Johnson's Russia List
#6559
19 November 2002
davidjohnson@erols.com
A CDI Project
www.cdi.org
[Contents:
1. Washington Post: Mike Allen, Bush Defends Putin In Handling of Siege.
2. AP: Bush: New Countries Will Refresh NATO.
3. White House transcript: Interview of the President by Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty.
4. RIA Novosti: U.S. INVITES RUSSIA TO WATCH NMD TESTS IN DECEMBER.
5. Moscow Times/AP: Ivanov Says Military Has Shrunk by 14%.
6. Vremya MN: Leonid Radzikhovsky, AN APPENDIX REMAINING IN THE BODY.
Well, what are we meant to "do with Chechnya"?
7. New York Times: Sabrina Tavernise, With Few Bonds to Russia, Young
Chechens Join Militants.
8. Asia Times: Sergei Blagov, No place to go for Chechen refugees.
9. Yezhenedelny Zhurnal: Mikhail Fishman, TWO'S A CROWD. (re Yavlinsky
and Yabloko)
10. Transitions Online: Sergei Borisov, Notes from Ulyanovsk: The Fading
of Red October. In Lenin’s birthplace, only a weak echo of the October
Revolution can be heard--and the city itself may lose Lenin’s name.
11. Washington Post: Anne Applebaum, Russian With a Western Way.
(re Mikhail Khodorkovsky)
12. Rossiyskaya Gazeta: Timofey Borisov, Who Missed Barayev. (Rumored
High-Level Political Connivance, Security Lapses in Moscow Hostage Crisis
Analyzed)]
*******
#1
Washington Post
November 19, 2002
Bush Defends Putin In Handling of Siege
By Mike Allen
Washington Post Staff Writer
President Bush fervently defended Russian President Vladimir Putin
yesterday for using opiate gas to end the siege at a Moscow theater, and
equated the hostage-takers with the Pentagon and World Trade Center attackers.
The gas, which the Russian government at first refused to identify, killed
at least 123 of the captives. Among those who died in the raid was an
electrician from Oklahoma.
Bush called Putin a "good friend" in the fight against terrorism, and
praised him for the "very tough decisions" he made during the standoff in
late October.
"People tried to blame Vladimir," Bush told European reporters on the eve
of a five-day trip to a NATO summit and then to Russia, where he will meet
with Putin. "They ought to blame the terrorists. They're the ones who
caused the situation, not President Putin."
Rebels demanding an end to the war in Chechnya held more than 800 people
hostage for 58 hours. Commandos killed most of the guerrillas but also
scores of hostages when the gas was pumped into the theater's ventilation
system. The gas probably was an aerosol form of carfentanil, normally used
to sedate big-game animals.
The Bush administration was reluctant to criticize Putin after the siege,
while seeking his support for a U.N. Security Council resolution ordering
Iraq to disarm. Russia voted for it and Bush continued his solidarity with
Putin.
"Eight hundred people were going to lose their lives," Bush said. "These
people were killers, just like the killers that came to America. There's a
common thread -- that any time anybody is willing to take innocent life for
a so-called cause, they must be dealt with."
White House press secretary Ari Fleischer made similar comments immediately
after the siege. That was right before the Nov. 5 elections, and Bush was
not taking questions from reporters. At the time, Fleischer said the United
States did not know what type of gas had been used.
Bush told Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty that Russia "should be able to
solve their issue with Chechnya peacefully."
"That's not to say that Vladimir shouldn't do what it takes to protect his
people from individual terrorist attacks," Bush said.
The president told the European reporters that the renewed inspections were
"not a free pass for Saddam [Hussein]" but a mandate to disarm. "If he
doesn't, then we, of course, will consult, like we said we would do -- we'd
hold a meeting," Bush said.
The United States would use the talks to enlist other nations in enforcing
the resolution, likely by military force. Putin, while supporting the
return of inspectors, has publicly opposed an attack on Iraq. Bush said the
unanimous Security Council vote puts the word out that "we intend to
enforce the serious consequences if there's not disarmament; and that we're
able to work with our friends."
In a move that Bush aides said was designed to underscore support for a
free press in Russia, Bush also gave an interview yesterday to NTV, an
independent network.
*******
#2
Bush: New Countries Will Refresh NATO
November 19, 2002
By WILL LESTER
WASHINGTON (AP) - President Bush says the addition to NATO of former
members of the Soviet bloc will bring new life to the trans-Atlantic
alliance because totalitarian rule taught their people the value of freedom.
Moscow claimed as full Soviet republics three of the soon-to-be NATO
members, the Baltic states Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Bulgaria, Romania
and Slovakia were tied to the Soviet Union through the Warsaw Pact, the
Kremlin-dominated alliance signed in 1955 to counter the U.S.-led North
Atlantic Treaty Organization formed six years earlier. Slovenia also is to
be admitted.
Former pact members Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary joined NATO in 1999.
``The Warsaw Pact doesn't exist,'' Bush said Monday. ``As a matter of fact,
the Warsaw Pact is becoming NATO, slowly but surely,'' he said in a Radio
Free Europe interview.
The president left early Tuesday for Prague, the Czech Republic's capital,
for a summit of leaders of the 19 NATO nations. He will also visit Russia
and prospective NATO members Lithuania and Romania on the five-day trip.
Bush said Monday he'll assure Russia's president this week that Russia
``has nothing to fear'' from a NATO expanded into territory once claimed by
the Soviet Union. Bush also said the alliance will play an increasing role
in tracking down international terrorists.
After the Prague meeting, Bush flies to President Vladimir Putin's hometown
of St. Petersburg for his second visit in a year.
``I'm going to Russia to make it clear to Russia and to Vladimir Putin they
have nothing to fear from NATO expansion, ... to explain why I think it's a
positive development,'' Bush said.
Previewing the trip with a round-table interview with eastern European
reporters, Bush said: ``Russia is not a threat, and therefore the military
strategies of NATO need to be changed to recognize that new reality.''
On Iraq, Bush promised to consult with allies over possible strikes, even
though the United States is not seeking NATO's direct help to confront
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.
``The NATO alliance understands this issue,'' Bush said. ``One way or the
other, he is going to be disarmed.''
