offending books are being sent for pulping and
then used in the production of toilet paper. However, this year, as a result
of a catastrophic shortage of textbooks, the authorities are relaxing their
monitoring of the implementation of the decree. And Soviet-era books are
sometimes allowed to stay in a library, provided that the librarian
underlines the term "Soviet" throughout.
But in today's Uzbekistan, it is not only the Soviet era's cultural
inheritance that is banned from study. Teachers in the state's music schools
have told me that they are now required to remove the works of Mozart, Bach
and Beethoven from the syllabus, "because Uzbekistan has plenty of great
composers of its own."
CONCLUSION
It would appear, then, that an unfounded exaggeration of the role of one's
people in world history is symptomatic of a nation in crisis, and that this
sort of historiography may well be incorporated into the ideology of a new
and still precarious state.
*******
#11
Russia official quashes proposed PM presidential bid
By Ron Popeski
MOSCOW, Dec 17 (Reuters) - A Russian government spokesman slapped down on
Tuesday a public suggestion that Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov should run
for president in 2004 in an election widely seen so far as a walkover for
incumbent Vladimir Putin.
Officials and analysts said the proposal by a group pledging support for
Kasyanov was a crude attempt to embarrass the prime minister, or even provoke
the president into dismissing him.
"This is either disinformation or a deliberate act to try to discredit the
prime minister," deputy government chief of staff Alexei Volin said in
televised comments. "This is an attempt to ascribe excessive political
ambitions to Kasyanov and paint him as a politician rather than a head of
government."
Kasyanov appeared at two public events but said nothing about the proposal.
Putin also offered no comment.
After more than two years in office Putin enjoys unprecedented public support
of more than 80 percent in opinion surveys, but has not said whether he will
run for a second term.
Kasyanov, 45, has earned a reputation as a sound manager overseeing the
upturn and reforms in Russia's economy following the 1998 financial collapse.
His ratings clear 50 percent.
As Putin's only prime minister he has survived repeated rumours of imminent
removal from office, and chiding from the president that he is reluctant to
pursue more ambitious targets.
Television showed members of an "initiative group" in the Volga city of
Nizhny Novgorod putting forward Kasyanov's name, praising his "brilliant
competence and professionalism." Members made clear they had not informed the
prime minister.
"It is clear that this fuss is not to Kasyanov's advantage," said Andrei
Ryabov of the Carnegie Endowment think tank, who suggested the initiative
could have been launched by groups close to Putin worried about the prime
minister's influence.
"He poses no threat now to the president, but he could be seen as an
alternative if Putin's authority declines."
Commentators pointed to previous post-Soviet "initiatives" proposing senior
public figures for president -- including Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin
in 1998 and Security Council chief Alexander Lebed in 1996. Both were soon
forced from office.
"This may be an attempt to irritate Putin, to have him believe that his prime
minister has ambitions that are not really there," said Boris Makarenko,
deputy director of the Institute for Political Technologies think tank. "But
I believe both Putin and Kasyanov know better. This is a cheapish trick."
Politicians said the incident sought to trip up Kasyanov.
"If someone was trying to start rumours, he was playing a lousy trick on the
prime minister who is, after all, subordinate to the president," Boris
Nadezhdin of the liberal Union of Right-Wing Forces told NTV television.
"It is tantamount to suggesting that the deputy head of a factory wants to
take over from the boss."
********
#12
BBC Monitoring
Plotting seen behind Russian premier's presidential nomination - analyst
Source: Ekho Moskvy news agency, Moscow, in Russian 1520 gmt 17 Dec 02
The move by an obscure initiative group to nominate Prime Minister Mikhail
Kasyanov as a candidate for the 2004 presidential election may have been
orchestrated by the so-called St Petersburg lobby in an attempt to secure
President Vladimir Putin's chances of re-election. Such is the conclusion
reached by Ekho Moskvy radio analyst Andrey Cherkizov. The following is the
text of the comment carried by Russian news agency Ekho Moskvy on 17 December:
[Commentator Andrey Cherkizov] On Tuesday [17 December] an initiative group
of volunteers seeking to set up an all-Russia committee to nominate Prime
Minister Mikhail Kasyanov for presidency met in Nizhniy Novgorod.
