Johnson's Russia List
#6576
27 November 2002
davidjohnson@erols.com
A CDI Project
www.cdi.org

[Contents:
  DJ: In case you need something to do while on Thanksgiving
holiday, or some other holiday...
  1. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace meeting summary:
Putin's Support: A Mile Wide, But How Deep? (Richard Rose)
  2. The New York Review of Books: Christian Caryl, Death in Moscow:
The Aftermath.
  3. Harvard University Gazette: Mikhail Gorbachev 'Looking Back on
Perestroika.' (transcript)]

*******

#1
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
www.ceip.org
Meeting summary
Putin's Support: A Mile Wide, But How Deep?
November 20, 2002
Richard Rose, Director of the Centre for the Study of Public Policy at the
University of Strathclyde, discusses the "Putin phenomenon."

On November 20, 2002, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace hosted a
presentation entitled "Putin's Support: A Mile Wide but How Deep?" by
Professor Richard Rose, Director of the Centre for the Study of Public Policy
at the University of Strathclyde. Rose presented some of the findings
included in his most recent book, Elections without Order: Russia's Challenge
to Vladimir Putin, which he co-authored with Neil Munro. Rose also discussed
the results of public opinion surveys conducted in Russia by the Centre for
the Study of Public Policy and the Russian Center for Public Opinion and
Market Research (VCIOM), which are available on-line at
http://www.russiavotes.org/. Andrew Kuchins, Director of the Russian and
Eurasian Program at the Carnegie Endowment, chaired the presentation, which
was followed by a question and answer session.

Putin's Popularity, and the Political Climate of Russia

Rose opened the meeting by noting that opinion polls conducted in Russia
elucidate three particularly interesting aspects of the "Putin phenomenon."
First, support for Putin has proven consistently high. The percentage of
Russians approving of their president's performance has barely contracted
since Putin came to office with a 79% positive rating. Indeed, VCIOM's most
recent poll, conducted during the weekend that the Moscow hostage crisis came
to a controversial end, found Putin's approval rating to be an astronomical
77%. Second, contrary to the expectations of many commentators, these numbers
have not proven "too good to last," and Putin's approval rating has remained
stable throughout his presidency. Strangely, Putin's popularity has not
served as a "coattail" for Duma or government officials, however; the
approval ratings for the Russian government spiked at only 45% last month,
while the all-time high rating for the Duma is lower still, at 27%.

Predictably, the majority of the Russian populace would vote for Putin if the
election were held in the next week. Surprising, however, is the fact that in
spite of the Communist Party's drooping popularity in recent years, a
communist candidate might manage to garner as much as one quarter of the vote
in the next presidential election. Rose argued that the ideal Putin opponent
would be a politician like Yevgeny Primakov, for instance-someone who is not
a hard-liner, does not subscribe to Gaidarian economic principles, and is not
tainted by Chubais's money, yet still has the resources to support an
expensive campaign.

Where is the Russian Electorate?

Rose's data reveals that a plurality of Russians hold no strong allegiance to
formal parties, or even to particular ideologies. One-fifth identify
themselves as communist sympathizers; 18% as democrats; 2% as patriots; and
7% say they support whatever party is in power. By contrast, 40% of Russians
see themselves as belonging to none of these categories, and another 10%
aren't sure how they would characterize themselves. Rose pointed out that
fully half of those who admit to having a strong ideological preference do
not identify themselves with an organized party. He also mentioned that even
among those who support "the party in power," there is considerable confusion
about what that phrase means. Half of those surveyed could not identify the
party that controls the Kremlin. This testifies both to the extent to which
Putin's personal popularity is independent of his party affiliation, and to
the fact that the "inside the Beltway" maneuvering that resulted in the
formation of the "Unity" bloc is neither transparent nor relevant to most
Russians.

Psychological Transformation and Economic Reform

Faced with immense political, social, and economic changes in the last
decade, Russians have had little choice but to adapt to the new conditions.
It is true that considerable nostalgia for the old regime remains, but
overall, Rose's data indicates that the majority of Russian citizens have
completed, or are in the process of completing, a psychological
transformation. Last month, 51% of those surveyed responded that they and
their family had already adapted to recent changes, up from 32% in July 1999.
Another 18% indicated that they will be able to adapt fully in the "near
future." Only 27%-down from 45% in 1999-believe that they will never be able
to adapt. As Russians increasingly feel that they can keep up with the
changes happening around them, the number describing their material condition
as good or passable has also risen in the past several years, from 45% in
July 1998 to 60% in September 2002. The percentage that considers its
economic situation "bad" or "very bad" has fallen precipitously, from 54% in
1998 to 38% today. Rose argued that these numbers show that most Russians are
now integrated in the twenty-first century world, adding that few Russians
are truly destitute. One-third of Russian citizens now own video recorders,
and 10% regularly surf the Internet. Nearly 90% of Russians have at least
heard of the Internet, which Rose considers an unequivocal sign of material,
psychological, and intellectual progress.

Chechnya

Public opinion polls continue to show that the Russian populace is deeply
split over the war with Chechnya. Though only 15% blame the Russian
government for the recent hostage crisis (compared to 45% who blame Chechen
terrorists), Rose was struck that over one-third of Russians accuse the FSB,
which they believe has shirked its duties, of bearing the primary
responsibility for the incident. Nearly one-fifth of Russians have had a
friend or family member serve in Chechnya, and as a result, the preponderance
of public opinion supports extricating Russia from the Chechen quagmire, even
if it requires accepting losses. Less than one-third of Russians believe that
the conflict will be settled on terms favorable to Russia; 14% believe it
will ultimately result in "enormous losses on both sides," while 37% fear
that the war "will spread to other parts of the North Caucasus." In August
2002, 47% of those surveyed believed that the war would last for at least
another five years, and Rose speculated that public opinion has become more
pessimistic still in the wake of the hostage crisis. At the same time,
however, Rose noted that the general expectation remains that Russia should
stay involved in Chechnya, and he deemed the protracted conflict "a
condition, not a war."

The State of Russian Society

Rose argued that most Russians, tired of the many upheavals which they have
experienced, now desperately want to live in a "normal" society-a condition
which 93% of those surveyed feel that their country has not yet achieved.
Americans typically see historical legacies as encouraging or hindering the
attainment of social normalcy, Rose pointed out. Russians, by contrast, see
their present problems as the chief barriers preventing the improvement of
their society. When asked to name the two biggest obstacles to Russia
becoming a more normal society, 66% identify Russia's weak rule of law and
government corruption, while half blame low wages and unemployment.
Surprisingly, only 15% blame the transition to a market economy. Rose
asserted that these data indicate that Putin need not look far afield when
planning reform; rather than focusing on the grandiose task of transforming
society, he should strive to improve the functioning and increase the
transparency of his own government.

Prognosis for the Future

One of the most striking findings of public opinion surveys, mentioned Rose,
is the Russian public's patience. Only 11% of respondents doubt that recent
hardships will ever give way to positive results. Seven percent expect to see
improvements in the next five years, 19% in the next ten years, and 63%
"eventually"-later still, that is. The long-term vision of Russians is a
stark contrast to the myopic political scene of America and Western Europe,
where politicians think in units of months, not years, and where citizens
expect instant results. Another heartening sign is the overwhelming support
of young Russians for free-market principles. Two-thirds of young respondents
favor a market system over state controls, compared to only 23% of those over
55.

Bringing the discussion back to where he began it-Putin's popularity-Rose
argued that the president has already taken important steps toward
establishing a more normal society. Like a western politician, Putin has
managed to energize a broad support base, even if the diverse nature of his
champions precludes profiling a paradigmatic Putin supporter. Russians' low
expectations for their leaders' performance has endowed Putin with
considerable power, for even barely passable performance distinguishes him
from Yeltsin in the minds of many Russians. Rose fears, however, that low
expectations might embroil Putin in a "low-level equilibrium trap,"
dissuading him from making potentially positive-but potentially
risky-reforms. In this case, Russians' patience, on which their hopes for the
future rely, might prove dangerous; if they are too accepting of a slow pace
of reform, the impetus for change might disappear altogether.