The president offered support to Putin for his handling of last month's
hostage crisis in a Moscow theater that left 128 captives dead, almost all
in the rescue operation. ``He made some very tough decisions,'' Bush said.
The president noted that al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden in his recent
audiotaped message was ``praising these Muslim attacks,'' including the one
in Moscow, and mentioned Chechnya.
Asked whether he believed bin Laden was plotting another attack on the
United States, Bush said, ``Whether it's him or somebody else, they're
plotting an attack, no question about it. That's why we've got to get them.''
Of the seven-yearlong battle between Russian troops and independence-minded
rebels in the small Caucasus Mountain republic of Chechnya, Bush said, ``I
will continue to talk to Vladimir about the need to protect and recognize
the rights of minorities in any country, and at the same time deal with
terrorism. I hope he can find that balance. I think he can.''
Bush praised Russia for helping to draft the strong resolution on weapons
inspections in Iraq that was ultimately adopted by the U.N. Security
Council. U.N. weapons inspectors returned to Iraq on Monday.
Thousands of militant protesters have pledged to converge on Prague during
the two-day meeting. ``I am mindful of what happens when a U.S. president
shows up at times,'' Bush said. He said he is convinced Czech authorities
will maintain order but added: ``There is going to be a lot of noise and
clamor.''
Bush will hold separate one-on-one meetings on the sidelines of the NATO
summit with Czech, Turkish and French leaders and with NATO's secretary
general, George Robertson. He has no meeting scheduled with Chancellor
Gerhard Schroeder of Germany, who angered Bush during Schroeder's
re-election campaign by opposing U.S. plans toward Iraq. Administration
officials sought Monday to play down the dispute.
``He'll certainly see Chancellor Schroeder during the course of the
meetings,'' said Secretary of State Colin Powell during a session with
local high school editors. ``They'll be in meetings together for two days.
They will have an opportunity to exchange greetings.''
On the Net: Prague Summit:
http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2002/0211-prague/index.htm
******
#3
White House
For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
November 18, 2002
Interview of the President by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
The Library
1:45 P.M. EST
Q Mr. President, this week NATO will be celebrating an historic expansion,
as well as focusing on transforming the Alliance to meet new threats, such
as Iraq. You have spoken about the possibility of leading a coalition of
the willing against Iraq. Why not speak about using NATO forces against
Iraq, since, under NATO's charter, all members are supposed to come to the
aid of any member under direct threat?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, first of all, I hope we can do this peacefully. And by
doing it peacefully, that means I hope Saddam Hussein disarms. Of course,
we've hoped that for 11 years. We've hoped that for 16 resolutions. We now
have a 17th resolution and this time, I intend to work with nations that
love freedom and peace, make sure the resolution stands. And if he doesn't
disarm, you're right, I'll lead a coalition of the willing to disarm him.
And there's all kinds of ways for that coalition to be formed. It could be
formed with NATO if they choose. I have said to the U.N. Security Council
we'll go back and discuss the matter with you. But Mr. Saddam Hussein must
understand he'll be disarmed one way or the other. I hope it's done
peacefully.
Q The new members of NATO are quite small. Do you see them as contributing
something significant militarily to the Alliance?
THE PRESIDENT: I was hoping you'd ask, do I see them contributing something
to the Alliance. I'll answer it that way. First, I'll answer it militarily
-- because I do believe they can contribute something really important, and
that is they can contribute their love for freedom. These are countries
which have lived in totalitarian states. They haven't been free. And now
they've seen freedom and they love freedom. Just like America loves
freedom. And that's going to be a really important -- it will add some
vigor to the relationship in NATO that's healthy and wholesome.
And I think they will. The key is to -- I think they will help militarily
-- but the key is to change the military strategy of NATO. Lord Robertson
understands this. It starts with the understanding that Russia is not our
enemy. NATO doesn't need to be constructed to prevent the Warsaw Pact from
invading Europe. After all, the Warsaw Pact doesn't exist. As a matter of
fact, the Warsaw Pact is becoming NATO, slowly but surely. We don't need
that type of mentality, and we've got to have a military strategy that
addresses the true threats.
The threats we face are global terrorist attacks. That's the threat. And
the more you love freedom, the more likely it is you'll be attacked. And
therefore, the Article 5 that you referred to for NATO becomes very
relevant in this war against terror.
The war against terror will not only be defeated -- the terrorists will not
only be defeated militarily, but the terrorists will be defeated as we
share intelligence, and as we cut off money, and as we deny access, and as
we stiffen up border requirements in order to make sure that people can't
go from one spot to another with plots and/or messages to attack.
And so it's a different kind of war. And it's going to be an interesting
meeting, because not only is the meeting going to expand, but the meeting
is going to address how best to achieve this common objective. I'm
absolutely convinced that the so-called military gap between America and
all countries can be addressed with a good strategy. And that will be
interesting for observers to watch. I think it's going to happen. I know
that Lord Robertson, who runs NATO, is committed to developing a relevant
strategy and one that will work.
Q Russian President Vladimir Putin has equated his war in Chechnya with the
U.S. war on terrorism. Do you agree with that equation, or do you still
feel, as was stated during your election campaign, that Russian forces are
committing brutalities against innocent Chechen civilians?
THE PRESIDENT: I think that Russia should be able to -- or hope that Russia
should be able to solve their issue with Chechnya peacefully. That's not to
say that Vladimir shouldn't do what it takes to protect his people from
individual terrorist attacks. But this is a different kind of war that we
face. This is a war where we're dealing with people who hide in caves and
kind of shadowing corners of the world and send people to their suicidal
deaths. It's a war that I believe can lend itself both to chasing those
people down and, at the same time, solving issues in a peaceful way, with
respect for the human rights of minorities within countries.
I said that in the campaign. I also say it to Mr. Putin every time I see him.
Q Do you envision Russia ever becoming a full-fledged member of NATO?
THE PRESIDENT: I think the partnership between NATO and Russia is going to
be a very constructive partnership. We'll see. Time will tell. The key
thing is to make sure the relationship works the way it should, which
really says to Russia that a expanded NATO on your border is not a threat
to you or your future. As a matter of fact, it should enable you to grow
peacefully.