Speaking to the Ekho Moskvy radio, the chairman of the board of directors of
the Independent Election Institute, the former head of the Central Electoral
Commission, Aleksandr Ivanchenko, called this initiative " doubly illegal".
"The old law on presidential elections made such moves illegal, whereas the
new law has not yet been adopted," he said.
Moreover, the official presidential campaign has not yet started and will not
start for at least a year. In simple terms, we are dealing with a clear false
start. But it is not a simple false start.
Let me quote [Communist leader Gennadiy] Zyuganov who had the following to
say to Ekho Moskvy radio by way of a comment on the situation in question:
"This is no news to me. After Kasyanov was taken to every possible office,
including that of [President George W.] Bush, during his trip to Washington,
he came home in an exhilarated mood. It is quite probable."
To begin with, let us note that the above was said by Zyuganov, who has never
shown any particularly warm feeling towards Kasyanov.
I recently said that over the coming year - before the State Duma election -
we shall witness the creation of a serious set of presidential candidates,
the first in Russian modern history. I named two possible candidates whom I
think to be quite ambitious - Kasyanov and [State Duma member, Communist
Sergey] Glazyev.
In early December Kasyanov made a speech in Berlin at a meeting celebrating
the 50th anniversary of the Eastern Committee of the German Economy. In his
speech Kasyanov - for the first time in his prime ministerial career -
touched upon purely political issues: those of NATO's eastward expansion, the
need for joint efforts in eliminating the remnants of distrust between Russia
and NATO; and directions and mechanisms for resolving the Chechen conflict.
The speech could be interpreted as a test of his abilities, as it were.
Somebody must have taken the same view and decided that the time had come to
act.
But let us return to Zyuganov. Willingly or unwillingly, he reminds us of
what we have been through once before. In 1998 [the then prime minister
Viktor] Chernomyrdin made a trip to the USA and had plenty of meetings with
[then Vice President Al] Gore and [then President Bill] Clinton. He was very
warmly received by them. Upon his return to Moscow, Chernomyrdin was
immediately removed from his post by [President Boris] Yeltsin.
Those who are now - 18 months prior to the presidential election - beginning
to promote Kasyanov as a potential presidential hopeful are pursuing two
goals: a) to prompt Putin to remove Kasyanov from his post; and b) to make a
laughingstock of Kasyanov, thus stripping him of any chance of taking part in
the March 2004 election.
Ivanchenko, in his interview for Ekho Moskvy, said that "a candidate who
makes two or three starts evokes amusement and thus voters' attitude towards
him is undermined". And this is true.
One can, of course, console oneself with the fact that if the presidential
election in Russia had been held in early December, today's Kasyanov would
get 0.5 per cent of votes. The poll was held by VTsIOM [the All-Russian
Public Opinion Survey Centre] and its results were announced by the VTsIOM
director, Mr Levada.
However, one could also recall that in 1996 Yeltsin began his presidential
campaign having only 4-5 per cent of the votes. One could also recall that
initially no-one took Putin seriously: people were simply ignorant of him [as
a potential candidate].
The thing is that knowledgeable people understand that with every passing
day, the gap between the direction that Putin has chosen and the quality of
the steps he is taking is increasing. This gap does not allow for sufficient
guarantees of Putin's easy re-election to the president's post. It is far too
early to order crates of champagne in celebration.
That is why I suppose that this , almost farcical story with Kasyanov's
nomination was initiated by those who would like to get some extra guarantees
of Putin's successful re-election and at the same time to frame [ex-premier
Sergey] Kiriyenko.
Let us call those people the St Petersburg lobby and relax for the time being.
[In its analytical programme at 1630 gmt on 17 December, Moscow Region
Channel 3 TV asked the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party, Vladimir
Zhirinovskiy, to comment on Kasyanov's nomination for presidency.
