Johnson's Russia List
#6604
17 December 2002
davidjohnson@erols.com
A CDI Project
www.cdi.org
[Contents:
1. Moscow Times: Victoria Lavrentieva, Economists: 'Election Disease'
Stunts Growth.
2. Izvestia: Svetlana Babayeva, TWO COUNTRIES OF A SINGLE PRESIDENT. Social
foundation of reforms in Russia may be restricted to the stratum of
reformists alone.
3. Luba Schwartzman: TV1 Review.
4. Interfax: Minister gives Russian immigration figures ahead of
government debate.
5. gazeta.ru: Conditions worsen in Kamchatka as strike gathers pace.
6. The Electronic Telegraph (UK): Julius Strauss, Death gangs fuel
Chechen hatred.
7. Asahi Shimbun: Yoichi Funabashi, How well can Russia play the oil
`wild card'?
8. UPI: Ariel Cohen, U.S.-Russian Asian teamwork.
9. RFE/RL: Zamira Eshanova, 2002 In Review: Central Asia Improves
Relations With West,
But To Whose Benefit?
10. Izvestia: RUSSIA IS BEHIND THE UNITED STATES ALONE AS FAR AS THE ARMS
RACE IS
CONCERNED. ANALYSIS OF 2001 INTERNATIONAL ARMS EXPORTS.
11. Montreal Gazette: Russell Working, Restoring the faith. In a region
with a legacy
of anti-Semitism, the resurrection of a synagogue and a thriving school has
invigorated
Kazan's Jews.
12. Moscow Times: Andrei Zolotov Jr., Dostoevsky Enlisted in Patriot Drive.
13. Gazeta: FIGHTING FOR PURITY OF THE RANKS. An interview with Major
General Sergei
Shishin of the FSB.
14. New York Times: Sabrina Tavernise, Multiliths Overtaking Monoliths On
Skyline.
15. Reuters: Kremlin says power reform on track despite delays.
16. The Globe and Mail (Canada): Mark MacKinnon, Ukrainian opposition
parties to
stand united. An anti-Kuchma politician is now backing a former rival.]
*******
#1
Moscow Times
December 17, 2002
Economists: 'Election Disease' Stunts Growth
By Victoria Lavrentieva
Staff Writer
The government is pushing the country in the wrong direction by slowing
down the pace of reforms ahead of parliamentary and presidential elections,
leading independent economists warned Monday.
"The economy performed better [this year] than most people expected, but
the quality of growth has significantly deteriorated," said Andrei Klepach,
director of the Center of Development, one of 15 think tanks in the newly
created Association of Independent Centers for Economic Analysis.
The association, which members said they formed to better get their message
out, said it doesn't expect any significant progress on reforms or any
structural changes in the economy until 2005.
That message, Klepach said, is that "the so-called Dutch disease, which is
a problem of oil-dependent countries, is spreading across the economy."
The economy is expected to grow from 4.1 percent to 4.2 percent this year,
slightly better than the government had forecast. But Klepach and other
economists from the association said this growth is driven by petrodollars
and consumption while many industrial sectors are on the verge of collapse.
In the absence of further reforms, the economy won't grow by more than 2.4
percent next year if the price of oil averages $15 a barrel and only 4.4
percent if it averages $21.50, said Evsey Gurvich, head of research at the
Economic Expert Group, an association member.
In relative terms, the economy is performing well. In its world outlook
report for 2003, the World Bank downgraded its original forecast from 3.6
percent to 2.5 percent, but sees Russia growing 4.3 percent, higher than
the government's own forecast of 4 percent.
But economists say such growth over the long term is only possible if
Russia switches its focus from natural resources to manufacturing, attracts
more direct investment, and the government strikes a better balance between
growing expenditures and lower revenues.
According to Andrei Neshadin, executive director of the Expert Institute,
the overall tax burden on companies is expected to decline from 45 percent
of GDP in 2002 to 39.5 percent next year, while government expenditures are
expected to grow 15 percent this year and maybe even more next year.
"This might have a negative effect on growth in the future," Neshadin said.
Neshadin said businesses do not expect any progress on key reforms --
communal housing, the national power monopoly, currency controls, the
banking sector -- until after the elections at the end of 2003 and
beginning of 2004.
"The government wants to keep the instruments it can use to influence
businesses and regional administrations in the coming elections," Neshadin
said. "Which means that the pace of reforms won't be as fast as many people
would like to see."
Leonid Grigoriev, who is chairing the association, said this also means
that Russian is unlikely to join the World Trade Organization until 2005 or
even 2007. However, he said, this delay could be positive if officials
don't get lazy.
"A transition period is necessary to adjust to severe competition and not
to sit idle and do nothing," he said.
*******
#2
Izvestia
December 16, 2002
TWO COUNTRIES OF A SINGLE PRESIDENT
Social foundation of reforms in Russia may be restricted to the
stratum of reformists alone
Author: Svetlana Babayeva
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
AN UPDATE ON THE COUNTRY PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN HAS MADE OF RUSSIA.
A CRITIQUE OF THE RUSSIAN REALITY REFLECTED IN RECENT OPINION POLL
According to the All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center, every
second Russian evaluated economic situation in the country as "bad" or
"very bad" this year. Just over 30% of respondents appraised it as
"mediocre", and only 3-4% "good". Sociologists of the Public Opinion
Foundation refer to results of the opinion poll they organized and say
that 2002 was "better than 2001" for 27% of respondents.
Standard & Poor's recently upgraded Russia's long-term foreign
currency rating from BB- to BB, and its ruble rating from BB- to BB+.
The rating prognosis is stable. The commentary for the decision
mentions "well considered policy of the national leadership over the
last 3 years" and "predictable financial condition". Predictability
notwithstanding, foreign investments did not come to Russia en masse
in 2002. Investors distrust Russia. They refer to ineffective courts
and corrupt officials as the major obstacles.
The presidential image is the only thing that remained unchanged
in 2002. Weakness and ineffectiveness of economy and state
institutions, and even difficulties of life in general do not affect
Vladimir Putin's image. On the contrary: according to the Public
Opinion Foundation, Russians ready to vote for him tomorrow swelled
their ranks to the record 56% (all through the year the figure varied
between 50% and 52%).
According to the data provided by the All-Russian Public Opinion
Research Center, closer to New Year's Eve the president may well
congratulate himself on the unprecedented rating of trust at 83%. No
other national leader in a democracy can boast of this rate of trust.
Russians view Putin almost as a personal friend or relative. As a
result, after their own relatives (62%, according to the All-Russian
Public Opinion Research Center) and friends and acquaintances (54%),
Russians trust Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin (28%) more than colleagues
(24%), army (8%), superiors (5%), local authorities (2%), or the media
(Lord, forgive us) and the Church (7-8%).
No institution in Russia is trusted or commands respect these
days (the government, parliament, political parties, army, Church,
media). Most Russians consider the policy of the Cabinet appointed by
the president a failure. Moreover, the population that trusts Putin
displays, when asked, a colossal dislike of the political and economic
initiatives that can be found on the regime's agenda nowadays.
47% of respondents evaluate the president's efforts to restore
order in the country as a success and 49% as a failure (according to
the All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center). The figures have not
changed much. The same goes for "economic revival" and "growth of
prosperity of the population". 33% of Russians think Putin is doing a
good job, and 62% condemn his job as a failure. As far as protection
of democracy and political freedoms is concerned, 46% of respondents
say that Putin has been successful and 40% that he has been anything
but. Some progress has been made only in evaluation of Putin's effort
to improve Russia's image in the eyes of the international community.
71% of Russians believe that the image has improved (it was 57% this
March), and 22% say that the image has remained as before. Anti-
Western tendencies and moods appear to prevail over pro-Western in
public opinion. The situation with Chechnya is different. In March,
2002, 67% of respondents did not think Putin was successful in
handling the problem of the restive region. The Nord-Ost tragedy
swelled ranks of the skeptics to 73%. Only 16% of respondents
approached by sociologists of the All-Russian Public Opinion Research
Center consider the president's policy with regard to Chechnya
successful.
Here are some other interesting figures. These days, only 14% of
Russians approached by experts of the Public Opinion Foundation
believe that communists' return to power would mean a throwback and a
worse life. 25% expect it to improve things in general, while 36% do
not expect any changes whatsoever. It means that approximately 60% of
Russians (almost as many Russians as the ones ready to vote for Putin
right here and now) at least do not see any serious difference between
the current policy and the one communists would have pursued.
This level of total distrust of the population in everything and
everybody save for the national leader (whose objectives it does not
appear to accept either, by the way) is unprecedented. Moreover, it is
paradoxical for a country which has not completed complicated reforms,
whose success is supposed to depend on a massive social foundation
and, at least, on the understanding of the direction the country is
moving in. There is, however, another paradox here: this dislike and
distrust do not evolve into anything else.