I'm going from Prague to St. Petersburg precisely to deliver that message
to the Russian people, that even though NATO will have been expanded on
your border, particularly in sensitive areas like the Baltics, you should
not fear expansion, you should welcome expansion, because you've now got a
neighborhood that is much more peaceful for you to -- in which to realize
your vast potential. And that's important for Russia to hear.
Q Russia now has a special counsel with NATO --
THE PRESIDENT: Are we getting the hook already?
Q Does that mean we're running out of time? Let me ask you another question
--
THE PRESIDENT: It's hard to see on radio.
Q Central Asia -- we broadcast to Central Asia. And many experts say that
the authoritarian regimes in that region are actually fueling terrorism
because their people feel helpless and unable to effect change. Do you
think there are any dangers in the U.S. aligning itself closely with those
governments that are --
THE PRESIDENT: I think any time the United States aligns itself with a
government that we never forget the basic premises of our existence, and
that is freedom is important, the human condition for all are important. We
value every life, everybody counts. And in my judgment, the more people
relate to the United States and work with the United States, the more
likely it is they will work to improve the human condition. And that's what
we spend a lot of time doing. One of the great things about our country is
that we embrace freedom, first and foremost.
It's one of my concerns about Iraq. Listen, we've got people living in Iraq
that are tortured and brutalized in order to keep this man in power. I weep
for those who suffer. And so the great cause of the United States is
freedom. I tell these countries, they talk about freedom -- I say freedom
isn't America's gift to the world. It's God-given. Everybody counts.
And it is with that spirit of recognizing the values of freedom I think
will help improve people, no matter where. And you're right, there's some
leaders there that need work with, and we're prepared to work with them.
But I will tell you, people -- poverty is a tool for recruitment amongst
these global terrorists. It's a way for them to recruit, perhaps. But
poverty doesn't cause killers to exist. And it's an important distinction
to make.
These global terrorists are, some of them are rich, monetarily. They're
obviously poor in spirit. They have no regard for human life. They claim
they're religious, and they kill in the name of religion. And there are
some breeding grounds, no question about it. And therefore, we hope that
prosperity spreads out from central government to help people. But I hope
people don't confuse the mentality of the terrorist leaders and economic
plight, because these people are plenty comfortable. They just kill. And
we're going to get them before they get us.
And that's what the world needs to know about the United States.
Q Osama bin Laden still seems to be alive. Are you --
THE PRESIDENT: Could be.
Q -- worried that he's plotting another major attack on the United States?
THE PRESIDENT: Whether it's him or somebody else, they're plotting an
attack, no question about it. That's why we've got to get them. But this
issue is bigger than one person. If -- the war on terror is a group of
fanatics. They hate America because of what we stand for. They hate us
because we love freedom. And that's why we're on the hunt. And slowly but
surely, we're dismantling them.
I told the people of this country it's going to take a while. I said it's
going to be patient -- the farther we get away from September the 11th,
2001, the more people are going to tend to forget what took place in this
country. And it's normal reaction for people to just kind of settle back
and hope that something doesn't exist. But my job is to remind people of
the threats we face, based upon facts, and to find these killers. And
that's exactly what we're going to do. As I tell people in America, there's
no cave dark enough to hide from the justice of America, and our friends.
And my speech I'm going to give in Prague to the youngsters there, I'm
going to remind them there is a coalition of the willing in place right
now, chasing down terror. We've got 90 nations -- 90 different nations all
teamed up, doing everything we can to bring these people to justice. And
we'll prevail. Make no mistake about it, we'll prevail.
Thank you, sir.
Q Thank you, sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any doubt in your mind we'll prevail?
Q Not anymore. (Laughter.)
END 1:55 P.M. EST
*******
#4
U.S. INVITES RUSSIA TO WATCH NMD TESTS IN DECEMBER
WASHINGTON, November 19th, 2002 /from RIA Novosti correspondent Arkady
Orlov/ -- George Bush's administration has invited Russian government
officials to watch the next test of an interceptor missile of the National
Missile Defence System, which was preliminarily planned for December 2002,
John Bolton, US Under Secretary for Arms Control and International
Security, told a press conference on anti-missile defence in London. The
press service of the US State Department has distributed the text of
Bolton's speech in Washington.
According to Bolton, the joint US-Russian working group for NMD issues
gathered for a session in early November to discuss transparency problems
and prospects for further cooperation. During the same session, the Russian
side was invited to take a look at an advanced Patriot system at the US
military base Fort Bliss in Texas and view NMS military facilities under
construction in the neighbourhood of the military base Fort Greely.
The under secretary also said the USA and other NATO members were
cooperating with Russia in NMD issues in the framework of the Russia-NATO
Council. This cooperation is "positive - and it is also the first practical
step towards the creation of a joint anti-missile potential for Russia and
NATO, which will enable them to protect troops and the critical
infrastructure," he said.
According to his account, NATO attaches great importance to NMD issues and
will probably add an article about the necessity of "studying the
opportunities of defending the troops of the allies and territories and
populated centres from the entire spectrum of missile threats" to the text
of the final declaration of the North Atlantic Alliance summit in Prague.
The declaration will also stipulate "parameters in the framework of which
NATO allies will jointly deploy the required potential."
*******
#5
Moscow Times
November 19, 2002
Ivanov Says Military Has Shrunk by 14%
The Associated Press
Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said Monday that the armed forces number
slightly more than 1.1 million -- a drop of about 14 percent compared to
the number he gave at the beginning of the year.
Ivanov said the military now has "a little over" 1.1 million personnel, the
Interfax-Military News Agency reported. Previously, Ivanov said the Defense
Ministry had 1,274,000 servicemen as of Jan. 1.
Ivanov said there could be further cuts, but he gave no specific figures.
"Nobody disputes the possibility of the reduction of the armed forces if
the international situation and, more importantly, a higher standard of the
army and navy, their technical supplies, resources and so on permit it,"
Ivanov was quoted as saying.
Ivanov said he would report to the Cabinet on Thursday on the military's
concept for the gradual transition from conscription to contract service.
"The transition to a contract military will be largely determined by the
economic potential of the state," Ivanov said.
