Johnson's Russia List
#6577
28 November 2002
davidjohnson@erols.com
A CDI Project
www.cdi.org
[Contents:
DJ: Happy thanksgiving!
1. Komsomolskaya Pravda: AMERICA OUTDOES RUSSIA ONCE AGAIN.(re prisoners)
2. BBC Monitoring: Russia now has lowest number of strikes in Europe -
labour minister.
3. Moscow Times: Victoria Lavrentieva, GDP Growth Not Real, EBRD Says.
4. Vremya MN: RUSSIAN ECONOMY: ANALYSIS AND FORECASTS. (views of
Vladimir MAU)
5. Financial Times (UK): Andrew Jack, Russia's reform juggernaut slows as
elections approach.
6. Reuters: Half million Russians to die of AIDS by 2010-doctor.
7. Kennan Institute event summary: Russia's Democratic Dilemmas.
(Harley Balzer)
8. Kennan Institute event summary: Dire Demographics: Population Trends
in the Russian Federation. (Julie DaVanzo of RAND)
9. Kennan Institute event summary: Russia Counts: The 2002 Russian
Census. (Cynthia Buckley)
10. Reuters: Putin redresses policy bias with trip to China.
11. Graham Stack: Re: 6575- EU.
12. RIA Novosti: GEOECONOMY CLAIMS ITS RIGHTS IN RUSSIA.
13. pravda.ru: Above All Barriers! German Gref urges businessmen to attack
the government, while Vladimir Potanin declares a currency revolution.
14. The New Republic editorial: A Separate War. Why Putin's Chechnya war
isn't America's fight.
15. Reuters: Russia to close Chechen refugee camps, EU alarmed.
16. Kyodo: Bush told Putin about plans for military commission in Iraq.
17. Reuters: Bush to press for Russian trade benefits.
18. Rossiyskaya Gazeta Says GRU, Police Officers Shot in Hostage Crisis.
19. Yezhenedelny Zhurnal: Sergei Parkhomenko, Alexander Rykli, AMENDMENTS
TO THE TERRORIST ACT. Looking at the first investigation into the Moscow
hostage-taking.
20. Moscow Times: Natalia Yefimova, Legislating the Language Russians Speak.
21. BBC Monitoring: Senators representing Russian regions oppose enforced
use of Cyrillic alphabet.
22. Reuters: Tennis-Yeltsin flies to Paris to support Russian Davis Cup
team.]
*******
#1
Komsomolskaya Pravda
November 28, 2002
AMERICA OUTDOES RUSSIA ONCE AGAIN
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
The United States has outdone Russia once again: this time in its
prison population numbers. In fact, Russia's penitentiary system has
become a "jail and medical care" service. At present, around 500,000
out of Russia's 890,000 prisoners need medical treatment: including
230,000 offenders who are mentally ill, 100,000 who have tuberculosis,
and 36,000 who are HIV-positive.
These figures were revealed by Deputy Justice Minister Yury
Kalinin. The government spends huge sums of money on medical treatment
for prisoners (around 700 million rubles has been allocated for TB
prevention in prisons, which is twice as much as in the previous
year). Food costs have also grown perceptibly. Not long ago, food cost
0.66 rubles per prisoner per day, whereas now this figure is 22 rubles
per day. Next year it will rise to 25 rubles, which actually is not
very much (60% of what a soldier's daily ration costs). Conditions in
Russian prisons are far from meeting European standards.
Owing to new laws and recent amnesties, the number of prisoners
in Russia has finally fallen to 100,000 less than in the United
States.
*******
#2
BBC Monitoring
Russia now has lowest number of strikes in Europe - labour minister
Source: Radio Russia, Moscow, in Russian 1400 gmt 27 Nov 02
The number of strikes in Russia has fallen considerably. Whereas a few years
ago the country went through up to 800 strikes a year, there have only been
80 this year. This is the lowest figure in Europe.
This announcement was made today by Labour and Social Development Minister
Aleksandr Pochinok, who was addressing a conference staged by the Russian
Managers' Association.
Pochinok said what accounted for the fall in the number of protest actions
was a policy of taking mutual interests into account, which was being pursued
by Russian employers.
*******
#3
Moscow Times
November 28, 2002
GDP Growth Not Real, EBRD Says
By Victoria Lavrentieva
Staff Writer
Despite the strong gross domestic product figures posted by the government
over the past three years, the economy has a long way to go before it
starts showing any real growth, the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development cautioned Wednesday in a report urging Russia to diversify the
economy from the resource sectors.
"What we've seen in Russia during the last years by its nature cannot be
considered real economic growth but rather catching up between available
industrial capacities and growth in productivity after the 1998 crisis,"
chief EBRD economist Willem Buiter told reporters at the presentation of
the bank's annual transition report on Russia and 26 other countries in the
former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
The Russian economy has been showing negative growth for much of the past
decade, and its GDP in real terms is still almost 30 percent below the
level it was at in 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed, economists say.
Capacity utilization in Russia is about 57 percent now, back at the levels
where it was in 1993, according to the World Bank, which with the
International Monetary Fund is also pushing Russia to diversify the economy.
"More importantly, it has gone up sharply from 37 percent after the 1998
crisis but remained flat since 2001, which means that it has reached its
maximum level," said Christof R?hl, the World Bank's chief economist for
Russia.
The EBRD expects the economies of the nine most-developed countries of
Central Europe and the Baltics to grow by 3.7 percent in 2003, compared
with a forecast of 2.2 percent in 2002. The EBRD forecasts that Balkan
countries will grow 4.1 percent in 2003, up from 3.6 percent this year.
However, growth in the Commonwealth of Independent States is expected to
slow down to 4.0 percent, down from 4.4 percent this year, as the easy
growth from Russia's oil and gas and the 1998 default and devaluation runs
out of steam.
The Russian government is predicting GDP growth of about 4 percent in 2002
and 3.5 percent to 4.4 percent next year.
"The growth in Russia starting from next year will be only driven by new
capacities, created by investments and by the increase of productivity and
technological progress," R?hl said.
In addition to long-expected progress in the restructuring of Russia's
energy and banking sectors, the EBRD pointed at three main weak spots in
the economy: the lack of diversification, the small role of small and
medium-size companies, and difficulties with both entering and exiting
business projects.
"Diversification of the local industrial groups into noncore sectors is a
good thing, provided it does not restrict the ability of others to do the
same," Buiter said. "It is a positive development that they are bringing
capital to other industries, but the question remains whether they will
encourage competition in these sectors."
According to the EBRD report, successful diversification depends on a
regulatory environment and on the extent to which both domestic and foreign
firms can compete in the new markets that these conglomerates are trying to
enter. "It should be a level playing field for all," Buiter said.
Russia has one of the lowest scores for competition and progress in
restructuring enterprises among the 26 countries surveyed by the EBRD. The
bank said the spread and strengthening of vertically integrated business
conglomerates may constitute a barrier to enterprise reform and development
of SMEs.
SMEs account for 26 percent of Russia's workforce, which is progress but
still two or three times less than in other former communist countries like
Poland or Hungary, the EBRD said. Also, the activities of Russian SMEs
differ drastically from those in other European countries. "They are mainly
active in trade and catering, while very few of them are actually
manufacturing goods," Buiter said.
The EBRD said Russia's private sector contributes 70 percent of GDP, a
chunk that it called "remarkable." But at the same time, the EBRD said
failure to reform the state sector is probably the most important problem.
"Distorted competition caused by various forms of state intervention
remains a key weakness of the Russian business environment," the report said.
However, the bank said it expects to see significant improvements in SMEs
with the introduction of new taxation and accounting procedures for small
companies in early 2003.
*******
#4
Vremya MN
No. 213
November 2002
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
RUSSIAN ECONOMY: ANALYSIS AND FORECASTS
By Vladimir GURVICH
Though there is still a month left till the end of the
year, many economists have already started analysing the
Russian economy's progress this year and making forecasts for
the future.
Below Vladimir MAU, rector of the Academy of the National
Economy under the Russian Federation's government, is assessing
the investment situation in this country.
In Vladimir Mau's opinion, capital investments in 2002
will grow by about 4 percent.
Vladimir Mau admits that this growth is more than modest.
The current investment level makes just 30 to 35 percent of the
1990 level. It seems that this indicator is very low. However,
we should not forget that some twelve years ago the economy was
declining despite a tangible amount of investments. Besides,
the effectiveness of capital investments was much lower than
now.
Today, the GDP growth rates are comparable with the investment
growth rates. This means that investment development will
prevail more and more in Russia, which is a positive phenomenon
in itself. This is the first thing.