There are two milieus in the Russian Federation. One of them can
be found at deluxe mansions and state dachas and in chauffeur-driven
limos. The other is everywhere else - in dark alleys and small and
seedy apartments where His Majesty, the Electorate survives on the
average monthly salary that will suffice for a more or less decent
dinner out for two at a restaurant. These two milieus do not come into
contact with each other. The process of "democratization" of the
country has isolated them from each other.
The Russian elite of the early 21st century is fencing itself off
from the rest of the population. Most dialogues with representatives
of the authorities leave the unpleasant impression that they do not
know anything about the 145 000 000 Russians living in this country
and do not want to know anything. Neither in general, nor
specifically. The elites are not interested. They are interested in
mansions and credit cards, offshore zones and vacations on tropical
islands, objets d'art and nightclubs.
A bit renovated in the early 1990's, the elite is rapidly
becoming a closed caste.
As far as corruption is concerned, Russia has not moved up a
single slot either by international ratings or in the opinion of the
population. Russia is still somewhere between Colombia and Ukraine.
Removal of Russia from the FATF black list of money launderers has not
changed anything. Winding down are speculations on the necessity to
make life easier for small businesses (so as to make them a foundation
of the middle class) and to root out corruption in the state
apparatus. Bureaucratic capitalism has taken root in Russia. Viewed
against this background, the attempt to adopt some clumsy anti-
corruption legislation by the Duma not so long ago merely highlighted
the obvious: neither the authorities nor society are interested in it
any longer. Everybody understands everything, but does not want to
change anything (for lots of different reasons). Reorganization of the
state apparatus, the administrative reforms that used to be Herman
Gref's Center's pet slogan these last three years, is postponed. What
is offered instead is certainly quixotic: the state itself is asked to
make room for free capitalism. Whoever will want to sign his own death
warrant?
Virtually nothing and nobody is putting the higher echelons of
power under pressure from below. The media could serve as an irritant
a couple of years ago. Not anymore; the media is tame. The state
(represented by its executives and officials, including the ones from
security structures) is the most powerful and energetic business
player.
The tendency of taking over of the market by the state was first
revealed a year or two ago. It became particularly noticeable
recently. According to the data compiled by the FBK company, there
were 9,718 federal state-controlled unitary enterprises in Russia in
August 2001. One hundred and fifty-two were marked for privatization.
A year later, there were 9,810 federal state-controlled unitary
enterprises, 435 scheduled for privatization in 2003. State property
in the hands of state officials (alias managers of federal state-
controlled unitary enterprises) becomes essentially private where
profits are concerned, but not when free-market competition is
involved: all rivals are squeezed out by non-economic methods.
There is another paradox to consider: lots of business tycoons
are quite content with this state of affairs. In the past, companies
made plans for less then a year. These days, plans are charted for 3-5
years. Investments exceeding companies' own assets are discussed. It
means that the companies trust the situation to remain stable, and
this is a wholly new business outlook in Russia. "Quality" of this
business is the only question: does it help formation of a new economy
that is quite competitive abroad or is it merely a parasite making use
of monopolies?
Has anything changed in the structures ordinary Russians deal
with in their everyday lives? The police, courts, etc? No comment...
Social life is at its lowest. The recently celebrated anniversary
of the Civic Forum which the Kremlin had intended as something to
provide an impetus for development of civil society was something
entirely different. We have United Russia actively building itself
instead; that is all we have to show for active life of society. Sad
as it undoubtedly is; considering the current still life of society,
it would make a return to Brezhnev's time look like some progress. It
will mean at least one channel of renovation of the elite (through a
political party).
The country is still ruled from the top. That is how it has
always been in Russia. The situation being what it is, it is the upper
echelons of state power then, who are supposed to send signals down:
to change, to open up, to become kinder and smarter... No signals are
being sent. The elite does not care.
A high-ranking state official: I would have understood it had
these elites, clans, or whatever they are been built on an ideological
principle. Here are centrists, here are the patriots, and the right
over there. No. They do not have ideologies. They share only one
desire: to spread their influence as much as possible...to seize as
many enterprises and industries as possible. For themselves, not for
the country. There used to be at least some rivalry among them at
first (like men from secret services vs. all the rest). No more
rivalries. Agreements are made nowadays...
*******
#3
TV1 Review
www.1tv.ru
Compiled by Luba Schwartzman (luba_sch@hotmail.com)
Research Analyst, Center for Defense Information, Moscow office
HEADLINES
Monday, December 16, 2002
- Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed Ruslan Tsakaev Minister of
Internal Affairs of the Republic of Chechnya. The Chechen Interior Ministry
was created on November 10th. President Putin then declared that it would
“take the brunt of the fight against the bandits.”
- The State Duma Budget Committee has recommended the approval of a draft
law in the second reading which allows individuals to take up to $10,000 in
foreign currency out of Russia.
- The State Duma also accepted in the second reading a draft law annulling
the tax on the purchase of foreign currency as of January 1st, 2003.
- Six soldiers deserted a Moscow Region division and showed up at the office
of the Committee of the Mothers of Soldiers. The soldiers cited abuse --
beatings and extortion -- by their superior officers as the reason they
left. The Military Prosecutor’s Office complaints will be carefully
investigate the complaints.
- Colonel Budanov has been found criminally insane at the time of killing
the Chechen girl, Elza Kungaeva. Experts have also discovered that Budaev
has deeper pathological problems. At the next court session, Budaev’s
lawyer will seek his client’s release and request forced treatment.
- President Putin met with Central Bank Chairman Sergei Ignatiev to discuss
the preparations of the law on currency regulation.
- The trial of Anatoly Babkin will resume in Moscow. Professor Babkin is
accused of state treason -- passing information on secret weapons
developments to American intelligence organs.
- The mother of Slavneft Vice President Djumber Tkebuchava has been freed in
the course of a special operation. She was captured in Tkvarcheli, Abkhazia
in early December. Suspects in the case have been detained.
- Hepatitis levels in St. Petersburg exceed national levels by 200-300
percent.
- President Putin congratulated composer Rodion Shchedrin on his 70th
birthday.
- Mikhail Margelov, the chairman of the International Affairs Committee of
the Federation Council declared that Iraq’s move to break the contract with
Lukoil was a mistake.
- Four cases concerning the illegal adoptions of Russian children by
foreigners will be reviewed in the Volgograd Court.
- Pension Fund Chairman Mikhail Zurabov declared that pensioners will
receive additional medical insurance as of next year.
- President Vladimir Putin chaired a Cabinet meeting dedicated to the
discussion of the Cabinet’s agenda for the next year.
- A unique museum will be opened onboard the Lenin ice-breaker ship.
- The visit of Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov to the Philippines is a
sign of Russia’s strengthening position in Asia. Russia and the Philippines
will increase cooperation in the fight against international terrorism as
well as economic cooperation.
- The registration of websites with the domain “.su” will be resumed. The
on-line community wonders whether a country that doesn’t exist should have a
domain name.
- 449,387 phone calls for President Putin have been received through the
toll-free line. He will answer some of these questions live on television
on December 19th.
- A fourth housing and utilities enterprise joined the strike on the
Kamchatka. Over a thousand people are now on strike.
- Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh is coming to Moscow for a four-day
official visit. He will discuss a number of international and bilateral
issues with the Russian leadership.
*******
#4
Minister gives Russian immigration figures ahead of government debate
Interfax
Moscow, 16 December: There are about 3m illegal foreign labourers in Russia,
Nationalities Policy Minister Vladimir Zorin said at a press conference in
Moscow on Monday [16 December] with reference to experts.
The government will consider a draft concept regulating migration on 19
December, the minister said.
Some 28 per cent of the foreigners working in Russia are employed in
commerce, including retail outlets and markets and public catering, the
minister said, referring to the Russian migration departments; 66.8 per cent
of foreign labourers work in industries.
Citizens of 119 countries, including 43 European, 36 Asian and 21 African
nations, have come to work in Russia within the past year, the minister said.
Citizens of Ukraine (32 per cent), China (12.6 per cent), Turkey (7.4 per
cent) and Vietnam (7.1 per cent) top the list of foreign labourers, he said.
The number of foreign labourers who have come to Russia in 2002 will exceed
300,000, the minister said. The rate of foreign labour migrants increased 19
per cent in January-June 2002, as compared to the first half of 2001. The
highest increase is reported from eastern Russia. The year-to-year rise in
foreign labour migrants in the first half of 2002 reached 46 per cent in West
Siberia, 38 per cent in Maritime Territory and 31 per cent in St Petersburg
and Leningrad Region...
