Johnson's Russia List
#6572
26 November 2002
davidjohnson@erols.com
A CDI Project
www.cdi.org

[Contents:
  1. Reuters: Russia's Putin vetoes tough new media curbs.
  2. ITAR-TASS: Journalists praise Putin for veto on amendments to media law.
  3. Newsweek International: Christian Caryl, The Dark Side of Russia. 
Vladimir Putin shows a new authoritarianism. That doesn’t seem to bother 
George W. Bush.
  4. ITAR-TASS: 60 per cent of Russians live in a bad environment.
  5. Interfax: Russian commentators note futility of Chechen warlord's appeal 
to NATO.
  6. Interfax: Russian rejects religious groups' claims of ill-treatment.
  7. RFE/RL: Gregory Feifer, Hostage Crisis Draws Putin And Yavlinskii Closer 
Together.
  8. Rossiyskaya Gazeta: Yabloko Leader Yavlinskiy on Party, Issues of the
Day.  
  9. pravda.ru: The Death of Russia. Approximately 44 millions of Russians 
live below the poverty line.
  10. pravda.ru: Sad Diagnosis: Russian Market Reforms Turn Into
Administrative 
Bustle. Russian electorate treats any economic changes from a political point 
of view.
  11. Drusilla Menaker: Russian newspapers.
  12. John Deever: Re: 6567-Baikal Wave.
  13. BBC Monitoring: Russian scholars on geopolitics and new tasks of the
army.
(Yefimov,Markov,Dugin)
  14. Reuters: YUKOS sees Russian, own oil output booming in '03.
  15. Reuters: Ukraine PM sees good ties with Russia as priority.
  16. Moscow Times: Boris Kagarlitsky, The President's Costly Error. 





*******

#1
Russia's Putin vetoes tough new media curbs
November 25, 2002
By Jon Boyle

MOSCOW (Reuters) - President Vladimir Putin summoned Russia's television
and newspaper bosses to the Kremlin Monday to tell them he had vetoed
controversial curbs on media coverage of "anti-terrorist" operations.

The measures, which would have sharply increased the authorities' powers
during crises like the October theater siege in Moscow, were approved by
parliament within weeks of the armed takeover of the theater by Chechen
rebels which ended in the deaths of 129 hostages.

Putin is ultra-sensitive to media coverage and has effectively neutered two
hostile private channels since coming to power two and a half years ago.
But his patchy record on media freedom has raised concerns over his
commitment to free speech, and Putin suggested the new rules went too far.

"We need to strike a finer balance between curbs and fully informing
society about the actions of the state so that the state does not start
seeing itself as infallible," Putin told editors, according to a Kremlin
transcript.

Editors had criticized amendments to the media law and the law on terrorism
in a letter to Putin, saying they were too vague and could be used in a
broader clampdown on the media.

Putin said he had written to the speaker of Russia's upper house of
parliament, Sergei Mironov, and the speaker of the state Duma, or lower
house, Gennady Seleznyov, to inform them of the veto.

He invited parliament to rework the bills, which he said would have
"prevented the mass media from objectively covering events."

The rules would have barred dissemination of information seen as hampering
anti-terrorist operations, endangering lives, remarks judged as propaganda
or justifying resistance to counter-terrorist measures.

They also would have prevented the media from publishing information about
technology, arms, ammunition and explosives used in anti-terrorist operations.

That clause could have hampered coverage of the use of a powerful
anesthetic that knocked out the rebels who had seized some 800
theater-goers but also killed all but two of the 129 hostages who died. 	   

PRICE OF FREEDOM

Putin's move was not wholly unexpected. Mironov, a native of the
president's home town St Petersburg often used as a stalking horse for
Kremlin plans, urged Putin last week to use his veto.

The president used the meeting, however, to lecture editors on their
duties, warning that in crises, careless words cost lives.

The state had to deprive hostage-takers of the oxygen of publicity, he
said. "The terrorists' main weapon is not bullets and grenades, but
blackmail. The best means of blackmail is to turn a terrorist act into a
public show."

Putin, often suspicious of journalists since the media mugging he suffered
for his sluggish response to the Kursk submarine disaster in 2000,
generally praised news coverage of the three-day theater siege.

But he criticized one channel for broadcasting pictures of elite forces as
they prepared to storm the building. The guerrillas were said to have
closely monitored television broadcasts of the siege.

"That could have led to a huge tragedy," said Putin. He did not name the
channel, but was widely believed to be referring to the private NTV station.

Putin said boosting profitability via higher ratings was legitimate but
"not at any price, not at the cost of blood."
       
*******

#2
Journalists praise Putin for veto on amendments to media law 
ITAR-TASS
 
Moscow, 25 November: The Russian journalist community thanked President
Vladimir Putin for vetoing amendments to the law on mass media.

The director-general of Pervyy Kanal (Channel One) television, Konstantin
Ernst, said however that Putin's decision "should not be taken as a victory
of journalists over deputies". He believes the most important thing is that
mass media and law-enforcement agencies have been given additional time
during which to jointly work out regulations for their activities in
emergencies. Ernst stressed that the joint work of the journalists,
law-enforcement people and parliamentarians on amendments to the law on
mass media "aims at avoiding mistakes and saving people's lives".

The head of the Russia's Regions group in the State Duma, Oleg Morozov,
said lawmakers "did not make a mistake by adopting this law". He noted that
parliamentarians are ready for joint work with journalists on amendments to
the law on mass media that should take into account journalists' proposals.
Morozov said there is no question of any deadline for the adoption of the
amendments to the law as it is necessary to work out a professional code of
conduct for the journalists and then move on to the law itself. At the same
time, he believes that "there is no need to delay this work".

The chairman of the State Duma Committee on Legislation, Pavel
Krasheninnikov, said Putin's veto on the law on mass media that restrict
the activities of journalists in public emergencies is a "courageous step
of the president". Commenting on the president's decision, he told
ITAR-TASS on Monday [25 November] that "this step will meet full
understanding both among mass media and people". He believes that any
restriction on mass media is a blow to the constitutional rights of
citizens and it cannot benefit society. As for the rights of journalists,
they clearly stated in their letter to the president that their activities
are self-regulatory, that is there is internal censorship that requires
objective coverage of events and sound grounds justifying journalists'
conclusions even in unusual and emergency situations, Krasheninnikov said.

The chairman of the State Duma Information Policy Committee, Boris Reznik,
said: "The president showed wisdom and complete understanding of the
situation". He believes that before such draft laws get in the State Duma
they should be broadly discussed by the media community that must work out
its own rules of behaviour in emergency situations.

The head of the Union of Right Forces party and its faction in the State
Duma, Boris Nemtsov, also applauded the president's decision. He believes
that "the president listened to the most responsible and educated part of
citizens - the journalistic community, democratic forces and a new
generation".

People's Deputy group leader Gennadiy Raykov said the Duma should take a
balanced approach towards this question and rework the law by introducing a
provision that will step up the fight against propaganda of terrorism.

Ekho Moskvy editor-in-chief Aleksey Venediktov said it had been agreed
during the meeting with the president that at first a professional charter
of journalists should be worked out and then amendments to the law on mass
media.

The Industrial Committee will work on the amendments on behalf of
journalists. It will meet on Tuesday to discuss a new law on mass media and
draft an antiterrorist convention.

Mediasoyuz [Media Union] vice-president Yelena Zelinskaya told ITAR-TASS
that Putin's veto demonstrates his big faith in the Russian media
community. In her words, "the media community will bear tremendous
responsibility by taking part in the development of the document that
regulates the work of mass media in emergencies". She believes that "a code
of rules tentatively called Antiterrorist Convention should be worked out
as soon as possible".

It is also necessary for any changes in media legislation to be approved by
the media community not only in Moscow but also in the regions, Zelinskaya
said.