Question and Answer Session

In response to a question about whether recent improvements in the economy
have translated into increased support for Putin, Rose responded that Putin's
approval ratings have remained stable and thus seem to demonstrate little
dependence on the health of the economy. Putin's numbers started off high in
1999, for instance-even as the economy continued to struggle in the wake of
the 1998 financial crisis-primarily because Putin was seen as an
"anti-Yeltsin." Even if the economy experiences a crisis, Rose expects that
Putin will remain a popular leader, not least because challenging a sitting
president in Russia entails overcoming substantial bureaucratic and financial
barriers. Pressed to elaborate on the basis of Putin's popularity later in
the session, Rose also argued that future attacks by Chechens would have
little impact on the president's approval ratings. In general, the factors
underpinning Putin's popularity seem not to be political. Concomitant with
the increase in Putin's support, Russians have become older, poorer, less
educated and more "proud to be Russian;" now, they place more trust the FSB,
want to see Russia regain its prestige, rely on state television for their
news, and support stability above all else. Barring a major disaster, it is
likely that the growing number of voters with these characteristics will
propel Putin to an easy victory in the next round of presidential elections.

Another attendee wondered whether Rose had detailed demographic information
on the 40% of Russians who choose not to align themselves with any particular
ideology, and if he believes that they might be mobilized to support a
candidate who is interested in building a strong party. Rose replied that he
does not have a demographic profile of this group, and therefore could not
make an accurate prognosis regarding its role in future elections. The Chair
asked Rose whether he had data dating back to 1991, which might elucidate the
impact of Putin's presidency on Russian public opinion. Rose did not have
these figures immediately available, but speculated that the Putin years will
be remembered as an era of "settling down," when Russia attempted to return
to some type of normalcy.

The session closed with a debate about the depth and breadth of Putin's
popularity. Despite his high approval rating, Rose argued that Putin's
support base is weaker than it may appear, pointing out that the "broad and
consensual" constituency that Putin has cultivated is composed of disparate
groups. Major policy changes-and even Russian support for U.S. action against
Iraq-could undermine Putin's power base. When questioned about this assertion
by meeting attendees, who pointed out that Rose's presentation seemed to
demonstrate how effectively Putin had managed to build a coalition of diverse
supporters, Rose acknowledged that for now, at least, Putin is all but
assured "broad and stable support." However, he warned that it is important
to remember that Putin's champions form a coalition-and that coalitions can
disintegrate with astonishing speed.

Summary prepared by Faith Hillis, Junior Fellow with the Russian and Eurasian
Program at the Carnegie Endowment.

*******

#2
The New York Review of Books
www.nybooks.com
December 19, 2002
Death in Moscow: The Aftermath
By Christian Caryl
Christian Caryl is the Moscow Bureau Chief of Newsweek. (December 2002)

1.
Vladimir Putin is a very lucky man. He lives in a country with a passive
public, a weak and demoralized independent press, and a subservient
political elite. All this helps to explain why he and his government have
managed, with little apparent damage to their credibility or popularity, to
avoid telling the Russian people exactly what happened during the
disastrous rescue of the hostages from a Moscow theater three weeks ago.

Of the 128 hostages now declared dead, all but five were victims of the gas
used to save them, a gas the precise composition of which has yet to be
revealed and which has only been vaguely identified as "based" on fentanyl,
an opium-derived anesthetic sometimes used in hospitals but apparently
notorious among anesthesiologists for its volatility and its potentially
lethal effects. Most of these 128 deaths occurred, it seems clear, because
of the negligence of those involved in the rescue operation, including,
particularly, the Federal Security Service (FSB), the domestic successor of
the KGB and the governmental body responsible for the operation to free the
hostages.

Among myriad other lapses, many rescuers and medical doctors clearly knew
nothing about the gas that had been used and were unable to make proper use
of antidotes that the government claims to have made available for this
purpose. Images of sick and dying former hostages, some dazed and some
unconscious, being ferried to hospitals on schoolbuses with no medical
attention whatever on board seemed to raise a host of questions that the
Putin government would be obliged to answer.

And yet as I write, three weeks after the storming of the Dubrovka House of
Culture, no satisfactory explanation has been given either by the FSB or
Putin himself, and none appears to be forthcoming.

To be sure, it is the hostage-takers, their instigators, and their
adherents who bear the primary moral responsibility for the ordeal imposed
upon hundreds of entirely innocent civilians. But this does not mean, of
course, that the Putin administration should not be held accountable for
its negligence in bringing this ordeal to an end. About two dozen former
hostages remain hospitalized, while hundreds of others who have already
been discharged will undoubtedly suffer for years from the various physical
and psychological side effects of their captivity and its startling
denouement. (Nine members of the assaulting forces are also officially
listed as injured by the gas.) Meanwhile, Moscow continues to be deluged by
rumors—mainly circulating on Russian Web sites—of other former hostages who
remain unaccounted for. Some accounts put their number as high as
seventy-seven. If the final death toll rises above two hundred, perhaps
more Russians will ask—as a few brave critics already have begun to
do—whether the method used was really well chosen.

If Russians, and their press and television, had the will and the means to
debate such anomalies, there would still be plenty of them to dwell on.
(Attempts by liberal deputies in parliament to set up a commission of
inquiry were stopped by forces loyal to the government.) So far, in fact,
efforts by the authorities to resolve lingering questions about the
storming of the theater have often ended up raising new ones. At a press
conference five days after the storming, an expert from the FSB made an
elaborate visual-aids presentation that described the enormous quantity of
explosives, equivalent to about 253 pounds of TNT, that the terrorists had
placed around the theater. But when a journalist asked why the terrorists
failed to set off their bombs even though the gas took several minutes to
take effect, the expert could only say: "It is hard for me to answer that
question."

On the day of the storming, official sources claimed that fifty terrorists
had been killed. A few days later the figure suddenly dropped to forty-one.
What happened to the other nine? Were some of them, perhaps, hostages
mistakenly regarded as hostage-takers and treated accordingly? Originally,
official sources said that two of the terrorists were captured alive (and
members of a television crew claim to have witnessed someone being taken
into custody by authorities shortly after the building was stormed). Now
the authorities say that all the terrorists were shot. Since the bodies of
the terrorists have been secretly disposed of, we may never know how many
there were, or in what manner they died. The various discrepancies in
official accounts cannot be satisfactorily investigated or resolved. Oddly,
and a bit suspiciously, not a single terrorist was left alive for
intelligence purposes.

This sort of confusion on the part of the Putin administration has been
typical. Throughout the crisis and its aftermath, official information
policy has ranged from conspiratorial reticence to clumsy obfuscation to
outright lying. Vladimir Vasiliev, the deputy minister of internal affairs,
declared in the first hours after the storming that sixty-seven hostages
had been killed during the assault on the theater— and that not a single
one of them had been a casualty of the "special means" used to neutralize
the people inside the building. Only days later, indeed, were the
authorities even willing to concede that the "special means" used had been
gas, and it was only four days after the special forces raid that the
minister of health finally explained that the gas was "based" on fentanyl.
Despite the admission that a volatile and potentially lethal gas had been
dispersed throughout the theater building, other officials persisted for
days in blaming the casualties among the hostages on their poor state of
health after their fifty-eight hours in captivity rather than on the gas
itself. (Among the motives for this campaign of disinformation, aside from
the fear of the negative effects on public opinion, was nervousness about
the international implications of using gas, which is regulated by the
Chemical Weapons Convention.[1] )

Coverage of the crisis by the government press and television also treated
us to an ominous reprise of Soviet-style propaganda tactics aimed at
discrediting the enemy. Shortly after the assault on the theater, state-run
TV began airing footage of the dead terrorist leader, Movsar Barayev, lying
in a pool of blood; an intact cognac bottle, nearly full and visibly dusty,
was shown next to his extended hand. Viewers were informed that the
terrorists, "so-called Muslims," had actually whiled away the hours in the
theater drinking booze and injecting drugs; the theater was said to be
littered with syringes, which were never shown.[2]

2.