The Russian government has set the 2003 quota for foreign labourers at
538,000, said Vladimir Volokh, who is chief of the Interior Ministry's
Federal Migration Service Department for Migration Control.
Moscow Region and Moscow asked for the largest quotas (100,000 and 90,000,
respectively). There are also high quotas in the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Area
(60,000), Maritime Territory (15,000) and St Petersburg (14,000). Ingushetia
and Chechnya have zero quotas.
There are 16,000 officially registered refugees from over 50 countries and
600,000 people enjoying the status of forced migrants in Russia, according to
Federal Migration Service information.
More than 7m foreigners came to Russia in 1991-2001. More than 3m foreign
citizens left Russia over the same period, Zorin said.
Meanwhile, internal migration [migration of citizens inside the country -
Interfax] reached 27m within the past decade.
*******
#5
gazeta.ru
December 16, 2002
Conditions worsen in Kamchatka as strike gathers pace
By Irina Petrakova
The residents of Russia’s Far Eastern Kamchatka peninsula are freezing. For
nearly a month now the staff of the local housing and utility services in
the capital of the province Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy have been on strike
protesting against the city authorities’ move to reform the housing complex
and their failure to keep up with salary payments.
On Monday one of their demands was fulfilled – the Kamchatka Region’s
legislative assembly ruled to pass responsibility for the public utilities
in the city to the regional administration. Nevertheless, the municipal
workers have no intention of returning to work. In the meantime, another
local municipal enterprise has joined the protest.
Housing and utilities workers of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy, who have been
on strike for four weeks now, will henceforth receive financing from the
regional budget. The decision was taken at an extraordinary session of the
regional legislature. After the session held early on Monday morning, the
regional authorities agreed that the housing and utilities complex of the
city should be subordinated to the regional and not to the city
authorities, and promised to earmark 5.3 million roubles for the
development of public utilities in 2003.
In the meantime, the municipal workers, according to the director of the
housing enterprise Zhilremservis Vladimir Tegai, consider the measures
taken by the regional authorities insufficient to settle the conflict. The
protesters are demanding that the authorities pay the backlog of wages in
full. On December 9 the regional administration promised to pay the debt of
12.3 million roubles to the municipal workers; though the strike action is
continuing and gathering pace.
Over 1000 municipal workers are set to continue the strike that has lasted
for almost a month. The number of protesters is growing day by day. In
particular, on Monday the three striking municipal utility enterprises in
Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy were joined by the workers of the municipal
enterprise Tsentralnyi. Employees from the Dalniy enterprise plan to join
the strike on December 19.
In addition to a pay rise and the immediate payment of overdue wages, the
protesters are calling for the immediate resignation of
Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy’s mayor Yuri Golenishchev. The Federation of
Independent Trade Unions of Kamchatka has been gathering signatures in
support of the city head’s dismissal.
Over 8,000 people have thus far joined the calls for Golenishchev’s exit.
However, in defiance of the protesters’ demands the Kamchatka governor
Mikhail Mashkovtsev chose not to fire the mayor, but simply ruled that
henceforth the housing and utilities complex would be subordinated to the
regional authorities instead of the city’s.
Workers at two municipal enterprises in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy –
Zhilremservis and Yuzhnoye – went on strike on November 25 and staged
demonstrations demanding city authorities repay overdue wages and halt the
unpopular and poorly thought-out reform of the city’s housing and utilities
services launched by the mayor’s office.
In early December another 200 workers from the Tushkanovskoye enterprise
joined the strike. At present, the total number of strikers stands at
1,100. In the past few days the strikers have held several rallies in front
of the mayor’s office and regional administration buildings, demanding the
resignation of Golenishchev. Earlier, some 100 utility workers blocked one
of the city’s main thoroughfares.
In the opinion of the first deputy governor Natalia Ryazantseva, it is not
only the utilities personnel with whom the mayor of
Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy has been at loggerheads as she suggested that
energy workers may also join the strike soon.
If that happens, the city, which has been wallowing in household rubbish
and mud because no one is cleaning the streets, may soon be plunged into
darkness.
The city administration’s debt to the local energy company Kamchatskenergo
stands at 33 million roubles. By January 5 the mayor’s office is supposed
to transfer another 65 million to the energy workers. However, the city
administration has refused to repay the debt, claiming that there are
insufficient funds in the city budget.
At the same time the city head Yuri Golenishchev has so far failed to
inform the regional administration of the city’s budget revenues and
spending in connection with the debt repayment. The finance directorate of
the Kamchatka region’s administration has only received the report on
spending of funds set aside for the city by the regional budget. According
to Golenishchev, the city has transferred about 48 million roubles to the
energy workers, but that sum “got stuck” in the region’s treasury.
*******
#6
The Electronic Telegraph (UK)
December 17, 2002
Death gangs fuel Chechen hatred
By Julius Strauss in Grozny
When the Russian tanks and jeeps blocked both ends of her road, Fatima
Bersamdukayeva was at home. Soldiers got out and ordered all males over the
age of 14 to line up in the street.
Then they loaded them into lorries and took them away. With the men out of
the way, the Russians began looting the houses, stealing jewellery, video
cassettes and even camera films. "It was two days before the first of our
men returned home," Fatima said. "You cannot imagine the state they were
in. They had broken ribs and damaged kidneys.
"Some of them were so badly hurt we had to take them to hospital for fear
they would die. We would have let the Russians take our last possessions if
they had only left our men alone."
The raid was one of hundreds of zachistki, a term the Russians use to
describe security sweeps that comes from the word "to cleanse".
At least three men seized that day did not return. They joined the ranks of
hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Chechens, from teenagers to pensioners, who
disappear in Russian custody.
More than two years after Russia seized control of Grozny for the second
time in a decade, the Kremlin insists that life is returning to normal.
Last week President Vladimir Putin declared that a referendum on a new
constitution would be held within three months and that presidential and
legislative elections would follow.
But even a casual visit to the city is enough to show that Moscow's
political plans are no more than window dressing for a brutal and
precarious military occupation. The rebels may be in disarray, but the city
is seething with hatred for the Russians.
On the northern approach to Grozny, an avenue of trees has been felled to
remove cover for guerrilla snipers.
A Russian lorry pours a funnel of smoke into the sky as protection against
anti-aircraft missile attack as helicopters come in to land.
Six tanks and armoured personnel carriers guard the entrance to the city.
Every car is stopped at checkpoints reinforced with concrete slabs
alongside sandbagged gun positions.
The devastation Grozny has suffered is appalling, even though it is layered
with a forgiving blanket of snow. It evokes images of Warsaw or Stalingrad
from the Second World War.
Entire streets have been levelled and buildings that survive have gaping
holes or walls missing. Many are stripped to their skeletons, like huge
corpses gnawed to the bone.
At night, dull occasional orange glows show where Chechens live in the
ruins like rats. There is no running water, electricity is sporadic and the
voltage is low.
Precious heat - the outside daytime temperature hovers around minus 15C in
winter - comes from precarious gas supplies fed through a crazy tangle of
metal pipes that residents have welded together.
Most Chechens in Grozny despise the Islamic radical rebels led by Shamil
Basayev, but they nurse a deep hatred of the Russians that will take
decades to pass.
"You have to live here to really understand what it is like," said Zinaida
Gehayeva, a 35-year-old nurse.
"We loathe the Russians. They say it is getting better, but every day is
worse. Every day they drag out more people who are beaten or disappear."
Every family has its story of loss and suffering at Moscow's hands. Umar
Uzdomirov was a dancer in the local Vainakh ensemble who fled Chechnya for
southern Russia at the beginning of the first war. In the summer he
returned and tried to claim unemployment benefit.
On July 30 he was seized during a security sweep of the central bazaar.
Later he was charged with complicity in a terrorist attack.
Last week his cousin, Yakhita Bakrieyeva, 44, said she spent months trying
to track him down, to no avail.
She said: "The Russians promise improvement, but these round-ups are
happening more and more. At night there is always shooting and the children
are terrified of a visit from the men in masks."
Even the Chechens who co-operate with Russian rule say the military is out
of control.
Ramzan Makhmudov, a civilian prosecutor in Grozny, said: "After the
zachistki we always get complaints. We investigate them, we put together
the documents and we send them to the military prosecutor. Nothing happens.
"Last year a law was passed that said there should be no zachistki without
the local authorities' representation. But they violate this continually.
It is during these raids that disappearances happen."
Ali Dinijev, 39, also works with the Russians. He is helping to build a new
housing block, a showcase project that aims to prove Moscow's claims that
the city is being rebuilt.
He said: "What is putting up new buildings going to do? If your family and
friends are disappearing, how would you feel? Where do you think they come
from, these suicidal terrorists? It is the Russians who are creating them."
