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#3 - JRL 6600
Washington Post
December 14, 2002
Once-Ruthless Entrepreneurs Cede Politics to Kremlin
for Free Economic Rein
By Peter Baker
Washington Post Foreign Service
MOSCOW -- For two decades, Russia has been trying to build a 3,000-megawatt
power plant deep in the heart of Siberia, pouring more than $1 billion into the
project. Now just half finished, it needs that much more to be completed.
So along came Russian mogul Oleg Deripaska, who made a deal to provide a $10
million loan to keep the project alive. If the money were not repaid -- and the
unfinished Boguchansk plant generates no revenue to repay debts -- he would
receive up to 25 percent ownership in what may ultimately be a $2 billion
facility.
Deripaska, the aluminum king of Russia, called it a reasonable arrangement to
save an important project while also protecting his investment. To critics,
though, it echoed the worst of the schemes of the 1990s -- known as loans for
shares -- in which emerging Russian oligarchs seized control of lucrative state
assets for a fraction of their real value.
Two years after President Vladimir Putin took office, the wealthy Russian
oligarchy he vowed to dismantle is alive and well. During his presidential
campaign, Putin boldly declared that "the oligarchs will cease to exist as
a class," yet with few prominent exceptions, the tycoons have prospered and
even consolidated their holdings.
Under Putin, just eight oligarchic clans now control 85 percent of the value
of Russia's top 64 private companies, according to a study; the combined sales
of the 12 top private companies alone equal the revenue of the government. Just
as under former president Boris Yeltsin, oligarchs get richer while sometimes
swindling minority shareholders and manipulating a pliant court system in
battles for domination of the country's most precious economic resources.
"Under Yeltsin there were oligarchs, and under Putin there are still
oligarchs, and in principle nothing has changed," said Alexei Zudin, an
analyst at Moscow's Center for Political Technologies.
If anything, the oligarchy has grown, adding a new generation of rising
titans with overflowing bank accounts and swaggers to match.
At 34, Deripaska has amassed a fortune estimated at $1.5 billion, making him
one of the seven richest people in Russia. A crafty, hard-knuckled player
sometimes accused of ruthless tactics, he controls the world's second-largest
aluminum company and the country's second-largest automaker. Lately he has tried
to muscle his way into the timber industry as his allies sought to overturn a
governor's election in resource-rich Siberia.
In an interview at his polished Moscow offices, Deripaska, wearing a black
shirt, black sports coat and blue jeans, defended himself and the evolution of
oligarchic capitalism. While business interests still fight it out, he said,
these days they employ more legitimate tactics. "It's a legal fight,"
he said. "And it's not bad that in some areas and some industries there is
consolidation. It brings stability."
Stability has been the watchword of Putin's tenure. Rather than eliminate
oligarchs as a class, Putin has institutionalized them and, to an extent, tamed
them into more seemly behavior. Instead of giving favorites the run of the
Kremlin, as Yeltsin had done, Putin meets with oligarchs as a group on a regular
schedule with fixed agendas. The epic battles of the 1990s have morphed into
more polite, less violent, though still fierce contests.
"It's as intense as before -- there's no big change. It's less criminal
than before," said Peter Aven, president of Alfa Bank and a minister in
Yeltsin's government. Under Putin, the oligarchs are free to assemble great
wealth as long as they stay out of the political arena. "He wants business
to make business and not to do politics. Politics is not as much on the agenda
as before."
The oligarchs emerged from the ashes of communism a decade ago as the nascent
Russian government began privatizing state-owned industries. In the rush to tear
apart the old state and build a market economy, Yeltsin's reformers sold off
assets for rock-bottom prices. Some of the more entrepreneurial Russians -- and
some of the more crooked -- snatched up oil wells, mines and factories and
siphoned off vast amounts of cash to foreign banks.
For a time, it appeared that these magnates were running not just banks and
factories but Yeltsin's Kremlin, especially after they helped reelect him in
1996. Putin, although he was Yeltsin's hand-picked successor, tapped into
popular resentment and initially appeared eager to take on the oligarchs,
launching investigations into the two most outspoken, Boris Berezovsky and
Vladimir Gusinsky, and driving them out of the country.
But he stopped there, making clear that only those who challenged him would
face trouble. What emerged was a mutual non-aggression pact.
"The agreement is we're not getting involved in politics, we're in
economics," said Igor Yurgens, vice president of the Russian Union of
Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, the association of oligarchs. "And the
other side is, he's not really involved in the competitive [business]
fights."