And yet, however hard it may be for outsiders to comprehend, President
Putin has emerged from the recent events stronger than ever. The hostage
crisis gave him an opportunity to replay one of the most dramatic moments
in his political career. In the fall of 1999, a series of mysterious
terrorist attacks killed more than three hundred people in Moscow and other
Russian cities. The government placed the blame squarely on the Chechens,
and Putin, who was then prime minister, retaliated by sending the army back
into Chechnya, which had had a three-year interlude of de facto
independence following the first Chechen war from 1994 to 1996.

It is true that the reign of the separatist president, Aslan Maskhadov
(chosen in a 1997 election that even the Russians recognized as fair), was
marked by criminal anarchy, hopelessly negligent administration, and the
growth of dark Islamist aspirations. Putin argued that there could be no
consolidation of central authority in Russia unless Chechnya were restored
to Moscow's control. At the time, in late 1999, there was support for this
position even among some Chechens, who were sick of the Maskhadov chaos.
The hopeless ineptitude of Maskhadov's rule had left the hard-line
separatists and Islamic adventurers isolated. For many ordinary Chechens,
sacrificing the symbolic benefits of self-rule seemed a small price to pay
in return for the promised restoration of electric power and functioning
schools—assuming that Moscow rule would be accompanied by a measure of
civility. In Russia at large, Putin's unyielding position on the Chechnya
question, and the earthy language in which he couched it, made him hugely
popular among people of all persuasions, who contrasted his forcefulness
and brutal clarity with the muddle and chaos of the Yeltsin years.

During the hostage crisis Putin invoked the terrorist attacks of 1999 to
explain why he refused to negotiate with the hostage-takers: "The
criminals, of course, are provoking us to introduce the same order in the
country as they once imposed in the Chechen republic. We will not give in
to this provocation." It was clear from the first that he would not agree
to the primary demand of the hostage-takers that Moscow declare an end to
the war and begin a troop withdrawal. Had he done so, indeed, he would have
surrendered the principle on which he had based his political career.

Now Russians have awarded Putin with some of the highest popularity ratings
he's ever had. In one poll following the storming of the theater, 85
percent approved of Putin's handling of the crisis. According to another
survey, his personal approval rating was as high as 77 percent.
Interestingly, 35 percent in one of the polls blamed the crisis on the
security services, which had somehow managed to allow dozens of heavily
armed terrorists to invade a building just under three miles from the
Kremlin. (Some 45 percent blamed the terrorists themselves.)

This result partly reflects a widespread assumption that, had the gas not
been used, the terrorists, with their large quantities of explosives, might
have succeeded in blowing up everyone inside, as they had threatened to do
from the outset. But in judging the appropriateness of the Putin
administration's response to this threat one should emphasize that the use
of gas evidently left the terrorists capable of setting off their
explosives. Putin's officials may have succeeded in deflecting blame from
the President by insisting that he had ceded the decision to use the gas to
the security service official who was in charge of the operation. In such
reactions one can discern a specifically Russian tradition of mystical
authoritarianism, where the supreme leader is viewed as a kind of
infallible god on earth while all earthly faults adhere to his
subordinates—a thought neatly expressed in a proverb that one hears more
frequently of late: Tsar khorosh, boyary plokhi—"the Tsar is good, the
aristocrats are bad."

Of course, it is easy to be a good tsar when the only criticisms of your
conduct do not get a wide hearing, and that is exactly what is happening in
Russia today. If anything, this latest crisis is already giving a huge
boost to the tide of authoritarianism that has intensified under Putin's
rule, in reaction to the perceived permissiveness of the Yeltsin era. To be
sure, during the crisis it was possible to encounter courageous criticisms
of the President and his cronies in a few independent newspapers, on the
Internet, and in the broadcasts of the almost heroically outspoken
independent radio station Ekho Moskvy. One of the station's commentators
harshly criticized Putin for failing to say or do anything about the crisis
for several long hours after it began. Still, such critical voices are
beginning to look increasingly beleaguered and they have limited reach
outside Moscow. Just a few days after the theater was stormed, Russian
lawmakers approved new limitations on press reporting of situations related
to terrorism—situations defined so broadly that the restrictions can be
applied largely as the government dictates.

Naturally, in the several cases when the government intervened to restrict
press coverage during the crisis, it always said it did so out of concern
for the security of the hostages.[3] As the press ministry argued at one
point, legitimately enough, "Saving people is more important than society's
right to information." But, as became dramatically clear in the aftermath
of the storming, the Kremlin's attempts to control the press were not
entirely motivated by concerns about the safety of the hostages. Nor does
the desire for curbs on the press originate solely in the Kremlin. When a
group of parliamentary deputies met with Putin the day before the storming,
they apparently surprised him by pressing him to reintroduce censorship.

3.

It is likely that the most enduring consequence of the hostage crisis and
its grim outcome will be a highly emotional climate, in which war against
Chechen rebels and their Muslim supporters will have wide support. The
terrorists[4] may have died without seeing their demands fulfilled, and yet
on one count they succeeded dramatically. Before October 23, when they took
over the theater, the war in Chechnya was an oddly nebulous affair—a war
that was never officially declared, and then was declared over, but went
on. For years now Putin and his generals have been claiming that the
"military phase" of the conflict ended long ago, even though Russian
soldiers have been dying in the republic at the steady rate of two or three
per day. But strict government censorship of war coverage has helped to
sustain the myth of a low-intensity police action on the distant margins of
national awareness.

Now the hostage-takers have shattered that fiction. They picked as their
target a theater in the center of Moscow that had been showing a hugely
popular "home-grown" Russian musical, a naive recycling of a Soviet
children's book about Arctic explorers that has long been beloved for its
patriotism. During the siege they transformed the theater, rhetorically and
physically, into the same sort of urban battleground they knew so well from
home—complete with boobytraps and Islamist kamikaze slogans. When
negotiators begged the hostage-takers, who included about ten women, to
release some of the teenage children in the theater, the Chechens responded
that they considered anyone over the age of twelve an adult—not least
because male teenagers in Chechnya are sometime victims of the brutal
security sweeps, conducted by Russian troops, that often end in the
disappearance or death of those detained and that have done so much to
stimulate implacable hatred of the Russians among the Chechen population.
The imagery of the siege has left a lasting impact. Again and again, during
the crisis, I heard Russians wondering aloud what sort of atrocities their
troops must have committed to drive the young women among the
hostage-takers to take such a desperate action.

In a less polarized atmosphere, such thoughts might lead to a critical
reappraisal of policy. The reality, unfortunately, is that the
hostage-taking has sharply intensified the traditional hatred between
Russians and Chechens —measured most dramatically, perhaps, by the despair
of Anna Politkovskaya, the remarkable Russian journalist who has received
countless inter- national awards for her brave coverage of the war, mainly
for the Russian biweekly Novaya Gazeta, and who negotiated with the
hostage-takers in the final hours before the storming of the theater. In
the days after the crisis she published an essay criticiz-ing members of
the Chechen diaspora in Moscow and elsewhere for their conspicuous failure
to condemn the hostage-takers.

Ironically, Putin's post-crisis popularity could easily enable him to start
negotiations from a position of strength. But the depth of popular
revulsion against Chechens has almost certainly wiped out any possibility
that the government would conduct talks—direct or indirect—with the leaders
of the rebels, a position forcefully re-iterated by Putin recently.[5]
These days the Russian–Chechen conflict is looking more and more like a
reprise of the Middle East—two peoples fatally locked in a savage spiral of
vendetta and reprisal.

