Johnson's Russia List
#6603
17 December 2002
davidjohnson@erols.com
A CDI Project
www.cdi.org

[Contents:
  1. RIA Novosti: A RUSSIAN PRODUCES THREE TIMES MORE FOR ONE DOLLAR OF WAGES 
THAN AN AMERICAN DOES.
  2. BBC: Steven Eke, Survey: 60% of Russian children unhealthy.
  3. Luba Schwartzman: TV1 Review.
  4. US State Department: U.S., Russia Discuss Joint Publication of
Historical 
Documents.
  5. RFE/RL: Gregory Feifer, 2002 In Review: Putin Foreign Policy Not Seen As 
Harming Relations With The West.
  6. Washington Profile: Human Rights in Russia and Chechnya: an Interview
with 
Elena Bonner. 
  7. Moscow Times: Boris Kagarlitsky, Enjoying the Frozen Chaos.
  8. The New Republic: Stanley Kauffmann, Remembrances. Russian Ark shimmers, 
but its content disappoints.
  9. BBC Monitoring: Russian government to focus on pensions and monopolies
next 
year.
  10. RIA Novosti: BORIS YELTSIN, SPOUSE COME TO TATARSTAN AT REPUBLICAN
LEADERS' 
INVITATION.
  11. RIA Novosti: SOTHEBY'S SELLS A STOLEN DOSTOEVSKY? 
  12. International Herald Tribune: Steven Fries and Joel Hellman,
Entrepreneurs 
see signs of progress. The former Soviet bloc.
  13. BBC: Caroline Wyatt, Moscow siege leaves dark memories.
  14. RFE/RL: Jean-Christophe Peuch, Relatives, Chechen Leaders Question
Official 
Version Of Raduev's Death.
  15. The Independent (UK): Felix Corley, Obituary: Salman Raduyev Chechen 
warlord imprisoned by the Russian.
  16. eurasianet.org: Igor Torbakov, RUSSIA MOVES TO REASSERT INFLUENCE IN 
CENTRAL ASIA, CAUCASUS.
  17. Moscow Times: Alexei Pankin, Hopes and Fears for the Coming Year.(re
media)]
 
*******

#1
A RUSSIAN PRODUCES THREE TIMES MORE FOR ONE DOLLAR OF WAGES THAN AN AMERICAN 
DOES 

MOSCOW, 16 December. /RIA Novosti correspondent/. For one dollar of wages a 
Russian produces three times more of products than an American does. 

These data were provided on Monday in Moscow by Academician Dmitry Lvov, 
chief of the economic section of the Russian Academy of Sciences, who 
addresses the 7th World Russian People's Council on the subject of "Faith and 
Labor". 

Lvov explained that for one dollar of wages an American produces USD 1.74 of 
US gross domestic product while a Russian for one dollar of wages produces 
4.75 dollars of the Russian gross domestic product. 

The Academician appealed to stop unjustified, in his opinion, talks about the 
Russians being "poor workers" and stated the necessity to increase wages in 
Russia by, minimum, three times. 

Lvov reminded that prices on commodities and services practically reached the 
global level, which did not happen with wages. 

According to Lvov's assessments, the proportion of wages in the GDP in this 
country was two times lower than in other European countries and in the USA. 
In particular, in the West the proportion of wages in GDP amounts on average 
to 69-72%, while in Russia -only to 31.5%. 

In the opinion of the Academician, the liberal economic policy of Russia was 
wholly servicing the rich society strata. Thus, from 1991 till 2001 revenues 
of a well-to-do group of the population increased by 1.5 times while revenues 
of all other groups dropped from 12% to 2% in relation to the most needy part 
of Russians. 

In conclusion Lvov stated that "presently we had two Russias." The first one, 
according to him, comprised 85% of the population of the Russian Federation 
but its share of the national wealth of the country amounted only to 7%. The 
second group consisted of 15% of Russians in whose hands 85% of national 
wealth was concentrated. 

Lvov stated that "2/3 of Russia's revenues were earned from the country's 
natural resources given to a man by God and which had to belong to 
everybody." That was why, the Academician opined, it was necessary "through a 
market procedure to additionally assess" the property obtained by Russian 
oligarchs free of charge and to have them pay the difference. 

In addition to that the academician drew attention of the World Russian 
People's Council to the demographic problem. He stated that if the rate of 
decline of population were maintained, then by the middle of the present 
century Russians would constitute only 38% of Russia's population. Lvov 
especially pointed out that young and middle aged population, including the 
so-called "new Russians, was dying out at a greater speed." 

*******

#2
BBC
16 December 2002
Survey: 60% of Russian children unhealthy
By Steven Eke 
BBC's Russian analyst  
 
More than half the children in Russia are in poor physical or psychological 
health, a government survey has revealed. 

The results of the survey of 30 million children by the Russian Ministry of 
Health will add to fears of a looming demographic crisis in the country. 

Russia's epidemic of ill-health and falling life expectancies have received 
much international attention over recent years, but the health problems 
suffered by its children are much less well-known. 

The results of the first stage of the nationwide survey showed that 60 per 
cent were unhealthy. 

Mortality rates 

The most common conditions were problems of the digestive and motor systems, 
often coupled with behavioural difficulties and nervous disorders. 

Russia's top medical experts say the report merely confirms their suspicion 
that ill-health is afflicting ever-younger sections of the population. 

They are developing a plan of emergency measures to boost children's health 
but say the health problems experienced by Russian women are one of the 
central reasons for the huge numbers of unhealthy children. 

Official statistics show that half the country's expectant mothers are 
under-nourished. 

Two-thirds of Russian babies are subsequently born unhealthy and infant 
mortality rates in the poorest areas of Russia are higher than in many parts 
of the developing world. 

Health problems begin at birth and appear to get gradually worse. 

By the age of 18, when military service beckons, half of Russia's young men 
are rejected because they are unhealthy. 

The country's doctors say that improvements might take years or decades to 
come, leading Russian demographers to warn that the growing generation might 
be just as unhealthy as the troubled children of today's Russia. 

******

#3
TV1 Review
www.1tv.ru
Compiled by Luba Schwartzman (luba_sch@hotmail.com)
Research Analyst, Center for Defense Information, Moscow office

WEEKEND HIGHLIGHTS,
Saturday, December 14, 2002
- Central Electoral Commission Chairman Aleksandr Veshnyakov received the 
Newsmaker of the Year award in the new national Press Elite contest.
- Irkutsk entrepreneur Pavel Kiselev was shot to death by unidentified men, 
along with his wife, her friend and four bodyguards.  Kiselev was wanted on 
10 statutes of the criminal code, including banditry and organized crime.  
His name had also come up in connection with several assassination attempts 
and contract killings.
- Yuri Prilukov set the European record for swimming in the 1500-meter 
free-style event in the European Championship.
- The Decembrists who took part in the 14 December, 1825 uprising were 
remembered at the Decembrists Square in St. Petersburg.
- The Vorobievy Gory Metro station has been re-opened after 18 years of 
restoration.
- A toll-free, 24-hour direct telephone line and a special internet site 
that will allow Russian citizens to submit questions to Russian President 
Vladimir Putin have been opened.
- Nizhegorod residents honored Andrei Sakharov, who spent 7 years on Gagarin 
street in administrative exile in their city.
- President Putin signed a decree on the referendum that will be held in 
Chechnya on the Constitution and electoral laws.  It may be held as early as 
in March of next year.
- State Duma International Affairs Committee Chairman Dmitry Rogozin met 
with representatives of the US administration to discuss a number of issues, 
including the situation in Iraq.