President Vladimir Putin has approved a plan to phase out the unpopular
draft and switch to an all-volunteer military around 2010, but top army
brass has warned that the transition could be too costly.
The Defense Ministry launched a pilot project in September to transfer the
76th Airborne Division in the northwestern city of Pskov to full staffing
by professional soldiers, saying the experiment would help determine when
the country could afford a fully contract military.
The experiment has been mired in controversy, with liberal critics of the
draft accusing top generals of trying to sabotage the project. Ivanov
dismissed such claims. "No one doubts that we should take this path," he
said. "They say that the generals are against it, but it's not so. The
officer corps understands quite well that if we don't start doing it now,
the more we drag it out, the worse it will be for the army and the officer
corps itself."
*******
#6
Vremya MN
November 19, 2002
AN APPENDIX REMAINING IN THE BODY
Well, what are we meant to "do with Chechnya"?
Author: Leonid Radzikhovsky
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
THE NIGHTMARE OF CHECHNYA WILL "REMAIN PART OF RUSSIA" - OF THAT WE
MAY BE CERTAIN. EVEN IF THE FIGHTING DIES DOWN, AND THE TROOPS ARE
WITHDRAWN, "PEACEFUL CHECHNYA" WILL REMAIN A CENTER OF HUMAN
TRAFFICKING, DRUG TRAFFICKING, THE ARMS TRADE, AND TRAINING TERRORISTS
FOR ACTION IN RUSSIA AND ABROAD.
Well, what are we meant to "do with Chechnya"?
At this point, there are two options. One is the official plan:
keep the troops in Chechnya (perhaps reducing their numbers), and hold
a constitutional referendum in February or March 2004; after the
referendum, there would be elections in Chechnya. The second option is
that proposed by the Union of Right Forces (URF). Over two months, the
troops are supposed to use "precision strikes" to destroy the largest
guerrilla gangs; then the troops would leave Chechnya; then, without a
military presence, there would be a referendum - and the questions
should not be set by Akhmad Kadyrov, but proposed by the people of
Chechnya themselves. In one of the more radical versions of this plan,
the URF would even grant the Chechens the right to ask themselves the
fateful question: "Do you want Chechnya to remain part of Russia?"
(Presumably, the answer is meant to be "Yes, of course we do!")
The slight drawback in all these "prospective measures" is that
they are directly connected to "documents about Chechnya", but not at
all to Chechnya itself.
In Moscow's warm offices, it's pleasant to discuss the status of
Chechnya within the Russian Federation. But as far as I'm aware of the
situation in Chechnya, people there are afraid to go out on the
streets; there are shortages of basic foodstuffs; there are no jobs
(except for crime) and no prospect of jobs; there is a shortage of
medical supplies; and the residents of Chechnya - those who are
somehow managing to survive - are being robbed on all sides, by
federal soldiers and guerrillas alike. Are we meant to believe that
people living in such conditions are concerned about what questions to
pose in a referendum, and spend sleepless nights worrying over whether
Chechnya should be a presidential or parliamentary republic?
However, being a critic is easy; but what alternative can be
proposed?
History shows us two ways out of such traps. The first:
mercilessly finishing off the bandit monster (our experience in 1944-
54 in the Baltic region and Western Ukraine). The second: withdrawing
permanently (what France did in Algeria).
But the situation we have here is much more complicated than
Algeria in 1960 or the Baltic region in 1945: after all, the crucial
external factor of a global terrorist war is involved, with Chechnya
as only one of its battlefronts. Therefore, in order to unravel or cut
the Chechen knot, we need some sort of political action which is
entirely new.
To be sure, no one in Moscow is mentally prepared or has the will
for such actions. But various forces do wish to keep the status quo in
Chechnya. Everyone knows that the status quo is desirable for those
who are stealing the billions of rubles allocated for "restoring
Chechnya", and for those who are advancing their careers through this
war or through the political process.
The scale of the problem is such that everyone is aware of these
circumstances. Splendid. And during these past ten years of war and
"peace", has anyone been convicted for their role in all this? Of
course! Colonel Yuri Budanov - the sole guilty party in the Chechen
war.
If this is how the "roots" of the Chechen war are being dug out,
how can there be any serious discussion at all?
Yes, the nightmare of Chechnya will "remain part of Russia" - of
that we may be certain. Even if the fighting dies down, and the troops
are withdrawn, "peaceful Chechnya" will remain a center of some things
in Russia: human trafficking, drug trafficking, the arms trade, and
training terrorists for action in Russia and abroad.
Chechnya will remain a region of the Russian Federation.
Residents of other parts of Russia will be able to travel there
without a visa - but only in tanks; no taxes will be collected in
Chechnya, of course; no Russian laws will be observed there; and if we
attempt to draft Chechens for service in the Russian Armed Forces, we
ought to consider which branch of the military is most in need of
Chechen conscripts - the paratroopers, or perhaps the nuclear missile
forces?
That is how Russia will relate to Chechnya. But how will Chechnya
relate to Russia? Those ethnic Russians who used to live in Chechnya
and managed to get away will not go back; they can't be deported there
by force, after all, and there is no reason to punish them in that
way. The elderly ethnic Russians who still live there don't dare raise
their eyes from the ground. And what do the ethnic Chechens think of
Russia? At least 100,000 people have died in Chechnya; this means
almost every family has lost someone. Will they forget all that - will
they start loving Russia and considering it their homeland? We can all
put ourselves in their place and think about how we would answer the
question. It's another matter that many Chechens hate each other far
more than they hate federal soldiers. Due to the fact that a civil war
is underway in Chechnya, the society of Chechnya is completely
fragmented, and Chechnya is not becoming a loyal part of Russia.
So in what sense will Chechnya remain part of the Russian
Federation? In the same sense that an inflamed appendix remains part
of the body - unless a surgeon is available to save that body.
(Translated by Arina Yevtikhova)
*******
#7
New York Times
November 19, 2002
With Few Bonds to Russia, Young Chechens Join Militants
By SABRINA TAVERNISE
GROZNY, Russia — Three friends in a Grozny suburb like to talk war. At
night, after the military curfew begins, they gather in their homes to
recount the day's events: Questioning by soldiers at the city's many
checkpoints. The disappearance of an old school friend. Another failed
attempt to find work.