Zhirinovskiy said: "Democrats need a joint candidate because neither Nemtsov
nor Yavlinskiy will ever become president or get a substantial number of
votes. That is why they are now looking for such a candidate. At one point
Kasyanov was selected by Boris Abramovich (Berezovskiy) to lead the
government and he remains to hold the post. This is just a development of the
same plot. I am sure that Boris Abramovich gave his money for it. An
initiative group has indeed been set up and will operate throughout the whole
country. The only thing to remember will be for Mikhail Mikhaylovich
(Kasyanov) to resign a bit earlier, maybe in the first quarter of 2003. An
election team will probably be set up a year ahead of the election. The
election is scheduled for 14 March 2004. Campaign work will begin and he may
get 5-6 per cent of votes at the election. The democratic parties - who will
be joined by the Communists because Berezovskiy has promised to finance both
- will be able to get a joint candidate who may lose the election but at
least they will develop a systemic approach. Besides, he is a person who has
been engaged in real work."]
*******
#13
From: "Robert Bruce Ware" <...@brick.net>
Subject: Human Rights in the North Caucasus (Re JRL 6603)
Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2002 2
Reading JRL, one finds entry after entry featuring Western commentators
complaining with bitter disbelief that pressure from Western organizations
has had no effect upon Russian policies in Chechnya. Yet a review of JRL
6603 provides an indication as to why this has been the case. This edition
of JRL featured an article titled "Human Rights in Russia and Chechnya: an
Interview with Elena Bonner", followed by two articles on the death of
Chechen warlord Salman Raduyev in a Russian prison, where he was serving a
life sentence. The first of these was an RFE/RL article titled "Relatives,
Chechen Leaders Question Official Version Of Raduev's Death" by
Jean-Christophe Peuch. The second was the Independents obituary for
Raduyev by Felix Corley.
The Peuch article opens with the explanation that Raduyev was imprisoned
for "a spectacular hostage-taking incident in 1996." One can only try to
imagine how we Americans would take an article in the state-sponsored
Russian media referring to the destruction of the World Trade Center as
"spectacular". The comparison is not hyperbolic. On January 9, 1996,
Raduyev and his raiders forced 3,000 hostages (and not 300 as the Corley
article erroneously states) under threat of death into a hospital in the
Dagestani city of Kizlyar. On the same day, Chechen President Djokhar
Dudayev threatened additional raids. Partly as a result of Russian military
bungling, approximately 100 of Raduyev's hostages later died in the rubble
of the Dagestani village of Pervomayskoye. Few of the hostages were ethnic
Russians. They were Dagestanis, including many ethnic Avars.
From 1831 to 1859, Dagestanis and Chechens united in their resistance to
Russian imperialism. After 1835, they were led by a Dagestani Avar named
Immam Shamil. During the war in Chechnya from 1994-1996, Dagestanis
accommodated 130,000 Chechen refugees, mostly in their own homes, and they
protested when Russian troops attacked Chechnya from Dagestan. The treaty
that gave Chechnya de facto independence in 1996 was brokered by Dagestanis
and negotiated and signed in a Dagestani city. Yet none of this prevented
Raduyev from attacking his supporters, sympathizers, and Islamic brethren
in Dagestan. Raduyev was finally apprehended in March 2000 after Russian
troops returned to Chechnya. He was subsequently tried, convicted, and
sentenced in a Dagestani court.
Peuch describes how the Chechenpress has joined Raduyevs kin in
challenging the official account of his death in prison. Suspicions are
inevitable given that Raduyev evidently died of internal bleeding, and no
challenge would be inappropriate since all of humanity is responsible for
the treatment of any prisoner. Inquiries concerning Raduyevs fate are
particularly important in view of brutalities suffered regularly by
detainees in Chechnya.
Yet both of these articles ignore the other half of the story. First,
Raduyev would not have been in a Russian prison had Chechen officials
arrested him in 1996 after he returned to Chechnya from the Kizlyar raid.