Sunday, December 15, 2002
- A Vietnamese sweatshop was discovered in the Moscow suburb of Monino.  
Vietnamese workers were shipped in through Vladivostok and worked for $50 a 
month.
- According to the Russian Ministry of Health, 12% of the medications sold 
in Russia last year were counterfeit.  Next year measures to check the 
authenticity of medications will be strengthened.
- President Putin met with Akhmad Kadyrov and Mikhail Babich to discuss the 
restoration of the Chechen economy and the development of the banking 
system.
- Federal Security Service (FSB) Director Nikolai Patrushev met with the 
directors of Russia's leading media organization to discuss the work of the 
FSB.  He declared that terrorism is the main threat to Russia and its 
citizens.  He said that, according to FSB statistics, 1000 rebel fighters 
were destroyed in Chechnya this year, the identities of the organizers of 
the Moscow and Vologda apartment bombings were established, and one of the 
terrorists was detained.  Also, in the course of special operations in 2002, 
over 4,500 firearms, 2,500 grenade launchers, 18,000 grenades and 2 tons of 
explosives were discovered.  Patrushev also noted that the FSB cooperates 
with 80 foreign special service organizations.
- Chechen terrorist Salman Raduev died of vascular disorders on 14 December. 
  Deputy Justice Minister Yuri Kalinin refuted media information that Raduev 
was killed.
- President Putin chaired the first meeting of the Council on Physical 
Education and Sports.  He said that financing of physical education and 
sports will be doubled next year.
- Lukoil directors may sue the Iraqi government for breaking a contract for 
the development of oil fields in West Kurna.
- Housing and utilities workers continue striking in 
Petropavlovsk-Kamchatka.  City Mayor Yuri Golenishchev failed to appear at 
negotiations for the third time, this time claiming that he had not been 
invited.  The workers of two other enterprises will join the strike in the 
next few days, bringing the total number of protesters to 1,200.
- President Putin was named "Man of the Year" by the Russian Biographical 
Institute.  The award was first given 10 years ago.  Russian General 
Prosecutor Vladimir Ustinov received an award for his input into the fight 
against terrorism.  Other laureates included Patriarch of All Russia Alexii 
II, cardiologist Leo Bokeria and gymnast Alina Kabaeva.
- Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Aleksandr Rumyantsev declared that 
Russia's contract with Iran on the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power 
plant does not violate Russia's international obligations, and that US 
concerns are unfounded.
- Russian Foreign Minister is setting off for a seven-day trip to the 
Philippines, Japan and the US.  He will discuss a number of issues during 
his trip, but the main focus will be on the fight against terrorism.
- The kidnappers of Sadi Sharifov, the father of Lukoil Vice President Vagit 
Sharifov, have been detained in Tbilisi.

*******

#4
US State Department
14 December 2002 
Text: U.S., Russia Discuss Joint Publication of Historical Documents 
(Compilation would cover Soviet-American relations 1969-1976) (430)

U.S. and Russian historians and foreign-affairs experts discussed
joint publication of documents covering Soviet-American relations from
1969 to 1976 at a meeting in Washington on December 10-12, 2002.

The consultations followed an agreement reached in a exchange of
letters between U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell and Russian
Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov.

Following is the text of a State Department Media Note released on
December 13:

(begin text)

Department of State 
Office of the Spokesman 
Washington, DC 
December 13, 2002
Media Note

U.S. and Russia Discuss Joint Historical Project

In accordance with the agreement reached in an exchange of letters
between Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and Russian Minister of
Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov in February 2002, Russian-American
consultations were held in Washington on December 10-12, 2002,
regarding the publication of a joint compilation of documents related
to the development of Soviet-American relations during the period 1969
to 1976. The meeting followed on a similar set of talks held in Moscow
in June 2002.

The participants in the consultations from the Russian side were the
Director of the History and Records Department of the Russian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs Piotr Stegny, Deputy Director Olga Ivanova, expert
consultant of the History and Records Department A.I. Filyev,
Professor V.O. Pechatnov of the Moscow State Institute for
International Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and First
Secretary and Consul of the Embassy of the Russian Federation to the
United States Roman Ambarov.

Participants from the U.S. side were the Historian of the U.S.
Department of State, Marc J. Susser; Deputy Historian David Herschler;
Acting General Editor Edward C. Keefer; Chief of the Policy and
Outreach Division Paul Claussen; and Department of State historians
David Geyer, Douglas Selvage, and Vicki Futscher.

During the consultations, the two sides discussed issues related to
the preparation of joint documentary volumes for the 1969-1972 period.
Agreement was reached on a methodology for preparation of the volumes.
Under Secretary of State for Management Grant Green hosted a luncheon
in honor of the Russian delegation. Afterwards, the delegation toured
the Diplomatic Reception Rooms at the Department of State.

Librarian of Congress James Billington hosted a luncheon in honor of
the Russian delegation, after which it received a tour of the Russian
Collections and the Manuscript Reading Room at the Library of
Congress. The two sides plan to hold their next meeting in Moscow in
early summer 2003.

*******

#5
2002 In Review: Putin Foreign Policy Not Seen As Harming Relations With The 
West
By Gregory Feifer

It's been a big foreign-policy year for Russian President Vladimir Putin, who 
signed a nuclear arms treaty with Washington and set up a new joint council 
with NATO. While boosting ties with the West, Putin also courted American 
adversaries, including China, North Korea, and Iraq. Other moves to reassert 
Moscow's fading influence in the international arena caused some controversy, 
not least over Chechnya. But as RFE/RL Moscow correspondent Gregory Feifer 
reports, the West is likely to overlook its squabbles with Moscow. 

Moscow, 16 December 2002 (RFE/RL) -- Russian President Vladimir Putin sought 
to reinforce ties with the West in 2002, but relations were partially 
hindered by other policies that sought to resurrect Russia's diminished 
influence in post-Cold War global politics.

In addition to signing a nuclear arms treaty with Washington and setting up a 
new joint council with NATO, Putin shrugged his shoulders over what many say 
was the military alliance's inevitable expansion to former Soviet states in 
November.

But Putin put his foot down on issues concerning other former Soviet 
countries such as Georgia, evoking some consternation in the West. He also 
visited Beijing and extended economic ties to "axis-of-evil" states Iraq, 
Iran, and North Korea.

The biggest bone of contention between Putin and Western leaders, however, is 
the Kremlin's campaign in Chechnya. The issue gained greater significance for 
Moscow following the hostage crisis in October, from which Putin emerged 
vowing to combat terrorism wherever it appeared.

Perhaps the most vivid example of Putin's personal engagement came during a 
European Union-Russia summit last month, when he shocked his hosts in 
Brussels by lashing out at a correspondent who had queried him about civilian 
casualties in Chechnya.

Putin called the Chechen rebels an Islamic threat to global civilization:

"The creation of a caliphate on the territory of the Russian Federation is 
only part one of [the religious extremists' and international terrorists'] 
plan. In fact, if you are following the situation, you surely know that the 
radicals are pursuing a larger goal -- they are talking about the creation of 
a world caliphate and the need to kill Americans and their allies."

Zbigniew Brzezinski was U.S. national security adviser to former President 
Jimmy Carter and co-chairs the American Committee for Peace in Chechnya, a 
bipartisan private organization. He says Russia has been skillful in trying 
to win favor from both the United States and European countries, on the one 
hand backing the U.S.-led war on terrorism and on the other joining European 
Union states in criticizing Washington's unilateralism.

But Putin's conduct over Chechnya, Brzezinski says, did him no favors in the 
West: "His very crude and literally uncivilized conduct in Brussels on the 
subject of Chechnya certainly has done damage to his image."

Brzezinski says Chechnya is a visceral issue for Putin, who came to power in 
1999 promising a quick victory over the breakaway republic. But he adds that 
Putin has tried to isolate the issue from the rest of his foreign policy 
agenda and realizes the West wants to downplay Chechnya in its relationship 
with Russia.

Robert Nurick, director of the Moscow Carnegie Center, agrees Putin is trying 
to downplay the Chechnya issue, which is a potential area of disagreement: 
"At the moment, the signs are that European capitals and the United States 
alike have other priorities and therefore are playing down the Chechnya 
issue, or are at least inclined to do it."

But Chechnya forced itself to the center stage after the hostage-taking 
incident in Moscow in late October. 

The president emerged from the three-day event stepping up claims that his 
campaign in the breakaway region is a part of the U.S.-led war on terrorism. 
He vowed to intensify military efforts in Chechnya and to pursue separatists 
abroad. 

After bitterly criticizing Denmark for allowing a conference including 
Chechen separatists to take place in Copenhagen, Moscow soon went after 
moderate separatist envoy Akhmed Zakaev. He was arrested in Copenhagen in 
November on a Russian request for extradition. Released earlier this month, 
he was detained again in London and is again awaiting possible extradition. 

The president's tough bearing during the hostage crisis nudged up his 
approval rating at home to a record level of 83 percent.

The Carnegie Center's Robert Nurick says Chechnya is a "neuralgic" issue for 
Putin, but that his emotional and diplomatically rash outbursts on the issue 
do not necessarily reflect policy. He says the extent to which Chechnya will 
pose a foreign policy problem depends on other issues, such as how far Moscow 
will push for Zakaev's extradition.

By trying to override legal processes through tough bilateral pressure, 
Nurick says Russian officials may fail to understand their importance in the 
West.

Boris Kagarlitsky, director of Moscow's Institute for Globalization Studies, 
disagrees that Chechnya poses external contradictions for Putin's 
administration. He says Moscow's insistence that its war in Chechnya simply 
represents a front in the war on terrorism is a logical extension of domestic 
policy, which is far more important in the Kremlin's eyes: "Terrorism isn't 
something that gets in the way of running the country, something that hinders 
the development of the state. It is something that helps the state and is 
needed by it. The state needs an enemy. If there's no enemy, that's bad. So 
if terrorism disappears tomorrow, that would be a catastrophe for the Russian 
state -- I mean that seriously. It would spark the end of the state, with its 
collapse as it now exists. In any case, it would be the political death of 
all current politicians -- all of them, including oppositionists."