The young men — Akhmed, Tamerlan and Ibragim — are lucky. Their parents are
alive. The father of one serves in the Chechen police force. Another's is a
local government official. But by the rules of this bitter guerrilla war,
their sex and their ages, from 17 to 20, make them suspect. That has
hardened their views and drawn a line between them and their parents, who
worked and lived alongside Russians.
"I go through four checkpoints to get to my institute," said Akhmed, who
like other young men interviewed spoke on condition that his last name not
be used. "It's like chess."
"They move," he said, referring to Russian soldiers, "and you move away."
The years of war have embittered and politicized a generation. The first
war began in 1994, when Akhmed was 12, and ended in 1996 with Chechnya
awarded a large measure of autonomy.
For three chaotic years, rival Chechen warlords controlled the small
southern Russian region. Then, after gunmen led by an Islamic fighter made
an incursion into the neighboring region of Dagestan, the Russian Army
invaded a second time, in 1999.
Middle-aged Chechens shared a Soviet past with neighbors in Russia. They
were linked in Soviet Young Pioneer camps, songs, common vacation spots and
the Russian language. Chechens were deported from their homes by Stalin,
but so were many other nationalities, as well as millions of ethnic Russians.
Young people have fewer of those bonds. With schools here in service only
sporadically, and many good teachers gone, even the privileged, like
Akhmed, are getting spotty educations. Many are losing their Russian. The
years of war and a new nationalist mood in Russia in which people from the
Caucasus are often singled out for discrimination have sown a deep distrust
of Russia.
"The main problem of Chechnya is the children of war," said Jabrail
Gakayev, a Chechen historian at the Russian Academy of Sciences. "They are
without specialties, sometimes without education. They are the social base
for the separatists."
Some characteristics of this tougher generation came into relief during
hostage crisis in Moscow in October, when Chechen militants took an entire
theater audience captive.
Negotiators who visited the theater described the militants as young and
fanatic. A legislator who negotiated with them, Iosif Kobzon, whose ties
with Chechnya date back to the 1960's, said the fighters broke from Chechen
tradition and "did not recognize elders."
"These guys were totally different," said Mr. Kobzon, who is also one of
Russia's most well-known entertainers. "They were made of totally different
stuff" than well-known Chechen rebel leaders like Shamil Basayev.
"I have been associating with the Chechen diaspora for 40 years," the
lawmaker said. "I have simply not seen such people."
The leader of the hostage takers, thought to be Movsar Barayev, a nephew of
an infamous warlord, looked about 25 years old, Mr. Kobzon said. Chechens
in Grozny described the young Mr. Barayev as spoiled by his uncle and ill
prepared for battle. Mr. Barayev described himself and his team as "the
suicide ones."
The older Chechen fighters like Mr. Basayev occasionally refer to a common
Soviet past when communicating with Russians. Maksim Shevchenko, a Russian
journalist who interviewed him frequently during the first war, recalled
one such appeal by Mr. Basayev, who wears the long beard of Islamic radicals.
"He switched off the tape recorder and he said, `You think I was always
this bearded fighter with a machine gun?' " recalled Mr. Shevchenko, who at
the time was writing for the daily Nezavisimaya Gazeta. " `I also sang the
song, "My address is not a home or street; my address is the Soviet Union."
Those were very good times.' "
That Soviet glue, it seems, has dissolved. Mr. Basayev claimed
responsibility for the Moscow hostage taking in a statement posted on a
Chechen Web site on Nov. 1.
Among young people who choose to fight for Chechnya these days, the most
willing are those who have lost parents or other adults close to them,
young Chechen men said in interviews. Hussein, 18, was 10 when the war
broke out. He and his siblings saw their parents killed during an attack on
the town of Urus-Martan, where they spent summers. After losing his family,
he lived with a band of boys in Grozny, much of the time in basements.
"They were all cursing the Russians," Hussein said in halting, broken
Russian. "We ran from place to place. Basements were full of bodies. They
can't rest until they get revenge. They began to fight. They don't care if
they die, because Russians don't let them live anyway."
After watching a bombing raid on a central market in Grozny that killed his
friends, Hussein said, he fought the urge to join the rebels. He is now
living in the neighboring region of Ingushetia, away from the fighting. He
was saved by his brother, Khassan, whom he found in Grozny after two years
of separation.
"People were screaming, old people, young people," said Hussein, describing
the central market attack, which took place during the first war. "Now no
one would believe it. I saw it. It wasn't that I wanted to cry. I didn't
want to live anymore."
Some young men fight for money. Aslan, 20, recalled that an orphaned friend
had been paid by Chechen fighters to set land mines. The friend, he said,
was maimed by one mine, suffering severe wounds to his abdomen and legs,
and now walks with a limp.
Aslan signed up for Chechnya's National Guard between the wars. He can
neither read nor write, and that caused a problem at a checkpoint in Grozny
recently when he was detained by Russian soldiers and told to read and sign
a statement. The soldiers, for their part, are often scared that they are
confronting armed Chechen rebels.
"These soldiers make you want to fight them," Aslan said. "Half of my
friends are running in the forest, fighting. I wanted to take revenge. But
let Allah punish. You kill one or two or three. But where do you stop?"
******
#8
Asia Times
November 19, 2002
No place to go for Chechen refugees
By Sergei Blagov
MOSCOW - The move by Chechens in Russia to seek political asylum in
Kazakhstan could throw a wrench into the otherwise smooth-running wheel of
relations between Russia and Kazakhstan. The Chechen appeal to Kazakhstan
also highlights hidden ethnic tensions in that Central Asian country of 3
million square kilometers, a vast tract of empty steppe that stretches from
the Caspian Sea to China.
Some 300 Chechen families, roughly 2,000 refugees, sheltering in camps near
Chechnya have asked Kazakhstan for asylum. "The Chechen people view
Kazakhstan as a second homeland", said an open letter to Kazakh President
Nursultan Nazarbayev, made public on November 12. The letter claimed that
"the Chechen people face extermination".