What had the Dagestanis ever done except to support (indeed, at one time
lead) the Chechen resistance? Why didnt the people of Chechnya exact
justice upon Raduyev for his crimes against their historic allies and
Islamic brethren? Why did''t the people of Chechnya take responsibility for
their own?
Raduyev's raid was but one of many reasons why the people of Dagestan today
hate Chechens far more bitterly than to the people of Moscow. During the
three years after Raduyev's attack Dagestanis were ravaged by the Chechen
hostage industry, and by daily raids and incursions from across the Chechen
border.
Today the very best that one can hear about Chechens in Dagestan is that
the Chechens are responsible for what has happened to Chechnya, something
one rarely hears from Western writers such as Peuch and Corley. What other
fate than that of Chechnya could possibly befall a society that tolerated
open slavery into the twenty-first century, and accepted the medieval
predation of its closest allies and supporters--a society that has never
yet come close to accepting responsibility for itself, for what it has
done, and what it has failed to do. Indeed, why should the Chechen people
accept responsibility for themselves when no one ever calls upon them to do
it? For much of the world it is enough that the Chechens are fighting the
Russians, and they are held accountable for nothing else. What could make
this clearer than the fact that none of the articles about Raduyev in the
last week has asked why the people of Chechnya did not apprehend Raduyev
and hold him responsible for his terrorist activities in Dagestan?
For no one in Chechnya accepted responsibility for Raduyev, nor repudiated
him, nor apologized for him. Nor did they stop Basayev and Khattab from
invading Dagestan again three years later. So why didnt the people of
Chechnya join their Dagestani brothers in fighting against Basayev and
Khattab? Had they done so the Northeast Caucasus might be a peaceful place
today, and Chechnya might be independent.
In 2000, when Russian authorities announced plans to return Raduyev to
Dagestan for trial, the Dagestani Prosecutor General asked them not to do
so on the grounds that Dagestani security forces would be unable to
guarantee Raduyev's safety. So many Dagestanis had sworn blood vendettas
against Raduyev that the police expected that they would be overpowered in
their efforts to prevent Raduyev from being beaten to death. In fact his
return to Dagestan was met by angry mass meetings that called for his
immediate execution. If it is now true that Raduyev was beaten to death by
officials in a Russian prison then that is a horrible thing, but it is mild
compared to what would have happened to Raduyev had officials simply
allowed him to step through the doors of the courtroom onto the Dagestani
street. It is horrible if Raduyev was brutalized in prison, but perhaps
some Dagestanis may be forgiven if they think it no less significant that
he promised to kill 3000 people in his captivity?
Peuch writes that the "Kizlyar hostage taking in Daghestan ... was one of
the most decisive setbacks suffered by Russian troops during the first
Chechen campaign." But he doesnt mention that it was also the single worst
setback suffered by the Chechen side. Had the Dagestanis joined the
separatist cause there would be a viable Islamic state in the North
Caucasus today. While that outcome was unlikely before Raduyevs raid, it
was certainly impossible afterwards.
Yet somehow Elena Bonner managed to get through her entire interview about
human rights abuses in Russia without mentioning any of this. She said
nothing about the massive human rights abuses that were committed by the
Chechen side against their neighbors, about the fact that in recent months
slaves were still being liberated in Chechnya. Nor has Amnesty
International ever mentioned any of it. Human Rights Watch hasn't discussed
it. Neither MSF nor the UNHCR has brought it to anyones attention. All of
these groups abandoned the people of the North Caucasus after Russian
troops left Chechnya in 1996. They left the region because they were
terrorized by the Chechen hostage industry. Yet not one of these groups has
ever found the integrity to publicize the terrors that occurred during
those years, nor to admit that they only found the courage to return to the
region in the wake of the Russian military, nor to acknowledge that they
can only operate there today under the protection of those same Russian
troops whom they condemn on a regular basis. The cowardice displayed by
these organizations is bad enough, but they have entirely disqualified
themselves by means of their imbalanced and misleading accounts of events
in the region, and have thereby reduced themselves to a condition of utter
irrelevancy. Anyone with any experience in the North Caucasus can see their
"reports" as being, at best, a conglomeration of half-truths. Certainly the
Russians can see it. So it is simply impossible for anyone with any
influence in the region to take these organizations seriously.