Kagarlitsky says Moscow and Washington essentially share the conviction that 
civilian casualties are unavoidable in the fight against terrorism. It is 
Western European public opinion that does not buy the argument -- and which 
poses Putin his greatest foreign policy problem on Chechnya.

Putin's stance on other issues in the former Soviet sphere also caused 
run-ins with Western countries.

Moscow insisted that Russians be allowed visa-free travel from and to 
Kaliningrad when Poland and Lithuania, which surround the enclave, join the 
European Union in 2004. After months of tense negotiations, Russia and the EU 
claimed success after inking a deal calling for the issuance of "facilitated 
travel documents" rather than visas. Brussels assured Lithuania that the 
agreement would not be contrary to its national interest. 

Russia, meanwhile, loudly accused southern neighbor Georgia -- where U.S. 
military personnel are training local troops -- of sheltering Chechen 
refugees. Moscow threatened military actions and was accused of bombing 
Georgian territory.

This month, Russia stationed troops and warplanes in the Central Asian state 
of Kyrgyzstan. Some analysts believe that Russia is seeking to reassert its 
presence in Central Asia and to counter the stationing of U.S. personnel in 
the region.

*******

#6
Human Rights in Russia and Chechnya: an Interview with Elena Bonner.
Washington Profile
www.washprofile.org
12/16/02

Elena Bonner, former wife of Andrei Sakharov, now chairs the Andrei Sakharov
Foundation and devotes her time to human rights groups in Russia.

Q. Are human rights groups in the United States similar to the groups in the
former Soviet Union?
A. Non-government human rights groups in the US are numerous and very
active. But I have had no contact with them, even though I follow their
activities. 

Q. Is it easier to be a human rights advocate in Russia or in the US?
A. I think it’s easier for the American human rights activists. The US has a
civil society, even if it’s weak, and there isn’t such poverty among
public-interest organizations as here. They can always find sponsors and
donors. In Russia it’s very difficult.

Q. Russia recently saw the appearance of “The Civic Forum”…
A. From the beginning and to this day I continue to oppose cooperation with
the power structure, cooperation organized by the President’s
administration. I think human rights groups should always, in every respect,
oppose the state rather than follow in its wake. The majority of human
rights groups who took part in the Forum were disappointed. Together with
government representatives, roundtables were organized to approach the most
important problems. As it turned out, this doesn’t work. There was a
roundtable on Chechnya, where members of “Memorial”, the Helsinki Group,
“Mothers of Soldiers” and others met with General Moltensky. The general
then issued an edict that all clean-out operations must be done through
orders, with transparency – and what happened? All the decisions of “The
Civic Forum” were completely ignored! This was an utter hoax – a
demonstration of the supposed cooperation between the state and
non-government organizations to fool world opinion.

Q. How much attention do world human rights groups give to defending human
rights in Russia?
A. Not enough. And the main thing – this amazes me – is how the West
(traditionally democratic countries of Europe and North America) and Western
leaders get hooked on the lies coming from Russia. These lies come not only
from Russia, as was the case in Soviet times, but also from leaders of
democratic countries – the myth that Russia is fighting international
terrorism in Chechnya. This is an absolute lie! Russia is waging a terrible
war against the people of Chechnya under the banner of combating
international terrorism. And the war being conducted by Russia today
stimulates terrorism!

Moreover, the West doesn’t want to notice that all the international
conventions protecting the civilian population, protecting refugees,
protecting asylum seekers, are all being violated by Russia and by the
Western democracies. Currently refugees in Ingushetia are being made to
return to Chechnya. According to the UN human rights convention, a person
cannot be forced to return if their safety and tolerable living standards
are not guaranteed. Chechens in Chechnya are assured of only one right – the
right to die. 

Q. Does that mean the West uses double standards?
A. Absolutely. Take the European Court. Former head of Yugoslavia Slobodan
Milosevic is now on trial, while Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin – best friend
of the German president, the American president, the British prime-minister
etc. In my opinion, Putin is responsible for the deaths of more of his
countrymen than Milosevic. 

The West tried to become involved in Yugoslavia – that’s why there were
international commissions everywhere. But look at what’s going on in
Chechnya – mass burials, people disappearing, executions without trials,
ceaseless “clean-out” operations, banditry, robbery, trading in corpses,
destruction of property. These crimes have been proven by the most respected
international organizations – the Helsinki Group, Amnesty International, the
Red Cross. But none of these charges were explored by any international
commissions. When it comes to Russia, the West is afraid to let out a peep.

In my opinion, in the 1970s-80s the West not only proclaimed, but also
followed the principle of protecting human rights. But today, continuing
these demagogic talks, it has sold off its principles. This will have
terrible consequences both for our general future and for the defense of
human rights in these Western democracies.

Q. What do you think about the situation in Iraq?
A. It’s difficult for me to judge. In principle, I don’t like the idea of a
humanitarian intervention. As was shown in Yugoslavia, in a humanitarian
intervention what is desired is perceived as reality. I doubt that good
intentions can be fulfilled through force. And I’m afraid that the same
thing will happen in Iraq, on a humanitarian dimension. But the problem of
the weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons, bacteriological and
chemical weapons! According to the dossier that Iraq sent to the UN, Western
democracies actively helped Iraq develop these weapons. This creates a new
collision. 

I cannot give an unqualified “no” to the current UN policies. But I have a
feeling that this is a very difficult operation, and I’m not sure it’s the
correct one. And I don’t know how to make sure Iraq is not a threat to the
world with its weapons arsenal. I don’t think anyone knows. 

Q. You called suicide bombers a new type of weapons of mass destruction…
A. I still continue to think so. The West gives money to schools in
Palestine, tries to organize an educational system there. But when we look
at these school programs, which are implemented in Palestine, we see that
it’s just a science of hate. During the intifada, the UN had to condemn the
Palestine movement and not show it any support, because minors in Palestine
join the militant movement en masse. This is a monstrous way of waging war.
The children get dragged into it, and that is a crime against humanity. I
will proclaim this until my last breath. 

Q. Can any parallels be drawn between the situation in Chechnya and in
Palestine?
A. Absolutely not!

Q. Can the Chechen conflict lead to “a Palestinian scenario”?
A. Mr. Putin, with his outhouses, can lead it to who knows what. In
actuality, the question is this: is there a place for Chechens in the world
today? Poor old people, women and children are being kicked out of
Ingushetia under fire, toward “clean-out” operations and the bare sky in the
middle of winter. In Georgia, under Russian pressure, Chechens are caught
and given to Russia. Chechens are not given refugee documents or the right
to see asylum in Russian territory. Do the Chechens have a place on this
earth or not? This question must be answered by the international human
rights groups and Western democracies. 

Q. How might the conflict in Chechnya end?
A. How should I know! In one of my articles I quoted Suvorov’s letter to
Catherine. Things turned out well – he says, about another war against the
Chechens – but there are no Chechens left. This letter to Catherine, which
is almost 300 years old, seems to be guiding today’s authorities.

Q. When will a civil society appear in Russia?
A. It is already appearing in the form of human rights groups. There is a
great number of these organizations with various interests. These
organizations actively demand peace all over Russia, that is, stopping the
war in Chechnya and instituting alternative military service. “Soldier’s
Mothers” actively seek to prevent hazing and to create decent service
conditions for a young person in the army. These organizations teach
defending your rights through non-violent judicial methods, help people
access the courts, and give free judicial consultations. There are many new
environmental organizations, and organizations that protect consumer rights.
These already exist and operate, and that’s very important.

I can give you an example. In our museum – the Sakharov Museum – we’ve
already had a youth club for three years. It’s called SAMBO, self defense
without force, and it shows how a teenager can protect his rights in our
society. It attracts a large number of high school upperclassmen, gives them
assignments, they write essays, put on exhibits on these themes. This is all
very interesting and important as a way to create a civil society and
teaching the new generation in an un-totalitarian but not quite democratic
state.

But in general, Russia is a difficult, inert country. The uplifting spirit
that had existed in 1989-90 reminds me of the February revolution of 1917,
when October came and with it Lenin’s letters: shoot one hundred priests and
a hundred prostitutes to set an example. I forgot the exact figures…

Q. What is the situation with human rights in other former Soviet republics?

A. It’s bad everywhere. And another double standard. The West doesn’t accept
Lukashenko with his sppeches. Which is right, I don’t much like him either.
But the West embraces Putin, with his murders.

