#15 - JRL 6594
Date: Mon, 9 Dec 2002
From: "Darlene L. Reddaway" <darlen@compuserve.com>
Subject: article about chechnya
The following article by me incorporates perspectives on Chechnya by Nukhaev, who used to have important posts with Dudaev and Maskhadov, and an important Russian scholar on Chechnya, Dr. Jakov Gordin.
Darlene
Why the West Continues to Fail in its Understanding
of the Chechen War: Commentaries by Khodzh-Akhmed Nukhaev and Dr. Jakov Gordin
by Darlene Reddaway
N. Ya. Danilevsky, author of the famous book, "Russia and Europe" has written: "There has hardly been a Russian enterprise that has provoked such general indignation and complaint in Europe than our war in the Caucasus [the region that embraces Chechnya]... No matter how much effort our commentators expend in trying to show the recent affair as a great victory for the general course of human civilization, nothing helps. Europe does not like the fact that Russia has taken to this war... The Europeans never take into account the fact that these Caucasian mountain-dwellers, by their fanatic religion and their way of life, by their habits, and by the very character of the land they inhabit -- are kidnappers and robbers, who can never and will never leave their neighbors in peace. Warriors without fear and rebuke, they are "lords" of freedom, and that is all!... Russia, under threat of being labeled as a persecutor and oppressor of freedom is told, 'Endure the million or so warriors that have nested in the unchartable crevices of the Caucasian mountains, who impede all peaceful settlements for hundreds of miles around. And not only that. While we wait for the inevitable Caucasian alliance with the first chance enemy who is ready to attack us, we are told to control ourselves..." [Jakov Gordin, "Kavkaz: Zemlia i Krov'" (SPB: Zvezda, 2000): 39]
One might think that this was written just last week, but what is most fascinating is that this was written some 120 years ago! It seems as though nothing has changed in this aspect of Russo-Western relations in all that time. In the 19th century, most Russian generals and policy-makers who served during the Caucasian war of 1801-1859 alluded to the similarity of their war and its causes to those wars that the Americans perpetrated during the same period against the Indians, the British against the Scotch highlanders and against the Indians of India, the Spanish conquistadors Pizarro and Cortez against the Aztecs..., and yet the Russians were never to experience the same level understanding toward their own expansionist intents as that with which these Western countries justified their own wars for civilization during the 19th century.
And so it is today. When Ahmed Zakhaev was released in London just a few days ago, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov felt compelled to defend Russia's interests in what he perceived as a common and international war on terrorism saying: "Can you imagine that if bin-Laden had just announced that he had planned another terrorist act against America that he would be questioned for a few minutes at a police station in London, and then released -- as they did with Zakhaev?"
Ivanov was repeating the same formula for defense of Russian policy with regard to Chechnya that had already been elaborated by Russian President Vladimir Putin on November 10 of this year, before leaving for his European tour, when he asked: "Is it right to ask Russia to sit down next to Maskhadov in talks, when in the West you would never consider sitting down next to bin-Laden?"
Putin went on to rather subtly imply that the West's continual refusal to understand the Russian predicament in Chechnya as part of the modern war on terrorism was nothing more than a tactic on the part of the West to induce the Russian government follow in the footsteps of the Yugoslavian debacle.
After all, it was in Yugoslavia where NATO countries slowly nestled in as a peace-keeping force to ostensibly settle religious disputes of the various Yugoslavian provinces, while Yugoslavia was dismembered. And it was in Yugoslavia where two and a half years ago America and Europe upheld Kosovar Moslems over the Christian Serbs to finally enable NATO a foothold in the last holdout country in Europe. Putin zealously emphasized that he would not allow his land to become prey to foreign interests the way Yugoslavia had.
When Putin spoke in Brussels and in Germany in the days following, he stressed the degree to which the Russian conflict with the Chechens is a fight against a Middle Ages fanatic mentality that does not recognize Western civilization and has vowed to destroy it. He underlined the fact that the Chechen conflict is also based in the desire to quench the internecine warfare that has riddled Chechen society for centuries, and which threatens a great bloodbath should Russian troops withdraw immediately from the area.
A Modern-Day Basis for Putin's Comments: Khodzh-Akhmed Nukhaev
Interestingly, it is not only the Russians who feel the lack of sympathy of the Western policymakers and press with regard to the Russia's position in the community of nations.