In the Northeast Caucasus the human rights community has completely
marginalized itself. It has failed to produce any result. It has become a
cipher. It has had no effect whatsoever because it has had no integrity.
If these organizations cared about the peoples of the Caucasus they would
have said, or would now say, something about the suffering of those peoples
from 1996 to 1999 when the Russian army was out of Chechnya. The fact that
they have failed to do so suggests that they care less about the local
people and more about convenient opportunities to bash Russia. But all the
Russia-bashing regularly served up by a host of Western organizations and
governments has never accomplished anything except to alienate and undercut
moderate Russian officials and strengthen the hand of Russian hard-liners.
In other words, it has never done anything but exacerbate and prolong
instability and suffering in the Caucasus. On the other hand, President
Putin announced that he would crack down on brutal "cleansing" operations
in Chechnya only after American officials began to publicly acknowledge
that international terrorist forces were operating in Chechnya. Sooner or
later anyone who truly cares about the peoples of the Caucasus must
recognize that only a balanced approach to their problems will have any
effect. When Western officials recognize that along with international
terrorists there are also plenty of local terrorists in Chechnya, when they
call upon the Chechen people to take responsibility for themselves and do
something about it, then there will finally be an opportunity for peace.
One must sympathize with Raduyev's wife, who will not have the return of
her husbands body, but she is wrong to deny that Raduyev was a terrorist.
There is no other word for someone who holds 3000 people in a hospital
under threat of death.
*******
#14
Profil
No. 47
December 16, 2002
RUSSIA IN ECONOMICS CLASS
Russia needs a broader view of its foreign policy within the CIS
Author: Alexei Bogaturov, deputy director of the USA and Canada
Institute
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
IN RECENT YEARS, RUSSIA HAS PRACTICALLY CEASED TO FORMULATE ITS
POLITICAL OR IDEOLOGICAL INTERESTS ACROSS POST-SOVIET TERRITORY. MORE
AND MORE OFTEN, THE TALK IS OF DEFENDING PURELY ECONOMIC INTERESTS.
BUT MANY STATE INTERESTS ARE BY DEFINITION UNPROFITABLE IN ECONOMIC
TERMS.
Russia's current policy on relations with other CIS nations is
mostly based on monitoring events. It stems from the realities of the
present situation. This pragmatic approach is useful, on the one hand;
but on the other hand, it does lack a certain something. After all, in
the Yeltsin era Russia did try (to what extent it succeeded is another
matter) to implement some kind of constructive policy across post-
Soviet territory, proposing its own vision of existing problems and
its own approach to resolving them. But now Russia appears to be lost
in thought - it observes, it reacts, but it isn't modelling or
proposing anything. Whether this is the correct course of action is
hard to say. However, it appears to me that it is time for Russia to
give up on a number of illusory objectives from the Yeltsin era and
finally make up its mind about its vision of relations within the CIS.
In recent years, Russia has practically ceased to formulate its
political or ideological interests across post-Soviet territory. More
and more often, the talk is of defending purely economic interests -
even going to extremes to do so. Sometimes there is the impression
that we are only trying to have normal relations with those nations in
whom we see our own economic interests. But if no economic interest
exists, it's as if that nation does not exist for us. Of course, this
approach may be viewed as a kind of reaction to Yeltsin's political
and ideological excesses. But it's impossible to ignore that we are
sometimes going to extremes with the "purely economic" approach.
The most characteristic example can be seen in relations with
Belarus. Clearly, Belarus will remain an unprofitable economic partner
for many years to come. However, there is such a concept as
"geopolitical resources". Paradoxically enough, it can also be
expressed in terms of real money - in millions or billions of dollars.
So, in speaking of relations with Belarus being unprofitable, we ought
not to forget those geopolitical resources.
