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2002 Yearend: Russia
By Anthony Louis
(Part of UPI's Special Report reviewing 2002 and previewing 2003)
December 10, 2002
MOSCOW (UPI) -- The year 2002 will be remembered in Russia for one event that overshadowed all else, much as the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on New York and Washington blocked out every other event for Americans -- the hostage-taking drama at a Moscow theater in October.
When 41 Chechen militants stormed a theater in central Moscow, just a few miles from the Kremlin, taking more than 800 people hostage, they brought home to every Russian the fact that terrorism can strike anywhere, anytime, even in the most unexpected places.
The hostage drama -- called Russia's Sept. 11 by many -- presented President Vladimir Putin with the worst crisis imaginable, one that appeared to have a downside whichever solution he might take.
The hostage-takers, who had mined the theater building, made only one demand -- that the war in Chechnya that Putin himself relaunched in the fall of 1999 be brought to a close, and that Russian federal forces withdraw from the separatist republic.
Putin made clear he would not negotiate with terrorists and ruled out removing Russian forces from Chechnya, which has been seeking independence from Moscow since the collapse of the Soviet Union a decade ago. That left only one option open -- to storm the theater and kill the hostage-takers, risking the lives of the hostages in the process.
In the end, this is exactly what happened as 129 hostages and most of the Chechens lost their lives -- mostly as victims to a gas used to knock out everyone inside the building before the catastrophic explosion could be triggered.
The operation was at once praised as a masterstroke that saved the lives of some 650 people and, at the same time, condemned as a typically botched Soviet-style operation in which innocent people were seen as expendable casualties.
Reports said many who could have survived with prompt medical attention died because there were few medical teams on hand to deal with the exodus of hostages after they were freed. Another factor contributing to the deaths was an inexplicable desire by the security services to keep the compound of the gas used in the operation secret, thus complicating treatment at the hospitals.
While officials lied about casualty figures and refused to answer questions regarding the killer gas, human rights organizations and international governments condemned the return of official silence not seen since the Kursk nuclear submarine disaster.
Putin's post-crisis approval rating soared, however, as the Russian leader had demonstrated strong will and a determination to wipe out terrorists rather than back down in the face of incredible odds.
Bolstered by the outcome of the Moscow operation, which was hailed as nothing less than a victory by much of the Russian media, Putin ruled out any negotiations with Chechen separatists and went on the offensive, demanding the extradition of Chechen leaders living abroad and pressuring neighboring Georgia to clamp down on Chechen rebel bases in the Pankisi Gorge, which borders Chechnya.
Putin also moved to dismantle Chechen refugee camps in Ingushetia, a tiny Russian republic. The camps were an eyesore that had attracted attention from human rights organizations and European parliamentarians. Thousands of refugees, faced with no heat, power or water, are being forced to leave their tent camps and move back to Chechnya, where misery and an unknown fate awaits them.
On the international front, Putin received support from President George W. Bush, who toned down criticism of the continuing war in Chechnya in return for Russia's support in the U.N. Security Council on a new, tough resolution on Iraq.
Bush also felt it necessary to fly to Russia to shake hands with Putin following the NATO summit in Prague, where three Baltic states -- Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia -- were invited to join the military alliance -- a move Russia had once called an unacceptable security threat.
While Putin pushed hard to equate Chechen separatists with al Qaida's terrorists in an international war on terrorism, he declined Washington's offers of involvement in a coalition against Moscow's old ally Baghdad and remained wary of the Bush administration's long-term intentions.
Feeling anger among some in the military over the growing presence of U.S. and NATO forces in Central Asia, where bases were established during the campaign against Afghanistan, and responding to domestic criticism that U.S. forces were using the war on terrorism as a pretext to establish a permanent regional base in Russia's southern underbelly, Putin moved to set up closer ties with Kyrgyzstan, where it will deploy attack jets and military transport aircraft.
With the relationship with Georgia strained over Tbilisi's alleged support for the Chechen rebels, Putin has also sought a commitment from Armenia, Russia's only ally in the Transcaucasus, to build closer military ties with Russia.
In an end-of-year visit to China and India, Russia's main military customers and strategic partners, Putin called once again for the establishment of a multipolar world to balance Washington's growing role as the sole superpower.
Russian officials have stepped up the rhetoric in recent weeks, calling for a Moscow-Beijing-New Delhi axis that would be able to balance U.S. power in coming years, possibly looking ahead to a possibility the United States might one day gain control over Iraqi oil fields and change the geopolitical situation for good.
Putin met understanding in Beijing over concerns that North Korea may possess a nuclear arsenal -- an unwelcome development China in particular has been eager to reverse. The Russian leader's condemnation of Islamic extremists in Kashmir -- a veiled attack on Islamabad -- also was met with joy in New Delhi.
Putin has another pragmatic reason to woo China and India -- the lack of foreign investment in Russia. Having failed to win significant investment this year, and facing stagnating economic growth figures, Putin has turned to China and India, appealing to business elite in both countries to turn their attentions to lucrative investment possibilities in Russia.
On the brighter side, Russian oil exports continue to grow, and Moscow is projecting $70 billion in oil revenues by the end of this year. Putin needs it as 2003 is when Russia must pay back more than $17 billion in debt and interest to international organizations. He also must ensure a jump in revenues from foreign investment to boost state coffers while maintaining the growing drain on the budget caused by the "black hole" that is present-day Chechnya.
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