******* 

#3
Newsweek International
December 2, 2002
The Dark Side of Russia 
Vladimir Putin shows a new authoritarianism. That doesn’t seem to bother
George W. Bush 
By Christian Caryl

    Hans Wilhelm Steinfeld, a journalist for Norwegian TV, has lived in
Russia for two decades. He’s had his share of run-ins with the authorities
over the years, but what happened last week was a novelty even for him. 
      HE HAD JUST FINISHED reporting a story on refugees from the war in
Chechnya when agents of the Russian security service confiscated his
videotapes and wiped them clean with a high-powered magnet. “This is the
first time I’ve ever seen them actually destroy journalistic material,”
says Steinfeld, who notes that the incident drew formal protests from the
Norwegian government—and that other foreign reporters have been having
similar experiences.
      A few years ago, such ham-handed treatment of Western journalists
would have been dismissed as an eccentric blast from the Soviet past. These
days, though, it’s part of a trend in Russia—an accelerating return to
authoritarianism that got a big boost during last month’s crisis in a
Moscow theater. The assault by Russian Special Forces to free more than 800
hostages from Chechen terrorists ended up killing 128 innocent civilians.
You’d think that the organization that ran the “rescue”—the Federal
Security Service, or FSB, successor to the KGB—would therefore be coming in
for some harsh criticism, especially considering that its refusal to tell
doctors what gas had been used in the operation probably caused many
avoidable deaths. But no. Instead, the aftermath of the crisis has seen a
tightening of controls on the press, an intensification of the war in
Chechnya—and a corresponding slackening of checks on the power of Russia’s
bewildering array of secret services. All this, some critics say, is a sign
of Russia’s dark side—the old apparatus of security and repression,
emerging once again.
      Ironically, the revival of Soviet-era political mores draws support
from none other than George W. Bush, who landed in St. Petersburg last week
full of understanding for the “very tough decisions” that Russian President
Vladimir Putin had to make. “People tried to blame Vladimir,” he said even
before arriving. “They ought to blame the terrorists.” Consider that
payback for a shrewd game by the Russian president, who’s been careful to
support Bush in his war against Al Qaeda—as well as an echo of the U.S.
president’s language in justifying his own policies. It was small surprise,
then, that Bush gave Putin a pass on such tricky subjects as Chechnya. At
their meeting, he pressed for negotiation, not a moderation of Moscow’s
increasingly brutal tactics in the war. But this raises a large question
about the new friendship between Moscow and Washington—namely, what price
is Washington willing to pay for friendship, in terms of Russian practices
that compromise democracy?
      From a Russian perspective, that price could be high indeed. Take the
media. Last week a group of 23 leading Russian journalists signed a
petition asking Putin to veto a new law, already approved by both houses of
Parliament, that would restrict reporting of situations involving
terrorism. Critics say the law defines those situations so vaguely that
almost any reporting linked with the war in Chechnya might qualify——not to
mention inquiries into such controversies as the medical treatment of those
who perished last month in the hostage crisis. So far there’s been no
response—even though the FSB, in particular, has been raiding the offices
of newspapers that have asked awkward questions. Not that the FSB needs to
resort to such crude methods. FSB veterans, after all, occupy key positions
in the press ministry and the state TV company.
      Even more ominously, efforts by liberal deputies in the Russian
Legislature to initiate an official inquiry into the hostage-taking and its
aftermath have been quashed by parties loyal to the Kremlin. The message
from the government is clear: officials who make mistakes on the scale of
the hostage rescue don’t have anything to fear, so long as they’re doing
the bidding of Putin and the FSB. Obviously, that’s a huge boost for the
vast network of former and current spooks who have attained new positions
of political and financial power under Putin.
      After years on the sidelines, Russia’s security services are now
firmly back on top. They serve in the half dozen or so successor agencies
to the old Soviet secret police that are now responsible for domestic
security and foreign intelligence—none of which is subject to Western-style
parliamentary oversight. (Even if they were, it probably wouldn’t make much
difference, since the Parliament itself is riddled with former members of
the security apparatus.) The spooks are also well represented in other
political institutions, ranging from regional governorships to key
positions in the presidential administration—where, for example, KGB
confidants of Putin like Igor Sechin control access to the president.
      Perhaps most importantly, the revival of the secret service under
Putin has also given his old intelligence cronies a chance to moonlight as
entrepreneurs. Some former spies run protection rackets for businesses,
head the security departments at big companies or offer “information
services” (including blackmail material) to paying customers. Senior FSB
officials are directly involved in struggles for the control of
corporations (such as the oil company Slavneft) or supervise lucrative but
potentially sensitive business sectors like the arms-export trade. Andrei
Soldatov, a journalist who runs a Web site devoted to the secret services,
says: “I’ve seen myself how the security officers in private companies just
pick up their phones and casually dial their former colleagues in the FSB,
asking ‘Can you look in the database and find me information about
so-and-so?’ ” Human-rights activist Sergei Grigoryants says that modern-day
Russian secret services aren’t the incorruptible protectors of the people
that official propaganda would have Russians believe. “The security
services have a wider meaning now. Their function is to hold power in this
country; their police work is just a small part of what they do. They are
interested in power and big money, not the war on terrorism or the
protection of citizens.”   
      Clearly, the FSB and its sister services aren’t shy about protecting
their new prerogatives. The old Soviet phobias about foreigners are
surfacing again, with more cities and regions placed off-limits to them.
Recently, relatives of three Russians imprisoned by the security services
on alleged espionage offenses came to the United States to drum up
support—conjuring up memories of the Soviet era, when the families of
dissidents who managed to get abroad spent their time lobbying Western
governments, human-rights groups and news organizations. (One of the three,
former naval officer Grigory Pasko, has spent about three years in jail for
revealing how the Russian Navy dumped toxic nuclear —waste into the Pacific
Ocean.) Karinna Moskalenko, a lawyer who represents the families of the
alleged spies, says the lack of a strong, independent judiciary makes it
relatively easy for the FSB to operate this way. “I’m not very optimistic
that the courts will free these people. The assumption in our country is
still that if someone is arrested, he’s guilty,” she declares. “If the
judicial system functioned properly, the secret services couldn’t do these
things. I’m very sorry for these three people, but I feel even more sorry
for my country.”
      If President Bush isn’t prepared to criticize the trend, who will?
Europe, perhaps. Ever since Washington’s position on Chechnya started
softening, the Europeans have been challenging Russian handling of the war
and its side effects. Those criticisms have clearly been getting under
Putin’s skin, as he made clear with some vulgar remarks to journalists
quizzing him on Chechnya at a press conference in Brussels earlier this
month. In the run-up to that summit, Amnesty International urged the EU to
take Russia to task for its human-rights record. Too bad it didn’t send a
similar note to George W. Bush.
       
With Andrew Nagorski in New York and Eve Conant in Moscow 

*******

#4
60 per cent of Russians live in a bad environment 
ITAR-TASS
 
Moscow, 25 November: About 60 per cent of Russians live in an unsafe
environment.

A survey conducted by the Russians president's surveillance department
jointly with offices of presidential representatives in federal districts
has found that the environment of almost 15 per cent of Russia's territory,
where about 60 per cent of the population live, "does not correspond to
standards of ecological safety".

A "significant contamination of the atmospheric air and sources of the
drinking water supply" are seen in more than 40 [out of 89] Russian regions.

The department said in its report, posted on the Russian president's
official website, that concentrations of harmful substances were above
maximum permissible figures in 207 cities with a total population of 64.5m.

"The high content of harmful admixtures in the atmosphere negatively
affects health of people. The chronic bronchitis morbidity rate of the
adult population has grown 1.7 times over the past five years and of the
children's one 1.5 times," the summary said.

The presidential department's experts said the quality of the drinking
water in Russia was unsatisfactory.

Besides, fertility of land tends to decline and harmful substances
accumulate in it because of forest fires.

Another problem is decontamination and treatment of industrial waste posing
a threat to population health and ecological systems.

"These factors along with irrational use of natural resources and a low
effectiveness of state control of environmental activity threaten to
ecological safety in the country," the report said.

It said the natural resources, economic and finance ministries failed to
enforce federal environmental programmes. Spending on environmental
protection measures has decreased more than 10 times as compared to 1999.

Federal authorities have not ensured the development of statutes to support
the implementation of the federal law on the environment.

The presidential surveillance department has proposed in its report that
the government send to the parliament a draft federal law stipulating fines
for environment-polluting activities.

The department will present the results of the survey to President Vladimir
Putin and to the government.

*******

#5
Russian commentators note futility of Chechen warlord's appeal to NATO 
Interfax
 
Moscow, 25 November: Relations between the Chechen opposition and the West
are on the verge of breaking up, head of the Political Technologies Centre
Igor Bunin said concerning the ultimatum that Chechen field commander
Shamil Basayev sent to NATO.