Recently, the Chechen Khodzh-Akhmed Nukhaev touched on this topic in an interview given to the Chechen newspaper, "Mekhk-Kkhel," and this interview was reprinted in "Saint Petersburg Zvezda," No. 10 (2002). In the 1980's the Soviets imprisoned Nukhaev for his part in the struggle to establish Chechnya as an independent state. In the 1990s, Nukhaev occupied important posts in the Chechen "governments" of both Dzhokhar Dudaev and Aslan Maskhadov. But then, Nukhaev had a change of mind, and did not participate in the second Chechen War that began in the late 90s. Instead, he began to work on the cultural level, endeavoring to reestablish a tribal type of local juridical and social system in Chechnya, with laws and relationships based in the Koran.
In the above-mentioned interview, Nukhaev penetrates the Western stance with regard to Russia and the Chechen problem, reproaching Putin for relying on the false hope of a sure partnership with the West. Nukhaev warns, as Danilevsky warned 120 years ago: "If we measure our social conditions by those of the West, then the Chechens are 'barbarians,' and the Russians 'quasi-barbarians' -- because static traditions hold sway in Chechen life whereas in Russia cumbersome and slow-moving historical, autocratic 'anachronisms' hold sway... It is for this very reason that the Atlantic civilizations will always consider both we and the Russians as 'alien.' And we will never become one of 'them' as long as vestiges of the past still halt us from modernization." [Zvezda, No. 10 (2002): 168]
Nukhaev's acuity and candor do not stop there, and in fact, his further comments in this same article rather act to confirm that 1) Putin has a firm foundation for characterizing the Chechen conflict as a conflict with a "mediaevel" way of life, 2) Putin is right to distrust the theatrical proclamations of Maskhadov, 3) the Chechen conflict has been poorly understood in the West, and 4) some Chechen leaders have exploited this inadequate comprehension to further goals that do not actually serve the Chechen people.
Nukhaev stated that he felt compelled to reject Chechens like Dudaev and Maskhadov who had compromised longstanding traditional Moslem beliefs with Western values: "And whenever the conversation turns to values, for us as Moslems, Islamic values should be our first priority. And these Islamic values are absolutely incompatible, from every moral point of view, with the consumerist values of the Atlantic civilization... If we are fighting for some high ideals, then how can we sell and betray them in exchange for the 'bread and spectacle' of Hollywood and New York?" [Zvezda, 154]
Nukhaev calls Dudaev and Maskhadov "hostages of politics," indicting them for having participated in the "bread and spectacle" of the West to establish an anti-traditional form of Chechen social organization -- an independent republic. He openly disdains Dudaev and Maskhadov for demanding their paltry human rights in a farcical play for international sympathy, and adds: "The holy jihad taken together with the attempt to realize anti-Islam values in practical life takes us far from those first communal values that our predecessors sought to protect when they first stepped into war with Russia." [Zvezda, 170-171]
For Nukhaev, such "Islamic states" as Dudaev and Maskhadov have sought to establish in Chechnya have been formed on the bases of a false premise, and they lead to false actions. In this regard, he believes that "being under oath to defend the political interests of their government, which today consists of their being recognized as a State on the international level, the 'political figures' of the Chechen Republic are forced to consider the betrayal of Afghani Moslems a 'lesser evil' for which they gain the advantage over the 'greater evil' -- the loss of their Chechen independence for which they have endured so much loss." [Zvezda, 161]
Today Nukhaev sees three ideologies at war within Chechnya that must be resolved before there can be any kind of peace. These three ways of thinking stem from three distinct periods of relations with Russia: 1) the 16th century taip-tukkhan (claln-tribal) social organization with a base of blood-tie communities; 2) the 19th century religio-political (Imamat Shamil) social organization based on the agricultural community ("governmental shariat"); and 3) the 20th century politico-economical (State) social organization based on an urbanized civil conglomerate, a type of which Dudaev and Maskhadov have espoused. [Zvezda, 170]
The differences in these Chechen ideologies have been sharply felt in the early 1990s, as the Chechen intelligentsia, fearing the mixed taip-State structure as it was violently instituted by Dudaev, fled Chechnya en masse to preserve their lives. This exodus came in the wake of Dudaev's administration closing schools and assassinating the rector of Groznyi University. And these ideological differences were felt once again after Maskhadov came to power in 1996 and several Chechen taips requested the Russian government to come into Chechnya and intervene on their behalf to quell the rising tide of kidnapping, violence, closed schools, and acts of destruction against social and law enforcement institutions.
