Johnson's Russia List
#6583
3 December 2002
davidjohnson@erols.com
A CDI Project
www.cdi.org
[Contents:
1. AP: Russia, China Leaders Express Solidarity.
2. RIA Novosti: RUSSIA-CHINA-INDIA: A NEW GEOMETRY.
3. RIA Novosti: RUSSIA DONE AWAY WITH TOTALITARIANISM: PREMIER.
4. Luba Schwartzman: TV1 Review.
5. RFE/RL: Gregory Feifer, Analysts Say Putin's Sky-High Ratings
Reflect Expectations, Illusions.
6. Le Monde: French Editorial Says Russian President Putin Unable
To Effect Changes, Counter Mafia, Corruption.
7. Le Monde: French Daily Interviews Russian Industrialist on Corruption,
Mafia Dealings.
8. Moscow Times: Boris Kagarlitsky, Euroskeptics or Europhiles?
9. Transitions Online editorial: Not-So-Fine Balance. The debate about
the failings in the Russian media’s coverage of October’s hostage crisis
has--unfortunately and conveniently--simply distracted attention from
the Kremlin’s own handling of the crisis.
10. pravda.ru: Nord Ost: the Battle Continues. Total sum of compensations
claimed by former Nord-Ost hostages makes up 7.5 million dollars. And
this is just the beginning.
11. gazeta.ru: United Russia to monopolize mass media.
12. PONARS: Eduard Ponarin, Walking on Thin Ice. Putin's Rapprochement
with the United States on the Background of the Latent Anti-Americanism
in Russia.
13. UPI: Sam Vaknin, Europe's new plague-I. (AIDS)
14. Matthew Maly: What is Economics?]
*******
#1
Russia, China Leaders Express Solidarity
December 2, 2002
By STEVE GUTTERMAN
BEIJING (AP) - The leaders of Russia and China vowed Monday to strengthen
their ``strategic partnership'' and declared common positions on key foreign
policy fronts, urging peaceful solutions in Iraq and North Korea and
promising to support each other's battles with Muslim separatists.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and China's Jiang Zemin signed a 13-page
joint declaration calling for a ``multipolar world'' - a phrase used by both
to express dissatisfaction with U.S. global dominance.
Putin emphasized that Russia - which spans Europe and Asia - wants partners
and power in both the East and West.
``We're absolutely certain that the special strategic relationship between
Russia and China will not only enable us to solve the problems facing our
countries, but also will create a basis for stability in the world,'' Putin
said.
His two-day visit comes after a year in which he improved relations with the
United States and Europe by supporting the international anti-terror campaign
and accepting NATO enlargement.
The statement called for a nuclear-free Korean peninsula and appealed to the
United States and North Korea to engage in dialogue and stick to a 1994
agreement for the North to give up its nuclear program in exchange for
foreign energy aid.
North Korea said last month that the 1994 agreement had collapsed after the
United States, South Korea, Japan and the 15-nation European Union suspended
fuel oil supplies. The cutoff was meant to punish the North for starting a
new nuclear weapons program.
The statement urged the ``normalization of relations'' between Washington and
Pyongyang.
``At this stage we are talking about a political dialogue within the
framework of which any questions could be discussed - including those that
raise concerns for either America or North Korea,'' said Russian Foreign
Minister Igor Ivanov.
Jiang and Putin also said the conflict over weapons of mass destruction in
Iraq can only be solved through diplomatic means and pledged to ``continue to
work together within the United Nations'' to ensure that U.N. Security
Council resolutions are not violated.
The United States has threatened war to disarm Iraq if it violates the latest
Security Council resolution, but Russia and China insist that only the
council can make that decision. Both are permanent council members with power
to veto U.N. actions.
Moscow and Beijing have tried to restrain U.S. dominance by insisting that
the United Nations should have the last word in international affairs.
Putin and Jiang also offered each other mutual backing for China in its
struggle against separatists in its Muslim northwest and Russia's war in
predominantly Muslim Chechnya.
The leaders accused other governments of ``double standards'' on terrorism
and human rights, saying they reject ``the use of human rights questions as a
lever for pressure in international relations.''
They said ``terrorists and separatists'' in Chechnya and northwestern China
are international terrorists who ``should be condemned and become the object
of a common fight on the part of all the states of the world.''
Putin also met with Premier Zhu Rongzhi, legislative chief Li Peng and Hu
Jintao, who replaced Jiang as Communist Party leader last month and is
expected to become president in March.
Ivanov said Russia was assured ``there will be complete continuity as regards
the future of our relations,'' which he said is ``very important.''
********
#2
C O M M E N T A R Y RUSSIA-CHINA-INDIA: A NEW GEOMETRY
MOSCOW, December 2. /from Dmitry Kosyrev, a RIA Novosti political analyst/ --
The formula of "Russia-India-China strategic triangle" was coined by
ex-Foreign Minister of Russia Yevgeny Primakov in 1998. But December, 2002 is
a different time and a different epoch. Moscow, Delhi, and Beijing are indeed
constructing a new geometry of relations - this time without anti-American
implications, unnecessary for Moscow as well as for its allies. Today, the
global fight on terror makes Beijing and Delhi revise some avenues of their
foreign policies and to start rapprochement. In principle, Russia can play
here the mediator's role.
Sources in Chinese diplomatic circles confirm that most members of China's
foreign policy community have forgotten what were the objectives of "India's
deterrence" policy pursued in the 1960's. Now, Beijing's only problem is how
to give up the obsolete policy with dignity and without leaving Pakistan
altogether, which it used as a counterweight for India for decades. Delhi and
Beijing are actively exchanging visits of high officials, and are not
neglecting the work of experts. At the recent seminar in Beijing, experts
from three countries freely exchanged of views on how to end up with the past
and to normalise Indo-Chinese relations.
China sees that the threat of terrorism and Muslim extremism on its northwest
borders remains feasible and did not vanish, when Afghanistan got rid of the
Taliban rule. Xinjiang, the vast scarcely populated area bordering on the
Central Asia, was one of the test grounds for international terrorist
organisations aspiring to tear Xinjiang away from China.
It was expected that in this case, the Talib Afghanistan, the terrorist
Xinjiang and the Pushtun-populated north of Pakistan could become a powerful
conglomerate of subversive formations aimed at the Central Asia along with
India and China. The crux of the matter is that the terrorist infrastructure,
especially, ways of financial feeding, has not been eliminated. Russian
President Vladimir Putin mentioned this during his meeting with George W.
Bush in St Petersburg, referring to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.
A common enemy makes countries draw closer, and this is true for China and
India. Of course, both countries are disappointed with Washington's inability
to end up with the Central Asian terrorist conglomerate, still basing in
Pakistan. They are also irritated by the doubtful policy of Washington
towards Iraq, which can result in enhancing extremist sentiments in the
region. Therefore, the rapprochement of the two Asian giants looks a
reasonable decision. Apparently, this rapprochement can not be even hampered
by the issue of the Himalayas glacier which China obtained in 1960s after
border clashes with India.
The anti-terror accent of Putin's current visit to India and China is
obvious: for instance, in India, he is due to discuss Afghanistan, terrorism
funding, Pakistan, etc. Moreover, the Russian president can become mediator
in solving one of delicate problems of the regional diplomacy. It is known
that India aspires to join the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation, seeing it
as a useful tool for fighting terror in the Central Asia and economic
development of this neigbouring region. But India's joining this organisation
or other forms of co-operation are impossible without the consent of China,
in fact, the organisation's leader. China is no doubt interested in India's
involvement, but this process can be launched by Vladimir Putin who could
take the corresponding oral message from Beijing to Delhi.
It is known that Putin's visit to Delhi should result in signing documents on
stepping up scientific and technological co-operation, and, possibly, an
agreement on selling the Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier to India or
setting up a joint concern for manufacturing civil aircraft. But the looming
shapes of Indo-Sino-Russian co-operation for fighting terror in the Central
Asia can turn out to be much more important. Though again, this triangle will
be not in Primakov's style, that is, without anti-American implications.
*******
#3
RUSSIA DONE AWAY WITH TOTALITARIANISM: PREMIER
BERLIN, December 2 /from RIA Novosti's Andrei Malosolov/ - Russia is firmly
determined for democratic progress, and will never galvanise totalitarianism,
Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov said to a Berlin gala on the 50th
establishment anniversary of the Eastern Committee of the German Economy.