Aides to Putin said the perception that oligarchs do not own the Russian
president has loosened their grip on the rest of government as well. In the
past, said a Kremlin official, "bureaucrats were afraid to refuse because
they thought, 'If I refuse, the oligarch will go to Yeltsin and Yeltsin will
fire me.' And now that's not the case. The oligarchs economically can still buy
bureaucrats, but bureaucrats aren't afraid of them. That's a very important
difference."
The oligarchs, however, still have a place at Putin's table through Yurgens's
union. Every three months, two dozen of them troop into Catherine Hall at the
Kremlin for tea with Putin. They include Deripaska, oil kingpin Mikhail
Khodorkovsky and banking titan Mikhail Fridman. Putin brings his chief of staff,
Alexander Voloshin, and prime minister, Mikhail Kasyanov.
The group dynamic has formalized the relationship in a way that encourages
discussion of broader issues rather than personal lobbying, Yurgens said.
Even by Yurgens's account, though, the oligarchs maintain great sway over
issues affecting them. They won corporate tax cuts and shaped Putin policies on
banking, bankruptcy and deregulation. "I would say 70 percent of the time,
when the position is clearly put together, he says yes," said Yurgens.
"In 30 percent, he says, 'No, no, no, it's too early, it's in the interest
of big business, not in the interests of the country.' "
The bottom line for many oligarchs has been a more secure environment.
Assured that Putin will leave them alone, they have expanded their fiefdoms.
Many have brought home money that had been spirited abroad and begun investing
in their companies; capital flight is down a reported 80 percent. Instead of
quick profit, many now look to the future and aspire to respectability, adopting
Western-style accounting and corporate rules.
"They've reined in themselves," said Peter Boone, research director
at Brunswick UBS Warburg brokerage. "We certainly see it in the companies
we deal with." In a study, Boone and analyst Denis Rodionov concluded that
oligarchs have tightened their hold on Russia's economy. At the same time, they
found, the 10 largest private companies now want to list shares on international
stock exchanges and most want to sell strategic stakes to foreign buyers or
become international players themselves.
None of this, however, has stopped backroom dealing and backstabbing. While
not as extreme, tales persist of oligarchic looting. In recent months, for
example, rival groups have battled for control of Slavneft, among the largest
remaining state oil companies, by deploying squadrons of security guards to oust
opposing management teams.
Putin generally stays out of such fights. But Slavneft soon will provide a
major test of his willingness to enforce new rules. On Dec. 18, the government
will auction off its 75 percent share of Slavneft in the largest privatization
of the post-communist era.
From the start, one thing will be different -- the purchaser will pay what
the company is worth. The government set a $1.7 billion minimum, just shy of the
$1.76 billion value estimated by United Financial Group. Among the bidders:
Sibneft, Surgutneftegaz, Tyumen Oil Co., as well as China National Petroleum Co.
Sibneft's Roman Abramovich, a politically connected oligarch, has long eyed
Slavneft; a Sibneft executive won the recent management battle and last week
Sibneft bought 10.8 percent of Slavneft held by Belarus for $207.5 million. The
question is whether the fix is in at the Russian auction.
Another important case will reach a pivot point the same day when parliament
takes up legislation restructuring Russia's electricity monopoly. Anatoly
Chubais, the former acting prime minister and now chief executive of Unified
Energy Systems, wants to break it into private companies to create competition
and attract investment to upgrade Russia's woeful electrical system.
But critics complain Chubais, architect of the 1990s loans-for-shares
privatization, wants to repeat history by giving away valuable property. Exhibit
number one is Deripaska's deal with Chubais on the Boguchansk plant in the
Siberian region of Krasnoyarsk. "We think he's cut deals with all the
oligarchs," said William F. Browder, head of Hermitage Capital Management,
a minority shareholder in Unified Energy Systems.
Deripaska said he made the power plant loan agreement because the aluminum
industry needs power and without him the plant would never be completed. His
small cash infusion was meant just to get through winter. "I can find
thousands of opportunities that would give a much higher return," he said.
To defuse criticism, Chubais postponed asset sales and deals such as
Boguchansk. "Some of our opponents are trying to use this natural anxiety
[over reform] to create a problem for us," said an adviser to Chubais,
Leonid Gozman. "The only thing we can do is be as open as we can."
The issue inevitably will reach Putin, who has been characteristically hard
to read. Browder assumes Putin ultimately will order Chubais to reverse course.
"Putin is clearly acting in the interest of the state. He's not acting on
behalf of the oligarchs," Browder said. "He sometimes lets these
things drag out longer than he should. But at the end of the day he does the
right thing."
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