Secondly, the influx of capital investments into the
national economy is taking place against the background of low
world investment activity. This cannot but affect the situation
in Russia.
Thirdly, though the growth rates of investments dropped by
more than 3 percent from the 2001 level, the amount of state
investments made in the economy in 2001 was much greater than
this year. The question arises whether we should stimulate
state or private investments. By the way, private investments
will grow more this year than the total amount of investments.
In Vladimir Mau's opinion, this is a positive factor which
means that private capital is still rather active in Russia
against the background of the general investment recession.
Vladimir Mau believes that at present we are in a zone
where the predictability level of real priorities in the
development of the Russian economy is extremely low. Whereas in
the past the state could allow itself to concentrate great
resources in order to channel them into definite sectors, now
it finds it difficult to guess where to invest money. The
policy of concentration of resources should be replaced by that
of the maximum stimulation of the economy's adaptation
potential, which is a sphere of private business.
In Vladimir Mau's opinion, it is irrational and immoral on
the part of the state not to invest money in economic
development when major state institutions, such as the army,
police, courts and customs agencies, experience a deficit of
funds. The thing is that if they operate inefficiently, state
capital investments are not used in the best possible way.
Vladimir Mau predicts investment growth next year if the
government pursues a balanced economic policy course. However,
he believes that the level of this growth will largely depend
on the world market situation. At the same time, it is of no
importance whether foreign or national investments will grow
faster. The main thing is investment growth.
******
#5
Financial Times (UK)
September 28, 2002
Russia's reform juggernaut slows as elections approach
By Andrew Jack
Vladimir Putin has confidently held his own on the international stage,
most recently in a public low-key disagreement about terrorism with US
President George W. Bush. But the Russian president appears less confident
about pursuing his ambitious domestic reforms.
With parliamentary elections due in December 2003 and Mr Putin's own
mandate expiring in March 2004, critics see the Kremlin and the government
falling victim to "reform fatigue". But the delays may also suggest a
new-found realism and even an indication that Russia's fledgling democracy
is working better than many believe.
This week Valentin Zavadnikov, head of the industrial policy committee of
the Federation Council, the upper parliamentary chamber, warned that key
structural reforms - notably of the country's natural monopolies - were
falling behind.
Parliament has postponed consideration of laws on reforming the electricity
sector, triggering warnings that the liberalisation of the market - already
delayed from 2004 to 2005 - could be pushed back for several more years.
Anatoly Chubais, the former head of the presidential administration who now
runs UES, the state electricity operator, says: "The idea that there has
been a slow-down in reforms in the last few months is reality. There are
some unavoidable political laws which exist around the world, when people
think about elections rather than reform, and the short-term rather than
the long-term."
In private, some economic advisers close to the Russian government joke
about a new "Brezhnev era", referring to the stagnation that characterised
the Soviet economy in the 1970s and early 1980s.
The Putin administration got off to a strong start. It swiftly overhauled
much of the tax code, simplifying the rules for companies and cutting
personal tax rates to a flat 13 per cent. Then it pioneered steps towards
pension fund reform, the sale of agricultural land, and the introduction of
new civil and criminal codes.
But the date 2004 recurs in most of the timetables, whether for the
transfer of personal pension investments to private fund managers, moves
towards a professional army, the introduction of international accounting
standards for banks, or changes to improve the efficiency and independence
of the judiciary.
Other reforms have made still less progress. As Mr Zavadnikov puts it, so
far "no-one has seen" the long-promised and frequently-delayed government
proposals for restructuring the monopolistic gas market and its heavily
subsidised tariffs.
While government officials point to a busy legislative agenda, many of the
new laws will prove useless without fair implementation. That requires a
smaller and less corrupt bureaucracy. But attempts to restructure the civil
service and tackle corruption remain modest, and a recent World Bank report
pointed out that employment in Russia's public sector was rising.
Over the past few months, Mr Putin himself has castigated Mikhail Kasyanov,
the prime minister, for slowing economic growth, diminishing the chances of
meeting his target of outstripping Portugal's GDP by 2015. In his state of
the nation address this spring, he specifically lamented the lack of
progress on administrative reform.
Yet many analysts remain optimistic. Alexei Zabotkine, chief strategist
with UFG, a Moscow investment bank, says: "The whole process remains under
way. There is some deceleration ahead of the elections, but the litmus test
for me is a constant reiteration of a commitment to reform by the
authorities."
Roland Nash, head of research at the bank Renaissance Capital, says: "The
reform plan has slowed but it's a programmed slow-down. It's encouraging
that the government is determined not to be too ambitious. It's
disappointing from a macro-economic viewpoint, but understandable
politically."
Some argue that the minutiae of the technical details of reform are simply
less eye-catching than the initial sweeping changes. Others point to the
need for government to concentrate on a few key issues rather than
spreading its efforts too thinly.
Vladimir Mau, a senior government economic adviser and rector of the
Academy of Public Economy, stresses: "Structural reforms are complicated.
The Putin administration has carried out more than I expected in the
beginning, although less than I would want."
The Kremlin has shown itself sensitive to public opinion in recent months,
delaying housing reforms after angry pensioners protested against higher
heating bills. Many see its hand behind the slowdown in electricity reform,
which has been sharply criticised by politicians and by Andrei Illarionov,
Mr Putin's own economic adviser.
Even Mr Chubais remains sanguine. "The real recovery in the economy in the
past three years has been because [Mr Putin] chose the right strategy. He
definitely could do more, but he has achieved more than I expected."
In implicitly endorsing a reform timetable that runs well into his second
term, Mr Putin is at the very least laying out his achievements and his
future programme in more detail and with more notice than he did in his
2000 campaign.
*******
#6
Half million Russians to die of AIDS by 2010-doctor
By Ron Popeski
MOSCOW, Nov 27 (Reuters) - At least half a million Russians will die of AIDS
by 2010 given current infection rates and the authorities' failure to curb
the epidemic, the country's top AIDS specialist said on Wednesday.
Vadim Pokrovsky, head of Russia's official AIDS centre, said the official
number of HIV-infection cases now topped 220,000, though public awareness
remained low with only a relatively small number of actual AIDS sufferers.
He urged authorities to devote more attention and money to the problem.
Pokrovsky said the real number of HIV cases probably stood at about a
million, with many likely to die within a decade.
"We know that within 10-11 years, as these people became infected maybe five
years ago...no fewer than half of those infected will die," he told a news
conference ahead of World Aids Day on December 1. "That means a minimum of
half a million dead. And possibly even a million deaths."
Pokrovsky said that while the rate of infection had slowed in the past year
-- 40,000 new cases this year against 87,000 in 2001 -- Russia still faced
vast problems, with an annual budget of $6 million far short of what was
needed. But only about 800 people had actually been diagnosed as having AIDS.
"The problem is still on the rise even if the rate has fallen. That gives no
grounds for optimism because it is clear that what we are doing in Russia is
insufficient," he said.
PRIORITIES
The problem was not one of funds, he said, but of priorities.
"Recently we were told the former president of Russia (Boris Yeltsin)
receives an annual allowance of $2 million. Whether or not this is needed is
not for me to say," he said.
"Or raising a submarine for $200 million -- I cannot answer that either," he
added, referring to the operation to retrieve the wreck of the Kursk, which
sank in Arctic waters in 2000 with 118 lives lost. "But this simply shows the
resources are there."
Pokrovsky has led attempts to draw attention to the rise in HIV infection as
well as the high incidence of diseases long eradicated in the West, like
syphilis.
Russia's Justice Ministry said on Wednesday that some 36,000 inmates out of a
million-strong prison population were infected with HIV. Another 90,000 had
tuberculosis and more than 100,000 were drug users.
Pokrovsky said earlier this year that rising HIV infection rates made AIDS a
more frightening phenomenon in Russia than in Africa, because of the
country's declining birth rate.
He said on Wednesday that drug use remained the most common source of
infection at about 80 percent. But sexual transmission cases had climbed to
11 percent from four percent.
Some cities were particularly hit by increases, with Norilsk in the Arctic,
Tolyatti on the Volga and Orenburg in the south -- recording rates of more
than one percent of the population.
The first two, he said, had relatively high standards of living and therefore
greater activity by drug dealers, while the third was on a drug trade route
from nearby Kazakhstan.