******
#7
Asahi Shimbun
December 17, 2002
POINT OF VIEW/Yoichi Funabashi: How well can Russia play the oil `wild card'?
The author is an Asahi Shimbun senior staff writer and foreign affairs
columnist.
Driver Q, without whom I could not get around in Moscow, was grumbling
about the recent 1-ruble-per-liter price hike in gas.
``The government gave no explanation whatsoever to the people for raising
the price. I've heard rumors another price hike of 4 to 5 rubles is around
the corner,'' he said.
Just as Q was turning around to speak to me, he was stopped by a police
officer. Q slipped him a 50-ruble note and the officer went on his way.
As we took off, he said, ``That will pay for his lunch today.''
We were caught in a terrible traffic jam with cars entering the street from
all directions. I barely made it on time to an appointment I had with Simon
Kukes, president of Russia's fourth-largest oil firm, Tyumen Oil Co.
``Russia's oil industry has made a remarkable recovery,'' Kukes said. ``It
is a victory for privatization and the market. I expect we will have an
output of 9 million barrels a day in five to seven years,'' he said, his
voice full of confidence.
Up-and-coming private oil companies like Tyumen and Yukos are the driving
force behind the resurgence of Russian oil power.
In terms of crude oil production, Russia is third after Saudi Arabia and
the United States. It is also the third-largest oil exporter after Saudi
Arabia and Norway. According to Kukes, Russia, by exporting 3 million
barrels a day, is helping to diversify the oil supply, which in turn helps
stabilize the global economy.
Oil is also an important component of the post-Sept. 11 U.S.-Russia
strategic relationship. The United States is eager to make itself less
dependent on the Middle East, in particular Saudi Arabia, for its oil, and
Russia is looking to expand its market beyond Europe. This summer, Tyumen
Oil began exporting crude oil to the United States.
Russia is also strengthening oil ties with China. Yukos Oil Co. and a
state-owned Chinese company are jointly backing a project to build a
pipeline from eastern Siberia to Daqing in northeastern China. China is
also taking steps to invest capital in a private Russian oil company to
help secure the supply of crude oil from Russia. Russia exports oil to
China while China exports capital to Russia. The interests of the two
countries overlap.
However, in international oil politics, cooperation is synonymous with
competition.
Some Russian officials are anxious about Russia's growing dependence on
U.S. funds and technology. The United States, on the other hand, is still
circumspect about investing in Russia because it is distrustful of the
inadequate Russian legal system, not to mention the questionable conduct of
corrupt traffic officers who demand bribes in exchange for not writing
traffic tickets. Russia's fickle tax system poses another thorny problem.
The United States and Russia are also looking ahead and trying to shape
their policies for a postwar Iraq.
Russia has oil interests in Iraq. ``A large part of Russia's Iraq policy
has to do with oil concessions,'' said an official who advises Russian
President Vladimir Putin on strategic problems. ``If Russia is going to
dispatch peacekeepers to places like Kosovo, it should send them to Iraq,''
he said.
Some Russian officials are concerned that the United States is going to
install a pro-American government in Iraq, take control of Iraqi oil, boost
production and lower international oil prices to put the lid on Russia.
However, Bruce Misamore, an American who serves as the chief financial
officer of Yukos, said that a steep decline in international oil prices
would also seriously affect U.S. oil companies. There is no way the
oil-sensitive Bush administration wants to lower oil prices and risk
causing U.S. oil companies to go under, Misamore says, dismissing the idea.
Such conspiracy theories are a sign of Russia's anxiety, he said.
Putin's high approval ratings as the architect of a ``strong Russia'' are
possible because oil prices are relatively high, around $30 per barrel, and
stable. Both Russia's finances and foreign relations are buoyed up by oil.
That is all the more reason why it is afraid of a sudden drop in crude oil
prices.
While Russian oil may help stabilize the global economy and politics, at
the same time, depending on the situation, it could actually lead to
instability. It's a wild card that could be played either way.
And in this high-stakes game, it's the new and rising private oil firms
that are the bookies.
``When an oil man speaks, Putin listens,'' said a former economic Cabinet
minister whom I hadn't seen in a long time. ``The oil industry is the most
politically powerful industry in Russia. But with the growth of private
enterprise, it is also the area in which market mechanisms are the most
active. Putin has to listen to the market.''
It looks like a new game of oil politics that involves not only power but
also the market has begun.
The gas price hike that Q was unhappy about is also a product of this game.
Every oil company is eager to export oil to generate foreign currency, and
less enthusiastic about producing oil for the domestic market. The
government has no choice but to raise oil prices to encourage these
companies to boost domestic production.
However, such a course of action risks pinching the disadvantaged even
harder, to the point of triggering social unrest. Russian oil is also a
political wild card. Can Russia play it well?
*******
#8
Outside View: U.S.-Russian Asian teamwork
By Ariel Cohen
A UPI Outside View commentary
Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is research fellow in Russian and Eurasian studies at
The Heritage Foundation in Washington.
WASHINGTON, Dec. 16 (UPI) -- The Bush administration has reacted calmly to
the deployment of the Russian Air Force planes at the Kant air base in
Kyrgyzstan earlier this month. The changing nature of the U.S.-Russian
relations, the low numbers of the aircraft, their temporary rotation to
Kant -- all these factors make Washington policy planners sleep well at night.
"We are beyond seeing Russian troop deployment in Central Asia through the
prism of U.S.-Russian rivalry," said a U.S. National Security Council
official with responsibility for the region who spoke on condition of
anonymity. "This is no longer a zero-sum game. We hope the Russian know this."
Dmitry Gorenburg, director of Russian and East European programs at CNA
Corporation, a defense policy think tank in Alexandria, Va., with ties to
the U.S. Navy, believes that the calm U.S. reaction indicates that
Washington no longer sees the relationship in a competitive mode. Russia,
and Central Asian states, however, do not want China to deploy its troops
in Central Asia. This leaves Moscow and Washington to call the shots in the
region, Gorenburg says.
Russia and its Commonwealth of Independent States Collective Security
Treaty allies talked for years about the necessity to deploy a rapid
reaction force in the region. Explosions in Tashkent on Feb. 6, 1999, when
a series of six car bomb went off in the capital of Uzbekistan, killing 16
persons and injuring 130 others, and the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks in New
York came and went, while the forces were not deployed.
"(Russian President Vladimir) Putin is doing what Moscow experts were
recommending throughout the 1990s," says Irina Kobrinskaya, a national
security expert with Psi Foundation, an independent Russian think tank. "It
was obvious as early as 1995 that Russia has not economic capacity to
deploy adequate forces in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Therefore, Russia
had to 'internationalize' the peacekeeping there."
Moscow security sources believe that the military lobbied for Kant
deployment to balance off U.S. presence in Central Asia. Putin agreed to
these requests to placate the generals, as well as those among the public
who view Western deployment in Central Asia as a long-term threat to Russia.
However, U.S. officials say that Putin knows that Russia lacks budgetary
reserves and military hardware to provide an adequate force structure along
its periphery. Thus, the conditions of people and equipment in the Russian
bases in Georgia, Armenia, and Tajikistan are poor and so is
battle-worthiness of the forces. If the United States were to leave Central
Asia tomorrow, the thinking in the Pentagon goes, the Russians could not
fill the vacuum -- neither on their own, nor in the CIS framework.
What is most fascinating in this deployment, however, is that the "old"
Russian military thinking coexists side by side with the new one,
participants in a recent Center for Naval Analysis U.S.-Russian military
seminar. The old thinking says that Moscow has to keep up and compete with
Washington. The new thinking says, "We serve together in peace keeping in
the Balkans. Why can't we serve together in Central Asia?"
Washington military analysts point out that the new Russian-led aircraft
contingent out of Kant seems weak in comparison with the U.S.-led force
based in Manas. The multinational air force, which includes Russian, Kazakh
and Kyrgyz aircraft, would provide cover for CIS rapid deployment force,
which is projected to be 5,000 strong. To date, however, only two SU-25
ground attack jets, and two SU-27 fighters were deployed, and SU-27 will be
returning soon to their permanent bases.
For now, it could have been just an aerobatic a show to entertain Putin and
his defense minister, Sergey Ivanov.
To illustrate how dicey things can be, Russian presidential and defense
staff and accompanying journalists barely survived the trip back home from
Kant, when their air planes had to conduct an emergency landing in Aqtobe,
formerly Aktyubinsk, Kazakhstan, due to poor quality of Kyrgyz jet fuel.