"Basayev's statement is an expression of no-confidence in the West. Until
now, he would have never dreamed of talking with NATO in the same tone," he
told Interfax.

Chechen rebels have been moving away from the West and showing an
increasing focus on international terrorism structures, Bunin said. Next
time, Basayev will file a complaint directly with Al-Qa'idah, he said.
True, Basayev's threats may indeed be followed by terrorist attacks in
Russian cities but, on the whole, the activities of terrorist groups from
Chechnya are dying down and suicide missions are more frequently a sign of
agony [death throes], Bunin said.

In comparison, "because the Palestinian authorities are recognized by the
international community, Palestinians have no choice but to fight for the
maintenance and development of their state. Suicide bombings will continue
to take place, especially because this is one way to help one's own
family," he said.

On the other hand, in Chechnya, there is room for political manoeuvre and
the chances for survival are greater, Bunin said. "For this reason, if this
vicious circle of sweep operations and terrorist attacks is broken and
economic structures start to work, there will be no cause for terrorism,"
he said.

Basayev's latest threats will, "in a final analysis, benefit Russia,
because our enemies will be even more isolated", Sergey Markov, director of
the Institute of Political Research, told Interfax.

"By addressing NATO nations and mentioning barbaric activities such as
killing civilians and bombing houses, Basayev re-emphasised the terrible
barbarian methods used by Chechen terrorists and made it clear that they
are not freedom fighters, but gangsters who must be killed," he said.

Characteristically, "this time, the most unruly field commander acted as
the Chechen newsmaker instead of [separatist president] Aslan Maskhadov,
who is viewed by some NATO figures - especially Latvia and Estonia - as a
legitimate president", Markov said.

******

#6
Russian rejects religious groups' claims of ill-treatment 
Interax
 
Moscow, 25 November: Russian Justice Minister Yuriy Chayka discussed on
Monday [25 November] with Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly's [PACE]
representatives David Atkinson and Rudolf Binding complaints filed by
certain religious organizations about their treatment in Russia.

The ministry's public relations centre issued a report quoting Chayka as
saying that the Salvation Army and Jehovah's Witnesses alone have run into
problems in Russia.

A Moscow district court did order the liquidation of the local branch of
the Salvation Army but the city court quashed that ruling and sent the case
back. The Moscow branch of the Salvation Army will most probably be
reinstated, the reports says. The Salvation Army has been registered as an
all-Russian NGO [nongovernment organization] and in seven Russian regions,
it says.

The Justice Ministry has registered the Jehovah's Witnesses as an
all-Russian religious association. Its 230 branches have been registered
throughout Russia, the report says.

It was in Moscow alone that the prosecution service had asked the court to
liquidate the local Jehovah's Witnesses branch because of offences
committed by it, it says.

****** 

#7
Russia: Hostage Crisis Draws Putin And Yavlinskii Closer Together
By Gregory Feifer

Many expected that Moscow's hostage crisis last month would shake up
politics in Russia. But few could have predicted that President Vladimir
Putin would come out lavishing praise on a former political adversary,
Yabloko party leader Grigorii Yavlinskii, who helped negotiate with the
hostage takers. The Yabloko chief had long been a major thorn in the
Kremlin's side. Now, however, he appears to have joined its ranks as an
informal adviser. 

Moscow, 25 November 2002 (RFE/RL) -- If one prominent Russian politician
could be counted on to speak his mind when it came to President Vladimir
Putin, it was Grigorii Yavlinskii.

As fellow lawmakers scrambled to praise the president before and after his
election to office in 2000, the liberal head of the social democratic
Yabloko party criticized among other things Putin's crackdown on the free
press and the war in Chechnya.

Yavlinskii faulted Putin for undermining parliament as an independent
institution and making the government members of a "staff" that enabled him
to "do whatever he wants."

The Yabloko leader claimed to have been blacklisted by the Kremlin in
response, with orders given to the country's top television channels not to
allow him any airtime.

That has all changed. Following Moscow's hostage crisis last month, Putin
himself appeared on all three top channels together with Yavlinskii,
praising the Duma deputy for his attempts to negotiate with Chechen rebels.

The president criticized other negotiators, notably from Yabloko's liberal
rival, the Union of Rightist Forces, or SPS.

Meanwhile, Yavlinskii has indicated that he speaks regularly with Putin,
and leading media outlets claim the Yabloko leader is now essentially an
adviser to the president. "Yezhenedelnyi zhurnal" recently wrote that
Yavlinskii has "found a new influential ally, President Putin."

Yavlinskii did not reply to RFE/RL's requests for an interview. But Yabloko
Deputy Chairman Sergei Mitrokhin said that a "series of events" occurred
that moved relations between the two men in a "more positive direction." He
denied that Yavlinskii has become a bona fide informal adviser. "Yavlinskii
is a political figure, a politician, whose opinions interest the president,
and to whom the president listens," Mitrokhin said.

There is much to suggest the Yabloko leader has broken with his past record
of often blaming Putin for Russia's ills.

Yavlinskii has praised the president's ostensibly pro-Western foreign
policy since 11 September 2001. But on a Sunday-night political talk show
-- TVS's "Bez protokola" on 17 November -- Yavlinskii displayed a new
twist, indicating that the president himself is not to blame the country's
internal ills. "The policies that the president carried out with the United
States, which were beneficial not only for Russia, were the product of his
own state work, while at the same time around him, including in the
government, there existed a deaf opposition," Yavlinskii said.

Yavlinskii also, uncharacteristically, failed to criticize the president in
a recent scathing article on Russia's corrupt economy that appeared in
"Moskovskie novosti."

Mitrokhin backs the line that Putin is doing his best for Russia, saying
that he is "bound hand and foot by oligarchic structures," to which he is a
"prisoner."

That Russia's leader is not to blame for the country's ills is by no means
a new idea. The concept of a "good tsar" -- a benevolent leader whose
intentions are thwarted by scheming officials -- has existed for centuries
as part of the country's political culture.

But precisely what internal change does Yabloko's new line reflect, and
does it mean that the party has gained leverage in policy-making decisions?

Vladimir Pribylovskii, president of the Panorama political research group,
says "no." He said Yavlinskii's recent actions only indicate he is lining
up behind Putin with countless others.

Pribylovskii said Yavlinskii's support for the president surpasses that of
the pro-free-market SPS, which wholly backed Putin and his policies in the
first year of his presidency but has recently moved toward greater outward
criticism.

Pribylovskii said Yavlinskii is motivated by pragmatism. "Yabloko wants to
make it into the next Duma [in elections next year]. It's afraid 1 percent
[of the vote] will be taken away by means of 'administrative manipulation'
and it will be left outside the electoral field. Now it's serving the
president on the question of [a Duma vote against] referenda [in electoral
years] and so on," Pribylovskii said.

In Duma elections in 1999, Yabloko squeaked by the 5 percent minimum with
5.9 percent of the vote. SPS landed 8.5 percent.

SPS chief Boris Nemtsov has issued a number of calls to put forward a
single candidate for presidential elections in 2004. Yavlinskii has
steadfastly turned them down.

Yurii Korgunyuk, director of Moscow's Indem think tank, said Yavlinskii and
the party's leadership fear losing political prominence inside a new party.
Korgunyuk said Yavlinskii is driven by massive ambition and jealousies
toward SPS's leaders. Most of them are former so-called young reformers who
helped author the post-Soviet economic transformation under former
President Boris Yeltsin.

Duma Deputy and SPS ideologue Boris Nadezhdin told RFE/RL that Yavlinskii,
a perennial presidential candidate, recently gave up his dreams of winning
the presidency and changed his approach in the interests of landing a large
ministerial portfolio, perhaps as prime minister. "His personal trajectory
changed, and it became directly tied to possibilities of a career based on
appointments to important state posts. That's where his friendship with the
president comes from," Nadezhdin said.

Landing an important post rests in no small part on Yabloko's ratings,
Nadezhdin said. Those ratings, in turn, depend on the president, who wields
great control over the press and the popularity media exposure can bring.

Nadezhdin said Putin's interests, meanwhile, lie in keeping down the
liberal opposition. SPS's ratings began to grow in October, he said, and
the president's friendship with the Yabloko leader followed shortly.