******
#7
Kennan Institute
event summary
Russia's Democratic Dilemmas
October 21, 12:00
In a recent seminar at the Kennan Institute, Harley Balzer, Associate
Professor of Government, Georgetown University, discussed the prospects for
Russian democracy. Balzer began by noting that, “authoritarian political
systems rarely evolve into democratic systems, unless they have enormous
pressure from either the outside or the inside.” “In the post-9/11 world,”
he continued, “there has been a shift back to Cold War pattern of the
United States and other countries being perfectly willing to accept
authoritarian regimes that support our international policy.” This means
that if Russia is going to become more democratic, “it has to be the result
of internal social and political pressure,” and in his estimation, three
major dilemmas; the Russian economy, Putin’s politics, and dismal
demographics limit the potential for this internal pressure.
Balzer explained that recent improvement in Russia’s economy is based
primarily on the devaluation of the ruble and higher prices for energy
exports, while there is weakness in the development of the real economy and
small business sectors. In Balzer’s opinion, Russia’s economy is typical of
countries that are rich in natural resources, where “the energy sector
dominates and in some cases drives out the real economy.” He noted that
finished goods account for less than ten percent of exports, and small and
medium businesses continue to be restricted by rent-seeking bureaucrats and
the criminal world. Balzer further stated that in Russia’s resource-based
economy most of the professionals, people like university professors,
teachers, and medical workers, are not earning enough to play the social
and political leadership roles that they assumed in Russia before 1917.
Balzer described Russia’s political system as “managed pluralism.” He
explained that while many cite political stability as evidence of reform,
the development of political openings and the pressures that would force
the ruling elite to divest itself of control remain weak. According to
Balzer, Putin is attempting to create a form of “soft authoritarianism
suitable to the 21st century global age,” more specifically “a system in
which diversity is entertained, but kept within acceptable limits.” Balzer
noted that the national law on religion, Putin’s views on political
parties, and the treatment of the national media fit this pattern of
control. Balzer stated that it appears that Russian policies are headed in
the wrong direction for democratic consolidation in areas such as electoral
and party finance codes, voter registration, information transparency and
decentralization of political authority.
Finally, Balzer explained how the demographic situation in Russia—a
shrinking and ageing population, a looming HIV/AIDS crisis, and the
inevitability of immigration--creates a situation in which it is extremely
difficult to liberalize. The political implications of the demographic
situation include a greater possibility for right-wing extremism,
differential policies in Russian regions, and greater social tensions that
will encourage the Kremlin to “continue its policy of managed pluralism.”
Balzer concluded that while the points raised in his remarks do not
forecast imminent economic collapse or a crisis for democracy in Russia,
serious questions remain about the medium and long-term economic outlook,
the development of social, intellectual and human capital, and the
potential for democratic consolidation.
*******
#8
Kennan Institute
event summary
Dire Demographics: Population Trends in the Russian Federation
October 7, 2002
In a recent presentation at the Kennan Institute, Julie DaVanzo, Senior
Economist and Director, Population Matters Program, RAND, discussed the
devastating demographic situation in Russia. She noted that researchers are
eagerly awaiting the pending results of the latest Russian census (the
first of the post-communist era), which are expected to show that the
country is experiencing a sharp decline in population. DaVanzo explained
the nature and extent of the population decline, highlighting the recent
trends in Russian fertility, mortality, and immigration rates, and offered
several policy recommendations that could help address the problem.
Russian deaths have been increasing over the past four decades and since
1992, have outnumbered Russian births. This difference, combined with
declining rates of immigration, lower fertility rates and higher mortality
rates, has led researchers to predict that Russia’s population could fall
from its 2000 level of 145 million to 142 million by 2010. DaVanzo
explained that if Russia were to continue at its current rate of decrease,
projections by the U.S. Census Bureau imply that by 2050 it would have a
population of 127 million, a loss of nearly 18 million people over 50 years
(and she noted that some others project an even smaller total population
size then). DaVanzo’s research also illustrated that although Russia’s
fertility rate, of 1.2 children per woman, is low (and well below the
“replacement” level [2.1 children per woman] that ultimately leads to the
stabilization of population size), it is not unusual for the region. While
the sad state of Russia’s economy may contribute to this low level of
fertility, it is not clear that economic improvements will lead to
increases in fertility. Data from other Eastern European countries, such as
Poland and Hungary, showed that economic recovery has not boosted the
fertility rates in those countries. Although abortion was once the most
common form of birth control for Russian women, recent improvements in the
availability and quality of contraception, and the increases in
contraceptive use that have resulted, have led to a substantial reduction
in the number of abortions performed.
DaVanzo pointed out that Russia is also facing a rising mortality rate,
especially among working men, whose life expectancy is lower now than it
was in the mid-1960s. Circulatory diseases and external causes (i.e.,
injury, poisoning, or violence) contributed the most to the rise in
mortality rates in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The social and political
upheaval that followed the break-up of the Soviet Union appears to have
contributed to the increase in stress-related circulatory diseases that
also helped boost mortality rates in the early 1990s. DaVanzo noted that
alcohol abuse helps explain the high levels and variations in life
expectancy and mortality in Russia and that the data show a strong negative
correlation between per capita alcohol consumption and male life expectancy.
DaVanzo stated that the inefficiency of the Russian healthcare system has
also affected Russia’s mortality rates. Under the old Soviet system,
healthcare was originally designed to control infectious diseases, rather
than treat more modern “civilization” illnesses, such as cardiovascular
disease. There was an emphasis on quantity over quality, which resulted in
poorly trained healthcare personnel and inadequate medical facilities.
Currently, she continued, there is very little emphasis on preventative
care or public health. One particularly disturbing finding showed that the
current high death rates come from largely preventable diseases. Because
wages for healthcare professionals are so low, many of the more skilled or
better educated elect to emigrate to the West.
In conclusion, DaVanzo discussed several broad policy implications from
Russia’s current demographic situation. As more Russians enter pension ages
(60+ for men, 55+ for women) there will be a marked decline in the ratio of
working-age adults compared to the rest of the population. Other
implications include a large drop in the availability of military-age men,
which could affect Russian security policy, and a shrinking youth
population, resulting in less need for youth services (educators, schools,
etc.). DaVanzo reviewed some of the policy options that Russia could be
consider to stem its population decline. She noted that past pro-natalist
policies were largely unsuccessful; the anti-alcohol campaign, though
successful in reducing alcohol consumption and mortality, was so unpopular
that it was abandoned; and policies to increase immigration are likely to
be very controversial politically. Policies to reduce mortality are
probably more likely to be successful than those to increase fertility, and
economic improvements are likely to help improve health and increase life
expectancy. Because high Russian death rates are due in large part to poor
health behaviors (too much smoking and drinking and unhealthy diets),
public health programs could play an important role. Russian and Western
leaders must work together to look for ways to help improve the health and
life expectancy of the people of Russia.
*******
#9
Kennan Institute
event summary
Russia Counts: The 2002 Russian Census
November 18, 2002
In a recent seminar at the Kennan Institute, Cynthia Buckley, Associate
Professor of Sociology at the University of Texas discussed the recent
Russian census and the implications of its early findings. She explained that
Russian leaders had hoped that the historic census would help resolve
concerns about population change and provide insight into state capacity.
Buckley, who participated as a member of an international delegation sent to
observe the census, noted several technical problems and political
difficulties associated with the census. She contended that the problems and
difficulties encountered by the census gatherers would influence the data
generated through the census process and urged care in the interpretation of
forthcoming census results.
Originally scheduled for 1999, the Russian census was delayed several times
due to financial concerns, most notably the 1998 ruble collapse. Emotionally
charged debates concerning questions of religious identification (not asked
on the census), ethnicity, and linguistic identification marked census
discussions and preparations over the past three years, leading some scholars
to questions if the census would actually appear. Finally, however, Russian
officials managed to push forward and issued the census from October 16-23,
2002.
Prior to the census, most researchers and officials were concerned over
expected low response rates, possible problems with double counting, a lack
of consistency across enumerators and regions, self-censoring on ethnicity
and language, and an inability to accurately enumerate the illegal migrant
population. During the actual survey many of these problems were present, and
Buckley noted that she also observed various technical problems such as
double counting, poorly trained enumerators, variation on question formation,
and supply difficulties (with some regions region running out of
questionnaires). Buckley noted that all of these problems could have a
significant effect on the overall census findings, particularly at the
regional level.
Buckley pointed out that census enumerators also encountered political
difficulties that will have implications on the findings. She explained how
census organizers were unsure of how to address the migrant and refugee
question, choosing in some cases to just ignore it, which will likely cause
an undercount in Russia's larger cities and southern regions. According to
Buckley, regional pressures on ethnic or linguistic identification,
especially in the south, motivated many respondents of various backgrounds to
list Russian as their ethnicity and language. She predicted that this would
likely portray in an inaccurate increase in the number of ethnic Russians,
even with the appearance of new categories such as Cossack, emerging.