The same applies to Kazakhstan, for example. Yes, economic ties
with Kazakhstan may remain unprofitable for another ten or twenty
years; but this doesn't mean that we can afford to forget about our
geopolitical interests in that country - to forget that Kazakhstan is
our most important partner in ensuring the security of Russia itself.
The Russia-Kazakhstan border is open - it is "virtual" - which
includes being open for organized crime and drug trafficking; this
situation at our country's "underbelly" requires appropriate measures
to be taken: either making Russia's border with Kazakhstan non-
transparent, or providing aid in securing Kazakhstan's southern
borders. In economic terms, such a project is clearly unprofitable. In
geopolitical terms, it is vital.
Undeniably, over the past eighteen months to two years Russia has
substantially reconsidered the principles of its economic relations
with its CIS partners. The approach has become more rational: Russia
is trying to be open to concessions while at the same time
establishing an economic presence in various member nations of the
CIS. The principle is this: if you can't repay your debts to Russia,
give us your enterprises in lieu of debt payments. We ought to have
done this a long time ago. However, the approach should be integrated,
but this is what is still lacking. So those who continue to claim that
Russia's foreign policy does not serve its economic interests are
wrong. That is not the case. Yet we cannot fail to notice that our
current foreign policy is more focused on the interests of big
business than those of the state as a whole. And many state interests
are by definition unprofitable in economic terms. It appears to me
that what we lack these days is rational conservatism: while making
our foreign policy more focused on economic interests is essential, it
is also essential to have a balance between the interests of the state
as a whole and the interests of specific economic groups.
(Translated by Andrei Ryabochkin)
******
#15
pravda.ru
December 18, 2002
Our Life Will Be Poor and Quiet. Without Electricity
Russia no longer land of extremes?
On the New Year’s eve, experts and largest international investors are
considering Russia’s fate. It turns out that against the background of the
world’s unfavorable economic decline, Russia’s economy looks rather good.
Even the World Bank declares that it believes in Russia’s paying capacity,
in its decreasing dependence upon the oil price conjuncture and even plans
to give money to Russia. But in fact, Russia is asking for no money so far.
Standard & Poor's reports with confidence that paying capacity of Russian
debtors has considerably strengthened. It is not clear yet what is to come
next, as the whole of the world is plunged into the New Year preparations.
In any case, the Big World seems to be ready to admit that Russia is no
longer the country of white bears and economic extremes.
Russian shares are obviously on the rise. For instance, the international
rating agency Moody’s raised the limit of Russia’s currency rating and the
eurobond rating from Ba3 to Ba2. The forecast for all ratings remains
stable. Experts of the agency explain this optimism with several years of
Russia’s considerable economic growth and with the corresponding
improvement of the basic economic showings; such as increase of the gold
and currency reserves, reduction (sometimes even ahead of schedule) of
foreign short-term obligations. Besides, the Russian government very
reasonably reserved money for peak payments of the foreign debt in 2003 and
2005. Experts say, this reveals that policy of the state concerning economy
has become reasonable and predictable.
A bit earlier, agency Standard & Poor's also raised Russia’s long-term
sovereign rating. The long-term rating in the national currency was raised
from BB to BB+; the long-term rating in foreign currency – from BB- to BB.
The forecast is also stable. At the same time, Standard & Poor's confirmed
Russia’s short-term rating at the “B” level in the national and foreign
currencies.
To wide extent, foreign experts are inclined to think that the state of
Russia’s economy can be defined as stabilization; the term so widely used
by governmental officials, but still rather vague for majority of Russians.
Analysts say that against the background of stabilization, the stock market
in Russia and economy will be gradually developing, and economy’s
dependence upon oil prices will reduce. It is not clear yet whether these
measures will increase the well-being of the society. However, it’s
perfectly evident that majority of Russian population won’t agree to
“stabilize” the present-day situation even more; we mean the extensive
poverty, obvious unemployment of the most part of the population and
shameless enrichment of some layers of the society. To tell the truth,
experts say that the situation will develop optimistically only in case if
nothing extraordinary happens. What do they mean?