There is a bad psychological obstacle to Russian democracy, however-what he
calls a public "mistrust syndrome" concerning the West. "Russia was
confronting Europe for several decades to encourage that mistrust in the
Russian mind," explained the Premier.
He exemplified the public bias by attitudes to the NATO eastward expansion.
"Don't be afraid of NATO expansion-it is not spearheaded against Russia, we
are reassured. Russians are eager to believe it. NATO missiles are not
targeted on Russia, and that comes as the best proof of those reassurances,"
said Mr. Kasyanov, while pointing out that the Russian people-in-the-street
are taking their mistrust much to heart.
He regretfully pointed out another syndrome surviving at the grassroot
level-the totalitarian. "Democratic patterns may be working smoothly at the
top level of our community but the lower administrative levels-in particular,
local self-government-have made far smaller progress for now." The
people-in-the-street still think it takes a boss to make their rights
reckoned with, on the old Soviet pattern. "That's why when they go to the
polls at a local level, they all too often elect direly undemocratic bosses."
Certain Russian traditions make democratic changes drop pace-but those
changes are making an assured progress, though they may be not so quick as we
should like, remarked the Prime Minister.
********
#4
TV1 Review
www.1tv.ru
Compiled by Luba Schwartzman (luba_sch@hotmail.com)
Research Analyst, Center for Defense Information, Moscow office
WEEKEND HIGHLIGHTS
Saturday, November 30, 2002
- Deputy head of the presidential administration, Dmitry Kozak declared that
regional governments can be declared bankrupt and removed from power.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin gave an interview to Chinese journalists
on the eve of his visit to the PRC. He mentioned that one of his daughters
is studying Chinese.
- Russia will export 10 million tons of grain this year
- The Russian Agrarian Movement (RAD) spoke in favor of removing the Mikhail
Lapshin from the position of Chairman of the Agrarian Party.
- At the International Space Station, command was transferred from Russian
astronaut Valery Korzun to American astronaut Kenneth Bowersox.
- President Putin chaired a meeting on domestic and foreign policy.
- Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee declared that India and Russia
are of the same opinion -- that terrorism can be vanquished only through
close international cooperation.
- Speaking at the Minsk State University of Economy, Belarusian President
Aleksandr Lukashenko refuted accusations of selling illegal arms to Iraq.
- President Putin said that the question of the role of the media needs to
be discussed and solved, but without impairing the freedom of speech.
- Buryatian President Leonid Potapov declared that the republic will seek to
increase foreign trade with China.
- Chechen fighters who robbed Daghestani homes have been detained on the
border between Chechnya and Daghestan.
- A monument to those who died in the Finnish-Soviet War was dedicated in
Novgorod. The Soviet Union lost over 120,000 soldiers and Finland lost
48,000 in that 105-day war.
Sunday, December 1, 2002
- Murmansk residents will not see the sun for two months. For a few more
days there will be some twilight -- then the polar night will last through
the middle of January.
- The Netherlands, Belgium and France will not give entry visas to Russian
citizens whose monthly income is less than 10,000 rubles ($320).
- President Vladimir Putin met with the Chinese leadership in Beijing,
including Chinese President Jiang Zemin and General Secretary of the Chinese
Communist Party Hu Jintao.
- In Beijing, First Lady Ludmila Putina visited the Russian Embassy and met
with Chinese graduates of Russian universities.
- Fedor Konyukhov has set the world record, crossing the Atlantic Ocean by
boat in 46 days and 4 minutes.
- President Putin congratulated Russian tennis players on winning Russia's
first Davis Cup.
*******
#5
Russia: Analysts Say Putin's Sky-High Ratings Reflect Expectations, Illusions
By Gregory Feifer
Russian President Vladimir Putin's soaring public-opinion ratings set a new
record at 83 percent following Moscow's hostage crisis in October. At the
same time, however, Russians are critical of his handling of specific issues,
like the economy and Chechnya. In that and other matters, Putin's situation
is not unlike that of his American counterpart, George W. Bush, another
popular leader who has faltered on certain policy issues. But despite the
similarities, analysts look to homegrown traditions to explain Putin's
ratings, saying the statistics reflect the public's expectations more than
the country's real economic and social conditions.
Moscow, 2 December 2002 (RFE/RL) -- Russian President Vladimir Putin's
public-approval ratings arguably represent his most important political
asset. And what an advantage they provide, in shock value, if nothing else.
Political observers have long been expecting Putin's numbers to drop, but two
years into his presidency, they have hit a new high at a staggering 83
percent, prompting some to wonder what makes Putin so popular, and what, if
anything, such polarized figures really mean.
The poll, carried out in late November by the country's top polling
organization, the All-Russia Center for the Study of Public Opinion, or
VTsIOM, shows a 6 percent jump from 77 percent approval in September and
October.
The jump came a month after Moscow's hostage crisis, providing the first
confirmation that Russia's tough-talking president emerged from the event
looking good to his electorate.
The public generally supported Putin's decision to storm the theater where
Chechen rebels had taken some 800 people captive, despite the deaths of 129
hostages, most due to the effects of a sedative gas used to knock out the
hostage takers.
Sociologist Boris Kagarlitskii is director of the Institute of Globalization
Studies. He said Russians who witnessed the Kremlin's handling of the hostage
crisis were either impressed or frightened by what they saw. "Either people
support the gas attack or they are terrified. But in both cases they shut up,
so there is no problem with domestic dissatisfaction," Kagarlitskii said.
Putin's high approval ratings have always been a major factor in his
political might. But even as his overall ratings grow higher, other poll
results tell a different story. Only 52 percent of people in the VTsIOM
survey said they trusted Putin, while 15 percent said they trusted no one in
the government.
Questions on specific issues like economic policy showed even less-sparkling
results, with only 33 percent of respondents approving Putin's economic
program and 62 percent viewing it as a failure to various degrees.
An overwhelming 73 percent, moreover, said Putin had failed to "defeat the
rebels in Chechnya," the promise that got him elected and on which he has
maintained an unwaveringly hard line.
VTsIOM Director Yurii Levada says Putin's situation is similar to that of
U.S. President George W. Bush, who likewise maintains high public-approval
ratings despite the fact that many of his supporters criticize specific
Republican Party policies, including those on the economy.
Both Bush and Putin saw their ratings rise in the aftermath of traumatic
events: the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks and the events leading to the
second war in Chechnya, respectively. Both men are waging self-described wars
on terrorism, and both have been quick to stress national solidarity over
diverse political debate.
Levada said, "In the actual tone of the [Russian] administration's actions,
the point of view exists that anyone who criticizes the actions of the
president and authorities is acting against the interests of the state."
Levada added that unlike the United States, Russia does not have a society
that is used to pluralism and an exchange of different points of view,
another condition contributing to Putin's high ratings. "There is a great
deal of trust in the president, but [there is trust in] no one else on Earth.
That allows Putin to maintain exceptionally high ratings despite the fact
that he lacks major successes," Levada said.
Duma Deputy Viktor Pokhmelkin is co-leader of the Liberal Russia party. He
questions the accuracy of public-opinion polls and whether they can be said
to reflect the public's real sentiment. He noted that the seeming
contradiction of people criticizing Putin's policies even as they support the
man himself reflects a general feeling of desperation. "That many people in
our country are disappointed with the dragged-out transition period -- with a
period of social disintegration and the instability of their own
socioeconomic and legal situations -- leads them to see the head of state as
their last hope," Pokhmelkin said.
It's a tendency, Pokhmelkin said, that leads to a widespread attitude of
"state paternalism" in the public consciousness -- something he said is a
historic tradition in Russia.
Pokhmelkin said Russians are less likely than Americans to see their heads of
state as mere mortals, representatives of the people with human qualities
themselves. That helps account for the wild swings between low single-digit
approval ratings for former President Boris Yeltsin and Putin's highs --
emotional extremes that are seen less often in the West.
So far, Pokhmelkin concluded, Putin has answered the call by providing a
measure of stability, a "sacred cow," as he put it, in Russian politics.
But Pokhmelkin added that as a result, Putin will not be guaranteed an easy
time in the next presidential elections and could suffer a quick fall.
Pollster Vladimir Andreenkov is director of the Institute of Comparative
Social Research, or CESSI. He said polls conducted by his organization
confirm the pattern visible in VTsIOM's surveys: that respondents are highly
critical of economic policies and are skeptical of reform but support the
president in general, nonetheless.