Indem's Korgunyuk agrees. He said the Kremlin is actively seeking to foment
rivalry between Yabloko and SPS. "The thing is that while the conflict
between Yabloko and SPS continues, they will essentially be unable to
provide an alternative to [the pro-Kremlin] Unified Russia," Korgunyuk said.

Duma Deputy Sergei Yushenkov is co-leader of the Liberal Russia party,
which he helped form when he left SPS last year. He also questions
Yabloko's oppositionist credentials, not on the basis of Yavlinskii's
recent actions but on Yabloko's Duma voting record.

Yushenkov said Yabloko has cast ballots for "undemocratic measures"
strengthening the role of the state in various spheres of public life.

But Yushenkov reserves most of his criticism of Yabloko for the party's
practice of regularly voting for the Kremlin's draft of the federal budget.
"Each person can say about himself whatever he wants, but there are words
and there are actions. If you announce your opposition, but nonetheless
support the government's budget, then what kind of opposition are you?
After all, it is precisely the budget that contains in concentrated form
the policies carried out by the current regime," Yushenkov said.

Last week, Yabloko voted for raising the barrier of votes parties need to
land to qualify for Duma seats from 5 percent to 7 percent, a level that
would have disqualified the party from parliament in 1999.

*******

#8
Russia: Yabloko Leader Yavlinskiy on Party, Issues of the Day  

Rossiyskaya Gazeta
20 November 2002
[translation for personal use only]
Unattributed interview with Grigoriy Alekseyevich Yavlinskiy, leader 
of Yabloko, with television, radio, and newspaper correspondents asking 
questions; date and place not given: "Grigoriy Yavlinskiy: Slightly Right 
of Center" 

     Yabloko was the first participant in the 
project.   Aleksandr Arkhangelskiy (Kultura television channel), Sergey 
Buntman (Ekho Moskvy), Jill Doherty (CNN television network), Vitaliy 
Dymarskiy (Rossiyskaya Gazeta), and Kseniya Larina (Ekho Moskvy) spoke 
with Yabloko's leader. 

    [correspondent]   Grigoriy Alekseyevich, at what point on the present 
political spectrum--from the far right wing to the far left--would you 
put Yabloko? 

    [Yavlinskiy]   Though this division is very arbitrary, especially for 
Russia, we are a party with a liberal social ideology--we are slightly 
right of center.   I can explain why.   Because we are a party that 
advocates an open society, public politics, human rights, human dignity, 
and the use of political procedures instead of force in all possible 
instances.   If we are speaking of economics, we favor low taxes, 
demonopolization, and competition.   We are a party that considers its 
goal to be development of medium-sized and small business along with big 
business.   We favor a Russian government that is accountable and open. 

    [correspondent]   Who are Yabloko's possible allies?   Are they to 
the right of you or to the left? 

    [Yavlinskiy]   We shape our alliances based on a common understanding 
of the most acute, serious questions for the country, questions like the 
war in the North Caucasus, the way the government should operate, the 
situation involving corruption, and the execution of social programs.   
The social vector is very important to us specifically because we are a 
contemporary liberal party.   And any contemporary liberal party sets, 
for example, the availability of education for everyone, regardless of 
his social status or income, and minimal support for citizens as its 
goals. 

    [correspondent]   You have repeatedly said that we must and can 
conduct negotiations with Maskhadov.   Not as an opposition politician, 
but as a man who many times has aspired and continues to aspire to the 
role of president of Russia, can you imagine yourself in the president's 
position after such a crisis as the seizure of the hostages in Dubrovka? 

    [Yavlinskiy]   The role of Maskhadov himself has changed as a result 
of these events, from my viewpoint.   I cannot say whether he knew if 
preparations were underway for this terrorist act, and I cannot say 
whether he directed this terrorist act, but what I can certainly say is 
that during the entire three days, he did not do anything significant to 
stop the terrible bloodshed.   Look, at this point there is the question 
of the extradition of Zakayev, and so many actions, so much uproar, and 
so much activism in all countries of the world.   But certainly the 
events that occurred in Moscow are much more significant, simply outside 
comparison.   But neither Maskhadov nor his representatives stepped 
forward in any way during those days, and there was not even an attempt 
to acknowledge their responsibility.   And that changes the actual 
situation.   If we are speaking of negotiations, we must understand that 
they must be conducted with those who have social authority and those who 
can make decisions. 

    [correspondent]   Grigoriy Alekseyevich, is there public opinion in 
Russia today, and who shapes it?   Most people in our country are for 
radical decisions.   What do you think of that? 

    [Yavlinskiy]   First of all I would like to tell you that last week 
the architecture and monument construction   commission of the Moscow 
City Duma adopted the decision that it can support the initiative, 
presented by Yabloko, incidentally, to build a monument to victims of 
political repression, not even excluding Lubyanka Square.   As for the 
question overall, we are a party that represents a minority--an 
influential minority, but a minority--of roughly 10-15 percent which sees 
Russia differently than does the majority public opinion.   They see it 
as an open country, its policies as open, and the government as 
accountable.   And the state, in their opinion, must serve the people 
because they maintain it.   These people believe that the essence of 
everything, the most important thing, is human life and dignity, and the 
state exists to ensure that. 
    Unfortunately, there are an enormous number of people who perhaps 
think the same as we do, but are willing to resign themselves to the 
exact opposite.   As for the majority, which incidentally the current 
government represents, we can understand them too.   They are our 
fellow-citizens too; they are simply different and see Russia 
differently. 

    [correspondent]   So then Yabloko has no prospects for becoming the 
majority? 

    [Yavlinskiy]   I will put it this way: special historical conditions 
are needed for a majority to be formed around a party such as ours.   To 
look at the future, that, of course, is our task for the next 20, 30, and 
40 years. 

    [correspondent]   As a politician, where are you more comfortable--in 
the opposition or in power? 

    [Yavlinskiy]   It is not a question of comfort.   As a political 
party, we have certain goals and program precepts, which I was talking to 
you about.   So if they are being realized, we are prepared to 
participate in this; but if the tendencies go the opposite direction, 
then according to the way things actually are, we simply find ourselves 
in the opposition.   Recently I published an article entitled 
"Demodernization," which says that superficially one gets the impression 
that everything today seems to be moving in the right direction, but in 
fact there are processes underway that are leading the country in an 
altogether different direction. 

    [correspondent]   Grigoriy Alekseyevich, your article presents the 
idea that practically all the current members of the Russian elite are 
bound up in one way or another in the way things are and cannot destroy 
that without direct or indirect damage to themselves.   What is Yabloko's 
place in this process then?   Do you consider yourself part of the 
current political elite, and if you are against the way things are, how 
will this end for you as the party of systematic opposition? 

    [Yavlinskiy]   Those who represent a party, in the State Duma, for 
example, are classified as the political elite. 
    As for this generalization, in my opinion it is extremely fundamental 
and important, because it provides an explanation of why what seem to be 
obvious things cannot occur.   For example, why is there no independent 
judicial system in Russia yet?   Laws are adopted, but there is no 
independent court.   That is also why, if one is created and obtains 
political support, it will affect many very prominent representatives of 
the current political and economic elite.   Or the problem with the mass 
media and with those amendments that were introduced to the Law a few 
days ago.   Do people really not understand that a free description of 
what is going on in the country is an element of the country's security 
and helps us be aware of how people can defend themselves, how the state 
can defend itself, and how the president can defend his own position and 
his own interests?   Why do they want to restrict the mass media all the 
time?   Certainly because a free press, for example, would have written 
in 1998 that a default was imminent.   I am not going to name them, but 
extremely important economic and analytical publications did not see 
anything two weeks before the default!   Why?   Because they write not 
what exists in reality, but what the interests of their bosses are 
associated with. 

    [correspondent]   Recently there has been a lot of talk about state 
advisability--even a kind of alternative--state-minded thinking or 
anti-state-minded thinking.   Have you ever faced a choice between state 
interests and personal freedoms? 

    [Yavlinskiy]   From my point of view, state interests mean 
specifically that people have rights and they consider themselves 
independent, respect themselves and are not degraded.   I can explain 
this using a very simple example.   The economy of the 21st century 
cannot be created by people who do not have rights and cannot get justice 
in courts and defend their property and their rights as subjects of the 
economic process. 