Analysts say that it will be a political will of the Russian leadership
that will define the “stabilization.” It is believed that Russian
authorities will try to avoid a crisis and slow down implementation of
reforms on the eve of parliamentary and presidential elections. Moody’s
analysts say that the planned structural reforms in Russia’s natural
monopolies, in the bank sector and in the government service sector will
meet with resistance and get stuck under conditions of the general
political situation and reluctance of the state bureaucracy to change
anything. The experts have drawn a conclusion: Russians will live poorly,
but without any upheavals.
Opinion of the experts concerning the previously planned reforms proved to
be true. Duma deputies unanimously demonstrate the desire to abstain from
any reforms until a new composition of the parliament is successfully
elected.
Yesterday the State Duma Council decided to postpone the second reading of
legislation on power engineering reforms for a later period. The centrist
factions of the parliament that violently combated against reforms in power
engineering suggested by Anatoly Chubais, the chairman of RAO UES of
Russia, the energy monopolist, decided to gain revenge. Shares of RAO UES
of Russia, in their turn, dropped in response to this provocation.
Representatives of RAO UES of Russia are sure that negative consequences of
the postponement of the power engineering reform will be tremendous for
Russia’s economy. Russia’ s newspaper Vedomosti reports that the power
engineering reform is unlikely to be adopted in the year when a new staff
of the State Duma will be elected. So, Russia’s life will be poor, stable
and highly likely without electricity.
Concerns of international experts are far from these social and economic
issues. They consider columns of figures, diagrams and economies of
different countries on a global scale. That is why they still mention the
level of the world oil prices as the basic risk for Russia’s economy. And
this is despite the fact that everybody admits reduction of Russia’s
dependence upon the world oil prices. Russian industries that are not
connected with the fuel and energy complex are currently obviously on the
rise. However, experts still say that it will take a long period before
investors will stop considering Russia as a “bottomless barrel” which leaks
hydrocarbons here and there. And prices on this hydrocarbon depend upon the
quickness with which Americans will settle their problems with Saddam
Hussein.
Kira Poznakhirko
PRAVDA.Ru
Translated by Maria Gousseva
*******
#16
Asia Times
December 18, 2002
Talleyrand and Russian electricity
By John Helmer
MOSCOW - Napoleon's foreign minister Talleyrand - Charles-Maurice de
Talleyrand-Perigord - once said that man was given eyes in the front of his
head so that he could look forward, instead of backward. When Napoleon
discovered that Talleyrand was betraying him to his enemies, Napoleon told
him to his face that he was "so much shit in a silk stocking".
The question that still puzzles historians of Napoleon's rule is why, given
what he knew so well about him, did he permit Talleyrand to retain the
position of power that enabled him to continue taking money for spying on
Napoleon, weakening his political alliances, and ultimately conspiring in
his military defeat, abdication and imprisonment to death.
Until Napoleon fell, he believed that he was clever enough to use
Talleyrand's intelligence, while tolerating the man's vices to make him
predictable and controllable. Napoleon admitted enjoying the match of wits.
In the language of modern espionage, Napoleon thought he could "double"
Talleyrand. That was a mistake, the size of which could be measured by
Napoleon only after it was too late.
Is there a lesson in this to be studied in Russia? In the political
campaigns that lie ahead for the Kremlin in the new year, there are many
who whisper that President Vladimir Putin risks more than is prudent by
keeping in his employment a number of men who, according to the whisperers,
are as dangerous as Talleyrand. It's all very well, they say, planning to
be rid of them after the Duma election next December, or after the
president is confirmed in his releection a few months later, but what if
their betrayals cost Putin dearly before then?
Consider the lesson Talleyrand teaches for the price of Russian electricity.
According to a widely published rumor, not too long ago the president was
represented at a meeting at which Anatoly Chubais, the head of United
Energy Systems (UES), Oleg Deripaska and Roman Abramovich met to consider
how the state's electricity generating assets should be divided up among
themselves before and after the election; and what the price of electricity
should be all the while.