******

#7
Moscow Times
December 17, 2002
Enjoying the Frozen Chaos
By Boris Kagarlitsky   

The year that was did not bring the Kremlin victory in Chechnya, but it did 
see the government chalk up a series of victories in its ongoing battle with 
the free press. And that, undoubtedly, is far more important.

You can leave people without hot water and heat in their homes, but you can't 
cut off their propaganda. After all, a properly indoctrinated populace 
understands that it can do just fine without hot water, electricity and heat.

While journalists in Moscow were persuading the president to forgive their 
excessive show of free speech during the "Nord Ost" crisis, journalists in 
the provinces were under the gun. Criminal investigations were opened and 
searches conducted. 

The Moscow journalistic elite promised Putin that they would behave 
themselves. You can sleep easy: Censorship will not be introduced in Russia. 
There's no need for it. Everything the leadership could ever want will be 
done voluntarily, without compulsion or terror. The journalistic elite thinks 
too highly of its own well-being and places too much importance in its chummy 
relations with power to rock the boat. When it comes to lifestyle and 
mentality, are these people really any different from others in high places, 
be they government officials or captains of industry?

There are exceptions, of course. Take satirist Viktor Shenderovich, for 
example. He clearly doesn't understand just how good he has it. Instead of 
just telling a few jokes, he comes out with a laundry list of unpleasant 
things and ruins his bosses' day. And I'll never understand what happened 
with Leonid Parfyonov's weekly show "Namedni." It's thanks to people like 
this that censorship was nearly introduced in this country.

Opposition-minded journalists took advantage of the 20th anniversary of 
Leonid Brezhnev's death last fall to compare the restoration of "order" under 
Putin to the years of "stagnation" under Brezhnev. But stagnation is 
impossible in the Putin era. Under Brezhnev, the regime's slogan was 
stability; the perception of stability as stagnation came rather late in the 
day. The political system became more strict, and the dream of freedom left 
over from the 1960s was dispelled. But society itself was stable and this is 
why the early Brezhnev years evoke such nostalgia in many people.

The system had a firm foundation, although far-reaching processes were 
already under way that would in the end lead to the collapse of the Soviet 
order. Stability itself paradoxically gave rise to increased expectations 
throughout society, and these expectations brought the system down. 

The strength of the Putin regime derives from society's utter lack of hope 
that anything will ever change for the better. Some already have it pretty 
good, and for everyone else things couldn't get any worse. Most people have 
more or less adapted to their new life. Under Brezhnev the country lived for 
18 years without change, and at first life wasn't at all bad. The very lack 
of news was good news for people who still remembered the war and the Terror. 

The Russia that entered the 21st century was a country grown weary from 
unresolved problems and weakened by the sense of its own impotence.

Tired of unsuccessful attempts to find a way out of the crisis, the country 
resigned itself to poverty, inequality, the systematic degradation of 
education and health care, the impossibility of winning or ending the war in 
Chechnya, the corruption and insolence of government officials. The chaos of 
the 1990s produced a desire for order. But "order" has only compounded our 
problems. The Kremlin, with all its repressive might and the full weight of 
its propaganda machine has guaranteed that our problems will never be solved. 
Society will no longer look for a way out of the crisis. It will live in a 
state of crisis and regard this as the normal state of affairs. Everything 
will stay just as it is. The current order is nothing more than frozen chaos.

The country needs peace and calm. The government works to ensure that this 
calm is not disturbed. And if unpleasant events can't be prevented, then the 
people must at least be spared unpleasant news. That's why promoting 
prosperity in the information sphere has become a basic necessity for the 
state.

If we can't live well, at least don't remind us constantly that we're living 
badly. Especially with the New Year right around the corner; and with the 
price of oil on the rise; and given that we have the most popular president 
in the world -- not counting Turkmenbashi.

It's time to kick back and enjoy the ride.

Boris Kagarlitsky is director of the Institute of Globalization Studies.
 
******

#8
The New Republic
December 16, 2002
STANLEY KAUFFMANN ON FILMS
Remembrances 
Russian Ark shimmers, but its content disappoints

An oddity recurs. When Alexander Sokurov's Mother and Son was released here 
in 1998, I found myself disagreeing with several serious critics yet, in an 
important way, agreeing with them. It was not a matter of simple dissent. 
Clearly, this Russian director was a unique, impressive talent: but I 
couldn't agree that Mother and Son was a completely realized work. Here I am 
again, pulled two ways, about Sokurov's new film Russian Ark (Wellspring).

First, I note that any comment about Sokurov's art is, in this country, 
ridiculously ill-based. Now fifty-one, he has made thirteen feature films and 
twenty documentaries, yet aside from showings at festivals and other special 
occasions, Russian Ark is only the second of his films to be seen in the 
United States. A further oddity: though both those films left me troubled, 
I'm eager to see more. Sokurov's "incompletions" are more interesting than 
many well-polished items. 

The most striking, and most publicized, aspect of Russian Ark is that its 
ninety-six minutes are shot in one long take. There is no editing whatsoever. 
This is now possible technically because of digital videotape; previously 
every shot in every film was arbitrarily limited to twelve minutes, the 
length of a film reel. (The Hungarian master Miklós Jancsó was thus limited 
in such pictures as The Round-Up and The Red and the White, which are mostly 
composed of twelve-minute shots. Surely he would have made these films in one 
continuous shot if it had been technically possible.) Sokurov's one long take 
is not a technically permitted stunt: it is ultimately the film's aesthetic 
being. 

At the start the screen is black, and we hear a man's voice saying, according 
to the subtitles, "I open my eyes, and I see nothing." Well, we never see 
this man. (The voice is Sokurov's, we are told.) We are inside the Hermitage 
in St. Petersburg, which shimmers with magnificence. Before us soon appears a 
figure in nineteenth-century dress--a French marquis, as we learn--who acts 
as cicerone for the unseen twentieth-century visitor who remains figuratively 
inside the camera. We begin a journey through the galleries and halls of this 
breathtaking museum. But this is no mere guided tour. The Hermitage, as we 
see it, is inhabited by people from different periods in the last three 
centuries, not arranged chronologically. The first group is in 
eighteenth-century masquerade dress, chattering their way to a party; another 
group is in modern clothes; and so on. As people from different parts of 
those centuries visit the resplendent galleries, as they admire the 
paintings, attend concerts, converse, flirt, argue, wonder, Sokurov weaves a 
fabric not of sequential history but of continual habitation, the persistent 
presence of Russians. 

His use of his actors supports the feeling that we are moving, without 
program, through strata of society. His glances at Catherine II and Peter the 
Great and the very last czar are like warrants of pastness, and the film's 
finale, the last royal ball in 1913, is the most poignant such gala I have 
seen on film since Visconti's The Leopard. The music, most of it conducted by 
Valery Gergiev, is so sumptuous that we almost loll on it. Tilman Buttner, 
the cinematographer, used Steadicam equipment throughout, which made his 
camera portable. Figuratively he transforms that camera into the unseen 
visitor from the present who is sampling social history. 

Sooner rather than later, we become aware of the film's unbroken flow, and we 
feel this motion itself adding to the interest of what we look at. Being 
carried along by this flow is something like the growing excitement of music 
that is moving to and through its coda. The very being of the film grows out 
of this momentum, and the last shot justifies its title. 

But it is that selfsame motion, that gradual sweep, that raises questions. 
What would the film be without it? What is there intrinsically in the film 
that would grip us if it had been made--even excellently made--in the usual 
edited manner? We sample a lot of scenes that in themselves have no 
cumulation, no self-contained point. They merely become an aggregation. The 
ancient form-versus-content issue doesn't really apply here. Substantively 
there is no content. Everything we see or hear engages us only as part of a 
directorial tour de force. That force is exceptional, but since there is not 
much more to the picture, it leaves us hungry. 

A further discontent. This film about the Hermitage and its visitors through 
the centuries is apparently meant to encapsulate what Russia has been and has 
cared about. But, except for the few modern visitors, everyone in the film is 
in the social range from gentry up to royalty. Where is there even a hint of 
Russia's entirety? Not necessarily its peasants, who didn't frequent museums, 
but the millions other than the elite who did. This ark has a very selective 
passenger list. No room on board for any lesser person, no hint (even in the 
paintings we see) of what is called loosely but handily the Russian soul. One 
matter seems certain: this would not have been the ark of Russia if the film 
had been made before 1991. The political change at that time is hardly 
regrettable, but the implications of the change mark Sokurov's film. 