Regional variations also include possible gender effects, as women were
usually more likely to be registered, causing an undercount in the number of
working age men in high migration regions.
Buckley concluded by stating that the early results indicate that ethnic and
self-identification appear very flexible. Early findings also show that due
to the significant differences in the wording of questions on language use,
family structure, and marriage will make comparative analysis with the
findings of the 1989 Soviet census difficult.
*******
#10
Putin redresses policy bias with trip to China
By Richard Balmforth
MOSCOW, Nov 28 (Reuters) - Russian President Vladimir Putin, whose
pro-Western leanings caught China on the hop, restores the balance next
week with a visit to the Asian communist giant.
The December 1-3 official visit will give the Kremlin chief an early chance
of sizing up a new Chinese leadership after this month's reshuffle to bring
a younger generation -- and nearer Putin's age -- to the fore.
Ex-communist Russia and reform-minded communist China are bound to play up
the areas they have in common. But Putin is unlikely to show any signs of
cooling his ardour for Washington and the West in general.
"China will be dying to know from Putin whether this (pro-Washington
policy) is here to stay or not, whether this is tactics or strategy and I
think he needs to tell them this is strategy," said foreign policy analyst
Dmitry Trenin of the Carnegie Endowment think-tank.
Both powers stressed common positions -- including Iraq, NATO enlargement
and the declared war on terrorism -- ahead of Putin's first official trip
to Beijing since July 2000.
And the stage is set for Putin and China's Russian-speaking President Jiang
Zemin, in his twilight years in power, to extol the friendship and
cooperation treaty signed last year.
"We hope we will succeed in reaching new boundaries in cooperation," Putin
said last weekend.
Analysts say both powers still see some strategic need to counterbalance
the United States and an expanding NATO, which both view warily while
independently pursuing closer ties with Washington and the U.S.-led alliance.
More tangibly, the Sino-Russian relationship is also fed by a common
sympathy with each other's separatist problems, China's desire for Russian
weapons and oil, Moscow's need for goods from booming China, and their
4,200 km (2,625 miles) shared border.
BEIJING DOWNGRADED AFTER SEPT 11
Putin downgraded Moscow's relations with Beijing after throwing his weight
behind U.S. President George W. Bush's "war on terrorism" after the
September 11, 2001, airliner attacks.
China, indulged by Putin's predecessor Boris Yeltsin who allowed Russia to
serve as a counter-weight to U.S. world influence, was thrown off balance
by the speed with which the Kremlin rushed to Washington's support,
analysts say.
But the lucrative market China represents for Russian arms, oil and gas as
well as its huge geo-strategic importance makes nuclear-armed China a
partner Putin still has to take seriously.
Analysts said Putin will certainly want to measure up China's new communist
chief Hu Jintao and other newcomers to Beijing's power line-up who take
office early next year.
Contrasting them to the Soviet-educated Jiang, who sentimentally joined in
a Russian sing-song at Moscow's State University last year, Trenin said:
"It is vital for Putin to cultivate these people. Unlike Jiang, they are
not people who automatically have a warm place in their heart for Russia."
IRAQ,N.KOREA ON THE MENU
The Russian and Chinese leaders, whose countries are permanent members of
the U.N. Security Council, are certain to consider possible U.S. military
action in Iraq early next year.
Publicly, at least, the two sides will stress the role of the Security
Council in approving any use of force in the event of Iraqi non-compliance
with arms inspections.
On other foreign policy issues, they are sure to talk about ways of
convincing North Korea to drop its plans to develop nuclear weapons --
though whether they will find a way of exerting pressure on Pyongyang
remains to be seen.
Putin and Jiang, who say they both face internal separatist threats from
Muslim groups, will find common language on the fight against terror.
China backs Putin's tough stance on Chechnya and, unlike the West, does not
lecture him on the need to find a political solution or criticise rights
abuses by the Russian military.
China has called for international support for its own campaign against
separatists from its Uighur ethnic minority in the northwestern region of
Xinjiang.
Russian officials said the two sides would commit themselves to boosting
trade after last year's record $10.67 billion.
One sore point could be illegal Chinese migration into under-developed
Siberia, a hot issue among Russians in the far east. Officials also
expected progress on a territorial dispute involving two spots on the
border which has bedevilled relations for more than 30 years.
*******
#11
From: Graham Stack (graham_stack@yahoo.com)
Subject: Re: 6575- EU
Date: Wed, 27 Nov 2002
I haven’t read the full Prodi interview mentioned in
JRL 6575 /12, but isn’t it sensational that a Russian
president is enquiring about the concrete conditions
for a EU membership candidacy? And with what mandate
does Prodi brush him off? And what does he mean by
Russia being ‘too big’? Could he not be a little bit
more specific and at least say whether he is talking
about territory or population? Its not actually
particularly clear why either of these should exclude
Russia for all time from the EU, (let alone the
Ukraine).
At the moment there is quite an interesting debate
going on in Europe about eventual Turkish membership
and none at all about eventual Russian or Ukrainian.
Obviously, Russia could not join the EU in the near
future, but being accorded a status similar to that
Turkey has enjoyed is surely not too far fetched. This
would be in the short term strongly to the advantage
of Europe if it brought about a similar framework for
reform which has improved the human rights situation
in Turkey.
There would no doubt be many voices ridiculing the
idea due to the situation in Chechnya. But here’s the
rub: there are at the moment almost no international
institutional incentives for Russian reform
(strengthening the rule of law, democracy and human
rights), except in the limited policy field covered by
WTO negotiations. The factors driving Russian reform
are Putin’s popularity and will, ( the former is based
to some extent on the hardline in Chechnya, the latter
subject to electoral pressures), a certain sensitivity
to international reputation, and lobbying by powerful
economic interests, who can take care of themselves
when it comes to abuses by state security organs.
Would it not have been wiser for Prodi to have
answered that the sine qua non before there is any
consideration of a Russian EU candidacy has to be a
political solution in Chechnya?
*******
#12
C O M M E N T A R Y GEOECONOMY CLAIMS ITS RIGHTS IN RUSSIA
MOSCOW, NOVEMBER 27, 2002. /FROM RIA NOVOSTI POLITICAL ANALYST YURI
FILIPPOV/. Geoeconomy in Russia is becoming as important as geopolitics.
Therefore, the government's recent meetings held a few days after the NATO
summit in Prague where it was decided to grant former Soviet republics of
Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia access to the alliance showed that the
ministers were much more concerned about Russian exporters' support than the
increase of arms arsenals. Also the State Duma International Committee
refrained from rending the air with belligerent statements on those
"after-Prague" days, holding peaceful parliamentary hearings on the same
export issue instead.
These are rather characteristic symptoms proving that geoeconomic ideology is
gradually but steadily claiming its rights in Russia.
When did it happen that economic cooperation with Western countries pushed
aside Russia's traditional confrontation with that very West represented by
NATO? On the 11th of September 2001? Or a little later, during the Putin-Bush
meeting on the ranch in Taxis? Or, perhaps, it happened at the Russia-NATO
meeting in the suburbs of Genoa, which nearly resulted in announcing their
strategic alliance?
This is obviously the case when any answer will do. Because Russia's
generally changing position in the world, confirmation of its new urge
towards raising problems before partners from geoeconomic, not purely
geopolitical point of view develop from a number of these answers. Combating
antidumping measures with respect to Russian exporters, promoting Russian
companies to the world markets, tax and customs regulations are gradually
becoming key issues in Russia's foreign policy.
However, could it have been otherwise? The fact that economic potential in
international relations time and again proves to be more often than military
power has not been discovered specifically by Russia. This is an all-world
trend, which one can only avail oneself of - either to advantage or not.
Today a successful export-oriented metallurgic industrial plant can replace
several divisions, while a big vertically integrated transnational oil or gas
company can be perfectly compared with a victorious army. But with an only
distinction, that they work for themselves and for their country without
inflicting any damage to other nations. International economic competition is
mankind's great invention, allowing nations to accumulate riches without
waging wars or shedding blood.
The only, though serious, danger lies in the fact that being a participant in
international competition you may lose. If it should happen to Russia, it
would be a sensation after which geopolitics, stake on power confrontation
and striving for economic autarchy can dominate here for a long time.
Accordingly, now many factors depend on Russia's foreign partners, on their
readiness to reach reasonable compromises. In the middle of December Geneva
will host a regular meeting of the working group on Russia's joining the WTO.