Between them, Deripaska and Abramovich own Russian Aluminum, the country's
leading aluminum producer; separately, they own car, bus and aircraft
factories; banks and insurance companies; the oil company Sibneft;
goldmines, power plants and airline assets. The urgency of their interest
is obvious from the global falloff in the price and demand for Russian
aluminum in 2002.
If Russian electricity were to become too expensive, Deripaska's
metal-producing assets would lose their value. What's more, if that price
were to jump during the cold months ahead of the elections, that would play
into the hands of those seeking to revive the parliamentary opposition, and
weaken Putin. That would be bad for all of them.
Whether there was a secret dacha meeting or not, it is inconceivable that
the Kremlin, Chubais, Deripaska and Abramovich - others as well - haven't
been carefully sounding each other out on the price of electricity. Whether
they have reached a common agreement is another matter, although money has
been doing some of the talking.
Since the third week of September, a group of strategic investors began to
buy up UES shares. What is known about the sellers is that they are the
minority Western and Russian institutional shareholders, who have made
public their fear that Chubais intends to destroy the value of their
shareholdings by dividing UES assets in a fashion that benefits
power-hungry oligarchs such as Deripaska and Abramovich. What is suspected
about the buyers is that they are Deripaska and Abramovich, who are playing
on the Kremlin's distrust of both Chubais and the Western shareholders of
UES, with a promise to dispose of both at an electricity price that is
patriotic and politically advantageous - in the short run.
Before the share-buying started in September, the UES share price was about
8 US cents; by late December it had climbed to over 13 cents, a gain of
about 70 percent (that's 60 percent better than the Russian stock market
index as a whole). Several hundred million dollars appear to have changed
hands. If they are a group, the new buyers already control at least 12
percent of UES, and it is rumored that they will continue buying until they
have 25 percent. If that happens, they will have sliced the old foreign
shareholder group in half. Chubais' former international supporters will be
half as numerous, and less than half as powerful.
Since the Kremlin started with 52 percent of UES, and hasn't budged, why
should it care who owns the rest, so long as the president is confident he
can control them? The answer depends on a point that is a secret very
well-kept now, and likely to remain so: Does Putin trust Deripaska and
Abramovich any more than he does Chubais?
In retrospect, Chubais saw his rivals closing in, and in midsummer offered
them a deal. They could acquire power-generating assets he could afford to
dispose of, he said, in one of his famously cheap loans-for-shares schemes.
That was too obvious for Chubais's Western supporters to stomach, and so he
was obliged to withdrew the offer, proposing a moratorium on selling UES
assets. The share price started its upward climb, but not because the
existing shareholders believed in him.
Chubais then came back at the end of November with a scheme called the
Investment Guarantee Fund. This was halfway between what Chubais promised
his Western allies not to do, so that they might stop selling; and what
Deripaska and Abramovich told him they intended to acquire, so that the
momentum might be slowed down. The fund proposed to identify new power
plant projects in which investors could be attracted in exchange for a
privileged stake. The problem with that, the Westerners noticed, was that
it appeared to devalue the existing power-generating capacity of UES. This
encouraged some investment banks to rerate UES, encouraging further selling
of the shares.
While Deripaska and Abramovich continued buying, the Russian government
decided to reduce capital spending in 2003 by UES to $710 million - a 25
percent cut over the Chubais plan. The government also ordered UES to hold
its retail electricity tariff to a rise of no more than 14 percent in
rouble terms - almost zero if inflation is taken into account. That was the
political writing on the wall, and in commercial terms, it clearly signaled
that Putin intended to devalue the shareholders' asset in order to benefit
the welfare of the state - and his election prospects. Predictably, the
Western investors heeded their Moscow brokers' advisories, and continued to
bail out.
If Chubais's critics thought that he was selling out to the Western
investors, they have been proved wrong. If Putin's critics thought that he
had been too soft on Chubais, they look likely to be mistaken also. From
the Kremlin point of view, it is proving relatively easy to tax Deripaska
and Abramovich to subsidize the price of electricity.
Napoleon never did as well with Talleyrand. But then, with those two, we
have eyes that can look backward.
*******
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