    [correspondent]   Grigoriy Alekseyevich, you were already talking 
about the amendments to the Law on the Mass Media.   It is clear that 
they are linked with the events in Dubrovka.   Where, in your view, is 
the line between free speech and irresponsibility?   And who should 
decide--the state or the journalists themselves--how to cover the war 
against terrorism? 

    [Yavlinskiy]   That is a question of the professionalism of those 
very same law enforcement organs, those who conducted the operation.   It 
was necessary to immediately make and announce the decision that no one, 
not journalists and not non-journalists, should go beyond this line.   It 
was a simple procedural task: here is the disaster zone, you cannot go 
there, stand there, take an interview and tell about it, but stay behind 
the line.   You cannot appear on floors from which the operational 
situation can be watched...   But there is no need to adopt a separate 
law for that every time.   Most journalists are responsible people.   All 
that needed to be done was explain how they should behave.   Now that the 
question has been raised to the level of law, it is an altogether 
different idea that is prescribed, and one in generalized form to boot.   
In the regions this will have very extensive consequences, because there 
the "precepts" from Moscow are executed at 10 times the scale.   
Somewhere some Vikhr [whirlwind] operation will be announced, and all the 
journalists will fall under the demolition machine. 
    The idea of terrorism is to frighten us and make us live differently 
than we are living.   If you begin to change everything on a 
self-censorship basis, then what are we fighting for, what are we 
struggling for?   I insist that if rights and liberties are eliminated in 
the name of security, it means, just as in the well-known phrase, those 
who prefer security to freedom deserve neither the one nor the other and 
lose both the one and the other.   When I met with the president a few 
days ago, I asked him to veto these amendments.   The president promised 
to examine the problem.   Incidentally, the president agreed with the 
need to answer society's painful questions related to the terrorist act 
in Moscow and the operation to free the hostages.   Vladimir 
Vladimirovich expressed the intention to give an order to officials to 
publicly explain all the issues regarding these events. 

    [correspondent]   What do you think of Russia's position on the Iraq 
question?   What kind of a job did the Ministry of Foreign Affairs do 
here, in your opinion? 

    [Yavlinskiy]   It is simple to talk about this topic now, since the 
decision was made unanimously in the Security Council.   Everyone is 
satisfied with this decision, but if anyone is dissatisfied, he is still 
saying that he is satisfied.   Even Saddam Hussayn recently announced 
that he is very satisfied with this decision.   From my viewpoint, the 
situation there is alarming.   Most importantly, there is no answer to 
the question of how war can be avoided.   And it can be avoided if, for 
example, the current leadership of Iraq really understands that an armed 
contingent ready for action is monitoring the entire surrounding 
situation.   All this was discussed for a very long time, and certain 
resolutions were adopted, but the matter did not go beyond talks.   Iraq 
has already won more than 100 days. 
    Russia, like any country, is interested in the transparency of the 
regimes in the countries that surround it.   Furthermore, we are 
interested in ensuring that unpredictable regimes on our borders do not 
have weapons of mass destruction.   Our country has the longest borders 
with the most unstable regions of the world.   So the proportion of the 
problems that we are experiencing compared with our allies is not the 
same.   And our own interests must be in first, second, and third place 
for us.   Only they must be correctly formulated. 
    Our Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not say anything about that and 
sometimes made statements on humanitarian issues instead of political 
ones.   But at any rate Russia's objective interests dictate specifically 
the position that it ultimately took in voting on this resolution. 

    [correspondent]   In your statements and in particular in your 
article "Demodernization," you examine the current situation in Russia in 
detail and with quite a number of supporting arguments, but when the 
second eternal Russian question of "What should be done?" comes up, you 
do not offer many ideas.   In the article you suggest just one thing: 
rely on the good tsar.   Does this conclusion mean that you recognize the 
system that exists in Russia as a given? 

    [Yavlinskiy]   Do you want ideas?   How to improve the tax system?   
Or how to prevent a rightist at the helm in Russia?   Such ideas are 
known to every graduate student.   That is not the point.   The point is 
something else.   Twice in our history--in 1917 and 1991--society 
suddenly abandoned the government and changed it.   In Russia such a 
thing happens when the gap between society and government becomes 
irreversible.   That was how the tsar disappeared.   And that was how, 
completely unexpectedly, the Communist system disappeared.   And here is 
another example.   Slightly over 90 percent of the people in Russia do 
not want to bring in nuclear waste.   But today the condition of society 
is such that no matter how often you raise this question, and no matter 
how much you appeal to people to defend their rights, the masses do not 
respond.   Here is the answer to the question of "What should be done?"   
Each person answers that question for himself.   In Italy, for example, 
one phrase was changed in the labor code, and a million people undertook 
to defend their rights. 
    As for the "good tsar," this concept is related to the specific 
characteristics of Russia, not one country in the world knows it better.  
 Would it occur to anyone to say that the president of France is Louis 
the 14th?   Or that the chancellor of Germany is the kaiser?   It would 
not.   Because the modernization that occurred there took society so far 
from such a concept that it can only be taken as humor there.   It is 
something else again in Russia, where archaic relations, even feudal 
relations, if you will, have largely been preserved.   That is the 
reality in which we live today.   And when I say that we represent a 
minority, I in fact want to emphasize that the current system of 
relations is implanted in our citizens.   That is how they look at 
government.   If you ask whether they want democracy and freedoms, you 
will get the answer, yes, we do, but they still expect that someone 
should give it all to them.   There have been many revolutions and coups 
in Russia, successful and unsuccessful ones, but such relations could not 
be changed.   And in the article I say that the tsar in our country must 
have two characteristics: he must be able to behave in accordance with 
tsarist discipline, and at the same time he must still seem to be an 
intelligent person.   Then very fundamental changes can occur.   Am I 
hoping for that?   I have no special hopes.   But I must say that in the 
late 1980s, for reasons that have certainly not been explained to this 
day, the general secretary suddenly began to violate the discipline of 
the general secretary.   And the country changed in three years. 

    [correspondent]   Will you enter the presidential election? 

   [Yavlinskiy]   It is still too early to talk about that.   But I can 
say that we as a party of the democratic opposition will take part in all 
elections. 

    [correspondent]   Will you join the government, if it is offered? 

    [Yavlinskiy]   I do not rule out anything at all. 

*******

#9
pravda.ru
November 25, 2002
The Death of Russia
Approximately 44 millions of Russians live below the poverty line

The birth rate in all regions of the Russian Federation, with the exception
of Dagestan and Ingushetia, is below the line of natural reproduction,
which supposes that one million of women must give birth to one million of
girls, future mothers. However, currently, only 600,000 girls are born for
every million Russian women. If this continues, the Russian population will
be reduced to If 74-76 million people by 2040. Taking the current death and
birth rates into consideration, the Russian population can be expected to
drop to 25 million people in 100 years. This was stated by the director of
the family and upbringing laboratory in the State Research Institute of
Family and Upbringing, Viktor Sysenko. 

Approximately 44 million Russians are below the poverty line. They don’t
get enough to eat, are poorly dressed, never attend theatres, and don’t
spend vacations at the seaside. Poverty is a severe strain on family
relations. Experts say that about eight million Russians are currently
unemployed; this has become a really difficult problem for many fathers and
husbands who fail to adjust to the harsh reality of life under capitalism. 

Sociologists say that this demographic decline is connected, not only with
mass poverty, but also with the destruction of the Russian family and
declining morals. 

Regarding the divorce rate, Russia is currently in second place. There are
more divorces only in America. In 2002, the US divorce rate made up 5.5 per
1,000 people on average, while in Russia it was 4.3. Just to compare, there
were 2.5 divorces per 1,000 people in Italy within the same period. The
number of marriages registered in Russia is currently almost twice as less
as in the 1980s. 

In addition, the number of unregistered marriages and illegitimate children
are increasing in Russia. The number of illegitimate children made up 21%
of the total amount of children born in 1995, and the level reached 28% in
2000. In some regions, the Far Eastern region for instance, the share of
illegitimate children makes up 40%. 