U.S.-led force at the Manas air base boasts 20 F-16 fighters and over 2,000
troops, deployed primarily to support the peacekeeping force in
Afghanistan. The Russian-CIS deployment can complement this force, and
provide the basis for Russia-NATO cooperation envisaged in the NATO-Russian
Treaty signed in May of 2002. However, it is not the fact of deployment,
but its nature and quality, which influences strategic balance in Central
Asia.
As Russian and U.S. military experts point out, however, that conventional
troop deployment in military bases makes them a target for terrorist-style
operations by highly trained and motivated guerillas. Without a strong
intelligence and special forces components, both Western and CIS forces
have not teeth and eyes. And even with a strongest intelligence and
toughest troops, the battle against terrorism cannot be won without
addressing religious, political and economic causes of the phenomenon.
Which brings a whole another dimension to counter-terrorism in Central Asia
-- and elsewhere. Military operations are but one aspect of the war on
terrorism. Others include active promotion of alternative visions of Islam
that are moderate and tolerant; limits on anti-Western propaganda in
mosques and Islamic academies or madrassas; increase in political
participation; growth of civil society; and the rule of law.
Central Asia is a potential target for radical Islamist recruiters because
these economies stagnate and do not provide economic opportunities to a
large cohort of unemployed young people, while authoritarian regimes
tighten their screws. The new Russian and CIS deployment, just like the
U.S.-led force in Manas deployed in 2001, will be slow to provide
non-military answers in the war on terrorism.
*******
#9
2002 In Review: Central Asia Improves Relations With West, But To Whose
Benefit?
By Zamira Eshanova
The war on terrorism put Central Asia in the spotlight of international
attention throughout much of the past year. Four regional governments are
continuing their cooperation with U.S. and other Western powers in
antiterrorism efforts, earning political and financial support from them in
return. But despite earning points for the leaders of Central Asia, it
remains unclear if the new partnership with the West is adding up to
clear-cut benefits for the people of the region.
Prague, 16 December 2002 (RFE/RL) -- The year 2002 was a good one for Central
Asian rulers, with one exception: Turkmenistan's Saparmurat Niyazov, who late
last month was the target of an alleged assassination attempt and whose
isolation from the outside world continues to grow.
For the rest of the Central Asian states, the year saw strengthening ties
with the United States as it continued its war on terrorism and operations in
Afghanistan. Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan continued to host thousands of
coalition forces. Tajikistan likewise hosted troops, and Kazakhstan supported
U.S. efforts by offering use of its airspace and air bases.
In turn, Washington and its allies were grateful toward their new partners in
the geographical hub of Asia. A number of high-ranking military, government,
and parliamentary delegations have traveled over the past year to Tashkent
and Bishkek to praise their governments' cooperation in the war on terrorism.
The presidents of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan have all received
warm welcomes in the White House this year.
Some observers noted a troubling attendant trend: a softer stance on
continued allegations of widespread human rights abuses throughout Central
Asia. Criticism of the countries' human rights records was markedly muted,
although some Washington officials mentioned the issue during trips to the
region.
Among them was Lorne Craner, U.S. assistant secretary of state for democracy,
human rights and labor. In his frequent visits to the region, Craner repeated
that the United States would not sacrifice its long-term commitment to human
rights in favor of short-term political expediency. He added that Washington
is deeply concerned about human rights in Central Asian countries.
Despite such statements, Central Asian governments were generously rewarded
for their close cooperation with the United States. U.S. financial aid to the
region increased over the past year from $230 million to almost $600 million.
Other Western financial institutions also raised their level of economic
assistance to the region, for example, the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, which boosted assistance from $269 million in 2001 to almost
$400 million in 2002.
But despite those extra millions, 2002 was not a good year for the majority
of Central Asia's people, who are growing more discontented and frustrated
with the region's stagnant economies and repressive regimes.
Despite reported growth and heightened Western assistance, living standards
for the majority of the population fell dramatically in all five countries
throughout the year. Dafne Ter-Sakarian, a Central Asian analyst with the
Economist Intelligence Unit, explained this apparent contradiction.
"Throughout the region, there is the growth in terms of export revenue -- I
mean, it's based on export revenue. And the problem with that is that it
tends to end up benefiting a small circle of people," Ter-Sakarian said.
Ter-Sakarian said the increase in Western aid did not have a beneficial
impact on the lives of ordinary people because of distribution problems and
misappropriation. Ter-Sakarian believes that all five Central Asian countries
are backsliding on economic reforms. "Reform has slowed down. What little
reforms there had been, now they are going back, in fact. Things are, from
that point of view, getting worse, really," Ter-Sakarian said.
Independent observers say living standards are not the only development
indicators to decline throughout the region in 2002. Civil liberties like
press freedom also suffered, even in the countries in the region considered
the most liberal.
Alex Lupis, a Central Asia analyst with the New York-based Committee to
Protect Journalists, said that overall, the situation facing local media in
the region looks worse now than it did at the beginning of the year. "I think
the most disconcerting [development] is the trend in Kazakhstan, which
throughout the 1990s was seen -- along with Kyrgyzstan -- as one of more
liberal and progressive and hopeful states in Central Asia. Over the last 12
or 13 months, since November of the last year, the government has really
become much more aggressive in cracking down on newspapers and independent
television stations," Lupis said.
Lupis noted that some "cosmetic" improvements in press freedom have been seen
in Tajikistan and in Washington's closest Central Asian ally, Uzbekistan. But
he added that these changes are part of a general image overhaul initiated by
the governments rather than the beginning of true reforms. "You know, the
governments continue to see in independent media the threat to their
authority and see it as basically incompatible with their style of rule. But
because of closer relations with Western governments, they have become a
little more sensitive to trying to appear to be a little more liberal and
tolerant," Lupis said.
Although Uzbekistan has officially abolished state censorship -- a move
publicly hailed by both Tashkent and Washington -- Lupis said censorship
still remains in the country, albeit in a different guise.
The overall status of human rights likewise seems to be on the decline. U.S.
officials have pledged to put human rights at the top of their Central Asia
agendas. But if anything, closer relations with the West seem to have
emboldened Central Asian leaders to continue a regionwide crackdown on human
rights in the name of fighting terrorism and religious extremism.
Aaron Rhodes is executive director of the Vienna-based International Helsinki
Federation for Human Rights. He said the past year saw human rights take a
turn for the worse in Central Asia and that the change will ultimately bring
negative consequences for the West. "Because the situation of the people in
these countries is very grim, they aren't looking with very much hope when
they envision their future, and they are frustrated by their isolation in
relation to the democratic part of the world, in relation to the
Euro-Atlantic political community. And [the] result is that there is a
growing distrust and anti-Western feelings in Central Asia," Rhodes said.
Ordinary Central Asians appear to reflect this view. Karim, a teacher from
the Uzbek city of Andijan, said people feel increasingly uneasy as they
contemplate the future. "Society is moving toward a dead-end street. We've
been in this crisis for a long time. There's nobody who can point us in the
right direction. People have no idea where they are going; there is no one to
explain the situation. The only concern of ordinary people these days is to
drag themselves through the day, to physically survive it somehow. That's
it," Karim said.
Rhodes said the war on terrorism has put an emphasis on what he says are the
wrong priorities. The result, he said, is that the United States and other
Western countries have lost much of the moral authority they once enjoyed in
Central Asia and elsewhere. "You know, the war on terror has to be a war for
human rights, because those repressive governments in Central Asia constitute
a security threat for the Euro-Atlantic political community. The danger of
the situation is that, in the framework of this so-called war on terror,
there is a sense of accepting the policies of repressive governments. And
that puts the U.S. and its allies really on the wrong side of things," Rhodes
said.
All three Western experts interviewed by RFE/RL believe that current
political, socioeconomic, and human rights trends in Central Asia leave
little room for optimism about positive developments in the year to come. The
growing frustration of the region's people, combined with the authorities'
unwillingness to introduce reforms and to liberalize society, might prove a
recipe for unrest rather than for true stability and prosperity.
*******
#10
Izvestia
December 17, 2002
RUSSIA IS BEHIND THE UNITED STATES ALONE AS FAR AS THE ARMS RACE IS CONCERNED
ANALYSIS OF 2001 INTERNATIONAL ARMS EXPORTS
Author: Dmitry Litovkin
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
RUSSIA IN SECOND PLACE BEHIND USA IN TERMS OF ARMS EXPORTS
As far as quantity of weapons and military hardware exported in
2001 is concerned, Russia was behind the United States alone. This is
the conclusion of Washington ProFile news agency drawn from analysis
of annual reports on arms sales forwarded to the UN.
Ruslan Pukhov, Director of the Center of Strategies and
Technologies Analysis: These ratings do not promote any hidden
objectives or have any hidden motives. I cannot actually say what they
are for.