It will dot all the i's concerning agriculture, the services sector and
customs fees. But the main problem is whether the West agrees that it is high
time Russia's new geoeconomy-oriented foreign policy turned from a sensation
to a commonplace fact.
*******
#13
pravda.ru
November 27, 2002
Above All Barriers!
German Gref urges businessmen to attack the government, while Vladimir
Potanin declares a currency revolution.
The Russian Union of Businessmen and Industrialists has finally actively
started defending the rights of Russian business. The union held a
conference on currency regulation today. RF Minister of Economic
Development and Trade German Gref spoke at the conference; in fact, he
called upon officials of the Union of Businessmen and Industrialists to be
more active defending their rights.
From the beginning, German Gref admitted that tax, non-tax, and
administrative costs of Russian business currently make up 50% of the Gross
Domestic Product. In his words, 40% of the GDP are tax and non-tax costs of
the Russian business exempted by the government, 10% of the GDP are the
spending on the overcoming of administrative barriers. The chief liberal of
the Russian government stated that ,although the government has carried out
a tax reforms, the tax burden and costs of the Russian business are still
extremely high in Russia.
His opinion is that the currency and customs regulations fixed in Russian
legislation are in fact lagging behind the pace of development of the
Russian bank system and Russian business on the whole. “Moreover, in most
cases, the measures of state currency regulation are not observed by
Russian business, and they often don’t work at all.”
The governmental legislation on currency regulation is also abundant in
faults and errors, German Gref says. However, there is still a chance to
amend and improve it before submitting to the State Duma. The minister
urged Russian businessmen to demonstrate more actively their position
concerning the problem to the authorities. He thinks that it’s time to give
up the practice of state measures of currency regulation being carried out
at the expense of the RF economic subjects. German Gref says that a maximum
liberalization of the currency regulation regime would allow Russian
businesses to reduce their costs.
The position of the Russian business community was substantially expressed
by the president of the Interros holding, member of the Union of
Businessmen and Industrialists Board, Vladimir Potanin. To his regret,
Vladimir Potanin had to admit that Russian legislation on currency
regulation, a really pressing problem for the Russian economy, is lags
behind the reality.
In fact, Vladimir Potanin formulated the key postulates of a currency
revolution in Russia. In his words, the RF Ministry of Finance and the Bank
of Russia must certainly retain several governing functions in the sphere
of currency regulation. On the other hand, it’s time to radically
reconsider the attitude of the state towards Russian business in the sphere
of currency regulation. It’s high time to turn operations of a capital
nature into informative operations only, and not impose far-fetched
restrictions upon them. In addition, the Central Bank’s viewpoint on the
obligatory sale of currency proceeds must be abolished once and for all.
Certainly, the legislation on currency regulation developed by the
government currently takes into account the interests of Russian business
and provides some certain balance of the interests of the state and the
businessmen, Potanin says. When the legislation is adopted, the life of
large-scale business in Russia will become easier. However, remaining
administrative barriers will be all the same a hard barrier for the small-
and medium-scale business in Russia. In this connection, Potanin says that
the government should pay its closest attention to the problem.
Akhtyam Akhtyrov
PRAVDA.Ru
Translated by Maria Gousseva
******
#14
The New Republic
December 2, 2002
Editorial
A Separate War
Why Putin's Chechnya war isn't America's fight.
All the evidence suggests that Vladimir Putin is about to retaliate against
last month's terrorist attack on a Moscow theater with characteristic
ruthlessness. His generals have halted a planned troop pullout from Chechnya
and vowed a renewed Russian offensive. Putin himself has stepped up his
rhetoric, vowing never to negotiate with Chechnya's elected president. And
the Russian Duma has voted to amend media laws to further restrict press
coverage of future military actions in the breakaway republic.
Given Russia's past forays into Chechnya, these developments ought to be a
matter of some concern in Washington. Human rights organizations have
documented Russian abuses in Chechnya in gory detail--including, in one
recent case, the discovery of the burned remains of nine civilians killed by
Russian forces. At least 140,000 Chechens have been forced to flee the
province. Yet, so far, Washington has shown virtually no concern at all.
President Bush has declared this a "'time of solidarity" with Russia.
Speaking with European reporters earlier this week, the president explained
that America's "good friend" Putin should "do what it takes to protect his
people from ... terrorist attacks"--implicitly acceding to Putin's
long-standing argument that his actions in Chechnya are of a piece with the
U.S. war on terrorism. They're not. Russia clearly faces a threat in
Chechnya, but, Putin's spin notwithstanding, that threat is secession, not
global Islamic terrorism. Unlike the killers in Bali and at the World Trade
Center, the Chechens have a specific, local grievance: They want autonomy or
independence. According to Thomas de Waal, co-author of a comprehensive book
on Chechnya titled Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus, most Chechens are
liberal Sufi Muslims who have no sympathy for Islamic fundamentalism and
whose decade-long campaign has focused on one goal: leaving Russia. (Chechens
are far more likely to dress in leather jackets or traditional headscarves
than chadors.) What's more, in part because the region is surrounded on three
sides by Russian troops and on the fourth by high mountains, few Islamist
volunteers have traveled to Chechnya from abroad.
Putin's American apologists say the United States can't afford to be
squeamish about human rights in Chechnya because we need Russia's help in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and beyond. But, in fact, it is precisely because of
geostrategic concerns that the United States must distinguish Russia's
actions in Chechnya from U.S. efforts against global Islamist terrorism.
Giving Moscow a free pass in Chechnya--as the Bush administration seems
strongly inclined to do--will further alienate moderate Muslims around the
world from U.S. goals and interests. Indeed, Islamists have already begun
using Russian atrocities in Chechnya as an issue with which to bludgeon the
United States. On his latest audiotape attempt to reach his target
audience--young Muslim men--Osama bin Laden explicitly refers to Chechnya.
Islamic extremists in Britain have highlighted Chechnya in speeches, calling
on followers to fight the United States and its allies to the death. Islamist
leaders in Pakistan have made the plight of Chechen Muslims a central focus
of their anti-Western diatribes.
Certainly, fear of offending public opinion in the Muslim world cannot be the
overriding goal of U.S. foreign policy. There are many cases--the war in
Afghanistan, the potential war with Iraq, U.S. support for Israel--where
American security and American principles require ignoring the sentiment of
the Muslim "street." But Russia's abuses in Chechnya are not such a case. Our
values clearly impel us to push for a peaceful solution to that conflict.
And, while Russia's cooperation in the war on terrorism is important, Putin
has many more reasons to cooperate with the United States than not.
Ultimately, if the United States hopes to win the war on terrorism, it must
persuade moderate Muslims that it is not fighting a war against Islam.
Several of the biggest catches in the battle against Al Qaeda have taken
place in Pakistan, for instance, where a shaky government relies on the
support of moderate Muslims and where Islamists have made major gains over
the past year. The United States, in other words, needs not only military
victories but political ones as well. Coming to the aid of threatened Muslim
minorities in the Balkans during the 1990s helped improve America's image in
the Muslim world, demonstrating that our political ideals pertain regardless
of religion. Funding programs for moderate Muslim scholars and helping build
liberal, secular schools so poor children in countries like Pakistan have an
alternative to radical madrassas may help as well. But such efforts will be
of little use if the United States is seen as abetting, without comment or
criticism, the Russian bloodletting in Chechnya. The world is watching.
******
#15
Russia to close Chechen refugee camps, EU alarmed
By Maria Golovnina
MOSCOW, Nov 27 (Reuters) - Russia said on Wednesday it would close "tent
cities" housing tens of thousands of Chechen refugees by late December, but
the European Union expressed concern over the safety of those who may be
forced to go home.
More than 70,000 Chechen refugees, up to 30,000 of them living in tents, are
refusing to return to the war-torn homeland they fled after Russia began its
second post-Soviet drive to crush the southern province's bid for
independence in 1999.
"There is an intention to send these people back to their native lands in the
nearest future, perhaps in December," Aleksei Vasin, spokesman for the
pro-Russian Chechen administration, told Reuters from the regional capital
Grozny.
The European Union, a major aid donor to Chechnya, said a lack of security in
the separatist region did not allow for the safe return of refugees, mainly
sheltering in Russia's tiny province of Ingushetia, which borders mostly
Muslim Chechnya.
"The European Commission, and the international community at large, have
repeatedly asked the authorities not to close any camp in Ingushetia...,"
Poul Nielson, the EU's top aid official, said in a statement.
"Forcing (refugees) to go back to Chechnya, where the conflict is still going
on, would be against international humanitarian law as well as conventions
that the Russian Federation is party to," he said.