Even though Nukhaev acknowledges that Chechnya is deeply divided, he sees the ideal Chechen society as one that would turn back in time to a societal and religious structure that predates the Renaissance: "The Chechen people consists of communities bound by blood ties... This is the real social base of our society.. And this social organization can only be a tribal-taip structure that integrates the various blood-related communities into a taip-tukkhan associations, and through them into one national organism. So you see, the governmental system, beyond the fact that it is morally-incompatible with the teachings of Islam, is in addition not suitable for our people for purley social reasons." [Zvezda, 155]
Nukhaev calls for a separation of his people from the late-formed "Atlantic civilization." For as Nukhaev sees it, "Washington, after September 11 last year has divided the world into the 'rich North,' the haven of consumers of goods and services, and the 'poor South,' the suppliers of raw materials, which is us, in the best of cases." [Zvezda, 154] In Nukhaev's opinion, this leaves little room for Russia, let alone Chechnya, to feel itself at home in the new world order.
In full understanding that in its capacity as a State Russia can never grant independence to Chechnya, he calls for Russia to refuse formal and legal representations of its Statehood in order to facilitate the mutual peaceful settlement of their differences.
Nukhaev proposes that Putin remember the more Eastern roots of Russian socio-religious forms and turn to the Chechen people as the charismatic leader, not the President, of the Russian people to effect a formula of a "win-win" peaceful scenario in which the Chechens and Russians would not relate to each other as governmental entities, but as "One value-space inhabited by two social systems." [Zvezda, 170]
One could perhaps interpret this to mean that the Chechens would allow themselves to remain a part of the Russian State if Russia would just treat them as a people with their own way of life and traditions -- as long as that way of life did not egregriously violate Russian law. It is a rather delicate tap dance, but an interesting proposal nevertheless, for it shows how terribly the Chechen world view is incompatible with creeping Western globalism, for all the West's claim to be both the home of the "lexus and the olive tree."
Resolving the Past with the Present: Dr. Jakov Gordin Comments on the Chechen Situation
For a last word on the recent developments in the Chechen conflict, I met with a specialist in the area of Russo-Caucasian relations, the author of "Kavkaz: zemlia i krov'" ["The Caucasus: Land and Blood"], Dr. Gordin Jakov. Dr. Gordin has been carrying on a written exchange of ideas with Nukhaev, and has published Nukhaev's interview in his journal, "Saint Petersburg Zvezda." He also regularly conducted radio programs in the 1990s on the Chechen crisis for Petersburg radio.
Gordin, as Nukhaev, acknowledges that Putin cannot possibly let go of Chechnya. And this has nothing to do with oil or with monetary profit, since all the tappable resources in Chechnya could not possibly compensate Russia for the loss of lives and money that have been spent in Chechnya over the last two centuries.
In Gordin's view, there are several more cogent reasons why Chechnya will remain a part of Russia. First, Chechnya is geopolitically strategic for Russia -- serving as its window to Georgia and to the East. Second, Chechnya is important to Russia for preserving its territorial integrity. Russian presence there inhibits anti-Russian groups and nations from using it as a handy launching pad for terrorist and military operations against Russia that are rooted in Islamicfanaticism -- as it had been used in the past by the Turks and Persians. And thirdly, and most importantly, in Gordin's view, is exactly Putin's statement that he will not let Russia become the next Yugolslavia. Chechnya is central to the territorial integrity of Russia.
Gordin expressed great doubt that Nukhaev's return to a taip system of justice and social organization would be effective. In the first place, as Nukhaev himself stated, Western influence has already worked to reform the old taip system and the mentalities of those Chechens in it. Second, he thinks that Nukhaev is proposing a return to a mythical Chechen society, because Gordin insists that the organization of Chechen society, as with all Moslem societies, was not initially based on the Koran. Instead, Gordin reminds us that the Islam was adapted to powerful and violent political organizations of nomadic tribes, whether of Chechens Arabs, or Turks, who used their might to cruelly subjugate the territories that lay around them.
As Gordin's book "Caucasus: Land and Blood" amply demonstrates, based on historical memoirs, political treaties, and documents of the time, the Chechens were undeniably the "terrorists" of the Caucasus in the 19th century, regularly robbing, pillaging, and taking captive people from neighboring lands for slave trade. The Chechen tradition and way of life demanded that the they carry out such raids to prove their bravery, honor, and to provide an income for their families.
At the request of Georgia, Russia undertook the task of subduing the Chechens in 1801 in order to save Georgia and other Christian lands from their constant attacks, which were meant to aid and abet the Moslem fanatics among the Persians and Turks in their quest to dismantle the area. Now these warlike tendencies, replete with religious overtones, held at bay for a little more than a century, have been resurrected in the 1990s, together with the traditional Chechen right to seek revenge.