As a matter of fact, there is not a commonly adopted system of
arms export evaluation. Washington ProFile experts admit it freely,
emphasizing that "the UN lists are incomplete". Indeed, the UN lists
take into account only the data countries make available of their own
volition. There exist other ratings as well, like the ones made by the
Stockholm Institute of Peace Problems Analysis, Defense News, and arms
exporters themselves.
Washington ProFile mentions, for example, that 120 countries
delivered reports on their arms deals. Twenty-seven countries sold
arms, and 39 bought (the rest of the countries did not make these
deals). The United States is the largest arms exporter. It sold 2,879
items in 2001. Russia is the second largest arms exporter with 520
items. Ukraine is the third largest (389). France sold 152 items, and
Great Britain 96.
The Stockholm Institute also counts weapons and military
hardware. Its estimates show that the United States sold 5,489 items
in 2001 and Russia 4,443. Washington and Moscow are followed by
France, Great Britain, and Germany (each with about 1,000 items sold
abroad). These three exporters are followed by the Netherlands and
Ukraine.
Why this difference in figures? Arms deals are very complicated.
Moreover, actual deliveries (in accordance with past contracts) differ
from the dividends and from the contracts that have not been fulfilled
yet. According to the Research Service of the US Congress, Russia
signed $5.8 billion worth of contracts in 2001 (the United States
itself $12.1 billion worth of contracts). The Stockholm Institute
claims that Russia became the world leader as far as actually
delivered items are concerned.
Hence the difference. Besides, the deals are always confidential
and the buyer and the seller alone know how much this or that system
costs...
*******
#11
Montreal Gazette
December 16, 2002
Restoring the faith
In a region with a legacy of anti-Semitism, the resurrection of a synagogue
and a thriving school has invigorated Kazan's Jews
By Russell Working
Kazan, Russia
It was a time of turmoil in Russia's Tatar Autonomous Republic. In 1994,
local officials were demanding independence for the Muslim-plurality region,
and taxpayer dollars were rebuilding mosques that had been turned into
warehouses during Soviet times.
Fifteen Jews decided it was time to reassert their own spiritual heritage.
They applied to the government and obtained title to a pre-Revolutionary
synagogue that had been converted into a government education centre. And
when the teachers refused to heed an eviction order, they blocked the
entrance to the building. "Nobody was against giving us the synagogue, of
course, but they were procrastinating," said Mikhail Skoblionok, a
56-year-old businessman who was part of the protest. "So we decided to put
pickets at the doors and not let the teachers in. ... Of course it was a
scandal, but otherwise we wouldn't have gotten the building back."
The synagogue now stands at the heart of a remarkable rebirth of Judaism in
this part of a country that still struggles with a legacy of anti-Semitism.
It is not only a house of worship, but it is home to the Hesed Moshe Jewish
Community Welfare Centre of Tatarstan. And in a nation Jews have fled in
droves for Israel and the United States, many of Kazan's 10,000 to 12,000
Jews say they are here to stay in this Volga River industrial city of 1.1
million.
In provincial Russia, offices can be shabby affairs, with wiring stapled to
the walls and a cluster of clunky telephones ringing unanswered on the
director's desk. But the newly renovated synagogue is as stylish as a house
of worship in Montreal, and the centre's outreach programs rival those of a
Western organization. The organization does everything from providing walkers
to the elderly to hosting a 350-student strong youth club.
Across town, a Jewish school has excelled academically to the point that
ethnic Russian and Tatar students are signing up for a program that includes
Hebrew language studies and Jewish history. The community's vibrancy owes
much to a strong Russian Jewish Congress and generous donors, including some
in the United States and Israel.
"This community has wonderful and very professional leadership," said Rob
Wang, head of the Jewish Communities of Western Connecticut, an American
group that has formed a partnership with Kazan's synagogue. "Out of all the
emerging Jewish communities in the former Soviet Union, this is one of the
most successful and the most organized."
Before the 19th century, Jews were not allowed to settle outside a prescribed
pale in Western Russia, and Kazan, built in the 1200s, was off limits. But
Jewish traders and discharged soldiers began arriving in the late 19th
century, followed by refugees from war zones in World War I. In the 1940s, a
flood of refugees fled the Nazi advance across Belarus and Western Russia,
and the Soviet government relocated factories here, out of reach of the
Germans.
Even nowadays, Neo-Nazis have vandalized synagogues and attacked Jews and
other minorities in many parts of Russia. Some Muslims have demanded the
eviction of a 400-student Jewish School from the state-owned School No. 12
building.
The hostility peaked last year when vandals poured gasoline on the roof and
set it alight. All four floors of the school were damaged by water when
firemen doused the blaze, said Olga Trupp, principal of School No. 12. "If
we're not wanted, we can relocate, as long as they give us another building,"
she said.
Many Jews say they feel accepted here. The synagogue's youth club has
initiated exchanges with the region's other religions, so that Muslims,
Russian Orthodox believers and Jews visit each others' houses of worship and
study the other faiths.
"We're still getting calls from other students saying, 'When are we going to
do that again?' " said Ilya Velder, 21.
The entire community takes pride in the school's accomplishments, Trupp says.
Students study Hebrew and Jewish history, has a room full of new computers
with Internet access, and most of its graduates go on to higher education.
The school is so highly regarded academically, many Russian and Tatar
families send their children there.
And despite last year's arson, Trupp perceives a new spirit among Kazan's
Jews.
"Ten years ago, nobody would say on a streetcar, 'I am a Jew,' or speak
Hebrew or anything like that," Trupp said. "Nowadays, when they go in the
city, our children are proud of being Jews. I think that's the main thing we
achieved. Jewish children are not afraid of being Jews."
*******
#12
Moscow Times
December 17, 2002
Dostoevsky Enlisted in Patriot Drive
By Andrei Zolotov Jr.
Staff Writer
Just a block away from the old Moscow hospital where he was born in 1821,
Fyodor Dostoevsky managed to preside Monday over a national conference of
military, educational and culture bureaucrats tackling the elusive concept
of patriotism.
"Patriotism is the close interrelationship of a person, society and the
state," a poster on the stage in the former Red Army House quoted
Dostoevsky as saying.
To listen to the conference's participants, a patriotic upbringing was
simpler when Lenin had a monopoly on poster slogans. But the sudden advent
of capitalist greed coupled with a lack of moral guidance in post-Soviet
Russia has endangered the very foundation of Russian society -- patriotism.
This has left the country with problems ranging from drug addiction and
draft dodging to radical youth groups and neglected war memorials, they said.
Turning to Dostoevsky is the latest twist in the government's search to
return some sort of patriotic indoctrination to public schools, state media
and youth organizations.
Never mentioning Dostoevsky -- and speaking in a language much more
bureaucratic than that of the 19th century classics -- mid-level officials
spoke Monday about largely mundane issues such as how to find money to buy
Russian tricolor flags and double-headed eagles for provincial public
schools. They discussed how to coordinate the activities of the Defense and
Education ministries in sponsoring military-style high schools for orphans
and how veterans organizations and schools could work together to teach
"courage classes" to schoolchildren.
The conference, which started Monday and brings together about 220 military
and civilian officials, is part of a $6 million, four-year program called
"The Patriotic Upbringing of the Citizens of the Russian Federation in
2001-05," which President Vladimir Putin signed three years ago. But in an
example of how poorly the program is funded, organizers had to ask regional
administrations to pay for their delegates' trips to Moscow. Sixty-seven of
the 89 regions agreed.
Retired Vice Admiral Yury Kvyatkovsky, who heads Rosvoyentsentr, the small
government organization behind the initiative, said the patriotic program
was a major shift in Kremlin policy from the Boris Yeltsin-era approach, in
which patriotism was left to enthusiasts.
"The government has put forward a task to build up a system that will
transcend the entire government structure from top to bottom," Kvyatkovsky
said.
But there is a long way to go before the program's goals are realized, he
said.
The program is complicated by a lack of consensus on what people should be
patriotic about, a lack of funding and lack of coordination among the
relevant agencies.
A concept of patriotic education developed by Kvyatkovsky's organization
was originally scheduled to be approved by the Cabinet in November but was
postponed because of a slew of amendments introduced by the regions.
Kvyatkovsky said he hoped the proposal will be adopted early next year.
Military generals complained Monday that many conscripts simply don't know
who won World War II and the difference between the Patriotic War of
1812-14 and the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45.
As part of preparations for the 60th anniversary in 2005 of the Soviet
victory in World War II, a special committee headed by one of the 1991 coup
leaders, General Valentin Varennikov, was set up to evaluate history
textbooks.
A Kremlin official said 60 percent of army graves and monuments need repair
and many more remain unmarked, leaving a lot of work for military patriotic
groups.