And, as in the Middle East, this situation is charged with larger regional
implications. Putin has repeatedly criticized the government of Georgia,
which borders on Chechnya, for harboring some of the guerrillas; following
the crisis Putin stressed that his government was prepared to retaliate
against any terrorists who might attack Russia "no matter where they might
be located."[6] No one disputes that there are plenty of
contacts—organizational and financial—between the rebels and the worldwide
"mujahideen establishment." But these contacts were minimal before the
Russian military intervention in the mid-1990s; the savage Russian
treatment of the Chechen civilian population since 1999 has only served to
drive previously moderate or apathetic Chechens into collaboration with the
hard-liners, who have themselves treated Russian prisoners brutally.[7] The
core of the conflict in Chechnya is still a nativist revolt against the
legacy of Russian imperial rule, and it can be solved only by addressing
the specific political problems of Russian domination underlying the conflict.

Unfortunately, part of Putin's larger dilemma is that there is no one to
negotiate with effectively even if he suddenly decided he wanted to. The
feudal and fractious nature of Chechen society, compounded by the Russians'
complete destruction of whatever rudimentary civil institutions once
existed in the republic, now makes it almost impossible to find negotiating
partners who could deliver on any promises they make. Even if Maskhadov had
not been discredited by his ties to the international terrorist networks,
his control over the various rebel forces is too tenuous—probably even more
than it was in the chaotic days of 1996–1999. The solutions that remain are
either politically impracticable—such as the creation of a Kosovo-style
"international protectorate" while maintaining Moscow's nominal
sovereignty—or too grim to contemplate. And that, unfortunately, makes it
easy to imagine that the October hostage-taking won't be the last terrorist
act of this scale to be carried out on Russian soil. Except that, next time
around, the Chechen suicide fighters probably won't start off by taking
prisoners and proposing negotiations.
—November 20, 2002

Notes
[1] This fear has proven unwarranted. A few days after the gas was used the
US government made it clear that it would not hold the Russians responsible
for violating the agreement—perhaps, among other things, to avoid
endangering the new Russian–American alliance post–September 11.

[2] Few Russians were actually fooled by this inept propaganda. Still, it
remains instructive, since it clearly represents a clumsy attempt to
discredit the Chechens in the eyes of Russia's own restive Muslim
population, which numbers around 15 million.

[3] When the authorities criticized Ekho Moskvy for conducting an interview
with one of the terrorists by mobile phone, the station quickly removed the
transcript from its Web site. A regional Moscow television station was shut
down temporarily during the crisis for reasons that were never entirely
made clear by the press ministry—perhaps a calculated ambiguity designed to
keep others on their toes.

[4] I have no reservations about describing the hostage-takers as
"terrorists" (unlike CNN, which came up with the positively Orwellian
"armed dissidents"—as if Barayev were an Andrei Sakharov who had just
happened to pick up a Kalashnikov on the street). If we define terrorism as
acts of violence specifically targeting civilians for the purpose of
advancing a political agenda, then those who took over the theater were
clearly terrorists. Incidentally, among the American press The Washington
Post provided by far the best coverage of the crisis.

[5] Before the crisis there had been several tentative negotiations between
rebel representatives and several highly placed Russian politicians. The
Chechen party to these negotiations was Akhmed Zakayev, a Maskhadov
representative, who met several times with the unofficial Russian
emissaries in Switzerland and Liechtenstein. After the hostage-taking
crisis, the Russian government issued an international warrant for his arrest.

[6] That could pose further dilemmas for the United States, which has
recently been signaling its support for the Russian struggle against
"international terrorism." In the wake of the crisis US diplomats
officially pronounced Maskhadov, once promoted by Washington as a possible
interlocutor for peace negotiations, to be "damaged goods," and effectively
gave Putin a free hand to deal with the Chechens however harshly he sees
fit—Putin as Ariel Sharon.

[7] Indeed, the atypically Islamist emphasis of the hostage-taking
operation —the women in Arab-style hijab (something actually quite alien to
the Chechens), and the advance publicity tape sent to al-Jazeera—represent
a conscious and rather forced effort to demonstrate collaboration with
Islamic extremists. Some analysts have suggested that the Chechens have
lately found their financing from the Muslim world drying up as a result of
international crackdowns following September 11, and that this might
explain their conspicuous embrace of Islamic symbols in recent months.

*******

#3
Harvard University Gazette
November 14, 2002
Mikhail Gorbachev 'Looking Back on Perestroika'
Monday, November 11, 2002
Sanders Theatre, Harvard University

TRANSCRIPT

TIMOTHY COLTON: Good afternoon ladies and gentlemen. I am Timothy Colton, a
Professor of Government, and Director of the Davis Center for Russian and
Eurasian Studies.

I am most pleased to welcome you here today, and especially to welcome our
honored guest, Mikhail Gorbachev, the former President of the Soviet Union.
It is fitting that this meeting take place on an international day of
remembrance of historic events. Our focus here is not World War I, which
the country commemorates today. Nor is it the Russian Revolution of 1917,
which also had an anniversary this month. Or even at perhaps a different
level of historical gravity, the anniversary of the death of Mr. Brezhnev,
the last of the old time Soviet leaders who, by coincidence, died 20 years
ago yesterday.

Our focus, instead, is the remarkable chain of events that began with Mr.
Gorbachev's selection as leader of the Soviet Union in March 1985. And
that, in less than seven years, led not only to the liberalization and
partial democratization of the USSR, and not only to a first wave of
economic reforms, but also to the end of the Cold War and, indeed, to the
end of the Soviet Union as a unified state.

We have, today, a special chance to hear reflections on the era of
Perestroika from the man who, more than anyone, made it happen. Our format
will be straightforward. President Summers, of our own university, will
introduce our speaker. Mr. Gorbachev will deliver prepared remarks for
approximately 45 minutes, after which he will entertain questions from the
floor.

I will moderate the Q&A, and will bring the program to a close at 5:30
sharp. I ask you, please, to be sure to turn off all cell phones, if you
haven't already. And also to consult the fine print on your tickets about
rules concerning photographs and tape recordings.

It is now my privilege to introduce the President of Harvard, Larry
Summers. President Summers studied at MIT and Harvard Universities. Rose
like a rocket in the economics profession. And became a full Professor of
Economics at Harvard at the age of 30.

In 1991, he took leave to work as Chief Economist to the World Bank. His
stay in Washington was extended for the rest of the decade, as he served in
succession as Under Secretary, Deputy Secretary, and then Secretary of the
Treasury in the Clinton Administration. He returned to Cambridge in 2001 as
the 27th President of Harvard University.

During his time at the Treasury, Larry was an integral member of the team
that helped develop American policy toward the now 15 states of the Former
Soviet Union. He and others in the Administration worked in cooperation
with pro-reform forces in Russia and other countries, with an eye to
accelerating and consolidating the transformation to a more open and more
market-based economy that was begun under the leadership of our guest this
afternoon. President Summers. [Applause]

PRESIDENT LAWRENCE H. SUMMERS: Thank you very much, Tim. And, I want to
begin by thanking you, by thanking the Davis family, by thanking all of
those associated with the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies not
just for the remarkable opportunity that the University has today, but what
has been accomplished over a very long time.

I see here Professor Bergson, Professor Pipes, Professor Fields. These are
men whose learning, whose study, whose understanding of developments in the
Soviet Union, in Russia, have contributed immeasurably to the progress that
the world has made in not just understanding history, but in shaping history.

I don't know which of them, and at what point, could have imagined the
developments of the last 15 years with the end of the Cold War. Students
here are too young to remember what the world was like at the height of the
Cold War. Let me just remark that my elementary school had fire drills. And
it had civil defense drills. And it had them with roughly equal frequency
because of the Cold War.

It is not given to any of us predict how history will be written two
centuries from now. But I think it can fairly be said that there are few
people who strode the world stage during the last quarter of the 20th
century who are as likely to occupy a prominent place in those history
books as our guest today, Mikhail Gorbachev. For history shaped Mikhail
Gorbachev. And Mikhail Gorbachev shaped history.