Viktor Sysenko thinks that the government must guarantee advantages to
young mothers, which is first of all a substantial payment when the first
baby is born, and amount of the payment should increase when a woman gives
birth to a second, or even a third baby. This practice of Kindergeld is
widely used in Finland. Mothers are not to work until their babies reach
three years of age. Then, mothers only work six hours a day if she has one
baby and four hours a day if she has two 

NEWSru 
Translated by Maria Gousseva 

*******

#10
pravda.ru
November 25, 2002
Sad Diagnosis: Russian Market Reforms Turn Into Administrative Bustle
Russian electorate treats any economic changes from a political point of view

The forum “Financial week in Moscow” opened today. Head of the Federation
Council Industrial Policy committee Valentin Zavadnikov spoke at the
forum’s opening; he said that none of the reforms currently carried out in
Russia are market reforms. In fact, under the guise of reforms, ministries,
state-run monopolies, and local authorities settle their own mercantile
problems. 

According to the senator, the majority of the structural reforms carried
out in Russia today are not effective. For instance, the reform of the
electric power system is seriously stuck at the moment; the more discussion
it causes, the quicker it loses its market nature. Valentin Zavadnikov says
that the reform of the Russian railways is rather slow; moreover, it is not
a reform in fact at all. As for reforming of the gas market, the senator
mentioned that no conceptual documents had been developed on the problem yet. 

We should mention that three years have already passed since the moment
when the first discussions on the necessity of reforms were started to the
moment when necessary legislation was developed. At that, all parties
involved have failed to come to an agreement on the basic postulates of the
reform. Under the strongest political pressure, the State Duma gave the
first reading to the package of laws on the reform. However, Duma deputies
and Federation Council members immediately discovered lots of
incompatibilities in the documents and pointed out that the documents
needed more perfection from a judicial point of view. Moreover, Duma
deputies discovered that when representatives of the energy monopolist, RAO
UES of Russia, made amendments to the documents on the reforms instead of
deputies, they not always acted correctly. As a result of the mentioned
facts, a second reading of the laws on reforming of the Russian energy
system is currently open to question. 

Valentin Zavadnikov is sure that the same situation can be observed with
the reforms of the communication sphere. The RF Communication Ministry was
to have presented a concept of reforming the traditional telecommunications
sphere till the end of the year. Instead of it, the ministry presented
amendments to the law on communications, which certainly have nothing to do
with reforms of the sphere on the whole. 

The senator mentioned that reforming the communal and housing sphere is
also actively discussed. The discussions are closely connected with
political problems. Valentin Zavadnikov thinks that currently developed
laws on local self-government don’t settle the problem of the communal and
housing economy reforming, as the services still remain under the
jurisdiction of municipal authorities, while these are market services all
over the world. 

Meanwhile, the slow realization of structural reforms and considerable
presence of the state in the economy hamper development of the Russian
financial market, which consequently deprives the economy of necessary
investments. 

In this situation, it would be important to mention that any kind of actual
market reforms is out of the question for the nearest 1-1.5 years. Coming
parliamentary and presidential elections will turn any kind of important
problem into a political problem. As is well-known, any kind of market
reforms carried out at the expense of ordinary consumers (voting
electorate, to be precise). That is why nobody from the political elite,
who hopes to retain his position, will take the risk of supporting any
measures that are unpopular among the population. 

Kira Poznakhirko 
PRAVDA.Ru 
Translated by Maria Gousseva 

******

#11
From: "Drusilla Menaker" 
Subject: Russian newspapers
Date: Mon, 25 Nov 2002 

In view of recent exchanges, List readers interested in the state of Russian
newspapers and the Russian news media more generally might want to know
about IREX's Russian Independent Print Media Program. The USAID-funded
program assists the development of Russian non-state newspapers through a
Russian NGO, the Press Development Institute. We provide training for
independent, regional newspapers seeking to develop as viable businesses,
protect themselves legally and improve their content. We do seminars,
workshops and consultations organized through our offices for the Central
Region (Moscow), the Northwest (St. Petersburg), Volga (Samara), Urals
(Ekaterinburg), Siberia (Novosibirsk) and the Far East (Vladivostok).

IREX also works to develop the Press Development Institute as an advocate
for independent media and a resource center for the newspaper industry. We
have staff trainers for newspaper advertising, design, business development
and new technology, and a team of media lawyers. (By the way, we also
currently seek full-time journalism and newspaper management trainers --
Russian citizens only).

As a result, our team knows a lot about Russian newspapers, the media
industry, regional press and media independence and anyone with queries is
invited to contact me (dmenaker@irex.ru).

Best regards,
Drusilla Menaker
Chief of Party
IREX/Russian Independent Print Media Program
Press Development Institute
Tel: (7095) 777-0174
E-Mail: dmenaker@irex.ru
www.irex.org and www.irex.ru

*******

#12
Date: Mon, 25 Nov 2002 
Subject: Re: 6567-Baikal Wave
From: "John P. Deever" 

Dear David: Thank you for including a notice in JRL about Baikal Wave, the
well-known Russian environmental group whose offices in Irkutsk were raided
this month by the FSB.  Further information about this group's opposition to
certain oil and gas pipeline routes and more about their work preserving
Russia's natural resources is posted on the group's website in English and
Russian at http://www.baikalwave.eu.org/

"In the past ten years the unique and inimitable natural beauty of our small
homeland, the Tunkinsky valley, has been subject to extremely harmful human
impact -  fires, forest clearances and the drainage of the Koimorsky marsh. 
The creation of the National Park within the Tunkinksy region has hardly
weakened man's influence on the fragile and vulnerable nature of the
Tunkinsky region. And now a new disaster threatens: there are plans to lay a
gas pipeline through the Tunkinsky valley in order to pump gas to China and
other countries.  The operator of the future pipeline is the company "Rusia
Petroleum." . . . [YUKOS] and Moscow government officials are also planning
to build an oil pipeline through the Tunka.  It will run parallel to the gas
pipeline.  Crude oil will flow continuously to China and other countries. 
And it will be used for the development of the Chinese economy.  Any
accidents which take place in the oil pipeline when it goes through
Tunkinsky valley will effect our land and our rivers.  The oligarchs and
government officials need many billions of dollars from the sale of oil and
gas.  In exchange for devastated and lacerated land and the trampling of
nature, the people of Tunkinsky will not receive a cent.  So let's all tell
"Rusia Petroleum", [YUKOS], the oligarchs and the government about this
together, with one voice.  Let them find other ways to transport gas and oil
to China and other countries." -- A. Bobkov, correspondent for the newspaper
"Sayani," Translated from Russian by volunteer Sarah Wingfield
Posted at: http://www.baikalwave.eu.org/tunka.html

John P. Deever
Publications Program Officer
Initiative for Social Action and Renewal in Eurasia
1601 Connecticut Ave NW #301
Washington DC 20009
tel: 202-387-3034, fax: 202-667-3291
http://www.isar.org

******

#13
BBC Monitoring
Russian scholars on geopolitics and new tasks of the army 
Source: Krasnaya Zvezda, Moscow, in Russian 21 Nov 02
 
The Russian Defence Ministry's official daily Krasnaya Zvezda editorial
staff held a round-table discussion with leading scholars on the role of
Russia and its army in the present-day world as it shifts towards
unipolarity. The following is the text of the report entitled "The Russian
army, politics, and society: Strategic doctrines", published on 21
November. Subheadings inserted editorially:

The world is changing, having inevitably involved Russia in that process.
What will our state's role be in world civilization under the new
historical conditions? How much are the Russian army's functions being
transformed in a globalizing world? These and other questions were
discussed at the Krasnaya Zvezda editorial staff round table with leading
Russian scholars, political scientists and commentators.

Russia must adjust itself to new reality

Nikolay Yefimov, doctor of philosophical sciences:
I think that we need an adjustment of our society's perception of the
situation surrounding the North Atlantic Alliance while taking into account
the fundamentally new geopolitical reality and Russia's present
capabilities after the tragic break-up of the USSR. We are not looking at
China from the position of 1969. It is irrational to idealize the West but
even its demonization will not help Russia's self-identification in a
rapidly changing world. Moreover, the West is quite heterogeneous. Emotions
are inappropriate in politics, as in science. Of course, foreigners are
taking advantage of our weakness in their relations with post-Communist
Russia. But that is natural from the point of view of geopolitics. The life
of the world community has always been harsh.