Andreenkov agreed that Putin's perceived provision of much-sought-after
stability helps explain the phenomenon. "[Putin is a] person [perceived to
be] trying to solve problems, both economic and military, in Chechnya and so
on. Here's a person who's trying, who's acting. He essentially speaks and
acts correctly. Well, the result isn't very good, but at least he's doing the
right thing," Andreenkov said.
Andrei Ryabov is a political analyst at the Moscow Carnegie Center. He agreed
that both Putin and Bush have positioned themselves as successful fighters in
their respective wars on terrorism. But he added that both need to be seen to
be achieving continuous successes to maintain high ratings, and that makes
them vulnerable to shifts in events. "I think the criterion for Putin's
victory is, above all, the reduction of the threat of terrorist acts and the
reduction of the threat to the country's national security. At the same time,
if such tragic acts [as the hostage crisis] take place again in the future,
they will undoubtedly weaken his authority in public opinion to a significant
degree," Ryabov said.
Putin boosted his short-term ratings following the hostage crisis by acting
tough, Ryabov added. But in his overall war on terrorism, it will be far more
difficult for him to achieve tangible gains against terrorist groups. In this
way, Ryabov said, Putin is putting his high ratings at risk.
*******
#6
French Editorial Says Russian President Putin Unable To Effect Changes,
Counter Mafia, Corruption
Le Monde
28 November 2002
[translation for personal use only]
Ever since he was propelled to the presidency
of Russia nearly three years ago, the same question has been asked: what
does Vladimir Putin want? Going by his statements, the answer is simple:
a modern Russia (which does not necessarily mean democratic), based on
the reestablishment of the state's authority and economic development.
This goal contrasts with the situation left by the two terms of Boris
Yeltsin. On the ruins of Soviet communism was established a system marked
by anarchic authoritarianism, brutal privatizations, the rule of mafias
over which hovered the shadow of the "Family," according to the name
given to Boris Yeltsin's the close relatives and their friends. The
result was devastating: collapse of production, capital flight, and the
pauperization of most of the Russian population, while a few oligarchs
gathered in billions immediately deposited abroad.
It was no good that Vladimir Putin proclaimed his intention to
strengthen "the vertical direction of power" by establishing "the
dictatorship of the law," no good that he condemned the corruption, the
organized crime that has taken over entire sections of economic activity,
the corrupt justice system, etc.; fundamentally, nothing has changed. The
exclusive investigation that Le Monde is publishing today shows that the
Russian president remains a prisoner of the groups, or even individuals,
who have appropriated the natural riches of Russia thanks to the
privatization at the beginning of the 1990s. Eliminating their
competition with the complicity of the political power by "legal" or
criminal means, these groups and these individuals have built colossal
fortunes by monopolizing the raw and energy materials and exporting them
without their benefiting the nation's development.
At the same time, they make sure to keep out foreign investments (12
times less than in China!), in order to preserve their privileges. There
is no advantage to them from adoption of laws that would introduce into
Russia the minimum transparency compatible with international standards.
Despite the official statements on the need for reforms, their interest
joins that of the bureaucratic apparatus, whose power is based on the
impenetrability and contradictions of the legislation. This conjunction
explains why the majority of the measures announced by Vladimir Putin
have been illusory reforms that have never amounted to anything or have
never been applied, when they have been passed by a Duma at his service.
Powerless in face of the oligarchs, Vladimir Putin bases his
authority on the 'siloviki,' the power structures and especially the
secret services from which he came and whose agents populate all the
wheels of power. With the army and the reincarnations of the KGB, it is
possible to wage a disastrous war in Chechnya. It is not possible to
break away from the bad habits of the past, recent and distant, and build
a new Russia.
********
#7
French Daily Interviews Russian Industrialist on Corruption, Mafia Dealings
Le Monde
28 November 2002
[translation for personal use only]
Interview with Dzhalol Khaydarov, former partner in the Chernoi
group, by Vladimir Ivanidze, place and date not given: "Conglomerates Are
the Product of an Alliance Between the Yeltsin 'Family' and the Bandit
Clan, Says Jalol Khaydarov"
[Ivanidze] In early 2000, when you broke your
ties to the Chernoi group, you met in a large Moscow hotel with Anton
Malevskiy, head of the Izmailovo mafia and an associate of Mikhail
Chernoi. What did he say to you?
[Khaydarov] He proposed to "talk a little" with me. He wanted me
to return to the group. I had put the OUGKM copper production complex,
about which they understood nothing, back on its feet for them. And
then, I knew too much about the group, its practices, and its financial
arrangements. Anton Malevskiy said to me: "If you do not want to work
with Chernoi, work directly with me: I will arrange everything." Then
the conversation took another turn. He knew that I had transmitted
documents to the MVD (home ministry) and FSB (former KGB), in the hope
that they would ensure my safety, and he warned me. "You must not do
that! No one will help you, neither Cherkessov (number two at the FSB at
the time) nor Patrushev (FSB number one) nor Rushailo (home minister at
the time). You know very well that we have an alliance, eight years
ahead of us."
[Ivanidze] These eight years correspond, you say, to the length of
two presidential terms for Vladimir Putin, elected in 2000?
[Khaydarov] Exactly. Malevskiy confirmed to me the alliance
between the Yeltsin "family" and one of the very first mafia groups, the
alliance of Roman Abramovitch and Mikhail Chernoi. It was thanks to
this understanding that the group's immense, vertically integrated
conglomerates, built purely and simply on theft, were created. As
concerns aluminum, the idea came from Oleg Deripaska (director general of
Russal, created in 2000 and the world's second largest aluminum producer)
and was implemented by Mikhail Chernoi and the Izmailovo group. Roman
Abramovitch and Oleg Deripaska, who each control 50 percent of Russal's
shares, symbolize the union of the two clans: an administrative clan at
the heart of the state system, and the criminal clan.
Ask why one factory or another has fallen under the control of
Russal. You will be told that its shares were purchased. Look
further, and you will find that the previous shareholder is in prison,
has become a drug addict, or has disappeared. When I worked with
Mikhail Chernoi, the group was distributing $35 to 40 million in bribes
every year. A judge, a regional governor, a decision, or a law can
always be bought. In the early 1990s, they killed. But now, they
prefer to have people sentenced or sent to prison. They can do
anything.
[Ivanidze] How does the alliance you describe work?
[Khaydarov] An example: that of Anton Malevskiy. The home
ministry has gotten rid of all files on him. In 1996, Anatoly Kulikov,
then home minister, created a scandal by denouncing the Izmailovo group
led by Malevskiy and Chernoi to the Duma. Malevskiy found himself the
subject of a Russian and an international arrest warrant. And then,
nothing happened. I saw a response from the MVD to a request for
information from Israel judicial officials that claimed that Malevskiy
was an honest citizen and had never been involved in anything untoward!
[Ivanidze] Does this require an "alliance"?
[Khaydarov] Another example. Vladimir Putin, who had just been
elected, wanted to appoint Dmitri Kozak to head the Russian general
prosecutor's office, a key organ of Russian power. He was not able to
do so, and Ustinov, the "family's" liegeman, kept his job. This failure
on Putin's part made the country's normal development impossible.
Nicholai Axionenko, another member of the "family," was dismissed from
the transport ministry because he was calling too much attention to
himself. He was taking his percentage from each big factory.
Aluminum, in terms of costs, is energy and transport: We need trains.
Axionenko made it very clear: Without a percentage of package of shares,
there would simply be no railway cars.
[Ivanidze] Who are the strong men of the Yeltsin "family?"
[Khaydarov] Roman Abramovitch represents them. He manages their
shares, for example 50 percent of Russal, based on the agreement signed
with the Chernoi group in early 2000. Then, there is of course Vladimir
Voloshin, head of the presidential administration under Yeltsin, and whom
Putin was not able to get rid of. His story is known, starting with the
scandal of the AVVA financial pyramid (created with Boris Berezovskiy).
He controls the "family's" interests and takes care of anything that
could harm it.
If he cannot do so, he turns to Roman Abramovitch, to Oleg Deripaska,
or Valentin Yumashev (former head of the presidential administration,
author of Boris Yeltsin's books, and husband of the former president's
daughter Tatiana Diachenko). It is not the Yeltsin family in a literal
sense: Boris Yeltsin was "thrown out" a long time ago; it is a group that
holds the real power. And Chernoi can cover its crimes and develop its
business with the help of the state.
[Ivanidze] Why does Oleg Deripaska seem to symbolize this alliance?