Born in March of 1931 in the Stavropol province of the Soviet Union, he
attended Moscow State University, and graduated with a law degree. He rose
through a variety of senior government and Communist Party positions.
Became a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union in 1972. Became the youngest member of the Politburo in 1980.
And ascended to the position of General Secretary of the Communist Party in
1985, and held that position for six extraordinarily significant years,
until December 25th of 1991.

Mikhail Gorbachev's Perestroika and Glasnost set in motion dynamic changes
in the shape of the world that have meant opportunity, that have meant a
chance at freedom, that can mean greater prosperity for hundreds and
hundreds of millions of people.

And Mikhail Gorbachev did something that has been done rarely, if ever, in
history. He set in motion such a transition without the tragedy of mass
violence. We do not have memorials to the end of the Cold War in the way
that we have memorials to the dead of World War I or to the dead of World
War II. And that is a tribute to many men. But it is very much a tribute to
the remarkable efforts of Mikhail Gorbachev.

Tolstoy once wrote that "the vocation of every man and woman is to serve
other people." Mikhail Gorbachev has served his country. He has served his
era. And he has served humanity. It is a great honor to welcome him to
Harvard University. Mikhail Gorbachev. [Applause]

MIKHAIL GORBACHEV (Translator): Thank you very much. Thank you all for
having come here. And, thank you for your interest in me and my work, but
particularly for your interest in Perestroika, your interest about the time
that was mentioned here, the period that was mentioned here by President
Summers, the period that has had a tremendous impact on the developments in
my country, in Europe, and in the world, a period that, indeed, changed
dramatically the relationship between our two nations.

And that new relationship had tremendous importance, tremendous impact on
all further developments in the world. It made it possible to take
decisions that meant a new approach to world affairs, a new approach to
cooperation. I believe that it was a preparation, to some extent, a
preparation for our common work, our common concern, to be well-equipped
for a new century, the 21st century.

Professor Marshall Goldman, yesterday--by the way, Professor Goldman whom
I've known for a long time, and known well for a long time, who is one of
the leading scholars in the Davis Center. And I also would like to
recognize the work of this Center that has been studying our country for
several decades.

Professor Goldman, yesterday, showed me a clipping from your University
newspaper. And, it shows the line of people lining up for invitations, for
tickets, to this lecture. So, I have to thank you all for this interest.
The line reminded me of something. [Applause] It reminded me of the lines
queuing for vodka during the anti-drinking campaign.

My life, my already long life, included 50 years in politics. I went
through all the steps on the ladder of the political career. And that
included leadership positions at a municipal level for ten years. I was the
head of what we call a region, what you, here in this country, call a
state. So, I was the equivalent of a state Governor in my country. But I
was not an elected leader.

Following that, I worked for seven years as a member of the Politburo. For
four years, I worked together with Brezhnev, then with Andropov and
Chernenko. So, it was a long political road. And I knew our whole political
system inside out. And it was that long path, and that long experience that
ultimately resulted in certain conclusions that I drew. And those
conclusions were at the basis of my policy during the years of Perestroika.

I think I was a reliable partner. Had I not been a reliable partner in that
party nomenclature, I would have been kicked out. And, a song has all the
words. And, this was part of my song. I liked to take the initiative. And I
liked people who acted independently, and took the initiative.

Let me tell you, very frankly, that so far as the party career is
concerned, it was not, so to say, a big deal for me. I didn't have a
passion to accomplish a big career. Some people want a big, a successful
career so much that their head begins to swim.

I actually wanted, three times, to leave Soviet politics. And, on one
occasion, I was ready to go into the academic world. I passed the exam. And
I was ready to go into that academic world. But then I was elected First
Secretary of the Regional Party Committee. And, when I decided to remain in
politics, and from that time on, all my forces, all my knowledge was aimed
at doing something in that area.

For me, an extremely important matter was the issue of dignity. And, I
never agreed with anyone who tried to humiliate me, to humiliate my
dignity. I am a person who is ready to compromise. But, compromise should
not be at the expense of the values and goals. And compromise should not
include a loss of self-esteem, a loss of face, a loss of dignity.

In all situations, I remained cool. I don't know where that came from.
Maybe it's just a natural ability. The thing I hate most is betrayal. And I
have been betrayed many times. I am naturally committed to a Democratic
approach. I've always valued a Democratic atmosphere in relations between
people. And I never tolerated loose and irresponsible attitudes.

I've always thought that if people unite for some objective, for some goal,
they should act without being nudged, without being pushed. They should
take the initiative. They should take responsible initiative.

My creed has always been to select a team of strong individuals, not to be
afraid that one of them will become a competitor to me. Of the people who
worked with me, in different years, five became the secretaries of regional
party committees, deputies to Supreme Soviet members of the Central Committee.

I wanted to say to you, as an introduction to what I have to say, that all
of these things are important. This is how I view myself. I think that
this, in a way, defined my subsequent decisions and activities. And,
another important thing is the impact of Moscow University. Perhaps, had it
been another university, not Moscow University, it would have been
different. It was Moscow University that had a defining impact on me.

I have said that I lived in different eras. I remember the pre-war era. I
remember the years of repression, the years of summary arrests. My family,
too, was affected by repression. I saw the war firsthand. I lived in the
territory occupied by the Nazis, by the Germans. And then I saw how people
worked to rebuild the country. And, therefore, there is a big patriotic
charge in me.

I represent a generation of people who were shaped and who became mature
individuals after World War II, the people who were better educated, the
people who were profoundly impacted by the 20th Congress of the Communist
Party where Khrushchev criticized Stalin for the first time. This was, for
us, a breath of fresh air, a breath of freedom. And that breath of freedom
remained with us for all time. Those who started in politics at that time
had a critical approach, and retained a critical approach to everything.

I have to say that my party career, even though it was quite long, was
quite successful. And, telling you all this, I would like to not only give
you some facts of my career, but also to help you to understand why a
person who grew within the system, within that system, could come to
thoughts and conclusions that ultimately shaped the concept of Perestroika.

Even today, some people are still debating whether Perestroika was
inevitable, whether it was necessary. I must say that we, in the Gorbachev
Foundation in Moscow, decided to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the
beginning of Perestroika. And, we decided to do it by conducting an opinion
poll.

The Russian Academy of Sciences helped us to conduct that poll in the
various regions of the country. We asked the Russian people whether reforms
were necessary, whether they ought to have been launched. At that time, 42%
said yes, absolutely, reforms were necessary. Forty-five percent, however,
said no, no, they never should have been started. So, this shows the
attitude ten years after the beginning of Perestroika.

Nevertheless, I believe that this is very positive, that the response is
actually very positive. Half the people of the country, half the population
agrees that Perestroika was necessary. And that was happening, by the way,
the poll was happening in 1995, in 1995 when people had been badly affected
by the breakup of the country, by the shock therapy, the destructive impact
of the cowboy method of economic reform, when most of the people in Russia
lived in poverty and hardship. Nevertheless, 42% said yes, Perestroika was
necessary.

And, even more than that, in that poll, I was affected by other replies.
For example, people were asked what they thought about the rescinding of
Article Six of the Soviet Constitution, under which the Communist Party was
the leading force, the dominating force in the country. People were asked
what they thought about political pluralism. People were asked what they
thought about the Democratic changes, what they thought about the freedoms
and rights of the individual.

For the first time in Russia's thousand year history, there had been free
elections. So people were asked what they thought about that, and also
about freedom of religion. And to all those questions, 60 to 70% of the
people answered positively, answered yes.

And I believe that this, in a way, is an endorsement. And this is ground
for hope that, after a period of hardship and difficulty, after learning
how to use the new Democratic freedoms and rights, the new Democratic
tools, the people will be able to pull the country out of the crisis, out
of the continuing crisis, and to build a new Russia, to build a free and
Democratic Russia.