And the sooner society recognizes the need for the country to adapt to the
changes of the general civilization level that are occurring, the more
favourable positions Russia will manage to occupy in the world system's new
structure. It is senseless to oppose the objective processes of the world
community's development. Yes, we did not develop the current rules of the
game, but that is what history has ordained. Unfortunately, today far from
everyone understands the sense and inevitability of the new foreign policy
course under the conditions of globalization.

The recognition of the consequences for Russia of the objective process of
globalization has still not arrived in our society. Globalization is
leading to the formation of a worldwide financial and information space,
and the North American state's new role, which is increasingly becoming the
super-state structures' instrument of world policy, and the very role of
these structures in the life of the world community.

A significant portion of the domestic elite continues to think based upon
inertia using the nostalgic perceptions of the era of the bipolar world.
But a Eurasian power with a powerful economic and military potential is
already no more. Russia's share of the worldwide economy is less than three
per cent, but the United States has more than 20, and even India has more
than five per cent. We can relate to Mr Brzezinski in different ways but,
obviously, he is correct when he notes that the American-Russian
condominium requires a symmetry of actual force. Equals speak on an equal
basis with equals. That is why Khrushchev permitted himself to bang his
shoes at the UN.

In his time, they reproached Aleksandr Nevskiy that he was adopting the
Golden Horde's rules of the game. And now where are its khans? But Rus
stands. While taking into account the acceleration of social time, it is
not difficult to predict the possible future of the present world leader.
But then again, will it become better for a weakened Russia when the
"supporting" pillar comes tumbling down and chaos arrives in international
relations? Will a tired country, which has lost a significant portion of
its technological and military potential over the course of a decade of
unsuccessful reforms and that is only groping for the path of its revival,
gain from that?

Sergey Markov, the director of the Institute for Political Studies:
Therefore, Russia must participate in the creation of the unipolar world.
Of course, the United States alone should not be that pole. A
decision-making mechanism (consensus), similar to that which exists in the
European Union, must exist in that world. And Russia must be one of the
most powerful parties in this world coalition government. Accordingly, we
must do a lot of work to do that.

New tasks of the Russian army

Clarity with functions is appearing for our army under these conditions of
the transition to a world government with limited asymmetrical sovereignty.
The Strategic Missile Troops, which permit us to preserve a certain root of
sovereignty and to achieve the fact that foreign troops will not be
deployed on our territory without the concurrence of our leadership, bear
the former. Today the majority of experts think that in the next decade
there is more than a 50-per-cent probability of the employment of nuclear
weapons in local conflicts. Therefore, the problem of the employment of
nuclear weapons as before is not only a theoretical problem.

The army's second function is participation in intensive and rapidly
flowing local conflicts like Desert Storm and the US armed forces'
operations in Afghanistan. And the third most important component is
participation in local low-intensity conflicts (for example, the Kurdish,
Chechen, etc). Today there are more than 100 such conflicts in the world.
And the fourth function is participation in military-technical cooperation,
including within the framework of international peacekeeping operations.
Which means not only deliveries of equipment but also the training of
specialists. We have a marvellous military school. And the training of
specialists, the delivery of military technologies, the technologies of
command and control and the conduct of joint exercises - that in fact is a
very important process of the formation of a single world government - the
instruments of coercion to execute its will.

The world will still attentively study our experience of war in Chechnya.
It is unique. Why did a weak army, which had been repeatedly betrayed by
the highest state leadership, begin to win? President Putin has done the
main thing: the authorities have ceased to betray their army. That is the
primary lesson of Chechnya.

"World government" or "world of empires"?

Aleksandr Dugin, the director of the Centre of Geopolitical Expertise, and
the leader of the "Yevraziya" [Eurasia] Party:
Many people pose the question, in principle is it possible to form a
unipolar world from the philosophical point of view? I can say that various
philosophical models of the structure of the world exist. A bipolar world
can present itself as a plus and minus, and a unipolar - as the centre and
the periphery.

Markov:
Any conflict can be shifted inside. For example, the conflict between
conservatism and liberalism can be continued inside a unipolar world.

Dugin:
Theoretically, a unipolar model is entirely possible since bipolarity in
the finished form existed only after the Second World War, after 1947,
although according to geopolitics it was potentially always present in the
form of the dualism of the civilizations of the maritime and land types.

But I think that unipolarity, as it is developing in the present world, is
not the optimum form of world structure. It is flawed already from the
moral point of view because a pluralism of value systems exists, and the
present unipolarity is based upon only one of them - on the Western
European, secular, Liberal-Democratic. Second, from a purely pragmatic
point of view I think that today adequate preconditions have not been
created for the direct creation of a unipolar system without an
intermediate stage. Technologically, multipolarity would have to become
that intermediate step. We are talking about the appearance in place of the
two superpowers of not one hyper-power but of several independent "large
spaces", a kind of states-continents. The European Union is an example of
that large space that could very well acquire full-fledged geopolitical
sovereignty in the future.

Actually, and here I agree with Sergey Aleksandrovich Markov, it is
impossible to defend sovereignty in our world alone. Even the Soviet Union,
including the Warsaw Pact, was not adequate to maintain sovereignty and
therefore, incidentally, it broke up. The very unipolar system appeared
precisely due to the fact that the sovereignty of the second pole could not
be further ensured. But, in my view, the present unipolar system itself -
that is the logical, only inertial continuation of the old bipolar system,
only with the disappearance of one pole. On the contrary, we must proceed
to the concept of a new imperial pluralist-sovereignty (multi-sovereignty),
to the organization of the world based upon the new principle, based upon
the principle of "large spaces": the American large space, the European (or
Euro-African) large space, the Pan-Asian large space, the Eurasian large
space, and possibly the Latin American, Arab and Pan-African. The future
world must consist not of states and not of one "world state" headed by a
"world government" but of empires.

Markov:
I agree with that. The process of the formation of a single mankind and a
single world government will in fact take several decades. And therefore we
can't talk about the total disappearance of sovereignties. But we must
certainly absolutely precisely acknowledge what the border of this
sovereignty is. Today there cannot be unlimited sovereignty, all the more
so for an individual country.

Standing for cultural variety

Dugin:
A few words about terminology. "Political Islamism", about which so much is
being said today is not quite the same as the "Islamic World". That is an
extreme and even heretical form of the manifestation of a quite narrow
marginal sector of the Islamic World. It is very important to oppose
radical Islam at all levels, which is connected to terrorist practice. But
we certainly need to meet traditional Islam halfway. Even in a unipolar
world, the factor of traditions will not disappear and will make itself
known. In the final analysis, if nothing else, it will bring that
unipolarity to collapse.

Today everyone is talking about the standardization of information, the
youth culture, etc. But I will cite this example: if we will drive out 10
km from Madrid and visit a Spanish youth discotheque, we will hear not
American rap and other cosmopolitan melodies but electronic elaboration of
"Flamenco". And the young men and girls dance with elements of the
traditional Spanish grace of movement. I think that the factor of culture
and originality will appear with new unanticipated force in the process of
globalization. Which we are already seeing. The gap between European and
American universal traditions is growing. I am already not talking about
Russia and Eurasia. And while discussing political, social and military
technologies, we must not forget about our cultural identity.

And the Muslims are giving us an example here. Although Eurasia and
Eurasianism has its own value model. It is multidimensional. And therefore,
it is in and of itself democratic and multipolar. Both Christianity,
traditional Islam, Judaism, Buddhism and other religious and cultural forms
will find a place in it.

Markov:
Today traditionalism is developing even in America. Drive to some interior
location and see how in the restaurants the local masses social directors
teach visitors to dance cowboy dances. And at this interior location they
hate Wall Street. They hate it significantly more than in our country.

***** 

#14
YUKOS sees Russian, own oil output booming in '03
By Dmitry Zhdannikov

MOSCOW, Nov 25 (Reuters) - Russia's number two oil firm YUKOS said on
Monday that Moscow was unlikely to curb so far unstoppable national oil
output growth next year, when YUKOS' own production is set to rise 15-18
percent.

YUKOS head Mikhail Khodorkovsky told reporters the world's second largest
oil exporter was likely to use all possible export routes to boost oil
supplies to the West, in order to bypass limited export pipeline capacities.

YUKOS' own ambitious production plan could allow it to overtake LUKOIL as
Russia's top producer as early as 2003. But even then, it will remain short
of its long-term goal of becoming one of the world's top five oil companies
by production.