One aspect of patriotic upbringing that delegates agreed on was the
promotion of national symbols. But even that issue raises a problem -- not
every school can afford to buy a flag or a double-headed eagle to put on
the wall.
Deputy Education Minister Yury Kovrizhkin said the ministry has published a
set of 13 posters featuring the national symbols that sell for 168 rubles.
"Not too expensive," he said with pride.
Upstairs, among a handful of vendors selling patriotic books and posters, a
company called Oryol & Co. offered fancy eagle pins and awards.
Tatyana Korolyova, a public education official from the Kaluga region, said
that unlike many regions, Kaluga has sufficient funds to buy symbols. The
governor allocated 1 million rubles last year to buy cloth -- not paper --
flags for every school, she said.
Korolyova acknowledged, however, that she had come to the conference to
find out whether the region could obtain a federal grant for a patriotism
program centered on school museums.
"It's an important subject," she said of patriotic upbringing. "We were
afraid to speak about it for many years. It wasn't in fashion."
She said she didn't think the program should have a strong military slant
-- as did patriotism in Soviet days.
"For me, a patriot is a man who performs his civic duty in times of peace
and war, preferably in peace," she said.
*******
#13
Gazeta
December 17, 2002
FIGHTING FOR PURITY OF THE RANKS
An interview with Major General Sergei Shishin of the FSB
Author: Alexander Golubev
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
ANALYSIS OF 2001 INTERNATIONAL ARMS EXPORTS.
AN INTERVIEW WITH MAJOR GENERAL SERGEI SHISHIN, THE NEW HEAD OF
INTERNAL SECURITY DIRECTORATE OF THE FEDERAL SECURITY SERVICE. THIS
AGENCY IS SUPPOSED TO EXPOSE AND PREVENT THE ACTIVITIES OF SECRET
SERVICES, TERRORIST GROUPS, AND INDIVIDUALS AIMED AT PENETRATING THE
RUSSIAN SECURITY STRUCTURES.
MAJOR GENERAL SERGEI SHISHIN IS THE NEW HEAD OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
DIRECTORATE OF THE FEDERAL SECURITY SERVICE (FSB), ONE OF THE MOST
SECRETIVE UNITS IN RUSSIA'S SECURITY STRUCTURES. THIS DIRECTORATE WAS
IN CHARGE OF OPERATIONAL PREPARATIONS FOR THE SCANDALOUS
INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE MOST GROUP AND VYACHESLAV AMINOV.
THIS IS SHISHIN'S FIRST INTERVIEW IN HIS NEW CAPACITY.
Question: The internal security services in Russian and foreign
law enforcement agencies are rather secretive units. What tasks does
the Internal Security Directorate perform? Are there any principal
differences between the work of your department and other Russian
secret services?
Sergei Shishin: There are no principal differences. As for the
tasks, the Internal Security Directorate, within the sphere of its
competence, is supposed to expose and prevent the activities of secret
services, terrorist groups, and individuals aimed at penetrating
(physically or technologically) the Russian security structures and
their facilities with the aim of damaging their security.
Along with that, the Internal Security Directorate protects
informants, buildings and constructions, and communications from
technological or physical penetration and from acts of sabotage.
Besides, the Internal Security Directorate protects FSB
officials.
Question: To my knowledge, your subordinates have prepared some
scandalous investigations recently - like the Most Group
investigation, for example.
Sergei Shishin: Yes, the Internal Security Directorate was
actively involved in preventing the unlawful activities of the so-
called Most Security Department whose staff, mostly former officers of
the KGB and FSB, had tapped other people's telephones, placed Vladimir
Gusinsky's opponents under total surveillance, and committed other
crimes. Moreover, they made repeated attempts to involve acting
officers of the FSB in their activities.
We exposed a mole in our own ranks. I'm not going to identify
him, but the man had sold classified information to the Most Security
Department. Actually, he had been doing it for years. The officer
confessed everything and was sentenced to several years imprisonment
by the court of the Moscow garrison in summer 2002. He is serving his
sentence now.
Question: Did the Internal Security Directorate participate in
the Nord-Ost hostage release operation?
Sergei Shishin: Our officers were involved in the operation
mounted by the Special Center of the FSB. Moreover, officers of the
Internal Security Directorate identified and rendered harmless the
terrorist accomplice who briefed the criminals on everything happening
outside. Unfortunately, I cannot identify him by name, because the
investigation is not over yet. I think, however, that all information
on him and on his arrest will be made available to the general public
in time.
Question: But he was not an official of the law enforcement
agencies or secret services, was he?
Sergei Shishin: No. He was a man from the Caucasus, who was in
constant contact with Movsar Barayev in the theater.
Question: Exposing corrupt officers in your own ranks is one of
your priorities. Do you expose corrupt officers frequently?
Sergei Shishin: Yes, it is indeed a priority. Unfortunately, even
security structures are not immune to corruption. We do all we can to
expose corrupt officers.
Question: Are these isolated cases, or are there dozens of them,
or perhaps hundreds across Russia?
Sergei Shishin: They are quite rare. The FSB has always been more
careful in personnel selection than other law enforcement agencies and
secret services.
Question: Do your subordinates involved in corruption
investigations often find themselves under pressure?
Sergei Shishin: We are in the focus of attention of the president
and topmost echelons of the FSB, who tell us to do our job regardless
of names or positions. In other words, we do not mind pressure of the
sort you are talking about in the least. All attempts to use the so-
called "power of the telephone" are pointless. All the same, every now
and then our officers are directly threatened by criminal structures.
That is when our protection system comes into play.
Question: Protecting FSB officers is another priority of the
Internal Security Directorate. Do you have to protect them often? What
methods are used?
Sergei Shishin: We have a special state protection service. We
are forced to protect our officers more often now, because of the
counter-terrorism operation in Chechnya. More often than not it
applies to officers working in Chechnya. As for the methods, they are
the usual ones - from personal bodyguards to relocation and a new
identity.
Question: The last question. What tasks have your superiors
outlined for the Internal Security Directorate?
Sergei Shishin: The tasks are traditional. All the tasks the
Internal Security Directorate is facing are attributed to the
problematic economic and domestic political situation in Russia, or
threats to the FSB from external sources including foreign
intelligence agencies and international terrorist organizations. In
this light, we have to make internal security structures in the
regions more active and have them coordinate their work with the
Internal Security Directorate of the FSB. The subject is important for
other structures too, not just for the FSB.
*******
#14
New York Times
December 17, 2002
Moscow Journal
Multiliths Overtaking Monoliths On Skyline
By Sabrina Tavernise
In a city whose skyline has long been dominated by concrete Soviet
monoliths, some unlikely new neighbors have been appearing.
A glass and metal spaceship-like apartment building squats behind the
Foreign Affairs Ministry. A lemon-yellow wedding cake towers over the
neighborhood where a famous Russian writer once lived. A curvy glass mall
stands defiantly across from the old K.G.B. headquarters. They are
apartments and office spaces being erected with tremendous speed as demand
for elite housing by Russia's growing wealthy class increases. The
buildings, much despised by a small group of historians and intellectuals,
are part of Moscow's frenzied rebirth.
The recent changes are signs of a new Russia, where a longing for luxury
was sharpened by 70 years of shopping monotony. Real estate brokers now
offer dizzying arrays of options, from dog-walkers to indoor tennis courts.
An elite fenced development in northern Moscow called Aliye Parusa has an
indoor water amusement park and a marina for yachts.
"It's a question of taste," said Milana Zotova, director for public
relations at Don-Stroy, one of Moscow's largest developers and owner of
Aliye Parusa. "Our clients are top managers, heads of companies, successful
people. They want security and convenience. Our concierge is an important
person for them. A grandmother sleeping behind a desk, this is not security."
It is also, however, a question of money. The largest apartments at Aliye
Parusa, or Scarlet Sails, sell for between $700,000 and $900,000 -- about
750 times the average annual wage in Russia. Even so, demand is high. Ms.
Zotova said all of the gated community's 500 apartments had been sold.
Among the residents are prominent government officials and executives.
"There's nothing like this in all of Moscow," she said, flicking her
fur-trimmed wrist toward the development's brightly colored towers, which
stand on the shore of the Moscow River.
The former residents of the neighborhood, called Shukino, home to many
military and police families, have been resettled into several high-rises
nearby, the costs split by the city, the residents and the developer, said
Ms. Zotova, who refers to those buildings as "economy class." In all, seven
five-story apartment buildings are to be razed to make way for the upscale
development.
The building boom has drawn a small but active opposition. A ragtag group
of several hundred historians, intellectuals and enthusiasts have been
fighting new development in areas where it threatens landmark buildings.