Over the past few years, the same polling organization, the Russian Center
for the Study of Public Opinion, has been conducting polls. And, they have
been asking people what kind of Russia would you like to live in. Eighty
percent of the people, every year, reply, "We want to live in a free and
Democratic Russia."

So, from this standpoint, we can say, even today, that Perestroika has
succeeded. People don't want to go back. The clock cannot be turned back.
There is no force that could succeed. And this is particularly true among
young people.

A few days ago, I had a meeting with the students of Moscow University, the
School of Economics. And, I have been talking to them. I was talking to
them for about 40 minutes. I told them about my path in politics. And then
I answered their questions for two hours. And they had about 100 questions
that I had to answer. And I saw that the young people in Russia are really
interested and concerned. And all their questions assume that we need to
continue to move forward by preserving our freedoms and our rights by
preserving the Democratic gains of Perestroika.

I faced an audience of people like you, 20, 22. Fifteen or 17 years ago,
they were still toddlers. Today, they live in a different country. They
were shaped by a different country. And they have a different vision. And I
believe this is extremely important. They will be shaping Russia, the
Russia of the future.

Perestroika was needed, was necessary, first of all, because of our own
domestic reasons. But there were also important international reasons why
we needed Perestroika. In the very first years of Perestroika, our famous
writer, Chinkisa Matov(?) organized a conference in Kirghizia to which he
invited outstanding people from many countries, including America,
including American academics and artists.

And I had a meeting with them soon after my meeting with President Reagan
in Reykjavik. And, the discussion with those outstanding thinkers prompted
me to make a statement about what is of priority importance. I said, at
that time, that, of course, there are class interests, group interests, and
national interests. But I said there are also universal human interests.

I remember, years ago, Professor Kliman, who was the lecturer in Criminal
Law in Moscow University, he sometimes had problems with his throat when he
spoke. He really had a bad throat. And so, he had to drink a lot of water
during his lectures. And, on one occasion, he didn't have water on the
podium when he was speaking. And, when finally they brought the water in,
and people laughed a little bit because they knew that he needed the water,
Professor Kliman looked at us. And he said, "Dear Colleagues, even the best
lecturer needs a little water." So, this is my water here. [Applause]

So, at that time, in that statement, I said that universal human values and
interests, at a time when the world faces the threat of nuclear weapons,
nuclear weapons that throw into question the very existence of mankind, at
a time when mankind is facing the global challenge of the environment, when
mankind is undermining the environmental basis for its own existence, at
this time, I said, "We should give priority to the universal value of all
mankind and the interests of all mankind."

And I will tell you that, certainly, this should be what the politicians of
today should bear in mind. I think that when I emphasize universal
interests, it doesn't mean that I don't respect national interests. I
believe that, when you emphasize and give priority to universal interests,
you, at the same time, give credit to the national interests properly
interpreted.

The truth, I am sure, will ultimately prevail. And this idea will be
properly understood by the new generations of political leaders. At a time
when we are still facing the threat of nuclear weapons and the pollution of
the environment, it is the destiny, the future of all mankind that is at
stake.

I believe that Perestroika started at a time when it was necessary, and
when the country was ripe for Perestroika. Not only objective conditions
were in place, but also the subjective conditions were in place for
Perestroika. Perestroika could not have started because of the initiative
from below. It could not have started outside the Party system.

And, sometimes I feel that it is really ridiculous-- Well maybe ridiculous
is too strong a word. But it's funny that some people say that reformers,
when they were finally in power, did not have a real plan, a real concept
of Perestroika.

Well, it would have been funny had those reformers been able to develop a
concept of Perestroika under the Soviet system when everything was
controlled, when everything was under total control. All of those who
tried, even attempted, to show different views, or dissident views, were
either jailed or exiled from the Soviet Union.

And, therefore, in the Soviet Union, Perestroika could only have started
within the system, within the Party itself, at the moment when the Party
and the country was finally led by people who were ready to take the
initiative and to take the responsibility for reforms. Not only in our
society, but within the Communist Party, finally, we had the people. We had
the forces that were ready to take responsibility.

I would say that the country was ready for Perestroika because of all its
past sufferings, because of its yearning for reform. But, we needed the
courage. And we needed to be able to take a tremendous risk to start this
kind of reform in the Soviet Union. People are asking today whether
Perestroika still has a future, or whether Perestroika is all in the past.
If you look at Perestroika as a concept, as a strategy, as a strategic
choice, then I believe Perestroika is still all in the future.

After my resignation, after I stepped down from the Presidency of the
Soviet Union, someone said the era of Gorbachev is over. And I replied, at
that time, and I still reply that the era of Gorbachev is just beginning.
[Applause] This is because the choice in favor of freedom, Democracy,
market economics, in favor of a more humane society, in favor of political
and intellectual pluralism, this is something that we are still mastering,
that we are still developing.

The goals, the objectives are still in the future. And when I was being
accused of not being resolute enough, I said that we would need at least
20, up to 30 years to put Perestroika on track, and to make Perestroika
embrace the entire society.

And again from this standpoint, and also from the standpoint of the new
thinking on which we based our foreign policy, everything is yet ahead of
us. And I see that even today, the concepts, the approaches to
international politics that we adopted are very relevant. Today national
interests are often being hyped, and some people are rejecting our
approach. We were saying that yes, national interests are important, but we
should look for a balance of national interest. We should not impose our
interests on all other countries.

We recognized the need for equal, equitable cooperation. We said that no
nation can dominate, and no nation should try to govern the world from one
center. Again, all of these things are still quite relevant. We are
learning to live with these principles, and it's very important to watch
the developments underway now.

If you look at what is happening with respect to Iraq, from a narrow
perspective, I look at it from a broader perspective. And I am asking
whether we will emphasize military force and imposition, or whether we will
work based on the rule of law, based on international law, and whether we
will work through the Security Council. I, therefore, welcome the outcome,
the agreement in the Security Council that was the result of very long
protracted negotiations.

And in this context I would like to talk a little bit about what probably
is the most important issue. And that is the pace of change. The pace of
change will be an issue that will be very important in the 21st century.
And you, as the leaders of the 21st century, will have to address that
because the international community will have to change because of the
challenges that it is facing. The pace of reform, the pace of change is a
very crucial issue. If you try to insist on realistic pace of change, if
you insist on that and impose an unrealistically rapid pace of change, then
it is reckless, and could have very bad consequences.

Professor Marceau of France once asked me whether I thought that the
criticism that I was working too slowly, that I was taking decisions too
slowly, whether that criticism was valid. And I said, "Well, I think that
indeed sometimes we work too slow." She replied, "I believe that, in fact,
you took a very rapid pace of change and society couldn't digest change so
rapidly."

And I agree with this. I believe that we were facing a country that was so
vast where there were 200 ethnic groups and nationalities and languages,
different religions, different cultures where there was a lot of
militarism, heavy industry, monopoly, a total monopoly of one political
party in that country. This is what we were facing, and this is the country
in which several generations of our people lived for more than 70 years. We
had to bear in mind that this was a very difficult country to reform. We, I
think, bore it in mind, but we did not fully know our country, we did not
know our country. And, therefore, we had sometimes to put a break on
developments.

And whenever we did that, the media complained Gorbachev is acting too
slowly. He is being influenced by the conservative forces, etc. etc. Well,
what can I say? I can only say to you, as young people you will be, as
Harvard graduates I'm sure, that you will be people who will be in very
important positions in your country and in the world. And I suggest that
sometimes you need to take the blows, and you cannot listen to every kind
of criticism. You cannot hope to be good for each and every person. This is
unrealistic. You should not react to everyone sneezing, so to say.

You have to listen. You cannot afford to be deaf to your society. You
cannot afford to be deaf to its pulse. That could result in many blunders
and mistakes. And something else I want to say is, again, the issue of the
page of reforms is still a very relevant issue. Today the new president of
Russia, and the new generation of citizens and politicians, are facing this
question.