[Khaydarov] You are speaking of his recent marriage to the daughter
of Valentin Yumashev? Yes, this is how he became a member of the
"extended family." Maybe he loves his wife? So much the better. But
I know that the issue of his marriage was discussed within the Chernoi
group as early as 1998. They first wanted to marry him to the daughter
of an FSB general, then to Boris Berezovskiy's daughter. They finally
settled on the Yumashev option.
[Ivanidze] Concretely, how is the money taken out and collected?
[Khaydarov] There are many possible systems: foreign bank accounts,
stock, real estate, offshore! Everyone has their own. I set up
between 50 and 100 structures for just one of us! No investigating
judge can make head or tail of it. For years, my job was to get all the
money to the West and into offshore companies.
[Ivanidze] Who decides to conduct a transaction in a sector or
against a company?
[Khaydarov] Mikhail Chernoi, with the head of the sector in
question -- Oleg Deripaska for aluminum or Iskander Makhmudov for metals
-- with the involvement of local governors, like Eduard Rossel in
Ekaterinburg or Aman Tuleev in Kemerovo. Then, each person carries out
the plan at his particular level, as each has his own security service.
For example, at Russal, you fill find a former KGB counterespionage boss,
former first vice presidents of the FSB, and people who have information
about state security.
[Ivanidze] What effect has Malevskiy's death in November 2001 in
parachuting accident in South Africa had?
[Khaydarov] Is he really dead? I have never seen a photo of the
body. Nothing has changed. It was decided to put forward people like
Deripaska, more presentable types, and to get rid of the more undesirable
ones. Knowing Malevskiy does not help anyone get a stock market listing
abroad. And the group wants to enter foreign markets to put an end to
money laundering. But who could invest in Russal, buy shares in it,
with partners like Chernoi or Malevskiy?
[Ivanidze] Mikhail Chernoi cannot leave Israel because of a
judicial investigation. Can the authorities really threaten him?
[Khaydarov] Israel has served as the refuge, the alma mater of the
Chernoi group and many others: Lev Levaev, Yakov Goldovskiy, Arkadi
Gaydamak. Chernoi carries a lot of weight: He has created a foundation,
finances members of the Duma, buys police officers. Fortunately, the
Israeli authorities have seen how much money has already been invested in
corruption and understood that Chernoi is not a "poor persecuted Jew,"
but a bandit. A law on the mafia has been adopted that provides for
sentences of 15 to 20 years for corruption. It is becoming more
difficult, but the group is managing to infiltrate everywhere.
[Ivanidze] What can Vladimir Putin do?
[Khaydarov] In theory, the president of Russia can do anything, but
that is only a theory.
********
#8
Moscow Times
December 3, 2002
Euroskeptics or Europhiles?
By Boris Kagarlitsky
The expansion of the European Union into the former Eastern bloc is set to
begin in just over a year. The signal has been given. The administrative and
political machines in Brussels are moving forward on schedule. The expansion
has yet to occur, but it has already been heralded as one of the greatest
events in the history of the European continent.
Europe has seen its share of major events since the days of ancient Greece
and the Roman Empire. It is not hard to understand why the Eurocrats in
Brussels see themselves as a kind of collective Napoleon or Charlemagne,
especially since they plan to unite the peoples of Europe not by force of
arms, but with rules and regulations. Yet as the bureaucratic euphoria
gathers steam, more and more problems are coming to light that the
functionaries in Brussels are fundamentally incapable of solving.
Uniting the continent is a noble goal. But removing customs barriers and
creating common rules and administrative bodies does not guarantee that
unification will be achieved. If that were the case, the Soviet Union would
never have fallen apart.
The Soviet Union was held together by a totalitarian bureaucracy, of course,
and the bureaucracy in Brussels is irreproachably democratic. It seems
reasonable to expect that demonstrators protesting against the EU will not be
beaten down with shovels, as happened in Tbilisi in 1989. But will a
democratic process ensure that the new supranational structures it creates
will function effectively? And will civil society benefit from the expansion
of a united Europe?
Civic groups have already voiced more than a few complaints about the current
bureaucracy in Brussels. It hardly seems likely that this situation will
improve when the EU apparatus grows once more. The euphoria of the
politicians obscures complex processes in society that the machine driving
European integration has chosen to ignore.
Just a few years ago, East European countries took a rosy view of unification
with the wealthy nations of the West. In Western countries, especially
Germany, on the other hand, people were obviously uneasy about the impending
eastward expansion. The cause of these opposite reactions was the same: the
expectation that the West would simply open its wallet and start handing
money to the East. People in the East looked forward to financial assistance,
while those in the West shrank from the prospect of bankrolling new programs.
This reaction was especially marked in the former East Germany, where people
feared that the funds currently earmarked for the "new lands" in the unified
Germany would be sent even farther east.
As 2002 comes to a close, the situation has changed. The number of skeptics
in Germany has declined. According to the newspaper Die Welt, roughly half of
all Germans now favor expansion. When you consider the total unanimity of the
press and the politicians, however, this change does not seem such a big
achievement. And while the Germans have got used to the idea of expansion,
their neighbors to the east are starting to have doubts. The number of people
supporting expansion in the candidate countries is decreasing steadily as the
deadline nears.
Estonia stands out among Euroskeptics. Only 35 percent of Estonians support
expansion, and that is no surprise. The country could lose significant income
from duty-free trade with Finland and Sweden. Estonians worry that their
resorts will be snapped up by wealthy foreigners and that prices will shoot
through the roof. Concerns are being raised throughout Eastern Europe that
citizens of former Soviet bloc countries will become second-class citizens of
the EU. If a referendum on joining the EU were held in all the candidate
countries, their number could be significantly reduced. But talk of a
referendum is heard only in those countries where the government's position
enjoys overwhelming popular support, as in Hungary.
The rise of Euroskepticism in the East and of expansion enthusiasts in the
West have both resulted from the realization that no one is going to spend
the money to raise living standards in former Soviet bloc countries to West
European levels. Even in Germany, parity between East and West has not been
achieved 12 years after unification.
But money is not everything. More importantly, will expanding the EU
strengthen democracy? Or will it prove a milestone in the formation of a
bureaucratic machine that, despite its best intentions, will be a long way
from a collective Charlemagne?
Boris Kagarlitsky is director of the Institute of Globalization Studies.
********
#9
Transitions Online
December 2, 2002
Our Take [editorial]
Not-So-Fine Balance
The debate about the failings in the Russian media’s coverage of October’s
hostage crisis has--unfortunately and conveniently--simply distracted
attention from the Kremlin’s own handling of the crisis.
So Vladimir Putin has vetoed restrictions on the media that many
politicians were calling for in the wake of October’s hostage-taking in
Moscow.
At this point, we could sigh with relief and reflect that Putin’s perceived
threat to the media has been overstated. Extraordinary circumstances, and
Russia’s parliament, gave him the chance to increase the state’s powers,
and he turned it down.
We could also explore the mea culpa that the media took to the president
when they asked him to veto the amendments. We could also object to NTV’s
decision to bring in a lip-reader to work out what Putin and two ministers
were saying before the Dubrovka theater was stormed. We might also question
the taste and the independence of the media when, in the midst of the
crisis, they chose to change their programming to include films about World
War II, terrorism, and New York firefighters on 11 September. There would
also be place for relief at the response of an army general who, asked
whether the Chechen problem might be resolved by "deporting them all to
Siberia and leaving them there," angrily responded that the question was a
“provocation” and that Stalin’s deportations were one of the causes of the
war.
But to discuss how good or bad the Russian media’s coverage was would
merely be a distraction from the bigger questions that remain only
partially explained: How and why did the hostage-taking happen? Why did so
many die in the storming of the theater--with the exception of one (or two
or three, depending on the source) as a result of a gas released by the
Russian military? Why have we not been told exactly what that gas was,
other than simply that it was a Fentanyl derivative? Why was there so
little medical aid available? How many people actually died? What about the
nearly 80 people said to still be missing? Did the Kremlin misread the
situation and the Chechen hostage-takers, given that that the Chechens did
not blow the theater up in the minutes before they were debilitated by the
deadly gas? What other options did the authorities think about? Why didn’t
they pursue those options?
These and myriad other subsidiary questions are all the more pressing
because of the parallels, the questions raised--and discoveries made--about
the Budennovsk crisis in 1995.