Russian officials promptly dismissed the appeal. On November 15,
Abdul-Khakim Sultygov, Russian presidential envoy on civil rights in
Chechnya, claimed that the letter was a "fake designed to destabilize the
situation in Chechnya".
But Akhmed Muradov, head of the Chechen-Ingush "Vainakh" cultural center in
the former Kazakh capital of Almaty, argued that the Chechens were seeking
asylum in Kazakhstan following three winters in the tents of refugee
centers in Ingushetia, bordering Chechnya.
Not surprisingly, Russian officials played down the unprecedented
collective appeal by thousands of Russian citizens to seek asylum. On
November 13, the speaker of the Federation Council, the upper house of the
Russian parliament, Sergei Mironov, said in Moscow that Chechens "have a
right to approach anyone anywhere" but "the decision will be made" by the
would-be receiving country. It sounded like Mironov anticipated Kazakhstan'
refusal.
If so, Mironov made no mistake. On November 14, a Kazakh Foreign Ministry
spokesman said that Kazakhstan viewed Chechnya as Russia's internal affair;
therefore asylum was unlikely to be granted to Chechens. Further, Umerbai
Musayev, the head of the Kazakh Interior Ministry's migration department,
argued that the Chechens could not be viewed as refugees because they were
Russian citizens and were not persecuted in Russia. They would thus not be
given refugee status because Chechens were allowed to move to other Russian
regions, Musayev added.
The Kazakh leader confirmed the statements of his subordinates. The issue
of Chechen refugees was "an internal affair of Russia, our neighbor and
strategic partner", Nazarbayev announced on November 15. In recent years,
at least 10,000 people from Russia's North Caucasus regions had moved to
Kazakhstan, he was quoted as saying by the RIA news agency.
Kazakhstan, a signatory of the international convention on refugees, now
finds itself in an uneasy position. Kazakh authorities have been reluctant
to accept more Chechen refugees, simultaneously trying not to upset Moscow
and to avoid an inevitable financial burden as well.
Kazakhstan was simply unable to accept that many refugees due to a shortage
of funding, argues Altynshash Zhaganova, head of Kazakhstan's migration and
demography agency. At present, she said, all Russian citizens were entitled
to simplified naturalization procedures in Kazakhstan: they could become
Kazakh citizens, but not refugees, she was quoted by Izvestia daily as
saying on November 14. Zhaganova also expressed concern that Chechen rebels
or criminals could abuse simplified naturalization procedures and move to
Kazakhstan.
Kazakhstan is, indeed, a second home to Chechens. Many Chechens, including
Chechnya's first president, Dzhokhar Dudayev; the leader of the
separatists, Aslan Maskhadov; and the head of the pro-Moscow Chechen
administration, Akhmad Kadyrov, were born in Kazakhstan.
During World War II, Chechens were deported to Central Asia en masse by
Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin, who accused them of helping the invading
Germans. On February 23, 1944, Soviet interior ministry troops rounded up
almost half a million Chechens and Ingush and sent them to the Kazakh
steppes, where they were engaged in hard manual labor.
In January 1957, the Chechens were allowed to return home, and some 200,000
did so. However, a sizeable Chechen community remained in Kazakhstan. For
instance, in Arbuzinka and Petrakovka villages of Atbassar district, there
are 12,000 Chechens, the largest Chechen enclave in Kazakhstan.
However, estimates of the Chechen Diaspora's size in Kazakhstan vary.
According to Kazakh censuses, there were 50,000 Chechens in 1989 and some
30,000 in 1999. Non-governmental sources, including the Chechen-Ingush
cultural center in Almaty, however, estimate that up to 100,000 Chechens
live in Kazakhstan, including recent refugees from war-torn Chechnya.
Against the backdrop of this sizeable Chechen presence already in the
country, predominantly Muslim Kazakhstan is seen as a safe haven for
thousands of refugees fleeing the war in Chechnya. However, Kazakh
authorities apparently do not want the Chechens to undermine the country's
good relations with Russia.
In recent years, Kazakhstan has tended to support Russia on a variety of
post-Soviet issues, from the Caspian division to regional economic and
security alliances. In response, Moscow has hardly taken notice of
Kazakhstan's Slav population, a potentially divisive issue between the two
countries. Russia has also made no territorial claims on Kazakhstan since
the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.
Kazakhstan still has a large Russian ethnic minority along a
7,000-kilometer border with southern Russia. The emigration of the Slav
population - or Russian-speakers - estimated at hundreds of thousands since
independence, has secured the Kazakh majority in their own country.
Russians - once a majority in Kazakhstan - now account for roughly a third
of the 17 million population.
In November 1999, Kazakh authorities arrested 22 people, including 12
Russian citizens, in the northeastern city of Ust-Kamenogorsk on charges of
conspiracy to overthrow the local government and establish an independent
Russian-speaking state in Eastern Kazakhstan.
Though ethnic tensions have been rare to surface, some Russian nationalists
in Moscow have blamed Kazakh authorities for discriminating against the
Slav population, thus pressing them to emigrate. Russian nationalists argue
that Kazakhstan never existed in its current borders and Kazakh
northeastern regions are historically part of Russia.
Moscow has also complained that its "transparent" border with Kazakhstan is
virtually open to smugglers - notably to drug dealers. Some Russian regions
dispatched local Cossack militia to guard the border. But the deployment of
Cossacks - descendants of a Slav warrior class - along their common
frontier touched a raw nerve in Kazakhstan. Memories of Cossack
colonization of the Kazakh steppes, violently moving the borders of the
tsarist empire eastward, are strong among the once nomadic Kazakhs.
Incidentally, Cossacks remain the traditional enemies of the Chechens as
well.
Nonetheless, a sort of quid pro quo has emerged between Moscow and Astana
as Kazakhstan tries to keep its Chechen Diaspora quiet, and in response
Moscow turns a deaf ear to the problems of ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan.
Moreover, as relations between Russia and Kazakhstan have been improving,
the two nations are even engaged in talks over a would-be territorial swap.