******

#9
BBC Monitoring
Russian government to focus on pensions and monopolies next year 
Source: RTR Russia TV, Moscow, in Russian 1100 gmt 16 Dec 02
 
[Presenter] Vladimir Putin has instructed the government to draw up the bills 
to be considered in the State Duma next year. The president announced this at 
the cabinet meeting today. Putin recalled that this week the government has 
to map out the plan of legislative work for next year. The president proposed 
that the cabinet prepare the whole package of fundamental legislation so that 
it can reach the legislative in good time. In the president's opinion, the 
government should be paying particular attention to structural reform of the 
natural monopolies and also doing significant further work on bills 
concerning changes to the pension system.

[Putin] We have a very great deal more to do in the government from the point 
of view of drawing up legislation, particularly in the social sphere. Here I 
mean pensions legislation and the need to pass a raft of laws to make the 
pensions system fully operational. We need new solutions, particularly 
concerning the structure of the so-called monopolies. The bill on 
restructuring the railways ministry has just gone through. This is a highly 
important part of our work, we need to keep a careful eye now on its next 
reading, make adjustments and accordingly map out the government's plan of 
action in this and several other areas which we have discussed many times.

[Presenter] The president also stressed that in finishing off crucial 
legislation the government must take account of the recent comments of 
deputies in the State Duma.

*******

#10
BORIS YELTSIN, SPOUSE COME TO TATARSTAN AT REPUBLICAN LEADERS' INVITATION 

KAZAN, December 16 /from RIA Novosti's Vladimir Shevchuk/ - The first Russian 
President Boris Yeltsin and his spouse, Naina, have arrived in Kazan, the 
capital of the Russian republic of Tatarstan. They were greeted at the city's 
international airport by president of Tatarstan, Mintimer Shaymiev and his 
spouse. 

The couple is going to stay in Kazan for five days. According to Yeltsin's 
Chief of Protocol, Vladimir Shevchenko, an extensive cultural program has 
been prepared for the VIP guests. Among other sites, they are to visit the 
Kazan State University, the Kazan Kremlin, the Our Lady's monastery of Raif 
founded in 1613, and a modern residential area. 

December 20, Boris and Naina Yeltsin will take part in a gala to mark the 
opening of the republic's as yet largest entertainment complex, the Pyramid. 

Mr. and Mrs. Yeltsin will return to Moscow in the morning of December 21. 

"A lot in my life has links to Kazan, since my early years," the ex-president 
revealed to this RIA Novosti correspondent at the airport. He said he could 
remember the city from the moment his father had been arrested in 1934 (Boris 
Yeltsin's father and uncle, both aircraft builders, were sentenced by the 
local KGB branch to three years of correctional labor in Siberian gulags for 
alleged sabotage and opposition to the Soviet regime). He went on to recall 
his subsequent visits to the city, while he was a college student and then 
after he took the federal presidency. 

Yeltsin said he was very glad to again find himself in Kazan, after six years 
of absence. He remarked jokingly that now that he was no longer in public 
office, he could take time to do the sightseeing. 

*******

#11
SOTHEBY'S SELLS A STOLEN DOSTOEVSKY? 

MOSCOW, December 16 /from RIA Novosti's Yelena Titarenko/ - The Culture 
Ministry of Russia can so far offer no valid evidence that the Russian books 
offered for sale at Sotheby's auction in NYC last night are on a wanted list 
after having been stolen and smuggled out of Russia. The books under 
discussion are the first editions of Dmitry Mendeleyev's "Chemistry 
Fundamentals" (published in St. Petersburg, 1869-71) and of Fyodor 
Dostoevsky's "The Karamazov Brothers" (St. Petersburg, 1881). It was in the 
four-volume "Chemistry Fundamentals" that Mendeleyev revealed his Periodic 
Table of the Elements. 

Viktor Petrakov, deputy head of the culture ministry's Heritage Conservation 
Department, has said in a RIA Novosti interview that specialists of the 
ministry's Libraries Department and of the Russian National Library are now 
trying to trace the books' inventory numbers and stamps back to their origin. 
The experts have so far been unable to identify the institution to which 
those numbers belong, but they continue the search, Petrakov said. 

"In our history, we had periods when books held by libraries would be 
discarded in large numbers or even destroyed," Petrakov recalled. But there 
were library workers who just couldn't bring themselves to burn old books and 
who secretly took them home. Some of such library books may have later been 
sold to antiquities dealers, he said. 

In book trade, there is a tendency to overprice books bearing a celebrity's 
ex libris while trying to get rid of any official library stamps that a 
volume may bear, as these will surely arouse suspicion even if the book's 
origin is untainted. 

The Russian Culture Ministry's Heritage Conservation Department will approach 
auction officials with a request to put books or other antiquities off sale 
only in case there are grounds to assert that these particular items have 
been stolen or smuggled out of this country, Petrakov said. He called on 
Russia's officialdom and public not to overreact to the fact that Russian 
rarities often find themselves on the international market. He described this 
as a normal process of cultural exchange. The department sees to it, however, 
that there will be no trading in stolen cultural treasures from Russia, he 
assured. 

*******

#12
International Herald Tribune
December 14, 2002
Entrepreneurs see signs of progress
The former Soviet bloc
By Steven Fries and Joel Hellman
Steven Fries, deputy chief economist of the EBRD, and Joel Hellman, lead 
public sector specialist at the World Bank, contributed this comment to the 
International Herald Tribune. 

LONDON: Just over four years ago, Russia's financial crisis dealt a blow to 
the fragile economies of the former Soviet bloc. Stabilization and growth 
have since returned more rapidly than anyone might have predicted, but 
foreign investors have remained hesitant.

Doubts remain about the quality of the business environment. But change in 
these areas is especially difficult to assess. That is why the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank have launched an 
unprecedented effort to listen to the companies of the transition economies - 
through 10,000 face-to-face interviews - and hear East Europeans' own 
assessments of the obstacles they face. The results are surprising.

The 1999 and 2002 rounds of the survey show that aspects of the region's 
business environment have improved dramatically, especially in the countries 
of Southeastern Europe and the former Soviet Union that remain off the radar 
screen of most foreign investors. Discriminatory practices that favored the 
old socialist dinosaurs over small companies and start-ups have begun to 
diminish. Tax regimes have improved. Finance and infrastructure are less of 
an obstacle.

Even corruption is starting to diminish, as fewer companies report paying 
bribes. And those that do, pay less as a share of their annual sales revenue 
- an average of 1.5 per cent in 2002, down from 2 per cent in 1999.

Moreover, the obstacles faced by small, entrepreneurial companies are coming 
down. In 1999, the "bribe tax" they paid was almost double that paid by 
large, state-owned enterprises; in 2002, they are about the same. It's a 
double dose of welcome news: While the gap is starting to close between the 
front-runners and the laggards among the transition countries, entrepreneurs 
and new businesses see greater opportunities to overcome the legacies of the 
socialist past.

Of course, a degree of investor skepticism about the sustainability of recent 
growth and good performance in the region is understandable. Is this just an 
inevitable bounceback from the deep, prolonged recession that many countries 
faced in the early years of transition - or the start of a sustainable 
expansion? Have the vested interests whose sustenance came from extracting 
privileges, grabbing assets and manipulating markets seen the advantages of 
innovation and investment in the future?

The answers lie in two key areas where the survey results show that progress 
continues to disappoint: business regulation and the judicial system. Onerous 
regulation and arbitrary bureaucratic interference in business decisions 
continue largely unabated in many countries of the region. Courts still have 
a long way to go in providing timely enforcement of property rights and 
contracts.

Part of the problem comes from states still too weak to reign in their own 
officials or to enforce their own rules and laws. Just as important are 
relationships between politicians and powerful companies that are still too 
cozy and too opaque, creating incentives to keep regulatory barriers high and 
courts weak. Despite the improvements in the business environment, the 10,000 
companies we surveyed still perceive in many countries of the region a vast 
inequality of influence in which their voices can be drowned out by the 
interests of political cronies and powerful financial-industrial groups.

If policymakers across the region want to encourage dynamic new companies, 
draw in much-needed foreign investment and attract back some of the billions 
of dollars that their own businesses have parked abroad, then they need to 
build on recent successes. They need to hear the collective voice of their 
own entrepreneurs marking the considerable progress of the past few years, 
but pointing out the still substantial challenges that remain.

Details of this year's survey are highlighted in the EBRD's Transition Report 
2002 and forthcoming World Bank publications. In three years' time, we will 
listen again to hear if the current period of relatively strong growth in the 
region was used to redouble reform efforts, or as an excuse for complacency.

*******

#13
BBC
16 December 2002
Moscow siege leaves dark memories
By Caroline Wyatt 
BBC Moscow correspondent  
  
Few here in the Russian capital will ever forget the shocking images of the 
Moscow theatre siege. 