Then, Chechen rebels bribed their way through Russian checkpoints, finally
being stopped about 60 kilometers inside Russia. They then retreated into a
hospital in Budennovsk, where they took roughly 1,000 hostages. Russian
troops unsuccessfully stormed the hospital. Close to 150 died, many from
Russian bullets. The crisis was finally resolved when Viktor Chernomyrdin,
the then prime minister, negotiated free passage back to Chechnya for the
hostage-takers.
Were there similar lapses in the Russian security systems this time? Why do
so many Russians civilians die whenever their forces try to save them? What
were the merits and problems of negotiations in such circumstances?
The Kremlin has repeatedly made clear its criticisms of the handling of the
Budennovsk hostage-taking and the subsequent decision to enter peace talks
with the Chechens. But whatever their own opinion, it should be the duty of
the media to force the government to justify its position in greater
detail. For while many Russians may think the same as the Kremlin (and
Putin’s popularity has soared), many do not. Opinion polls this summer
showed that only one-third of Russians supported continuing the war, and 59
percent thought peace talks should begin.
In short, Russians need more truth. They clearly do not think they are
getting much of it: Two weeks ago, only 9 percent of those questioned by
the Agency of Regional and Political Research (ARPN) believed the
government was telling the complete truth about the casualties of the 26
October storming.
Instead, the media amendments have ensured that the question of culpability
has been largely directed at the media themselves, not at the mistakes and
choices made by the Kremlin. Putin himself stated the issue point blank.
“Let's be honest," he said. "The television picture on one of the national
channels several minutes before the storming [of the theater], which showed
the movement of special forces and reported on what was happening inside
the theater, could have led to a huge tragedy."
True, and the media should apply a code of ethics, circumspection, and an
awareness of the point where lives might be endangered--but is it not even
more important to hear more about the lives that were actually lost than
those that might have been, to uncover the reasons for the huge tragedy
that did actually take place, and to hold to account those who are elected
to public office?
The truth is that it is politically convenient for the Kremlin that the
debate about the media’s handling of the crisis deflects attention from the
glaring incompetence (or brutal disregard) of a state whose actions leave
so many people dead. The political calculations could go further. Russians
are not stupid. As our correspondent in Ulyanovsk reported on 25 November,
when details are given, Russians ask awkward questions. For a spin-doctor,
the answer could be to direct their intelligent questioning elsewhere and
to starve them of details that could lead to more questions.
It has worked. Instead of being free to ask questions loudly, the media
have had to spend much of their energy in four critical weeks defending
themselves.
What’s more, like a cherry on the spin-doctor’s cake, the tug-of-war over
the amendments has actually allowed a flattering picture of the president
to emerge. He appears as a voice of reason, like Solomon weighing the pros
and cons--“We need to find a finer balance between limiting the media in
concrete, defined situations and fully informing society about the actions
of the state so that the state does not start seeing itself as
infallible"--and finding a seemingly reasonable answer.
The implicit message, however, is potentially disturbing: The state does
need to exert greater control, albeit limited, over the media and, and
given his finer awareness of the balance than parliament, Putin is a
philosopher-king capable of doing just that.
Whether this is the Kremlin’s real intention is something that time will
show. What is clear, though, is that during the second Chechen war, the
“fine balance” of media coverage from Chechnya has swung significantly in
favor of the authorities, that the Russian parliament is not overly
concerned about guarding the “fine balance” between media and state, and
that, unfortunately, the media’s ultimate “guardian” is the president.
And how good is his guardianship? Unfortunately, Putin’s decision that an
investigation into the Dubrovka crisis will be conducted by his own
appointee suggests he is not too concerned about independence.
*******
#10
pravda.ru
December 2, 2002
Nord Ost: the Battle Continues
Total sum of compensations claimed by former Nord-Ost hostages makes up 7.5
million dollars. And this is just the beginning.
Three people who have suffered as a result of the terrorist attack in the
Moscow theater on October 23 claim compensation at the rate of 1 million
dollars. This information was provided by an attorney of the Nord Ost
victims, Igor Trunov. In his words, Larisa Frolova, a Moscow citizen whose
son and daughter-in-law were killed as a result of the terrorist act in the
Moscow theater, claims a 1 million dollar compensation. Now, the woman has
to take care of her two grandchildren, who lost their parents.
The attorney says that former hostages Nikolay Lyubimov and Anna Bessonova
(the woman lost her husband and now has to take care of two children) also
expect to receive such a compensation.
Igor Trunov says that he is going to register the claims in the Tverskoy
municipal court of Moscow, where claims of five more victims have already
been registered. Two of the claims were filed by Alexandra Ryabtseva, 19,
and her father. The girl was seriously injured; now she may become an
invalid. Each of the plaintiffs estimates the moral and material damage at
the rate of 1 million dollars. Two more claims were registered by
pensioners Pyotr Sidorenko and Viktor Bondarenko, who had lost their sons,
the only bread-winners of the families. Svetlana Generalova, who had lost
her husband, also filed a claim.
The reaction of the Moscow authorities to the claims could be predicted
from the very beginning: the Moscow city administration considers the
claims for damage compensation to Nord Ost victims “unreasonable and
unfair.” The information was provided by press-secretary of the Moscow
mayor, Sergey Tsoi. He cannot understand why the Tverskoy court accepted
the claims at all. In his words, “accepting of the claims is equal to
recognition of the guilt for the terrorist act committed in the Moscow
theatre. And this is something with which the Moscow government cannot
agree to.” The press-secretary of the Moscow mayor added that “the Chechnya
problem and its consequences are in no way connected with the jurisdiction
of the Moscow authorities”; the settlement of the problem connected with
compensations to former hostages “must be done on a federal level.”
A conclusion suggests itself: the Moscow city administration is trying to
shift the responsibility for the Nord Ost hostage taking onto the federal
authorities on the basis of paragraph #17 of the law “On the struggle
against terrorism,” saying that the RF subject on which territory an act of
terrorism was committed is responsible for moral and material damage caused
by the accident. In situations of this kind, foreign citizens are
recommended to file claims against the RF Government.
Today, three more people who suffered during the hostage taking in the
Moscow theater are going to register their claims for compensations. So,
the number of former hostages and their relatives who registered claims for
compensation will make up eight people; the total sum of claimed
compensations will be 7.5 million dollars. According to attorney of the
Nord Ost victims, Igor Trunov, the Tverskoy court of Moscow plans to start
consideration of the claims on December 3.
As we already know from court practice in Russia, the situation with the
claims for compensations to former hostages may swing to any of the sides:
even if the court declares the claims valid, the Moscow authorities may
immediately appeal against the court decision, etc. However, no claims have
been filed yet by foreigners who suffered in the hostage taking. However,
if they do, the situation will have to be settled on the federal level
already.
Dmitry Litvinovich
PRAVDA.Ru
Translated by Maria Gousseva
*******
#11
gazeta.ru
December 2, 2002
United Russia to monopolize mass media
By Natalia Rostova
700 chief editors from regional media outlets gathered last Friday for a
media conference entitled ‘The 2nd All-Russian Conference of Regional Mass
Media’, hosted by the pro-Kremlin United Russia Party. With the help of
Russia’s regional press the party hopes to secure victory in the next
year’s election to the lower house of parliament.
Chairman of the general council of the United Russia party Alexander
Bespalov said in his opening address that the party is seeking the support
of regional journalists, and to that end is set to render financial
assistance to the regional press. ''We are ready to buy half a page in
every issue of all newspapers throughout the next year,'' Bespalov said.
At a media conference on Friday the party leaders announced one more
undertaking – a contest in honour of United Russia’s birthday entitled
‘Forecast 2003’. The delegates received forms containing a list of the
potential participants in the 2003 parliamentary elections, which included
United Russia, the Communists, the Union of Rightist Forces, Yabloko and
Zhirinovsky’s LDPR, and were asked to forecast the percentage of votes that
each of the political parties was likely to receive. The winner of the
contest – the one whose forecast coincides closest with the voting results
– will receive a car.
After the conference, journalists joked that the car would most likely go
to the one who predicts a complete victory for United Russia and who
applies all their efforts to make sure it happens.
After Bespalov, the floor was given to the federal ministers invited to the
gathering. Introducing Boris Gryzlov to the audience, Bespalov urged the
journalists to pose questions to him not as to the Interior Minister, but
as the chairman of the Higher Council of United Russia [the post to which
he was elected last month].
Gryzlov, however, came across more like a minister than a party leader. To
begin with, he said that given the new terrorist threat the regional media
faced increasingly high social responsibilities, such as helping the state
establish a safer society.