In a flurry of letter-writing and hand-wringing, they tried, and failed, to
stop the demolition of part of the house of the composer Rimsky-Korsakov.
Now a five-star restaurant occupies the area.
"It's like the death of a person," said Konstantin Mikhailov, 37, a
journalist and antidevelopment activist, referring to the lost buildings.
"We can't bring them back."
Mr. Mikhailov and others in the group pooh-pooh the styles and designs of
the new buildings, which they say are either cheap imitations of older
Russian designs or too large and modern to fit Moscow's two- and
three-story neighborhoods. He calls the new buildings "coarse imitations of
Russian architecture with the obligatory domes and towers."
His most recent protest was a small, sparsely attended photo exhibit above
a billiard hall on a Moscow side street. The pictures chronicled the
destruction of Moscow landmark buildings from the time of the Bolshevik
Revolution to the present. Free tours were given by an elderly woman,
sympathetic to the cause after her neighborhood was invaded by bank
high-rises.
"Moscow city officials say they are rebuilding into a European city, but we
don't need that," said the tour guide, Yevgeniya A. Zhirnova, 76. "We
should build as our forefathers did."
Ms. Zotova maintains that the design of her company's buildings -- with
brick-red and green facades, torch-like outdoor light fixtures and vaguely
Gothic decorative spires -- is Russian.
"We call it traditional Russian architecture rethought in a modern way,"
she said.
Besides, Moscow's previous builders had their own cakes and rockets. Stalin
ordered a series of imposing towers as symbols of Soviet power. New Arbat
Street, in the city center, was broadened and lined with large concrete
buildings that are now referred to as Moscow's false teeth. A central
church was razed in 1931, and a swimming pool was built in its place.
The resulting landscape is a bewildering mix of centuries and styles, where
candy-box churches sit in the shadows of Soviet giants, like the Ministry
of Defense or the much-despised glass and concrete Hotel Rossiya, the
eyesore of Red Square.
The new styles seem to compete among themselves for grandeur and novelty. A
glass building on a small, quiet side street, Maly Lyovshinsky, is a case
in point.
The building "doesn't belong there at all," said Antonella Iazzetti, an
architect with a practice in Moscow. "It departed completely from the roots
of the place."
*******
#15
Kremlin says power reform on track despite delays
By Olga Popova
MOSCOW, Dec 17 (Reuters) - Kremlin chief of staff Alexander Voloshin, who
is also the chairman of Russia's Unified Energy System utility, said on
Tuesday that the country's flagging power sector reforms were on track
despite a delay to legislation.
Voloshin, who despite his role as chairman of the Unified board rarely
speaks on corporate matters, made his comments as leaders of Russia's lower
house of parliament, the Duma, rejected a Wednesday date for a critical
second reading of bills backing the reform.
"The quality of reform is no less important to us than the pace," Voloshin
said at a conference to mark the post-Soviet power monopoly's 10-year
anniversary. "That is why the delay in reform for us does not mean that it
is halted."
Analysts saw the delay as a signal the Kremlin cannot cope with political
turmoil that could arise if the potentially unpopular reforms are passed.
Even staunchly pro-Kremlin legislators have criticised them.
In particular, lawmakers from the majority centrist coalition which tends
to back President Vladimir Putin and lets the Kremlin push through its
initiatives, say they will not be hasty with the bills ahead of 2003
parliamentary elections.
They worry electricity market liberalisation could lead to price spikes for
which they could be punished at the ballot box by a reform-weary populace.
United Financial Group chief strategist Christopher Granville said Voloshin
was using his position as chairman of Unified Energy as a political fig
leaf to say the Kremlin was not ready to make bold moves on power reform.
"The second reading is always the crucial one that locks in all the
substantial points. They come to this point and the will is lacking,"
Granville said. "In my view the president speaks in public when the message
is positive. When the message is not positive, if the message is 'We
blinked,' then the chief of staff is deputed to deliver that message."
RULING NEXT WEEK
A ruling on the reading date for the bills, which clear the government to
reform the ailing power industry and break up UES, will now come next week,
a senior government official told Reuters.
"The Duma Council decided to put back until tomorrow its meeting on the
package of laws on the electricity industry and will again study this
question at its meeting on December 23," Deputy Economic Development and
Trade Minister Andrei Sharonov said.
This means the reading by the Duma leadership, the Duma Council, could come
on December 24 or 25, he said.
The Duma gave initial backing in October to draft bills that would allow
the government to split up UES and launch an electricity market.
But key legislative factions said further approval hinged on radical
changes to the government's market liberalisation plan, including
amendments requiring state power tariff regulation.
"All these problems don't mean the reform is cancelled, just that it must
be more carefully thought through and a higher degree of consensus must be
achieved in society, the legislative corps and the shareholders of the
company," Voloshin said.
The capital markets, nervous to begin with about the breakup of UES, one of
Russia's biggest issuers of stock, grow more skittish with every delay.
"In our view...any delay in the restructuring of the electricity sector is
negative and value destroying for power utilities," the Aton brokerage said
in a market comment.
******
#16
The Globe and Mail (Canada)
December 17, 2002
Ukrainian opposition parties to stand united
An anti-Kuchma politician is now backing a former rival
By MARK MACKINNON
KIEV -- Ukraine's notoriously fractious opposition is planning to put aside
its differences and support a single candidate in the next election in
hopes of unseating President Leonid Kuchma and his clique, a leading
opposition politician said on the weekend.
Yulia Tymoshenko, the charismatic former energy tycoon who was considered a
dark-horse candidate to succeed Mr. Kuchma, said in an interview that she
will not run in the 2004 election and will back former prime minister
Viktor Yushchenko's bid for the president's office.
Although Ms. Tymoshenko said she and Mr. Yushchenko do not see eye to eye
on some policy matters, she said all the main opposition groups now agree
that Mr. Yushchenko has the best hope of winning.
Although Ukraine's constitution prevents Mr. Kuchma from running for a
third term, he is widely expected to try to anoint his successor by
throwing the weight of his mighty political machine behind his chosen
candidate. Many observers believe that will be either his chief of staff,
Viktor Medvedchuk, or Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich.
"The President's machinery will work to bring a successor forward, and
that's an incredibly powerful resource," Ms. Tymoshenko said in her Kiev
office. "The only way out is to consolidate the opposition forces, to put
forward a single candidate."
The presidential election is two years away, but the opposition, citing a
series of scandals and Mr. Kuchma's widespread unpopularity, has been
trying to force a vote earlier. The Kuchma administration has been rocked
by lasting accusations that the President ordered an opposition journalist
killed two years ago.
More recently, the United States accused Mr. Kuchma of personally
authorizing the sale of an advanced radar system to Iraq, in contravention
of United Nations sanctions.
Last fall, huge rallies were held in Kiev calling for Mr. Kuchma's
resignation. The events brought out tens of thousands of people, but also
demonstrated how divided the opposition is about a post-Kuchma Ukraine.
Some protesters were Ukrainian nationalists, but others were calling for
closer integration with Russia or the restoration of the Soviet Union.
Markiyan Bilynsky, director of the Kiev-based Pylyp Orlyk Institute for
Democracy, said the demonstrations did at least show that Mr. Yushchenko
was the most popular political figure in the country.
"It's not beyond the bounds of possibility that Kuchma will anoint
Yuschenko as his successor. He has to take Yuschenko's popularity into
account," Mr. Bilynsky said. The possibility of such a deal rises if Mr.
Yuschenko and his allies offer Mr. Kuchma immunity from criminal
prosecution after he leaves office, Mr. Bilynsky said.
Ms. Tymoshenko said even she would be willing to accept an immunity
package, although there remains a lot of animosity between her and Mr.
Kuchma and his supporters.
As the feisty 41-year-old's popularity has grown, Ms. Tymoshenko has been
the target of increasingly personal attacks apparently aimed at holding her
back politically. Brought into government by Mr. Kuchma in 1999 to be his
deputy prime minister, she was later fired and arrested on corruption charges.
Ms. Tymoshenko, who always denied the accusations, was released after
spending a month in prison.
After her release, she grew into the role of one of the administration's
most outspoken opponents, a position that her supporters fear puts her life
in danger. In the middle of last year's parliamentary election campaign,
she was hospitalized after a car accident that many believe was an
assassination attempt.
While she was in hospital, a judge appointed by Mr. Kuchma in effect
grounded her campaign by forbidding her to make appearances outside Kiev.
Ms. Tymoshenko said the entire series of events has only made her more
convinced that Mr. Kuchma cannot be allowed to retain any kind of grip on
power.
"Of course, any politician has ambitions, but I'm willing to subject my
ambitions to the higher interest of getting rid of this political cancer,"
she said of her alliance with Mr. Yushchenko.
******
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