So, at this point I would like to say, people are coughing, it's probably
my daughter. I would like to recognize her. And she is hinting that it's
time for me to wrap things up. (laughter) We have this connection.

I would like to talk about the impact of Perestroika on my country, on
Europe and on the world. But, of course, all these judgements are very
relative. I would like to quote someone, a person whom you may have word
of, Chou En-lai, the former Prime Minister of China. He was talking to a
delegation from France. And that delegation, people asked him what he
thought about the impact of the French Revolution on the world, and also on
China. And Chou En-lai, I think, responded very well. And he didn't take
too much time to answer.

He said, "You know, I think it's too early to tell." (laughter) So,
whenever you're told that someone knows all about Perestroika, and about
the underlying reasons for Perestroika and what kind of change happened,
what kind of lessons we must draw from Perestroika in our huge country,
well, let us say we should wait, and we will find the answers in the
future. The Gorbachev Foundation, of which I am President, is working to
study Perestroika. We have the library and the archive of Perestroika, a
public affairs center. We hold conferences and workshops and meetings,
working together with other think tanks and academic centers. We are
studying what happened during Perestroika, and how Perestroika is still
influencing what is happening in the world.

In the 20th century, for Russia it was a century of search. There was the
era of Lenin. The totalitarian period of Stalin. The period of Perestroika.
But, there is no firewall, there is no wall of China between these
different periods, because even though the country and the people change,
it is still the same country. And it would be both immoral and historically
wrong to totally negate any part of our history, any part of the work of
generations. This was what history willed. And every generation tried to do
its best. Some succeeded more than the others. It depended on many factors.
So, I call upon people to know history, to learn from history, to learn
from the mistakes and also from the positive experiences.

One thing is clear, particularly for Russia. You cannot force history; you
cannot impose anything upon history. You cannot push the process
artificially. And from this standpoint, I would say that a very important
issue always is the cost of reforms, the price that people pay for reforms.
And based on this criteria, I would evaluate the results of reforms, I
would evaluate the results of certain periods in history.

During the years of Stalinism, during the years of the totalitarian system,
our country was alive, our country was building itself. It industrialized,
it created a science and a culture that were outstanding. But, too many
people perished, too many people died because of repressions, because of
collectivization, because the peasants, many peasants were regarded as
almost the enemies of the people.

So, based on that criteria, we also evaluate the results of the Yeltsin
reforms. This was a time when we saw some positive changes. We also saw
that many democratic institutions were preserved. The country was moving
toward market economics. People understood that they should not expect the
government to solve all their problems. That they have to take the
initiative, and that they have to live their own life. For people formerly
of the Soviet Union, that was very important. They used to depend on the
government.

Also during those years, businessmen, young businessmen became a factor in
our society, particularly those businessmen that were not plundering the
country. But, there were also many more negative aspects in how those
reforms were conducted. The result was that two-thirds of the people of
Russia lived in poverty and hardship. It was too high a price.

So, to conclude, I think that if you ask me today whether I am happy,
whether I am pleased with the way things are in my country, in the world,
in Europe, whether what is happening today is in conformity is consistent
with the ideas that we tried to implement, it would be wrong for me to say
that nothing is really changing, has been changing over the past years.
But, I have to say that a lot of things are very alarming to me out of deep
concern to me. When the Soviet Union broke up, once again geopolitics
became the name of the game, and once again an attempt was made to
re-divide the world into spheres of influence. The charter of Paris for the
future of Europe was forgotten, even though it was a very good blueprint
for European security. We saw many conflicts. And the countries in
transition, the countries that had ended their totalitarian regimes saw
models imposed on them from outside.

And some people from Harvard who were in Russia, who were active in Russia,
helped Russia in a way that wasn't really appropriate. But, we're not
blaming Harvard, we're not blaming others. We are blaming ourselves,
because we tried to imitate instead of developing what is good for us. So,
again, we're not blaming Harvard; it was just a few people from Harvard who
tried to impose a model that was too radical for Russia, that was too
laissez-faire for Russia.

I think that a lot of things could have been done differently after
Perestroika. And a lot of things could have been done differently during
Perestroika. But, there are no "ifs" in history. I think that we could have
done more to build a new world order, a world order that will make it
possible to have some kind of global governance, while at the same time
preserving the cultural and ethnic diversity of the world. After the end of
the Cold War, George Bush and I both said, and all of us said, "We need a
new world order." Too little has been done to create this new world order.
We were not ready to address the process of globalization. The process of
globalization that has shaken the world, and that has, I think, negated
many theories including the famous Washington consensus that has now to be
abandoned.

Under President Clinton, the government actually played a very important
role in the economy, and that role was quite different from the so-called
Washington consensus. The government played an important role in science
and education and innovation. I believe that President Clinton, in that
sense, the Clinton period was a period of great progress, and of great
movement in those important areas that will define the future of America.

So, to conclude, a lot of opportunities have been missed. Political leaders
are often lagging behind the events. And that's why I am now undertaking a
new project, a new project together with a number of other former and
current presidents, my two co-chairman are former President Clinton, and
former President Cardoso of Brazil. We are working to create a world
political forum, because we believe that politicians, political leaders
need to be equipped with a new vision, with a new knowledge. So, life goes
on. Thank you. [applause]

COLTON: So, we will now have an altogether too brief period for questions
and answers. We have tried to anticipate dealing with this room, which is
large and wide. And we're asking people to go to microphones. We won't be
able to have an awful lot of these questions. I'm going to get President
Summers, who specifically requested this. The first question, and then I'll
go to the microphones and do my best through the glare to recognize
questioners. So, let's start with President Summers, question number one.

SUMMERS: Thank you very much for a splendid, and inspiring address. I
wonder if you might look back and address the performance of the
international community in its interactions with Russia, going back to the
time when you were in government, London Summit of the G7, and move
forward, and talk a little bit about what the more constructive
alternatives that you think could have been pursued.

You've been quite critical of the shock therapy type approach. Say a little
bit more, if you would, about what approaches you believe would have been
more appropriate for the international community and its interaction with
Russia.

[TAPE CHANGE]

GORBACHEV (Translator): -- happening in our country. We are 90% responsible
for what happened. We should not blame others. But, let me answer the
question of where perhaps we made mistakes, what could have been done
differently.

I am sure, and I have said that many times, that we, the reformers, acted
too slow to reform the Communist party. It is that party where the idea of
Perestroika was first broached. But, it is also in that same party that
there were forces that tried to impede Perestroika. It was in that same
part that there were forces that undermined me as President, that
undermined reforms. And it was those people who organized a coup that
failed, but nevertheless the coup undermined my position, the position of
the supporters of Perestroika, and it pushed forward the process of
disintegration in the Soviet Union, and made possible the reckless
decisions to dismantle the Soviet Union and our economy.

Our second mistake was that we acted too late to reform our union. Of
course, eventually we did decide to start those reforms. And even though it
was a struggle, we were able to develop a new treaty between the republics
for a new union of republics. And it was the coup plotters and the
conservatives who were afraid of that new union. And that's why they
organized that coup one day before the treaty was supposed to be signed.

But, we should have started to rebuild our union a lot earlier. That
probably would have made it impossible for the conservatives to stand in
the way. We also should have done more to stabilize the consumer market in
the Soviet Union. We failed in that respect. As a result of this, people
had more money because we paid better wages and benefits. But, they didn't
have anything to buy with that money. It was something that we needed and
could have addressed. We could have done this by taking, let us say, ten to
twenty billion rubles out of our defense budget, out of our military
sector. And this would have solved the problem of the consumer market.

Again, we tried to do it, but we acted too slowly. And that failure was
very costly. People tend to make their judgement of reform, and make their
judgement of the political leaders based on what they see in the stores,
based on what they see in the consumer market. And because of our mistakes,
the entire country was standing in lines. And actually, some of the
conservatives were trying to make things even more difficult. And the
result was that people were wondering.