The minister then abruptly changed the subject to the problem of soaring
crime rates and urged an intensification of the fight against illegal
migrants. He has criticized the press for their coverage of the topic.
''Russia should not be a territory across which illegal migrants make their
way from the south to the west, from the south to the north. We are obliged
to carry out a tough policy.
''As of November 21 we have sent migration cards to border checkpoints.
These cards will be handed out to citizens of other countries who are
currently staying in Russia. We must rid our territory of illegal migrants,
those people who are working here without proper documents.''
Not so long ago the Russian Interior Ministry deported 150 Tajik nationals
by plane, Gryzlov said. ''Some of them accepted that as a present, as a
free trip home…'' Whereupon the minister started lecturing the audience
sternly: ''And what are you doing?'' complaining that the journalists do
not understand anything when they write that the incident might exacerbate
tensions between Russia and Tajikistan.
''The media should understand that the uncontrolled and chaotic movement of
illegal immigrants poses a threat. We must rid our territory of illegal
immigrants and take tough measures against those who employ them.
Meanwhile, the media are suggesting that such measures are unacceptable,''
he said.
At the same time, Gryzlov agreed that ''media can be no better than its
environment'', and therefore, journalists are forced to live ''conniving at
vile demands and criminal bosses''.
The Minister said he was very displeased by TV series that portray
criminals as heroes, while state authorities are shown as corrupt and
unscrupulous.
Then the United Russia leader switched to the problem of freedom of speech
in Russia, noting that in line with the Russian constitution, that freedom
is indisputable. ''The president's veto on amendments to the media law
[restricting media coverage of terrorism] proved that freedom of speech in
Russia is indisputable. Thus, journalists face greater responsibility,'' he
said.
After that Gryzlov once again turned into the chief of police and lambasted
the media for impeding the work of the security services during the
Nord-Ost theatre siege in October, when a group of Chechen rebels held some
700 people hostage. ''Dubrovka [Street, where the Nord-Ost theatre building
is located] is not the first case [when the media misbehaved themselves –
Gazeta.Ru],'' he said, citing another hostage taking case when gunmen
seized a passenger bus last year in the North-Caucasian town of Mineralnye
Vody.
Then, television channels reported the details of the special operation to
liberate the hostages just as the security forces were about to begin the
storming. Luckily, the terrorists did not get wind of the report.
What outraged the Interior Ministry chief even more was that after the
Nord-Ost storming some journalists reporting on the gas used to disable the
hostage-takers described it as sarin.
Boris Gryzlov called those cases ''intentional attempts to destabilize the
situation in the country'' and added that all journalists ''should pay
special attention to the fact that they must serve our society, and our
society needs security''.
During the break Andrei Isayev, a member of the party’s general council,
explained to Gazeta.Ru why the party was taking such an interest in the
regional media and the point in gathering so many chief editors for a media
conference.
''Such conferences will become regular,'' Isayev said, ''because we want to
inform the people of our goals, because the regional media are serious
communicators, they convey the public standpoint on what ought to be done
and what ought to be changed''
Besides, one of the goals pursued by the party is ''to establish a dialogue
between the media and the party''.
''Honestly speaking,'' the UR general council member said, ''our
cooperation with the regional media is better than with the central press,
except for the state-run channels, which are neutral towards everybody.''
According to Andrei Isayev: ''The federal non-state media do not like us,
and we see that.'' And the reason for that dislike, in the opinion of the
party activist, is that ''they seem to be biased against us, as a party of
bureaucracy, or power''.
''As for the regional media, they are more impartial, and that does not
mean they do not criticize us, but that their criticism is substantiated.''
Out of gratitude for that constructive criticism and impartiality it
appears that United Russia intends to buy half a page in every issue of
every regional newspaper in the run up to the parliamentary polls.
*******
#12
Walking on Thin Ice
Putin's Rapprochement with the United States on the Background of the
Latent Anti-Americanism in Russia
PONARS Policy Memo No. 269
Eduard Ponarin
European University at St. Petersburg
October 2002
[DJ: The full set of recent PONARS papers can be found at:
http://www.csis.org/ruseura/ponars/policymemos/pm_index.htm]
The United States-although it attracts many immigrants and students from
all over the world and its lifestyle is widely emulated-is also an object
of intense and widespread hatred. The apparent paradox, however, is hardly
unique and is explainable according to some theories of nationalism.
Similar hatreds of various model societies have existed in many countries
and historical periods. Resentment of the United States will continue as
long as the United States remains a model society for much of the world,
and the comparison of the U.S. model with those societies who are emulating
it will not be in favor of the emulators. As a result, some societies will
undertake a search for an alternative model, which is usually found in
local histories. This sentiment is also related to cultural distance
between the model society and the emulating society. For instance,
countries such as Great Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand do not
register significant bursts of anti-Americanism, whereas those countries
that are more culturally distant do, especially if they had historical
ambitions to be world or regional leaders. France, for example, although it
has long been an ally of the United States, is still struggling with what
it perceives as the undue global dominance of the Anglo-Saxon culture.
The situation in Russia with regard to its perception of the United States
is not entirely unique, yet it is somewhat peculiar as Russia becomes a
U.S. ally against a backdrop of economic hardship and declining
international power and prestige. Russia's predicament could be expected to
exacerbate anti-American sentiment and thus prevent Russia from becoming an
ally of the United States. Mass surveys, however, tell us that apart from
two short-lived surges-one during the NATO intervention in Kosovo and the
other during the recent Olympic scandals in Salt Lake City-anti-American
sentiment in Russia is surprisingly limited. Surveys of Russian elites,
however, produce a somewhat different picture. They show that by the
mid-1990s, before the Kosovo crisis and the last Olympics, a shift toward
anti-Americanism had taken place on the elite level. On the popular level,
however, the United States remained a country much admired, which many
other countries hoped to emulate. Only in 1999, during the Kosovo crisis,
did the views of the mass public catch up with those of the Russian elites
on anti-Americanism. This wave of anti-Americanism, however, soon faded.
The specter of anti-American sentiment taking root in both elite and
popular attitudes should be a cause for concern for U.S. policymakers, who
must consider the following in their relations with Russia:
· Russia's ruling elite has been cooperative with the United States because
it still wants to integrate with the West, not because it always agrees
with the United States on particular policy issues.
· There is great potential for anti-American sentiment in Russia and the
political mechanisms that prevent its surge are wearing off.
· The United States government has to decide soon if it wants Russia to
continue to be cooperative or if Russia does not matter.
· If Russia matters, the United States has to reciprocate Russia's
cooperation because otherwise it might lose Russia.
· If the Russian elite feels rewarded, Russia has a good chance of becoming
a long-term Western partner.
Apparently, the Russian elite seems to generally believe strongly that its
best course of action is to continue efforts to Westernize the country.
Thus, cooperation with the United States is vital to achieving their goals
(although some elites seriously consider China's experience as an
alternative path for Russian development). The Russian elite, including the
political leadership and media magnates, normally limits expressions of
anti-American sentiment in the media, which accounts for generally low
levels of this sentiment on the popular level. Periodically, however, media
coverage of events and related commentary takes a decidedly anti-American
tone. This occurred during the 1999 Kosovo intervention that followed the
August 1998 financial crisis. Those two crises undermined two basic
premises of the Russian liberal revolution: that economic liberalism would
make Russia and Russians rich, and that with the end of the Cold War,
Russia would become an equal partner of the Western democracies. By the
mid-1990s, the Russian elite had realized that neither was happening, but
the media still maintained pro-Western and pro-U.S. coverage. Yet, so great
was the elite's frustration during the Kosovo crisis, the Western-friendly
media began-with official sanction-to send quite a different message. A
dramatic rise in anti-Americanism at the mass level followed.
Another such outburst occurred during the last Olympics (February 2002)
when the Russian public felt its athletes were wrongly denied victory in
several incidents. In that case, Russian anger rose over symbolic matters
where U.S. involvement was not immediately obvious, unlike in the Kosovo
case, where U.S. involvement had been quite real and had graphically shown
that Russia had lost very real, not merely symbolic, power. The fact that
the second surge of anti-American sentiment rose over a relatively trifle
matter suggests that the lid that the Russian elite are able to keep on
expressions of anti-American sentiment is wearing thin. Indeed, given the
perceived lack of reward for its cooperation with the West, it is not a
great surprise. Moreover, as Russia's post-Soviet identity is still in
formation, it is being shaped in part by this perception. Because many
Russians feel that they are not welcome in the West, an increasing number
of them are developing a non-Western Eurasian identity. This is evidenced
by a semiofficial recognition of Aleksandr Dugin (a formerly outcast
Eurasianist) who is now occasionally seen on TV, including on the
government channel; furthermore, this feeling is trickling down to the
public. Calls made by the former prime minister Evgenii Primakov to forge
an alliance with China and India and thus offset growing U.S. power not
only reflected the elite's frustration, but were also meant to increase his
popularity before the last elections.