The masked Chechen gunmen, wielding Kalashnikovs and hand grenades. 

Their female accomplices were almost more terrifying, covered from head to 
foot in black, their veils bearing Islamic slogans, their waists wrapped with 
belts full of explosives. 

At the time, it seemed for many Russians as if their world had been turned 
upside down, and that nothing would ever be the same. 

Some months later, such dramatic predictions have proved unfounded for all 
but those closely involved in the siege - the hostages and their families. 

Yet the repercussions of this dramatic event are still making themselves felt 
at home and abroad. 

Putin rides out storm 

Perhaps the main prediction not to come true was the negative impact the 
siege was expected to have on President Vladimir Putin's popularity in 
Russia. 

Many pundits - in the Russian press, in our Moscow studio and in the 
international media - warned that the death of so many hostages in the 
special forces' rescue operation, 129 people in all, would severely dent Mr 
Putin's standing at home. 

In the event, it did nothing of the sort. 

Shortly after the siege had ended and even today, the Russian president is 
enjoying record public approval ratings - 83% of Russians declare themselves 
satisfied with his rule. 

His decisive, even ruthless handling of the siege and his refusal to 
negotiate with the hostage-takers further shored up his reputation as a man 
of action. 

Almost all 50 or so of the Chechen gunmen and women were killed - whether 
from the effects of the anaesthetic gas or from special forces' bullets - few 
Russians care. 

Though no-one here would deny that the 129 accidental deaths of innocent 
hostages were a tragedy, most agree that the ending of the siege could have 
been much bloodier - not least if the Chechen hostage-takers had fulfilled 
their threat to blow up the entire theatre and their 750 captives. 

The siege may also have helped President Putin's case with his allies in 
Britain and the US. 

Western critics silenced 

Since 11 September, Mr Putin has made clear that he regards Russian troops' 
presence in Chechnya as an integral part of the war against terror. 

According to the Kremlin, Chechnya's pro-independence rebels have links to 
al-Qaeda and other Islamic extremist groups. 

That insistence has silenced most criticism from western governments over the 
human rights abuses being committed by some Russian troops in Chechnya 
against civilians. 

They include crimes such as the rape of Chechen women and young girls, 
extortion and the inexplicable "disappearances" of Chechen men of fighting 
age. 

These days, the UK Prime Minister, Tony Blair, or the US President, George W 
Bush, are reluctant to bring up such issues with Russia, now a confirmed ally 
in the war on terror. 

Siege hardened attitudes

The running sore of the Chechen conflict is at once Mr Putin's greatest 
strength and his greatest weakness in terms of domestic policy. 

Few Russians have forgotten the mysterious apartment bombings in Moscow in 
1999, which the Kremlin and the secret services blamed on Chechen rebels. 

The bombings gave Russia the excuse to send its troops back into Chechnya for 
the second time in a decade, while Mr Putin's promise to be tough on Chechen 
rebels helped win him the 2000 election as president. 

Yet the continuing loss Russian soldiers' lives in the rebel republic - 
thousands over the past few years - had made many Russians sceptical as to 
whether Mr Putin's "get tough" policy was succeeding. 

According to the pollsters, the siege reversed that trend. 

Six months ago, polling agency VZIOM found that two-thirds of Russians 
believed the problem of Chechnya could only be resolved by peace 
negotiations. 

After the siege, that figure fell to just 43%, while another 48% now believe 
continuing the war is the only option. 

Black humour

If the siege changed minds in some ways, it also confirmed several long-held 
beliefs among Muscovites - for example that their security forces and police 
forces are not the most alert or reliable. 

Initially, there was a widespread sense of shock that 50 armed rebels could 
simply stroll into a Moscow theatre unnoticed and unchallenged in a city full 
of police cars and men in uniform. 

Russian police are known for constantly checking the documents of foreigners 
and darker-skinned residents and their right to live or work here. 

But by the time the siege ended, Muscovites were back on form with their 
black humour. 

One comedian joked that he wouldn't be surprised if the Moscow police had 
checked the Chechens' documents, taken a $100 bribe to pronounce them valid 
and then offered to escort the gunmen to the theatre. 

That may be grossly unfair, but it certainly reflected a view held by many in 
the capital. 

So far, few heads have rolled on the official front. 

However, the Russian Government did try to bring in a new bill aimed at 
curbing the media, especially TV and radio - whom the Kremlin deemed to have 
over-stepped the mark by broadcasting the hostage-takers' demands and details 
of the special forces operation. 

In the end, the Russian media received a tongue-lashing, and was told not to 
do it again. 

Living with fear 

Of course, the most bitter impact of the siege has been felt by those most 
closely involved in it - the Russian hostages and their families. 

But Chechen civilians, whether in Moscow or in Chechnya itself, have also 
suffered. 

Most simply want peace. 

They're fed up with war, fed up with living in fear, tired of the presence of 
Russian soldiers and equally fed up with the rebels. 

Yet in Moscow and many other Russian cities, they are now scrutinised and 
monitored more closely than ever, some even thrown out of their homes by 
landlords who fear they could be harbouring the next Chechen rebel group 
planning an attack. 

And now there is little hope that the Kremlin will feel peace talks necessary 
or even advisable. 

For the hostages themselves, their friends and their families, life will 
never be the same again. 

While the rest of Russia tries to draw the lessons to be learned from the 
siege, more than 100 families will be spending this Christmas learning to 
live without a son or a daughter, or a husband or wife. 

Other survivors are still recovering from the trauma of their ordeal. 

And for ordinary Muscovites today, there is definitely a sense of looking 
around more carefully, a slight feeling of uneasiness when in a crowded 
public place - a scar on the city's psyche that will take some time to heal. 
  
*******

#14
Russia: Relatives, Chechen Leaders Question Official Version Of Raduev's Death
By Jean-Christophe Peuch

Chechen field commander Salman Raduev, sentenced to life in prison a year ago 
for a spectacular hostage-taking incident in 1996, died on 14 December in the 
Russian city of Solikamsk. Although Russian authorities claim the death was 
natural, Raduev's relatives and representatives of the Chechen separatist 
leadership believe he was murdered by his keepers. 

Prague, 16 December 2002 (RFE/RL) -- Salman Raduev, a separatist field 
commander who won fame for performing a series of armed forays against 
Russian troops in the first Chechen war, died on 14 December. Russian Justice 
Ministry officials say the 36-year-old guerrilla leader, who was serving a 
life sentence at the Solikamsk high-security prison in the Urals, died of 
internal hemorrhaging. Raduev's death occurred a few days after he had 
reportedly complained about circulatory trouble and had been taken to a 
hospital.

Russian media today quoted the Justice Ministry as saying Raduev had been 
under medical observation for the four days preceding his death on Saturday, 
but that doctors could not save his life.

The Chechenpress separatist news agency, however, suggested that Raduev was 
killed in prison by his keepers. "The moratorium on the death penalty has 
expired for Raduev," the agency wrote on 14 December, referring to Moscow's 
commitment made before the Council of Europe to no longer carry out death 
sentences pending the formal abolition of capital punishment.

Speaking to RFE/RL's North Caucasus Service, Raduev's wife, Lida, said she 
has no doubt her husband was murdered. Radueva said that when she visited him 
for the last time two months ago, Raduev did not once complain about his 
health. "I believe this is a new, false statement given by the Russian 
authorities and secret services because my husband, Salman Raduev, had never 
had any health problems. The only problem he had was that he had been wounded 
in the face in 1996. I think the Russians killed him," Radueva said. 

Russian Deputy Justice Minister Yurii Kalinin said an autopsy had confirmed 
that Raduev died of natural causes. He denied rumors that Raduev had been 
beaten or killed.

Russian officials have already warned that Raduev's body will not be returned 
to his family but will instead be buried in a common grave at Solikamsk 
cemetery. Following the October hostage crisis in Moscow, the Russian State 
Duma approved a bill that prevents the bodies of what the law calls 
"terrorists" from being claimed by their relatives.

Radueva said her husband was not a terrorist and that his body should be 
returned to his family. 

Raduev is the second Chechen separatist leader to die in a Russian prison 
this year. On 20 August, the security minister in the separatist government, 
Turpal-Ali Atgeriev, officially died of a stroke in his Yekaterinburg prison 
cell while serving a 15-year sentence. His relatives claim he was tortured to 
death.