On November 13, Russian and Kazakh foreign ministry delegations met in
Magnitogorsk, a Russian town near the Kazakh border, where Magnitogorsk
Metal Combine, or MMK, is based. They discussed a plan to give Ogneuporny
township to Russia in exchange for an equal acreage to be transferred to
Kazakh control. Ogneuporny has long been a part of MMK, yet the separation
has created countless hurdles for the people living in Ogneuporny, and MMK
as well.
As Kazakhstan has pledged to support Russia in "fighting terrorism", Kazakh
authorities are unlikely to accept more Chechen refugees. Obviously, Astana
is wary that Chechen militants could infiltrate, posing as refugees, and
then radicalize the Chechen community in Kazakhstan, a scenario that would
negatively affect relations with Russia.
******
#9
Yezhenedelny Zhurnal
November 12, 2002
TWO'S A CROWD
A FIERCE COMBAT ON THE RIGHT WING FORCES YAVLINSKY TO THINK UP
IMAGINARY DIFFERENCES WITH RIVALS FROM UNION OF RIGHT-WING FORCES
Author: Mikhail Fishman
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
SOME OBSERVERS THINK THAT GRIGORY YAVLINSKY'S YABLOKO PARTY WILL
SOON DISAPPEAR. OTHERS ARE SURE THAT YAVLINSKY HAS STARTED A SERIOUS
POLITICAL GAME, AIMING AT A HIGH POST IN THE GOVERNMENT OR THE
KREMLIN. MEANWHILE, AT PRESENT THERE ARE MORE QUESTIONS THAN ANSWERS
ABOUT YAVLINSKY'S FUTURE.
Judging from the press, the government and its precincts are a
market for personnel employment, and the Kremlin is a recruiting
agency for Grigory Yavlinsky. Rumors about alleged offers for
Yavlinsky to take a seat in a government body are circulated by
various sources. However, such rumors are based on only one
circumstance: Moscow politicians think that the leader of Yabloko
party is not in his correct place. Yavlinsky agrees with them. Not
only Yavlinsky's future depends on events happening around the leader
of Yabloko. The legitimacy of the right wing is not evident so long as
two relatively influential parties compete in this right wing. This
uncertainty damages Russia's liberal movement and deforms the layout
of political forces in Russia.
Yavlinsky has never appeared on the political stage for over two
years. He did not attend Duma sessions; he did not appear on TV
channels; he did not give interviews. The Yabloko leader returned to
public politics in spring, and if the motives of his long absence are
not clear, the reason why he returned is evident; the unheralded
beginning of a parliamentary election campaign again made the front
line stretching between Yabloko and Union of Right-wing Forces
obvious. An impending "combat" between the blocs required Yabloko
commander's personal presence. This summer Union of Right-wing Forces
reverted to the idea of nominating a common democratic candidate in
the presidential election and enunciated the nomination process. To
call a spade a spade, being a victor in the past parliamentary
elections (8.5% compared to Yabloko's 5.9%), Union of Right-wing
Forces decided to take over Yabloko. Like a real military leader,
Grigory Yavlinsky skillfully chose a defense tactic, established
discipline and order in his party, and found a new influential ally,
President Putin. However, the Yabloko leader has not yet explained to
party members or the nation what his actual strategic goal is.
In response to Union of Right-wing Forces' proposal - friendly by
the form but aggressive by the essence - Yavlinsky ventured to the
extreme degree of confrontation. He told Boris Nemtsov on Echo of
Moscow Radio in early October that he cannot unite with leaders, who,
in Union of Right-wing Forces, represent corrupt bureaucrat yes-men.
After that he hinted that the management of Unified Energy System of
Russia (RAO EES) must be brought to court. As far as the platform on
which the parties might nominate a common candidate is concerned,
Union of Right-wing Forces offered a list of general requirements:
market reforms, freedom of speech, movement toward the West, a
political solution of the Chechen crisis, and more...
Yavlinsky supplemented this list with a reform of the electric
energy sector and military reform. Owing to the fact that Yavlinsky
had stated long ago that these reforms were a sphere of ideological
differences with Union of Right-wing Forces, in which Yabloko would
not make a compromise in principle, the merger with Union of Right-
wing Forces in the presidential election became absolutely impossible.
By speaking out against Union of Right-wing Forces regarding the
issue of the reform of the electric energy sector and military reform
Yavlinsky intended to show ideological differences between his party
and the party of liberal reformers (factually, these differences do
not exist). For instance, Yabloko expressed its distrust of Anatoly
Chubais, when it voted against the reform of the electric energy
sector along with the Communists (sometimes different parties vote
against the budget owing to political motives). As for the
confrontation over the issue of the military reform, which cannot be
characterized as ideological, it was absolutely far-fetched. In
November 2001 Yabloko unanimously supported Union of Right-wing
Forces' plan for reducing the duration of compulsory military service
to a half a year, and the parties created a working group in order to
promote this idea. A bit later Yavlinsky changed his mind and called
that plan "harmful, dangerous, and senseless", and proposed to create
a purely professional army. Yavlinsky did not rule out (at least
publicly) the possibility of creating an alliance on the eve of the
presidential election. At the same time, being an experienced
tactician, Yavlinsky was preparing arguments for breaking off
relations with Union of Right-wing Forces.
A personal conflict between Yavlinsky and Union of Right-wing
Forces over uniting processes has gone too far. Boris Nemtsov, leader
of Union of Right-wing Forces, recently stated that Grigory Yavlinsky
is the only obstacle on the path to the merger of Yabloko and Union of
Right-wing Forces. As a matter of fact, he called upon party-members
to dismiss the Yabloko leader. Two members of the Yabloko faction -
Nikolai Travkin and Yelena Mizulina - moved to Union of Right-wing
Forces at the early phase of the conflict. It is evident that some
members of the Yabloko faction are now holding active consultations
with representatives of Union of Right-wing Forces behind Yavlinsky's
back. Nevertheless, Yabloko's leadership does not hurry to part with
Grigory Yavlinsky - it is possible that it has not yet received
guarantees from Union of Right-wing Forces.