Against this background, President Putin's rapprochement with the United
States is remarkable. It has given Russian Westerners a new hope. Indeed,
as a new Russian identity has not yet calcified, a new structure of
incentives may reinforce the government's pro-Western orientation. If
Russian cooperation with the West is reciprocated this time (for which
there may be a better chance now, given Russia's participation in the
anti-terror effort), the Russian government can show its public that its
pro-Western policies pay off. That may have long-lasting consequences
because it can help shape a pro-Western Russian identity. Identities are
malleable, but when they do solidify, they have lasting influence. It is
not very likely that Russia will turn into another Great Britain any time
soon, whatever U.S. policies with respect to Russia might be. But the
United States still has a choice in Russia between an occasionally sulky
ally like France or a hostile Eurasianist entity. What we see today may be
Russia's last attempt to integrate into the community of Western states.
*******
#13
Analysis: Europe's new plague-I
By Sam Vaknin
UPI Senior Business Correspondent
SKOPJE, Macedonia, Dec. 2 (UPI) -- The region that brought you the Black
Death, communism and all-pervasive kleptocracy now presents: AIDS. The
process of enlargement to the east may, unwittingly, open the European
Union's doors to the two scourges of inordinately brutal organized crime and
exceptionally lethal disease. As Newsweek noted, the threat is greater and
nearer than that of any hysterically conjured act of terrorism.
The effective measure of quarantining the HIV-positive inhabitants of the
blighted region to prevent a calamity of medieval proportions is proscribed
by the latest vintage of politically correct liberalism. The West can only
help them improve detection and treatment. But this is a tall order.
East European medicine harbors fantastic pretensions to west European
standards of quality and service. But it is encumbered with African
financing, German bureaucracy and Vietnamese infrastructure. Since the
implosion of communism in 1989, deteriorating incomes, widespread
unemployment and social disintegration plunged people into abject poverty,
making it impossible to maintain a healthy lifestyle.
A report published in September by the European regional office of the World
Health Organization pegs at 46 the percentage of the general population in
the countries of the former communist bloc living on less than $4 a day --
close to 170 million people. Crumbling and desperately under-funded
healthcare systems, ridden by corruption and cronyism, ceased to provide even
the appearance of rudimentary health services.
The number of women who die at -- ever rarer -- childbirth has skyrocketed.
Transition has trimmed Russian life expectancy by well over a decade to 59,
lower than in India. People lead brutish and nasty lives only to expire in
their prime, often inebriated. In the republics of former Yugoslavia,
respiratory and digestive tract diseases run amok. Stress and pollution
conspire to reap a grim harvest throughout the wastelands of Eastern Europe.
The rate of Tuberculosis in Romania exceeds that of sub-Saharan Africa.
The Joint U.N. Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) and the WHO just published their
AIDS Epidemic Update. It states unequivocally: "In Eastern Europe and Central
Asia, the number of people living with Human Immunodeficiency Virus -- HIV --
in 2002 stood at 1.2 million. HIV/AIDS is expanding rapidly in the Baltic
States, the Russian Federation and several Central Asian republics."
The figures are grossly understated and distorting. The epidemic in Eastern
Europe and Central Asia -- virtually on the EU's doorstep -- is accelerating
and its growth rate has surpassed sub-Saharan Africa's. One-fifth of all
people in this region infected by HIV contracted the virus in the preceding
12 months. UNAIDS says: "The unfortunate distinction of having the world's
fastest-growing HIV/AIDS epidemic still belongs to Eastern Europe and Central
Asia."
In the past eight years, AIDS has been suddenly "discovered" in 30 large
Russian cities and in 86 of its 89 regions. Four-fifths of all infections in
the Commonwealth of Independent States -- the debris left by the collapse of
the Soviet Union -- are among people younger than 29. By July this year, new
HIV cases surged to 200,000 -- up from 11,000 in December 1998.
In St. Petersburg, their numbers multiplied a staggering 250-fold since 1996
to 10,000 new instances diagnosed in 2001. Most of these cases are attributed
to intravenous drug use. But, according to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,
400 infected women gave birth in a single hospital in St. Petersburg in the
first 9 months of 2002, compared to 149 throughout last year. About one-third
of the neonates test HIV-positive within 24 months. The disease has broken
loose.
How misleading even these dire data are is revealed by an in-depth study of a
single city in Russia, Togliatti. Fully 56 percent of all drug users proved
to be HIV-positive, most of them infected in the last 2 years. Three-quarters
of them were unaware of their predicament. One-quarter of all prostitutes did
not require their customers to use condoms. Two-fifths of all "female sex
workers" then proceeded to have unsafe intercourse with their mates,
husbands, or partners. Studies conducted in Donetsk, Moscow and St.
Petersburg found that one-seventh of all prostitutes are already infected.
An evidently shocked compiler of the results states: "The study lends further
credence to concerns that the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Russian cities could be
considerably more severe than the already-high official statistics indicate."
The region's governments claim that 1 percent of the population of countries
in transition -- still a hefty 4 million people -- use drugs. But this, too,
is a wild underestimate. UNAIDS itself cites a study that concluded that
"among Moscow secondary-school students ... 4 percent had injected drugs."
Quoted in Pravda.ru, the Director of the Federal Scientific Center for AIDS
at Russia's Ministry of Health, Vadim Pokrovsky, warns Russia is likely to
follow the "African model" with up to an 80 percent infection rate in some
parts. Kaliningrad, with a 4 percent prevalence of the syndrome, he says, can
serve as a blueprint for the short-term development of the AIDS epidemic in
Russia.
Or, take Uzbekistan. New infections registered in the first 6 months of 2002
surpassed the entire caseload of the previous decade. Following the war in
Afghanistan, heroin routes have shifted to Central Asia, spreading its abuse
among the destitute and despondent populations of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,
Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In many of these countries
and, to some extent, in Russia and Ukraine, some grades of heroin are cheaper
than vodka.
Ominously, reports the European enter for the Epidemiological Monitoring of
AIDS, as HIV cases among drug users decline, they increase exponentially
among heterosexuals. This, for instance, is the case in Belarus and Ukraine.
The prevalence of HIV among all Ukrainians is 1 percent.
Even relative prosperity and good governance can no longer stem the tide.
Estonia's infection rate is 50 percent higher than Russia's, even if the AIDS
cesspool that is the exclave of Kaliningrad is included in the statistics.
Latvia is not far behind. One of every seven prisoners in Lithuania has
fallen prey to the virus. All three countries will accede to the EU in 2004.
Pursuant to an agreement signed recently between Russia and the EU,
Kaliningrad's denizens will be able to travel to all European destinations
unencumbered by a visa regime.
******
#14
From: "Matthew Maly"
Subject: What is Economics?
Date: Mon, 2 Dec 2002
Wow, what's been happening on the JRL pages lately! A debate on the Russian
economy! First, we had an Aslund piece that was a bit too optimistic, then
there was an opposing Stieglitz piece that was a bit too technical and very
critical of Aslund, and finally there was a piece that completely demolished
Stieglitz' argument, a piece that I personally found convincing. Whom to
believe? I wish I had studied economics! Let me try to sort it out to the
best of my ability.
Ever since graduating from the Moscow School for Mildly Mentally Retarded
with High Honors in Personal Grooming and in Drawing the Vowels, I liked
simple definitions. I define "economics" as "when people produce things that
other people consume". If it is easy to produce things that other people
need, then I define the state of economics as good, but if such things are
not produced, then the economics must be bad.
Everyone wants to advance in this life, and so my Russian classmates and
myself decided to produce mouth wipes for the Severely Mentally Retarded, as
in Russia everyone who lives on a pension is salivating at the sight of
food. As soon as we started production, some bandits came and demanded 20%
of our profit. When we said we don't even know what "profit" was, they hit
us over the head. It hurt. We then called in the militia. They came, stole
our tissues and harassed our secretary. They said they could do so because
they work in law enforcement. We then went to court. The judge named his
price. When we stated our belief that a case must be decided on the basis of
fairness, the judge suggested that we must be Severely Mentally Retarded,
which is a put-down, since we are Mildly Mentally Retarded.