"I don't see Russia facing a domestic oil glut threat again this winter.
This would allow oil production to grow further," Mikhail Khodorkovsky told
reporters.

A YUKOS spokesman said on Monday the firm planned a 15-18 percent oil
output rise in 2003 from an average 1.4 million barrels per day (bpd)
production in 2002.

"The plan was approved by the firm's executives last week but it has yet to
be approved by YUKOS's board of directors," which meets early next month, a
YUKOS spokesman told Reuters.

Russian oil output is booming for the fourth consecutive year and it set to
hit eight million barrels per day this month, for the first time in a decade.

But Russia's domestic consumption of around two million bpd is flat while
pipeline export capacities are limited to 3.5 million bpd. Russian majors
have to export up to 2.5 million bpd of crude oil and products via
expensive rail and river routes.

Industry analysts say oil firms will have to curb ambitious growth targets
or face a domestic oil glut and a price collapse after November, when bad
weather will hit main export ports and freeze river navigation.

TWO LEADERS

In the first quarter of 2002, Russia's domestic oil prices almost halved
compared with the third quarter of 2001 due to a domestic glut caused by
severe December storms and Russia's pledge to OPEC to curb supplies.

Khodorkovsky said a second consecutive glut was unlikely this winter as
Russian producers were now more experienced.

"By using a combination of export routes you can avoid oil gluts. But then
the question of transportation costs becomes very acute.

"We will curb oil output if it becomes unprofitable as a results of a
combination of different factors, such as the collapse in world oil prices
and increase in transportation costs.

"But I think this (unprofitable output) is very unlikely as YUKOS
production costs are among the lowest in Russia, and Russia's production
costs are now among the lowest in the world," he said.

The YUKOS spokesman said the firm would focus next year on cutting costs in
both the upstream and downstream sectors, and cutting administrative costs.

Analysts said they expected YUKOS to announce ambitious growth plans for
2003 as part of its long-term growth strategy to catch up with Western
supermajors.

"Next year we will have two leaders by production in Russia's oil
industry," said Valery Nesterov from Troika Dialog brokerage.

LUKOIL plans to boost oil output to 82 million tonnes (1.65 million bpd) in
2003 from 78 million tonnes (1.57 million bpd) this year. YUKOS would also
produce 1.65 million bpd if it decided to boost output by 18 percent next
year.

By comparison, French TotalFinaElf the world's fifth largest oil company by
output, is producing around 2.5 million bpd of oil equivalent.

******

#15
Ukraine PM sees good ties with Russia as priority
November 25, 2002
By Lina Kushch

DONETSK, Ukraine (Reuters) - Ukraine's new prime minister, who has taken
office as relations with the West deteriorate, set his sights Monday on
improving ties with big eastern neighbor, Russia.

President Leonid Kuchma picked Viktor Yanukovich as premier last week in a
bid to shore up support for his ailing leadership which has suffered
further from U.S. accusations that Kiev sold an aircraft warning system to
Iraq in breach of U.N. sanctions.

Fearing the loss of Western aid over the charges, Kuchma has moved to
replace his central bank chief and install an ally who is seen by analysts
as being more likely to try to increase domestic investment in the
country's slowing economy.

Yanukovich, returning to the eastern Ukrainian region where he was once
governor, said under his leadership the government would encourage trade
with Ukraine's former imperial master and boost the economy.

"(Cooperation with Russia) will be strengthened because it will help
Russia's economy and Ukraine's economy. But it will be pursued only on
mutually advantageous terms," Yanukovich told a news conference in Donetsk.

"Relations with Russia have been targeted as a priority."

Trade between Ukraine and Russia has fallen in recent years after the two
neighbors started putting up barriers in a tit-for-tat trade battle and
Ukraine had looked to western Europe for investment.

But U.S. charges that Kuchma approved the sale of a "Kolchuga" aircraft
early warning system to Iraq have made foreign investors wary.

Kuchma, who denies selling the system to Baghdad, has faced increasing
pressure to step down over the charges. Yanukovich, who has a tough
reputation for ironing out differences between rival business groups in his
region, is seen as Kuchma's last hope of thwarting the opposition calls for
his resignation.

Kuchma has also moved to stop squabbles between the central bank and
government over monetary policy by appointing Serhiy Tyhypko, leader of the
pro-presidential parliamentary faction Trudova Ukraina, as the bank's new
chief.

The central bank, under incumbent Volodymyr Stelmakh, had refused to give
in to government demands to print more money to issue loans to producers,
saying excessive money printing would fuel inflation and undermine fiscal
stability.

Deputies are due to vote on the bank reshuffle Thursday.

******

#16
Moscow Times
November 26, 2002
The President's Costly Error
By Boris Kagarlitsky   

Under President Vladimir Putin, Russia has become close to the West as
never before. Under Putin, freedom of speech and human rights are facing
the most serious challenges in this country since Mikhail Gorbachev ushered
in perestroika. 

These two theses have virtually become banalities. But how are they
connected with one another? The Russian authorities do indeed go along with
the West in all matters. The United States has been given access to
military bases in Central Asia. Although it formerly criticized eastward
expansion of NATO, Moscow has effectively abandoned its original stance.
Russian diplomats no longer criticize the NATO decision to accept the
Baltic states into its ranks. Furthermore, politically and symbolically, by
participating in the Prague NATO summit, Russia showed its support for the
bloc's expansion. 

On the issue of Kaliningrad, the so-called "compromise" with the European
Union not only represents a series of unilateral concessions, but creates a
mass of extra problems for Russian citizens. After Lithuania joins the
Schengen zone, Russian citizens will no longer be able to pass calmly
through the country to the Kaliningrad exclave without special documents.
Still, the Russian government agreed to a plan under which Russians will
need transit documents. The question of what should be done after Lithuania
joins the Schengen zone, which is the original reason for the negotiations,
remains unanswered. 

Why do Russian authorities constantly make unilateral concessions without
getting anything in return? Where does this selfless love of the West come
from in people who harp on about national interests and state priorities?

The explanation is quite simple. The authorities solve their domestic
problems by two tried and tested means -- either by means of plots at the
top or by putting the squeeze on those who disagree. 

Every time there is social outrage -- over purging "unsuitable" media,
razing villages in Chechnya or gas attacks on hostages -- Western public
opinion protests. In Moscow, these protests are seen as an organized
campaign by someone or other. And this is understandable. After all, this
is how political spin doctors have managed public opinion for 10 years in
this country. Or rather, provided "imitation" public opinion. 

Over the years, they have come to understand that to create a democratic
facade for the regime there is no need whatsoever for free elections and
freedom of speech. It is quite sufficient to imitate them. And Western
politicians invariably pretend they can't tell the difference. Seeing
approval from their Western colleagues, Russian officials in turn become
convinced that everything is set up exactly the same way in other countries
-- it's just that the rough edges are concealed that little bit better. 

And here they are making a fatal error. It is quite possible that officials
in Brussels or Washington differ little from their colleagues in Moscow.
But public opinion in Western countries is a reality to be reckoned with.
It has its own logic and internal processes that are not controlled from
the offices of bureaucrats or corporations. 

Alas, it is this naive slip that determines Russian foreign policy.
Criticism in Western media is interpreted as Western leaders'
dissatisfaction. Measures are taken to calm the West with the latest round
of concessions. And in response, the bosses in Moscow say Bush, Blair or
Schr?der should tell their newspapers to stop gossiping. 

But sadly, no one in the West can control the press the way they do here.
The media can be influenced, but this is technically difficult and
politically risky. 

Officials in Washington and Brussels accept the gifts of their Moscow-based
colleagues with grace, but they can't solve the problem. Even the concerted
efforts of Blair and Bush cannot fix Putin's reputation. Unlike Western
bureaucrats, Western public opinion is inclined to assess politicians not
by the number of foreign policy concessions, but by the number of dead. 

As far as Russia goes the problem has been resolved -- at least for the
time being. The gas attack on the "Nord Ost" theater showed just how tough
Putin and his team are. Now people are silent, because some support him and
others are simply cowed. In such situations, even excessive concessions
abroad no longer create political problems domestically. 

The more outrages the authorities create at home, the more they end up
capitulating abroad. 

Boris Kagarlitsky is a Moscow-based sociologist.

*******

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