BURNING TENTS
One refugee family told Reuters it was leaving for Grozny along with 30 other
families after local officials threatened to start burning their tents on
December 1.
Earlier this year, the Vienna-based International Helsinki Federation accused
Moscow of trying to force the refugees out by cutting off their water and
food supplies. It also said the authorities have failed to set up adequate
accommodation.
The Chechen Salvation Committee, a local human rights body working with the
refugees, said senior Ingush officials had visited the tent cities this week
to urge people to move out before the camps are closed down on December 20.
"The officials told them that otherwise Russian troops would have to deport
them by force," it said in a press release.
Vasin denied the refugees were unwilling to leave camps.
"It is not true that the refugees refuse to go home," he said. "I believe
about 80 percent of them will eventually go back to Chechnya, where we have
built housing in 13 areas to accommodate them. And please note that we
continue to build."
Igor Yunash of Russia's Federal Migration Service said those who wanted to
stay would be given homes in Ingushetia.
Security has been stepped up around the camps since Chechen separatists took
some 800 people hostage in a Moscow theatre in October, demanding Russian
forces quit their homeland.
The authorities suspect refugees in the camps of aiding rebels in Chechnya,
which won de facto independence from Russia after a 1994-1996 war.
But just three years later, then-Prime Minister Vladimir Putin sent Russian
forces back into the province to reassert Moscow's authority.
*******
#16
Bush told Putin about plans for military commission in Iraq
MOSCOW, Nov. 28 (Kyodo) - U.S. President George W. Bush informed President
Vladimir Putin last week about his plans to form a multilateral military
occupation commission in Iraq after toppling its leader by force, a Russian
diplomatic source said Thursday.
Bush told Putin about the plan during their summit talks in Russia last
Friday on the outskirts of St. Petersburg, but the Russian leader was
noncommittal as the plan did not make clear the involvement by the United
Nations, the source said.
The U.S. leader envisioned using military force to overthrow Iraqi
President Saddam Hussein and creating a U.S.-led commission -- including
Russia, Britain, Germany and France -- to oversee a joint international
military rule of Iraq, the source said.
The commission will be modeled after the Far Eastern Commission, which was
an international panel for the Allies' military rule over Japan following
World War II and included the United States and the Soviet Union among its
11 members.
The U.S. hopes to set up the body without necessarily getting approval from
the U.N. and last for an indefinite period of time until transferring its
role over to international civilian rule, according to the source.
But Washington may compromise and give the U.N. a part in the process in
consideration of Russia's position of having the world body take central
roles in such multilateral undertaking and of Britain's assertion of having
an interim rule in Iraq led by the organization.
In the summit talks, Putin backed U.S. efforts to force Iraq to dismantle
its weapons of mass destruction, and along with Bush warned Baghdad to
comply fully with a U.N. Security Council resolution calling for such
dismantling or face ''serious consequences.''
The Russian president, however, said the U.S. must act within the U.N.
framework in deciding to use force against Iraq.
While Moscow officials believe it would benefit Russia to take part in the
occupation commission to protect its rights and interests, some Putin aides
are unhappy the U.S. did not promise any rewards for Russia's making
concessions on the U.N. Security Council resolution on arms inspections in
Iraq, the source said.
Putin also urged Washington to exert influence in maintaining the price of
crude oil at the current level, saying Russia, which depends highly on oil
trade, could suffer a financial blow if oil production in a post-Saddam
Iraq recovers and oversupply forces the price to dip below $14 per barrel,
according to the source.
Bush said he will make such efforts and expressed understanding over the
protection of the rights of Russian oil businesses to develop the product,
gained during Saddam's rule, but did not indicate any specific measures on
the matter, the source said.
*******
#17
Bush to press for Russian trade benefits
WASHINGTON, Nov 27 (Reuters) - The Bush administration has told Russia it
will press Congress to lift Soviet-era restrictions on trade early next
year, U.S. officials said on Wednesday, rewarding Moscow for its
cooperation ahead of a possibly conflict with Iraq.
Senior Republican and Democratic congressional aides said a compromise was
possible, but a similar effort failed last year despite pressure from
President George W. Bush.
Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin discussed the issue when they met
last week in St. Petersburg, and U.S. officials promised to seek
legislative action as early as January, when Congress reconvenes.
The move is part of a broader diplomatic effort by Washington to ready its
allies for a possible war with Iraq. Israel, Turkey are among the countries
negotiating military and economic aid packages with Washington.
At issue for Russia is the 1974 Jackson-Vanik amendment, Cold War
legislation that links trade and emigration policies. To the Russians, the
amendment is more a diplomatic than economic affront. While it prohibits
countries without market economies from enjoying normal trade relations
with the United States, Russia has received annual waivers for years.
Bush pressed for congressional action last year but lawmakers balked, in
part to protest a dispute over Russian imports of U.S. poultry.
Many Democratic lawmakers were also wary of giving up Jackson-Vanik because
they see it as leverage in negotiations over Moscow's accession to the
World Trade Organization (WTO). They want Russia to agreed to sweeping new
measures to open its economy to foreign competition.
But key Democratic congressional aides said a compromise could be reached
early next year creating a new mechanism giving lawmakers input into the
WTO negotiations in exchange for lifting the Jackson-Vanik restrictions.
Eager for congressional action, Moscow has signaled support for such a
compromise, an aide said.
"We have made clear (to Moscow) that we are going to work very closely with
Congress to graduate Russia from Jackson-Vanik," U.S. National Security
Council spokesman Sean McCormack said.
In June, the Bush administration acknowledged Russia as a market economy,
easing Russian access to U.S. markets. The move was Putin's first tangible
payoff for vocal support of the U.S. military response to the Sept. 11
attacks.
*******
#18
Rossiyskaya Gazeta Says GRU, Police Officers Shot in Hostage Crisis
Rossiyskaya Gazeta
26 November 2002
Report by Timofey Borisov: "Barayevites Killed Internal Affairs
Ministry General. New Details About Dubrovka Terrorist Act"
The law enforcement agencies have started to detain
the Barayevites' accomplices. The first official suspected accomplices
of the terrorists who carried out the terrorist act on Dubrovka turned
out to be not only natives of the Caucasus. Two criminals were detained
in the village of Chernoye, Balashikhinskiy Rayon, Moscow Oblast. They
were Khampash Sobraliyev, a 30-year-old inhabitant of Chechnya, and Arman
Menkeyev, a 40-year-old native of Kazakhstan. They were found to have
two pistols, portable radio sets, three pairs of binoculars, and
equipment for suicide bombers' belts, like those used during the hostage
crisis on Dubrovka, in their possession.
An active participant in the terrorist act at McDonalds, 36-year-old
Yuriy Yankovskiy from Orekhovo-Zuyevo, Moscow Oblast, was arrested on
Malaya Filevskaya Street. He was found to have a pistol with a silencer
and two grenades in his possession.
And they are not the only ones detained in connection with the
terrorist act on Dubrovka. Earlier 37-year-old Aslan Murdalov, from
Dagestan, and the Mezhiyev brothers, had been detained as accomplices in
the preparation of and taking of hostages in the theater center. They
are also suspected of organizing the McDonalds restaurant explosion in
southwest Moscow.
They were probably involved in the McDonalds restaurant explosion [as
published]. Not long ago Internal Affairs Minister Boris Gryzlov said
that the idea was that this explosion would create a diversion ahead of
the big terrorist act at the theater center showing the Nord-Ost musical.
More detailed information will probably emerge when the 10 days are up
and the suspects are officially charged and the court has issued a
warrant for their arrest.
At the moment the law enforcement agencies are in no hurry to reach
any conclusions, because the widely publicized first arrests turned out
to be a damp squib. They had hastily included added an Azerbaijani
journalist and a Chechen woman hostage, Yakha Neserkhoyeva, to the
hostages' ranks. It transpired later that they had nothing to do with
the Barayevites.
The law enforcement agencies' also say that the information is
classified because the police are frightened of scaring off any terrorist
accomplices who might still be at large. And this simply cannot be
allowed, particularly in view of Internal Affairs Minister Boris
Gryzlov's announcement that the bandits were preparing not one, but four
terrorist acts.
This is indirectly confirmed by the Moscow police's recent finds. In
a garage in the Troparevo-Nikulino area (alongside the bombed McDonalds)
a Barayevite cache was found, containing 48 rounds for an under-barrel
grenade launcher, hundreds of cartridges, and 19 so-called suicide bomber
belts containing explosives -- like those worn by the women who
participated in the taking of hostages on Dubrovka.