Then the Tax Inspectorate came. We heard that in normal countries, taxes are
structured in a way that rewards success, promotes investment, and
encourages making your enterprise more competitive. We heard that taxes are
just a salary that people pay to the government for provision of social
services, to be done under control of people's democratically elected
representatives. Here, we get no social services and just pay so that the
bureaucrats who strangle us for a living can ride in expensive cars. The
taxes were many, and together with the Racket Tax and Normal Cost of
Business Tax (which means that you have to bribe everyone and can never hope
for justice) they were prohibitively high. It is not just that these taxes
made us uncompetitive on the international market (unless we are lucky
enough to steal resources elsewhere, such as getting the cheapest
electricity rates in the world, or selling oil that used to be a part of
national treasure): these taxes condemned us to never showing any legitimate
profit. When we tell people that in Russia the only way to structure a
business correctly is to make sure it is operating at a loss, people say
that we must be Mentally Retarded, and we are.
Since taxes are just a bribe determined in a course of a negotiation with a
tax inspector, we could stay in business only by reclassifying our
accountant to Severe Amnesia and Advanced Paranoia. Instead of investing to
increase our competitiveness, this accountant was placing money under the
mattress, or buying for the director of an enterprise that pays its workers
$200 per month (so they surely are not consumers in the modern sense of the
word) a villa in France costing $5M. These millions have not come from
production: they are more likely to have come from stripping assets or
impeding production (robbing those who try to produce against all odds
simply because they need to eat). Assets are something that you need for
production in the future. Impeding production means raising the costs of
doing business and making it less competitive.
We are told that normal people keep their money in the bank. Bank is an
honorable, tightly controlled, and accountable institution that finances
worthwhile business projects thereby earning money that it pays back as
interest to its depositors. In Russia, banks are financial institutions
created by people more honest of whom already had criminal convictions.
These institutions were created to facilitate transfer of money abroad,
asset stripping, robbing the general public, and for carrying out Gaidar's
privatization. Such banks never finance viable businesses: they bankroll
well-connected individuals, bankroll at the expense of citizens who kept
their life savings there and at the expense of small businesses that were
required to keep accounts there. When a bank would run out of money it would
simply close its doors and pay back nothing, leaving many of its Mildly
Mentally Retarded depositors feeling like Severely Mentally Retarded.
Another very important economic instrument is a stock market. In Russia,
stock market is when a strongman that used illegal tactic to acquire
significant assets, usually the assets that form a foundation of the Russian
national destiny, wants some easy money to finance his trip to a French
casino. He then goes looking for some Mentally Retarded (or for those who
manage other people's money and may be willing to compromise their
principles) and sells them some paper that states that they are entitled to
"profits" and even to the "opinion as to the management of the company".
Since showing profits means paying Russian taxes and paying Russian taxes
means being Severely Mentally Retarded, the company shows no real profits,
and then distributes (or even then does not distribute!) these "profits" to
shareholders. It is the same with us, Mildly Mentally Retarded: the state
says the food at our mental institution is financed to the tune of 30 cents
a day (which is not a lot, since we are human), but we only get seven cents
worth of food. It's not the economy, stupid, it is who is distributing. If
you want Russian profits, you need to run a Russian company, and a good way
to run one is to kill those who are running it now. Do not forget to take
the rubber stamp from the cadaver's pocket: without the rubber stamp the
bank will not transfer the company money to your personal account!
As far as shareholder rights, it is even funnier. Remember how the racket
hit us over the head? It hurt. Since very often our racketeers is your
majority owners (with rare exceptions, who else could own big business in
Russia BUT the criminal racket?) raising an issue of minority shareholder
rights could get you reclassified into Severely Mentally Retarded, or even
into Dead.
Since Russia has no concept of private property but instead has conditional
temporary possession based on informal personal relationship with power, we
Mildly Mentally Retarded cannot even understand what the term "Russian
stocks" stands for. One Mildly Mentally Retarded had some stock in Gusinsky'
s NTV television station, but exchanged it for a bright red plastic cup he
could quietly spit into whole day long, and he did well, gained some value.
Before you invest in Russian stocks, yet again, after the 1998 debacle, let
me tell you the test we use. If we hit a person over the head once and he
does not want it repeated - then he must be Mildly Mentally Retarded or
better, but if after the first hit he does not care if he is hit again or
not, he is Severely Mentally Retarded or worse. Stocks must reflect
underlying value and represent secure lawful ownership. You cannot always
hope that you will find someone even more stupid than you are to unload your
stocks to since you are already Mentally Retarded enough to have bought
them.
At the Boston Investment Symposium we heard that the Russian economy is
booming and is the envy of the world. Well, we have one Severely Mentally
Retarded who is spending his days trying to scratch back of his head with
his toe, even though we keep telling him that this is a Useless Pursuit. But
Russian economy is just like this: instead of producing, a Russian director
spends his days begging some bureaucrat to let him breathe. There are so
many hours in the day, and the resources are also limited, so that if you
spend most of your time and resources on unproductive activities, the
economy cannot be efficient. Russian economy suffers from an extremely low
creative potential because it continues to be envy-based, and envy is about
destruction of resources. How can an economy which is backward, structurally
inefficient, based on a dilapidated infrastructure, has virtually
impenetrable barriers to entry into business, makes doing business an
extremely risky and humiliating proposition, has no banking system and no
laws, has population whose average disposable income is extremely small, and
suffers from severe demographic and health crises be efficient or poised for
sustainable growth? Russian Minister of Labor Alexander Pochinok claims that
it could, and if you believe Pochinok one wonders if your mental retardation
is really all that mild.
Let me introduce a new verb, to pochinok, and here is its definition. To
pochinok people (and to give them gref) is to assemble intelligent, normal,
and Mildly Mentally Retarded people together (as happened in Boston
recently) and to give them figures that make no economic sense, as if the
audience consisted exclusively of Severely Mentally Retarded.
Another Pochinok figure had to do with falling Russian unemployment. In our
mental institution there are two types of personnel: ones that give us food
and ones that beat us with nightsticks. When we hear that in Russia more
people are employed, we want to know whether they are the ones that feed or
the ones that hit. Russia needs to employ MORE of the first category and
LESS of the second category, and that means that the fact that less people
register for unemployment is not illuminating. In Russia, gangs are always
hiring, while the heroin distributorships offer a sign-up bonus, a free dose
or two. So this decline of unemployment does not make me laugh
uncontrollably with glee, as Pochinok did in Boston: I am not an Idiot, you
see, but Mildly Mentally Retarded.
Since Russian economic life takes place in secret, against the government's
best efforts to control it and to stifle it, it is very hard to measure,
particularly since it is more and more based on such things as drug trade,
international credit card fraud, and prostitution. Yet, Mr. Pochinok
actually had the absence of mind to compare Russian economy and the Russian
stock market FAVORABLY to the American ones. Well, since in our mental
institution we are segregated by sex, we are reduced to measuring the
lengths of our penises for (questionable) sexual satisfaction. But our
physics teacher once told us, "Don't measure your penis while standing next
to a male elephant: it will feel much smaller than it actually is." I would
say to Mr. Pochinok that Boston is not a good venue to brag about Russian
economic success: Russian specialists may well be Mildly Mentally Retarded,
but they are not Blind: a hundred miles out of Moscow - and the true state
of Russian economy will show. Russian economy does have great potential and
it will grow if we succeed in changing the basic principles on which it is
operating, and we cannot start this process unless we get down to discussing
what is it that makes Russian economy so unique and so catastrophically
inefficient.
And just consider : Sorry, have to stop here: I am being led away to pee.
Matthew Maly
http://www.matthew-maly.ru/index-eng.html
Author's Note:
Mild Mental Retardation is convenient because you can always hope to be a
Russian Minister or work for the IMF, but in a course of daily existence, it
could be a severe drawback. I checked myself into an institution for Mildly
Mentally Retarded after I mistook a very generous US government gift to a
small group to American thieves (as proven by the Defense Department Audit
dated December 31, 2001) for the $67M that were ostensibly allocated by the
US Congress for conversion of the former Soviet producers of weapons of mass
destruction. http://www.matthew-maly.ru/index-eng.html#DEF My Russian book,
with a fitting title for a Mildly Mentally Retarded, How to Make Russia a
Normal Country (2nd Edition), will go to Russia's bookstores in two weeks,
right before Christmas.
*******
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