In a telephone interview from London with RFE/RL's North Caucasus Service, 
Akhmed Zakaev, the chief emissary of the president of the separatist Chechen 
leadership Aslan Maskhadov, said that he, too, believes Raduev was killed in 
his cell. "This is not the first time that [sort of thing has] happened since 
the beginning of the second [Chechen] military campaign. Several officials of 
the Chechen leadership have already been exterminated that way. Unlike 
Atgeriev and Raduev, some of them have not even gone through this farce that 
is called a trial. [One day in May 2000], the speaker of our parliament, 
[Ruslan] Alikhadzhiev, was called outside his home and taken away. Nobody has 
heard from him since then," Zakaev said.

The Chechen separatist leadership believes Alikhadzhiev died two years ago 
from torture in Moscow's high-security Lefortovo prison. Russia's Federal 
Security Service, which controls the prison, denies the claim.

Both Atgeriev and Raduev had been tried and sentenced for their role in the 
January 1996 Kizlyar hostage taking in Daghestan. The crisis was one of the 
most decisive setbacks suffered by Russian troops during the first Chechen 
campaign. A rescue operation attempted by federal forces proved unsuccessful, 
and the crisis eventually ended with the deaths of 78 people.

A few months later, then-Russian President Boris Yeltsin agreed to a peace 
accord that cleared the way for the election of Maskhadov as president of the 
breakaway republic. 

Criticized by the separatist leadership for his lack of discipline, Raduev 
had survived several assassination attempts during the first Chechen war. 
Alleged implants of titanium plates after a serious face injury reportedly 
won him the nickname "Titanic." 

Sidelined by the leadership of the breakaway republic, Raduev had taken 
virtually no part in the second Chechen campaign, which started three years 
ago. Arrested in March 2000 in Chechnya, the guerrilla leader was taken to 
Moscow and given a life sentence after a yearlong pretrial detention.

Raduev had since then given several interviews to Russian media in which he 
blamed other Chechen field commanders for their alleged thirst for power, and 
he showed signs of repentance for the Kizlyar hostage taking. He was 
reportedly working on a book about the Chechen war.

Both the Moscow-based gazeta.ru online news magazine and the daily "Vremya 
novostei" report that a prosecutor had recently visited Raduev to question 
him about Zakaev, whom Moscow wants extradited from Britain on charges of 
terrorism. "Whether the prosecutor got the information he wanted [from 
Raduev], and which methods he used to get it, is unclear," wrote gazeta.ru on 
14 December. 

"Vremya novostei" today suggested that Raduev, after being forced to give all 
the information requested from him, was therefore "no longer needed" by the 
Russian authorities and killed.

Also today, the liberal "Kommersant" daily said that "the real reason for 
Raduev's death will probably never be known." 

(Aslan Dukaev and Fatima Saidulkhadzhieva of RFE/RL's North Caucasus Service 
contributed to this report.)

*******

#15
The Independent (UK)
December 16, 2002
Obituary: Salman Raduyev Chechen warlord imprisoned by the Russian 
authorities 
BY FELIX CORLEY
 
SALMAN RADUYEV, the Chechen rebel commander who in 1996 reached the 
television screens and front pages of newspapers throughout the world by 
leading a raid on Kizlyar in Dagestan, died not in combat in Chechnya, but in 
a hospital in Russia's Perm region to which he was transferred several days 
ago from the White Swan hard labour camp.

Raduyev shot to fame in January 1996 when he and his band seized the hospital 
in Kizlyar, together with 300 hostages. After some negotiation, most of the 
hostages were freed in return for buses back to Chechnya. But the convoy was 
stopped in the village of Pervomaiskoe, where it was surrounded. Russian 
federal troops bombarded the village and eventually stormed it, with much 
loss of life (official sources put the death toll at 78). Raduyev, some of 
his men and a number of hostages escaped back to Chechnya, leaving the 
Russians to charge him in absentia with banditry, terrorism, hostage-taking 
and premeditated murder.

Two months after the raid, Raduyev and Umar Khaskhanov, another Chechen 
commander loyal to the separatist president Dzhokhar Dudayev, were apparently 
attacked after a feud with rival Chechen groups. Raduyev was shot in the head 
and was reported to have died of his injuries a few days later. Russian 
special forces claimed to have killed him in revenge for the Kizlyar attack.

However, a man claiming to be Raduyev appeared four months later. Although he 
was scarcely recognisable (the dark glasses he constantly wore date from 
here), his voice and defiant tone were unmistakable. In Germany he had 
undergone plastic surgery to his face, which he said had been severely 
wounded by a Russian sniper's bullet. Adding to the mystery, he said Dudayev, 
who in fact had been killed three months earlier, was in a critical condition 
in a "safe place".

Born in 1967 into the Gordaloy taip (clan) in Novogroznensky near Gudermes in 
eastern Chechnya, Raduyev stood out among the Chechens for his red hair and 
reddish beard. He married Dudayev's cousin's daughter (his immediate family 
was reportedly killed in 1995 in a raid on his home in Gudermes).

Educated in Gudermes, he graduated from a construction school. In 1989, after 
serving in the Soviet Army, he became the leader of a union of volunteer 
construction brigades in Gudermes. He rose to head the Chechen-Ingush Young 
Communist League at the end of the Soviet era and joined the Communist Party.

However, as the Soviet Union fell apart he became a supporter of Dudayev, the 
former air-force general who took power in Chechnya in 1991. The following 
year, Dudayev appointed him prefect of Gudermes, a position he held until 
Dudayev's forces were ousted from the town in 1995 following the Russian 
invasion. In the wake of the invasion, Raduyev called on the population in 
neighbouring Dagestan - an ethnically mixed, but also mainly Muslim, republic 
- to form "armed resistance groups" against Federal Russian forces. His 
appeal fell on deaf ears.

Raduyev's dedication to Dudayev's cause was absolute. In 1995 he was reported 
to have executed a wounded Russian soldier in front of witnesses, and in 
March that year - at a time when Dudayev's hold on the parts of Chechnya 
remaining in his hands was already shaky - ordered police to fire on 
anti-Dudayev demonstrations in Gudermes.

In the wake of the Dagestan hostage crisis, Raduyev was inevitably compared 
with the more famous Chechen rebel commander Shamil Basayev, who had led the 
first major Chechen raid outside the boundaries of Chechnya by seizing 
hostages in a hospital in Budennovsk in June 1995. Basayev's bold attack and 
his defiant return to Chechnya made him something of a folk hero among many 
Chechens, tens of thousands of whom had already died in the war with Russia. 
Raduyev's copycat action, however, served only to heighten perceptions of the 
Chechens as terrorists.

Nicknamed the "Lone Wolf" Raduyev was considered more violent and irrational 
than Basayev. In the wake of his return to Chechnya from the Dagestan raid, 
Raduyev vowed that he would never submit to Russian authority in Chechnya and 
declared that he was prepared to fight the Russian forces for 10 years if 
necessary.

As commander of the General Dudayev Army, which opposed Dudayev's successor 
as elected president, Aslan Maskhadov, Raduyev led some 1,000 men in south- 
eastern Chechnya (mostly former servicemen of Dudayev's special commando 
forces and the former president's adherents). Armed with tanks and APCs, he 
controlled the territory from Gudermes to the Chechen-Dagestani border.

When Russian forces moved back into Chechnya in force in 1999, Raduyev's 
defiance was not enough to prevent retribution from the Russian judicial 
system. He was arrested at his home in Novogroznensky in March 2000. 
"Yesterday, as a result of a special operation carried out by the FSB, one of 
the most odious bandit leaders, Salman Raduyev, was seized and brought to 
Moscow," Vladimir Putin, then the acting president, declared with glee. "Now 
he is in prison, which is the right place for him. We would like to think 
that this is just the beginning."

Raduyev became the first prominent Chechen warlord to be prosecuted by the 
Russian authorities (many others, including Ruslan Galayev and Khattab, have 
been killed by Russian forces). On 25 December last year, a court in southern 
Russia tried Raduyev on 18 different charges, including terrorism and murder 
- many related to the Kizlyar raid. He was found guilty and sentenced to life 
imprisonment.

During the trial, which was a nightly feature on Russian newscasts, Raduyev 
sat in a cage, wearing a baseball cap and large sunglasses. He would often 
speak out and gesticulate frenetically in his defence. During his 
unsuccessful appeal hearing, Raduyev accused the court of trying to "make me 
a scapegoat".

Salman Raduyev, guerrilla leader: born Novogroznensky, Soviet Union 13 
February 1967; married; died Solikamsk, Russia 14 December 2002.

*******

#16
eurasianet.org
December 16, 2002
RUSSIA MOVES TO REASSERT INFLUENCE IN CENTRAL ASIA, CAUCASUS
Igor Torbakov

After concentrating in early 2002 on fostering strategic ties with the
United States and European Union, Russia is retrenching in Central Eurasia,
moving vigorously in recent months to bolster its influence over other CIS
countries. Political analysts say the Kremlin is skillfully advancing its
agenda by utilizing Bush administration foreign policy rhetoric with its
emphasis on the anti-terrorism campaign and the right of preemptive action. 