Gordin reminded me that Chechnya existed in a rather peaceful state at the beginning of the 1990s. At that time, there was no real threat to the religious or traditional way of life in Chechnya, even though it was an integral part of Russia according to the Russian constitution.
Other republics that did secede from Russia, for instance, Georgia, Uzbekhistan, Kazakstan, and so forth, always had the formal right to secede as granted by the Soviet and Russian constitutions. Autonomous republics such as Chechnya have never had the legal right to secede from either the Soviet Union or Russia. And, as it turns out, the Russian President cannot just grant autonomous republics independence at will. The only way that Chechnya can legally become an independent republic is if the Russian Duma votes it to be so as an amendment to the Russian consititution.
Gordin considers that Dudaev himself clearly understood this, and approached Yeltsin anyway with the demand that Yeltsin unilaterally declare Chechnya an independent republic. When Yeltsin refused, Dudaev, being a general in the Russian army at the time, executed a military rebellion and provoked the latest series of Chechen wars. Old offenses having been thus inflamed, many Chechens raised the battle cry, while the Chechen intelligentsia fled the country.
Gordin also admits that the situation in the 1990s has been exacerbated by the conduct of the Russian army in Chechnya. It has also been prolonged by the desire of Russian generals for profit, for it is they and their associates who feed off the stream of money that flows into the war there.
Gordin expressed the opinion that Putin's current approach to the Chechen conflict is adequate to restoring the state of normalcy in Chechen that was interrupted by Dudaev. Putin's plan takes into consideration both Chechen tradition, social organization, and the traces of Westernization that have slowly left their mark on Chechen life.
Putin's attempt to slowly return a sense of law and order to Chechnya through the establishment of a series of rational educational, justice, and law enforcement institutions, his work with Kadyrov to create a Chechen legislative body and an electoral system for legally choosing its local President and his policy of using Russian troops as a temporary peace-keeping presence should eventually lead to a more peaceful solution.
However, Gordin feels that Putin should try to slowly incorporate representatives from a wider range of Chechen taip-tribal and other social layers into the building process for it to be longlasting and maximally effective.
Additionally, he urged President Putin to integrate existing Chechen forms of justice and social order with Russian ones, to assure the Chechens that their traditions and way of life could be preserved within the framework of a Russian governmental system. Putin might want to effect this in the way in was done in the 19th century and even under Soviet power: allow misdemeanor and crimes of lesser important to be judged by the Chechen shariat, and send only capital crimes up to the federal level to be judged by Russian law.
The logical question is: how can a lasting peace ever be effected when certain representatives from one side of the conflict defines Chechnya as a warrior nation that earns its keep on the spoils of war? And is it exactly "fair" that Western values should be forced on those like Nukhaev, who ostensibly seek to preserve another world view -- one that is at odds with the Western trend toward culturo-economic globalization?
Dr. Gordin with some trouble admitted that yes, it seems there is a rather significant percent of the Chechen population that is still inclined to count its worth and earn its keep by raids and slave trade. However he added that a great percentage of the Chechen population has already turned aside to a more Western way of life, and even prefers the Russian law and educational systems to the Chechen ones. It was for this reason that the Chechen intelligentsia fled Chechnya after Dudaev came to power. This spirit of compromise can also be seen in such thinkers as Nukhaev, who wish to seek a "win-win" scenario; and perhaps in those Chechens in the recent Chechen congress in Denmark who denounced the Dubrokva terrorist act.
It seems that the conflict can be solved for the Russian side only inasmuch as the Chechens are willing to compromise their traditions and come more into line with Western ones. And this is sure to stir up antipathy in Chechen die hards. Dr. Gordin warned that this conflict within Chechnya society will undoubtedly call forth Chechen civil strife in the future. And he added that there is always the danger that those Chechens who favor a war-like way of life could come to power in Chechnya through the democratic process.
In an aside, Gordin, as Nukhaev and Danilevsky, expressed a wise sadness at the inability of the West to come to grips with the Russian predicament. Gordin felt that failure of Western journalists to understand the Russo-Chechen conflict was partly due to their surrounding themselves with Russians who agree with the position the journalists seemed poised to push, and partly due to a misattention to historical and legal details.
"After all," he said, "it is simple. Would the American government just allow Texas to secede from the Union? I think they would send troops immediately to put down the rebellion."
Back to the Top
Next Issue
Dec. 10, 2002:
#6594
- Back to the Top -