And they were asking maybe Gorbachev is not the best leader, maybe there
would be someone else who could succeed where he failed. So, those three
big issues, big problems had we addressed them more successfully would have
made it much safer for Perestroika, and we could have continued with that.

As for the position of the western countries, the attitude of the western
countries, in the very beginning many western leaders were saying, "Well,
he is just another General Secretary, another Communist leader. He is
young. And so I was, by the way, 54, but they said, "He is a young leader."

But that, of course, depending on the background. And so they thought well,
this man could use his energy in order to better confront the West. They
were suspicious that I would continue Communist policies, so to say, based
on Communist concepts. I must say, on the other hand, that President
Reagan, I would like to give President Reagan his due. I was told by the
former Foreign Minister of France, Mr. Demoix(?), that at a G7 meeting in
Houston, in Houston the Foreign Ministers of the G7 were expecting
President Reagan's address. And this was right after I became the leader of
the Soviet Union in 1985. And the French Foreign Minister recalled that
they all expected President Reagan to say, "Well, you should be very firm.
You should not submit to any blandishments from Gorbachev to any attempt of
Gorbachev to influence you, to charm you. He is another Communist leader,
etc. etc."

But, then he recalled President Reagan said, "My view is that he is a new
General Secretary. He represents a new generation. Let us see this as an
opportunity, an opportunity to change relations between our countries and
the Soviet Union." I believe that this is very important.

So, even though, in the beginning of Perestroika, there was a lot of
inertia of the past, things began to change. In Geneva, after our first
meeting, I said to my people that Reagan was a real dinosaur, and he called
me "a real diehard Communist." But, then a little later, he said, "Let us
start on a first name basis. I'll call you Michael, and you call me Ron."
So, the situation was changing, and our relationship improved. Because we
were able to take important decisions together. We had to show restraint,
but we ultimately were able to solve many issues.

I believe that relations between the leaders of the Soviet Union, and of
the United States, that continued to improve also under George Bush, that
relationship also influenced the position of other leaders. So, I believe
that ultimately we had more and more mutual understanding. All of the
western leaders wanted us to change more rapidly.

Indeed, absolutely. The Soviet people want things to happen like in a
folktale. I say, "Change," and everything will change. They need not
change, but things must change; life must improve. Our film director,
Nikita Mikhalkov says that "our people are from the folktale." But, people
are changing. But, we are still far from the objective of changing the
entire mess of people, people who represent different cultures. It is still
a long way to go for our people to become real citizens.

Some people are still saying that the West had a plan to undermine the
Soviet Union, to damage the Soviet Union. Well, I can only respond to this
that indeed some people here had plans how to weaken the Soviet leadership.
And some people in the Soviet Union wanted to weaken the position of the
United States and the world. This was the Cold War. Billions of dollars and
rubles were spent on propaganda and on the Arms Race. Hundreds of billions
of dollars were used for the Arms Race.

I think that for too long the main western leaders did not really believe
in Perestroika, did not believe that Perestroika may succeed. I think it
was a mistake on their part. And I was receiving information that western
leaders did not particularly like the fact that the Soviet leaders were
very active in international affairs. But, that again, is quite normal.
There should be nothing surprising about this. Thank you.

MICHAEL ROSENBERG: Thank you Professor, and thank you President Gorbachev.
My name is Michael Rosenberg. I'm a student here at the college. And you
spoke today of nationalism, which is why I suppose my question is more of a
hypothetical.

If you, sir, were President of Russia today, what would you be doing about
the situation in Chechnya?

GORBACHEV (Translator): I have just had a chance to answer the same
question at the Boston Globe at a lunch with the editors of Boston Globe.
If I were the President of my country, there wouldn't have been this war in
the first place. (applause)

Now, about the current situation, what needs to be done in this situation.
I think that President Putin wants very much to solve this problem. It's a
difficult problem. In Chechnya, one part of the Chechnyan society is
working there to rebuild Chechnya. Today schools are open, and hospitals
are open, and the Chechnyans themselves are running the schools and the
hospitals, and the municipalities, event though there are some federal
representative sin Chechnya. But, there are also militant fighters, there
are still militant fighters who want to continue to fight. And their
position is getting tougher and tougher. And there is also, among the
Russian politicians, and the Russian military, a certain group of people
who probably would like to see the current situation continue indefinitely.

I think that even in the West, there are some people who would like to see
Russia bogged down in Chechnya for years and years to come. I have made my
position very clear in Russia and abroad. We should do more, and we have an
opportunity-- we should do more to put things on a political track, toward
a political solution.

As for the status of Chechnya, it should be a republic within Russia. But,
it should have a special autonomous status, a status that would take into
account the history, and the mentality of the Chechnyan people. So, this is
my position.

COLTON: The aforementioned Marshall Goldman.

GORBACHEV (Translator): Marshall, you had so many opportunities to ask
questions. Give a chance to the students. (applause-laughter)

MARSHALL GOLDMAN: A quick question then. Would you say something about the
origins of Perestroika. Where did you come up with the idea? Did you have
academic advisors? You said you'd served a long process in the government,
in the party, and you seem to be doing everything that other party leaders
did. What made you spread out and do something so radically different?

GORBACHEV (Translator): Well, certain it was not some kind of revelation on
my part, that as soon as I became the leader of the country I had some
revelation and started Perestroika. I tried to explain in my speech that my
previous years in politics, in Soviet politics, showed to me that we had a
system that stifled and ignored the initiative of the people. And I saw
that without people being able to take the initiative, they will never be
able to produce more and better, because people did not have incentive.

I saw that many problems had to be addressed by new laws, by new rules of
the game. That we needed to change the laws. Even when I was working in
Stavropol I saw how the nomenklatur in Moscow ignored the initiatives from
below, in agriculture, in industry, in public health, in government, in
finance. So, all initiative was rejected by the system. People wanted a
better life. People wanted to earn more. And this was actually condemned by
the system. The system condemned any kind of private property, any kind of
private ideology. A country that was able to launch sputniks into space,
that was competitive in outer space, could not give people enough to eat
and good clothing. People were standing in lines to buy things,
particularly imported goods. I felt that it was a shame, it was a scandal,
it was a scandal that this was happening in a country where there's natural
resources and educated people.

So, I felt that the system needed to be changed. So, this was how this
understanding of the need for reform began. When Chemko died, and we were
preparing for the Communist party ... (inaudible), there were a number of
people within the Politburo who wanted the Politburo to decide on the next
leader then and there. But, I said, "Let us not rush. Let us discuss this
tomorrow in the Politburo and in the Central Committee. Let everyone think
and consider, because I know that we will need great changes." And,
therefore, we need to select a person who will be supported. I understood
even then that we needed tremendous change, profound change, and very risky
change. So, I really was not very enthusiastic about taking the job.

We all understood how much needed to be done, and how difficult the change
will be. We understood that change will be difficult. If you read my
speeches even before Perestroika, when I spoke about domestic and
international affairs, even those early speeches, we spoke about the need
for change. There was a speech in December 1984 in London when I spoke
about the need for a new political thinking. And for three hours we had a
very lively debate with Mrs. Thatcher about the state of the world, and
about our future cooperation.

So, again, life itself nudged us toward this moment when we took
responsibility for change and reforms. I also think that my travels, my
previous travels in different countries such as Italy, France, Canada,
Belgium, this made me see many things. And this too had an impact on me.

COLTON: There's no more thankless role than being the one who says to
people who have lined up to ask questions that they can't ask them. But,
the problem is simply that we've run out of time. The hall is reserved for
a student group at 5:30, and our President will deal very sternly with us
if we keep them waiting. Perhaps you can come up and ask one or two
questions probably at the end. I'm afraid we are going to have to stop.
(applause)

I declare the meeting over. Thank you very much.

*******

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