The motivation for Russia’s shift in geopolitical priorities is a desire to
develop reliable partners. In the immediate aftermath of the September 11
terrorist attacks, Russian President Vladimir Putin focused on enhancing
Moscow’s relationship with Washington. [For background see the Eurasia
Insight archives]. But Putin’s strategic initiatives have been hampered by
decades of mutual mistrust between the erstwhile Cold War enemies, as well
as by economic competition connected with the development of Caspian Basin
energy resources. 

Over the past year, Russia has concluded strategic partnership agreements
with the United States, EU members and other countries. Nevertheless Russia
has no real and reliable strategic partners, prompting some to express
concern about geopolitical isolation, some analysts say.

"There is no country or even a group of countries or an international
institution that can or would want to give Russia some guarantees that its
security, territorial integrity or at least its economic interests will be
respected," writes the regional analyst Iskander Khisamov in the journal
Ekspert.

"Thus, no mater how weak or disintegrated the Commonwealth of Independent
States might be," Khisamov continued, "it remains Russia’s main strategic
priority – more important than America, Europe or China and India."

As the recent agreement to establish a Russian air base in Kyrgyzstan
underscores, Moscow is now keen to demonstrate that it remains a dominate
regional power in Central Asia. [For background see the Eurasia Insight
archives]. Khisamov, the political analyst, said the Russian base is meant
to show that Moscow "is the true master of the post-Soviet space." The
basing agreement also is indicative that Putin may be less accommodating in
his dealings with the United States in 2003. Putin himself said in November
that the era of Russian geopolitical concessions – which began with the
1991 Soviet collapse and continued through the post-September 11 appearance
of US military bases in Central Asia – was coming to an end.

"Russia has ceded so much over the last decade that further ‘giving away’
is simply out of the question," Putin said November 27 in comments
broadcast by Ekho Moscvy radio. "[Instead of ‘giving away’] we will ‘take’
– but [only] within the framework of agreements and international accords."

Russia’s participation in the US-led anti-terrorism campaign prompted
Russian nationalists to severely criticize Putin’s foreign policy. The new
policy emphasis has generally mollified Putin’s nationalist critics. 

Ironically, it is under the anti-terrorism campaign’s aegis that Moscow is
pursuing its current policy goals. Earlier this year, many Russian pundits
were critical of what they characterized as US imperial behavior. Now,
however, Russia is effectively mimicking the United States in seeking to
project influence in Central Asia. "Our elite who only recently was enraged
by the American arrogance, is now going out of its way to emulate
Washington," writes political scientist Liliya Shevtsova of the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace in her commentary published in the
Moskovskie Novosti weekly. 

There is a dramatic difference, however, between Moscow’s moves and
Washington’s: while the United States is unquestionably a global force,
Russia is struggling to shore up its regional power status. "The actual
policy of our country in the post-Soviet space in the outgoing year has
become a small replica of America’s behavior in the global arena,"
political commentator Tatiana Rublyova wrote in the Nezavisimaya Gazeta
newspaper. 

Being a pragmatist, Putin seems to be fully aware of the difference between
US and Russian strategic capabilities, and is content to skillfully play a
"weak hand." In addition to the America-led global coalition against
terror, of which Russia is an important but far from a leading participant,
Putin is diligently building his own mini-coalition on the basis of the
Collective Security Treaty (CST), of which Moscow is the indisputable
leader. [For background information see the Eurasia Insight archives].

Using the anti-terrorism struggle as a catch phrase, Russia is pushing to
create a full-fledged regional military bloc that can help Moscow
strengthen its grip over post-Soviet Eurasia. Some analysts suggest that by
the next scheduled CIS summit in May 2003, a new regional security
organization could take shape. 

Viktor Ilyin, philosophy professor at Moscow Technical University, in a
commentary posted on the Kreml.org website, called on Russia to develop its
own version of the Monroe Doctrine. "The exclusive right of control over
the former fragments of the [Russian] empire and support of the friendly
regional regimes there is the prerogative of Russia, which strives to
reintegrate the [former Soviet] Union space under its leadership," Ilyin
wrote.

In the same vein, the post-Soviet countries are now being increasingly
portrayed in Moscow as underdeveloped and in need of Russian protection.
The historian Vladlen Sirotkin, a specialist in French history, recently
compared poorer CIS states to the former French colonies in Africa. He went
on to suggest in a recent analysis published in the Literaturnaya Gazeta
weekly that Putin should emulate the policy approaches that Paris took in
the 1960s towards Africa. "France has completely restored control over its
‘African CIS,’" Sirotkin said. "It has retained its old military bases; it
controls the local economy and trade."

There appears to be a growing belief in Moscow that such a neo-imperial
policy in the post-Soviet space can succeed. Analysts mention such positive
factors as geographic proximity, economic and political dependence of the
post-Soviet nations on Russia and Moscow’s potential to exploit the
internal political difficulties of some CIS leaders, such as Kyrgyz
President Askar Akayev. [For more information see the Eurasia Insight
archives]. Also important, Tatiana Rublyova points out, "in contrast to
America, Russia possesses the historical experience of keeping these
nations within its sphere of influence." 


Editor’s Note: Igor Torbakov is a freelance journalist who specializes in
CIS political affairs. He has been a Regional Exchange Scholar at the
Kennan Institute, Washington DC, and Research Scholar at the Institute of
Russian History, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow.

*******

#17
Moscow Times
December 17, 2002
Hopes and Fears for the Coming Year
By Alexei Pankin   

At the end of each year, Sreda magazine, which I edit, asks media
executives in Moscow and the provinces, and heads of professional media
associations two questions: (1) In your opinion, what events in politics,
the economy and public life during the past year were most important for
the mass media, and why? (2) What are your hopes and concerns for the year
ahead?

We poll different people each year, but the results as a whole produce an
accurate sense of the current mood. The year 2001 was remembered for the
change of ownership at NTV, the looming bankruptcy of TV6 and fewer tax
breaks for the mass media. Many of those polled were therefore anxious
about 2002, if not downright scared. "As for next year, I would say all of
our worst fears will come true," Yury Fedutinov, general director of Ekho
Moskvy radio, said at the time. "You'll see for yourself in the very near
future."

What's the mood of the Russian media as it looks forward to 2003? I would
call it ambivalent. Things didn't get worse in 2002, but they didn't get
much better, either. Yury Purgin, general director of the Altapress
Publishing House in Barnaul and the vice president of the Association of
Independent Regional Publishers, voiced a common view: "The main positive
event of 2002 was the conference 'The Media Industry: Directions for
Reform,' held during the summer. And yet the conference was also the worst
thing that happened last year, primarily because regional media were not
represented and took no part in the Industrial Committee. ... In theory,
the committee should have united Russia's mass media, but it only united a
very select group. That's the real tragedy."
 
Similar assessments turn up again and again in the Sreda poll from people
working throughout the media industry across Russia. They see opportunity
and danger in the same events. They hope that things will get better, but
don't exclude the possibility that they will get much worse.

The press was perhaps not at its best during the "Nord Ost" crisis, but did
its trangressions really merit the punishment meted out in the planned
amendments to the mass media law? Fortunately, the president vetoed the
bill, and the press is now working on a code of ethics that spells out
norms of professional behavior for covering crisis situations. But the risk
remains that the press will become a willing accomplice in the vertical
structure of power. The government did well to reduce the tax burden on
advertisers by allowing them to include advertising expenses in the cost
price of their products. But at the same time, it did nothing to restrict
unfair competition from state media outlets.

It may sound paradoxical, but many media executives are concerned about the
upcoming national elections. The positive dynamic in media reform and the
transformation of the mass media into a normal, socially responsible
industry could be reversed as the political stakes rise. The powers that be
will be all the more interested in further restricting press freedom, and
off-the-books cash traditionally used to fund political campaigns could
well kick in again in full force. 

"I hope that the mass media will become more profitable and that they will
make their operations more transparent and begin to follow their own
professional principles more strictly," said Manana Aslamazyan, general
director of the nonprofit organization Internews Russia. "But I'm afraid
that things could go the other way entirely."

Only one sector of the media industry views the current situation with
unconditional optimism: the advertisers. "From the perspective of the
advertising community, this was a very good year," said Vadim Zhelnin,
general director of the Association of Advertisers. "I hope that we will
see economic growth across the board and that growth of the advertising
sector will continue. I see no reason why these hopes should not come true."

Only time will tell.

Alexei Pankin is the editor of Sreda, a magazine for media professionals
(www.sreda-mag.ru)

******

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