Although, on the other hand, excessive secrecy means that some
information can be difficult to verify. We have learned from unofficial,
but very reliable sources that it was not three victims the Barayevites
claimed. So far it has been officially confirmed that during the three
days of the terrorist act the Barayevites shot dead only one young woman,
the father of one of the hostages, and a young man, whom the terrorists
killed on day three.
Rossiyskaya Gazeta has learned that there were two GRU [Main
Intelligence Directorate] officers in the theater auditorium. One of
them managed to rip the carpet under his seat and hide his identity card.
The second was shot dead by the Barayevites together with his wife.
Moreover, the terrorists found police identity cards on two hostages, a
man and a woman, but they were not shot on day one. Incidentally, the
man turned out to be a retired police general. He and the woman police
officer were first taken out of the main auditorium and then killed on
day three.
*******
#19
Yezhenedelny Zhurnal
No. 46
November 2002
AMENDMENTS TO THE TERRORIST ACT
Looking at the first investigation into the Moscow hostage-taking
Author: Sergei Parkhomenko, Alexander Ryklin
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
THE PUBLIC COMMISSION ASSEMBLED BY THE UNION OF RIGHT FORCES HAS
COMPLETED ITS INVESTIGATION INTO THE HOSTAGE-TAKING IN MOSCOW. NOW THE
CONCLUSIONS OF THE COMMISSION WILL BE FORGOTTEN - UNTIL THE NEXT
TERRORIST ACT. TO TELL THE TRUTH, THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE COMMISSION
ARE FRIGHTENING.
The public commission assembled by the Union of Right Forces has
completed its investigation into the hostage-taking in Moscow. Now the
conclusions of the commission will be forgotten - until the next
terrorist act.
To tell the truth, the conclusions of the commission are
frightening. They indicate that most of the hapless hostages at the
Moscow theater did not fall victim to the terrorist act or the
counter-terrorism operation as such. They died due to the consequences
of the operation. The document the commission presented states plainly
that the majority of lives were lost due to negligence on the part of
officials responsible for first aid to ex-hostages, their
transportation to hospitals, and for the general coordination of the
rescue effort. The document also mentions that too much time, about an
hour and half, were allowed to lapse between the use of the gas and
providing first aid to ex-hostages; and first aid was not skilled
enough; and there were no doctors stationed at the entrance to the
theater; and unconscious victims of the gas used by Russian secret
services were dumped into buses together with dead bodies - no one
sorted them out. The conclusions of the commission also mention the
gas, which officials either knew about or did not know. And so on. The
commission did not reveal the identities of those responsible. It
merely listed articles of the Criminal Code that apply. The matter
concerns "Criminal dereliction of duty" and "Concealing information
with grave consequences".
The conclusions failed to become sensational. Everyone who had
watched the unfolding drama on TV reached the same conclusions even
without the commission. There were articles in the media, there was TV
coverage. All the same, the facts the commission compiled into a
single document, the facts it had specialists analyze are impressive.
Even though the commission did not uncover absolutely all details.
Lacking official status, members of the commission could not demand
information from all structures and officials involved in the events.
Irina Khakamada said at the meeting last Tuesday that had the
commission included members of parliament with official status rather
than just "representatives of the public", the findings would have
been more complete. For example, a parliamentary investigation might
have found the answer to the question of how a group of terrorists,
armed to the teeth, had made it to the center of Moscow in the first
place. The Duma turned down the initiative of the Union of Right
Forces - since the Kremlin had made it absolutely clear that it did
not want any commissions or investigations. The public had approved of
the actions of the president and secret services, so why not be
content with that?
As a result, the Union of Right Forces became the only political
party in Russia to think about whether the counter-terrorism operation
in Moscow was really a success.
The URF was accused of "trying to gain publicity from tragedy"
even though they did all they could to irritate the authorities as
little as possible. For example, the URF announced right away that it
did not harbor any grudges against secret services and promised not to
reveal future findings of the commission before their leader Boris
Nemtsov's audience with Putin. It is to this promise the pause between
the last working meeting of the commission and publication of
conclusions is attributed. Nemtsov was waiting for the audience as
promised. He got it on November 14 only.
The position of the Union of Right Forces is understandable.
Organizers of the commission retained the hope that the Kremlin might
change its mind and the president would order a thorough investigation
and prosecution of those guilty.
The opposite point of view prevailed. It was decided that a
single year before the parliamentary election a scandal of this
magnitude might get out of control. Everything should be kept under
the lid therefore. The Kremlin is not even saying that the Union of
Right Forces has got it all wrong. Nemtsov quotes the president as
saying that "What you are telling me is quite close to what
information I possess." It is just that awareness that the authorities
killed one hundred people through neglect does not interest the
Kremlin much.
In other words, the subject is closed. Commenting on the work of
the commission, Nemtsov assumed that "it will probably be the Kursk
story all over again." "I do not doubt that the Prosecutor General's
Office will take its time investigating the matter," Nemtsov
continued. "Eventually, it will come to the conclusions we have
already reached. There can be no other conclusions. As for charges
against specific officials, it is already clear that the matter will
be decided by the political leadership. I'm convinced that the
authorities do not want an open and honest discussion, that the regime
is manipulating public opinion, the latter deliberately focused on the
war on international terrorism. We saw it as our duty to tell society
what had really happened. We have done so."
Political clumsiness and hopelessness of the initiative the Union
of Right Forces came up with became even more clear when Putin
received additional confirmation of how correct he had been from his
American counterpart. Right before the meeting in St. Petersburg
George W. Bush undertook to continue the conversation on Russia's
position with regard to the planned war on Iraq, the US president made
it plain that he did not think there was anything wrong in how his
friend Vladimir had handled the hostage crisis in Moscow.
The Kremlin decision to keep the matter under the lid and was
also influenced by reaction of Russian general public to consequences
of the counter-terrorism operation. Even before the commission went
public with its findings, the All-Russian Public Opinion Research
Center conducted an opinion poll in Moscow to discover Muscovites'
attitude towards the hostage drama. Most respondents were confident
that casualties were "relatively light" or "inevitable in operations
of this sort". Nemtsov attributes this situation to the "informational
blockade" depriving society of objective information. There must,
however, be more to it.
The public might be aware that there was something wrong with the
counter-terrorism operation. Everyone saw piles of bodies in front of
the theater. According to the National Public Opinion Research Center,
Muscovites blame the secret services, which permitted terrorists to
bring a whole arsenal into the capital. On the other hand, the public
is convinced that resolve of the authorities is much more important
than their effectiveness.
A political consultant close to the Kremlin: All right, the URF
published their findings, and so what? Has a bomb exploded? Has the
sky fallen? Nothing of the sort. Even the most "independent"
newspapers and TV channels paid scant attention. Why do you think?
Because of the pressure the authorities put them under? No. We all
know that the story is over, the matter is closed. Society does not
want to know anything about it anymore."
We should not be fooled by this equanimity. The Kremlin has not
always been that composed. Comments in the media during the first days
of the crisis did enrage the powers-that-be. Atmosphere in society was
carefully molded - it is no coincidence that most experts whose
services the public commission enlisted asked that they be not
identified by name in the final document. The media was put under
pressure. Hence the scandals with Boris Jordan who was on the verge of
being sacked and with the amendments to the laws on the media and war
on terrorism.
Unions of journalists and chief editors wrote to the president
last Wednesday. The media had criticized the authorities for the
attempt to create another instrument of control over the independent
media, but this consolidation appeared unusual all the same.
In the meantime, finding an explanation will be much easier when
we take into account that the letter was not really centered around
this particular legislative initiative of the regime.
Authors of the letter essentially agreed with the assumption that
they themselves and their activities posed a problem for the
authorities. Moreover, they even expressed their readiness to
participate in finding a solution to the problem. As it turned out,
when the Federal Assembly was adopting the amendments, it was not
evening the score with journalists viewed by most politicians in
Russia as natural enemies. As it turned out, the powers-that-be were
not out to put the media under some more pressure. (Even though that
was how central newspapers and TV channels had interpreted all this at
first.) It finally dawned on authors of the document that everything
was absolutely different: the Federal Assembly was in fact realizing
its "eagerness to ensure stability of society and its security." No
one in his right mind will challenge this eagerness.
In fact, there is every reason in the world to assume that it was
the regime itself that organized the appeal to the president in the
first place. Officials of the presidential administration with
influence, Alexander Voloshin first and foremost, must have been
involved. Media Minister Mikhail Lesin's "presence" at the document
signing was quite revealing too. Position of his ministry with regard
to the legislation pertaining the media (approved by the Kremlin,
needless to say) is well known. The law on the media should be revised
or, even better, replaced by a new one, a law more in line with the
hard facts of life. These days, the only existing barrier is removed
from the road to this revision and replacement - distrust of
journalists.
It follows that the authorities are ready for a new terrorist
act. No matter what happens, leaders of the West will back up the
Kremlin. Or remain quiet. General public in Russia has already
reconciled itself with inevitability of terrorist acts and casualties.
As for the media, it will "organize itself" and analyze the mistakes
that led it to "incorrect" highlighting of the dramatic events (and
apparently their backgrounds and reasons). But the next public
commission is unlikely to come to any conclusions. The experts who do
not want to be identified today will probably refuse to be involved at
all tomorrow.
*******
#20
Moscow Times
November 28, 2002
Legislating the Language Russians Speak
By Natalia Yefimova
Staff Writer
Next time President Vladimir Putin wants to talk about "snuffing" someone
in an outhouse or to chat in English with his friend George W. Bush, he may
find himself violating federal law.
A bill establishing Russian as the official state language, due to be
considered by the State Duma in the critical second reading this week, bans
the use of language that is "vernacular, disdainful or foul" and mandates
the use of Russian in all official contacts, even with foreigners.
The proposed legislation also prohibits foreign words that have commonly
accepted Russian equivalents.
Asked whether this would mean that soccer-loving bureaucrats would be
punished for using the popular term "goalkeeper" instead of the Slavic
analogue vratar, the bill's main author, Duma Deputy Alexei Alexeyev,
replied: "Let's not exaggerate."
"If we throw out all foreign words, we'll be left with half a language,"
Alexeyev said Wednesday, pointing to such borrowings as "president,"
"telephone" and the Latin "P" used to designate parking areas.
The bill, he said, was simply meant to establish a state language, try to
keep it clean and foster the spread of Russian abroad, for example by
improving training for teachers of Russian as a foreign language.
The legislation does not spell out any types of enforcement or punishment,
but Alexeyev said he hoped separate amendments would be introduced for that.
Critics of the bill have scorned it as ineffective, saying that it tries to
cover too much ground -- some of it ideological rather than legislative.
"This is not a law that is needed; this is yet another attempt to find a
national idea," said Professor Maxim Kronhaus, director of the Linguistics
Institute at the Russian State Humanities University.
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the Russian language has absorbed
dozens of Western words, like "manager," "speaker" and "bodybuilding," many
of which have mutated in meaning or been Russified, like kompyuterschik.
But Kronhaus said that banning such expressions was absurd because "our
language is rapidly changing" and would naturally retain or reject foreign
borrowings and freshly hatched slang.
He also pointed out that parts of the bill did not look much like serious
legislation.
According to Article 1, Russian as the official state language would
"enhance mutual understanding" and "foster the spread and mutual enrichment
of the spiritual culture" of the country's many ethnic groups.
Kronhaus said that a law defining a state language was necessary insofar as
it could establish certain legal guarantees, such as ensuring accurate
translations of official documents or court hearings -- which the current
bill does.
But the proposed legislation is too amorphous in defining the areas where
the new rules apply, he said.
In addition to official contacts by federal, regional and municipal
government bodies, the rules for using Russian as the state language also
apply to all "activities" of private and nongovernmental organizations.
Likewise, the bill covers advertising, although the new regulations would
not be applicable to brand names or trademarks, nor would they affect
"functional" signs such as exit markers or stop signs.
As far as the rules for media, the latest version of the bill is
significantly less restrictive than the version passed in a first reading
in June. Now, journalists and television personalities will be able to use
"vernacular, disdainful or foul" language and foreign words if they are "an
inalienable part of an artistic concept."
Deputy Alexeyev said the bill's authors had taken into account national
language legislation passed in countries like China and France, but would
not push for the kind of sanctions, like fines, established in other places.
That may be a good thing for the president.
Last year, Putin addressed the Bundestag in his impressive German.
Earlier this week, when Putin met with media executives and agreed to veto
legislation placing new restrictions on journalists, he surprised observers
by using the decisively un-Russian neologism zavetirovat, instead of the
more familiar nalozhit veto.
Asked whether the language bill would mean Putin would be punished,
Alexeyev smiled and said, "Fortunately, liability has not been spelled out
yet."
*******
#21
BBC Monitoring
Senators representing Russian regions oppose enforced use of Cyrillic
alphabet
Source: Channel One TV, Moscow, in Russian 1200 gmt 27 Nov 02
[Presenter] The Federation Council today passed a bill on transferring all
the alphabets currently used in Russia to Cyrillic. Only three voted against,
including the representatives of Karelia and Tatarstan, republics where Latin
script is used alongside Cyrillic. A report by Pavel Ryazantsev.
[Correspondent] The bill, which stipulates that the alphabets of all the
languages of Russia's ethnic groups should be based on Cyrillic script, was
discussed at length and with some emotion in the chamber which reflects the
interests of the regions. There were quite a few against the bill. From their
point of view, Cyrillic cannot reflect all the sounds which Russian lacks and
it is therefore allowable to write Karelian or Tartar words in Latin or
another script.
[Viktor Stepanov, representing the government of the Republic of Karelia in
the Federation Council] Bringing in Cyrillic and using it to study Karelian
will in practice destroy the Karelian language. The Russian alphabet does not
have letters for "oer", "ue" and "aer", it is a different language and it is
my view that here we are trespassing, just as Lysenko trespassed in genetics,
on the genetics of human consciousness.
[Rafgat Altynbayev, representing the government of the Republic of Tatarstan
in the Federation Council] From a legal standpoint, this contradicts section
2, article 68 of the Constitution, under which the republics have the right
to determine their own state language. The alphabet is an integral part of
the language. I therefore believe that this is an issue which comes under the
jurisdiction of the republics and is their prerogative.
[Correspondent] The arguments of the supporters of Latin script were opposed
by their fellow senators from the national republics of Russia. Members of
the Federation Council insisted that the same script should be used
throughout the whole country in order that people should understand each
other better. They recalled that the problem of how to write the words of
ethnic minority languages arose when the Tartar parliament passed a law
replacing Russian letters and moving over to Latin, more precisely, Turkic
script.
[Viktor Shuderov, representing the government of the Republic of Udmurtia in
the Federation Council] In this sitting the legislators in parts of Russia
could bring in the Latin alphabet, in the next it would be perfectly possible
to bring in, say, Chinese. Imagine if we were to start getting letters from
the component parts of Russia in their native Chinese and had to sit down and
translate them.
[Dmitriy Mezentsev, representing the administration of Irkutsk Region in the
Federation Council] When we say that the state language of Russia and the
state languages of the republics should be based on Cyrillic, we should
understand that the great teachers Kirill and Mefodiy would have wanted us to
vote for this law.
[Yuriy Sharandin, chairman of the Federation Council committee on
constitutional legislation] This law does not [as heard, on-screen rolling
caption says it does] bring in a ban on any graphic representation of any
language, because it is conditional on federal law. I believe this is
strictly within the framework of the current constitution and is in the
interests of the Russian Federation.
[Correspondent] However, there is nothing to say that there have to be 33
letters in the languages of Russia's ethnic minorities, they could being in
additional ones to depict the sounds that Russian lacks and the Federation
Council voted by a majority in support of the law, which establishes Cyrillic
as the graphic basis of the languages of the Russian Federation.
*******
#22
Tennis-Yeltsin flies to Paris to support Russian Davis Cup team
MOSCOW, Nov 28 (Reuters) - Former Russian President Boris Yeltsin will
arrive in Paris later on Thursday to cheer on the Russian team in their
Davis Cup final against France.
"Yes, they have left Moscow and should arrive in Paris this evening," a
Kremlin spokesperson told Reuters.
Russian players Yevgeny Kafelnikov and Marat Safin both said that Yeltsin
had promised to visit Paris for the three-day final to cheer them on. The
best-of-five clash begins at Bercy sports hall on Friday.
The 71-year-old Yeltsin has been at all Russia's previous Davis Cup ties
this year, all in Moscow. He has been a big fan of tennis since taking up
the sport in 1992.
Cup captain Shamil Tarpishchev has repeatedly said that Russian tennis owes
much of its recent success to Yeltsin playing the game.
"Moscow hosting its first professional tournament in 1990, Yeltsin picking
up his tennis racket in 1992, Kafelnikov becoming the first Russian to win
a grand slam at the French Open in 1996... all have had a major impact on
the sport in this country," Tarpishchev said.
*******
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