Yabloko is strengthening defense positions taken by Yavlinsky and
state that the party is a civilized socio-democratic alternative both
to the party allied with governmental power and the party of
reformers. Yabloko's activists propose to consider Union of Right-wing
Forces as a prototype of a conservative party of the Western type, and
their own party - as the foundation of a serious left-liberal
movement. Judging from Yavlinsky's words, Union of Right-wing Forces
defends the interests of capitalists, and Yabloko represents the
middle class (small businessmen and intelligentsia). These
considerations have become the foundation of the theory of electoral
incompatibility of Union of Right-wing Forces and Yabloko, according
to which the movement of two liberal parties closer to one another
would be senseless, harmful, and dangerous, since it will lead to a
substantial loss of votes.
At present, when Yabloko votes for the budget, thus blending with
the right-centrist majority in the Duma and becoming part of a common
parliamentary force along with Union of Right-wing Forces, there are
more reasons for such rivalry. Grigory Yavlinsky acts according to the
logic of this confrontation when he proposes to put Chubais on trial
and creates precedents of ideological complaints based on principles
against the right-wing forces. The artificiality of differences
between Yabloko and Union of Right-wing Forces is not the main
problem. The problem is that the political project centered on Grigory
Yavlinsky, which did not endure the weight of global changes and
Yeltsin's resignation, is very doubtful.
In the meantime, it is true that Yavlinsky's voters are rather
extraordinary, and sociologists know their defining characteristics
pretty well. The Yabloko party is a party of the late-Soviet
democratic intelligentsia, which welcomed the collapse of Communism,
rejected reforms of the 1990s, did not benefit from its position, and
focused its anger on Boris Yeltsin and the government of reformers
Yegor Gaidar and Anatoly Chubais. Yeltsin preferred Gaidar to
Yavlinsky in 1991, which is why the architect of the "500 Days"
program was guided by personal motives when he made a decision to head
"the democratic opposition". The truth is that the reforms, which are
not associated with Boris Yeltsin any longer, have acquired a positive
sense. As a matter of fact, Russia's first president was the only
source of ideological content of Yavlinsky's party. Yabloko's present-
day existence is based on memories about a democratic fighter against
the oligarchic regime and severe laws of a political combat.
A political force based on the inertia of voters' trust and
personal efforts of its leader does not have prospects. Disputes over
the possibility of uniting Yabloko and Union of Right-wing Forces on
an equal basis are senseless, though their ratings are alike
(according to the All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion,
in October Union of Right-wing Forces' rating was 11%, and Yabloko's
rating reached 8%; 5% and 6% in September respectively). While Yabloko
is trying to create a platform for breaking off relations with Union
of Right-wing Forces, the latter has become an active participant in
the political process by informally supervising structural reforms in
Russia. The point is not that Union of Right-wing Forces' leaders are
more active than Yavlinsky. The party of liberal reformers retains the
essence of its policy, with which the party of liberal "anti-
Yeltsinists" is forced to agree, since it has lost its ideological
reference points. Yavlinsky has faced a very difficult choice - either
to close the party today, or wait until the symbolic figure of Boris
Yeltsin leaves the backstage of public consciousness. In addition,
this is a matter of money: according to certain reports, Yavlinsky
does not have enough sponsors, who keep the hopes of the Yabloko
political project alive in reality. As a matter of fact, Boris Nemtsov
has proposed that Yabloko dissolve itself. Sooner or later,
Yavlinsky's party will disappear, and no decorations will cancel this
objective fact of the political reality.
After the tragedy in the Melnikov Street in Moscow, President
Putin summoned Grigory Yavlinsky and thanked him for his contribution
to negotiations with Chechen terrorists. He noted that the Yabloko
leader did not turn his participation in negotiations into an
advertising campaign. This was a challenge aimed against the leaders
of Union of Right-wing Forces who commented on the circumstances of
the tragedy publicly and established a public commission for
investigating the terrorist act. To all appearances, the president
decided to support Yavlinsky in order to retain a strategic balance of
political forces in Russia. However, Yavlinsky hints that he always
keeps in touch with the president. At present, Yavlinsky supports
Putin's foreign political course. He accuses the bureaucratic regime
created by Putin's environment of all foreign political failures. In
other words, his criticism does not concern Putin. Observers conclude
that winds of change are blowing in the Kremlin, and the Russian
leadership currently prefers the Yabloko leader to the leaders of
Union of Right-wing Forces.
In reality this is not true. The Kremlin is interested in
consolidating the right wing, and understands that the merger of Union
of Right-wing Forces and Yavlinsky is impossible. Alexander Voloshin
recently proposed that Grigory Yavlinsky head the State building
committee. According to certain reports, Grigory Yavlinsky asked
Vladimir Putin not to appoint him as the chair of this committee. He
wanted to become a presidential plenipotentiary for Chechnya. It is
possible that rumors about the prospects of becoming the foreign
minister come from Yavlinsky too. It is evident that Yavlinsky has
started a serious political game, aiming at a high post in the
government or the Kremlin. Such an appointment (if it led to the
merger of the two right-wing parties) would change the foundations of
the state, as it presently exists. It depends on Putin whether a
radical structural reform on the right wing is launched or not.
*******
#10
Transitions Online
November 15, 2002
Notes from Ulyanovsk:
The Fading of Red October
In Lenin’s birthplace, only a weak echo of the October Revolution can be
heard--and the city itself may lose Lenin’s name.
by Sergei Borisov
ULYANOVSK, Russia--Russia’s Day of Accord and Reconciliation was, as usual,
marked by demonstrations. Sportsmen lobbied local politicians and advocated
healthy living, pensioners carried flags and banners, young radicals wore
gas masks. Thousands turned out in provincial towns, 25,000 in Moscow.
If large demonstrations about accord and reconciliation sound a little
unfamiliar and the relationship between healthy living and reconciliation
seems strained, your reaction is an accurate reflection of reality. The Day
of Accord and Reconciliation is 7 November, the day of the October
Revolution, and whatever the name, this particular public holiday is now a
peculiar affair.
Perhaps, though, the first Red October was itself a little like this.
Comrade Aleksandr Tarasov-Rodionov, chief of the Bolshevik’s military arm,
described the night power over one-sixth of the globe changed hands thus:
“An odd revolution--the Working Council is overthrowing the bourgeois
government, but the peaceful life of the city has not ceased for a minute.”
It was an odd revolution to end a strange year, a year that saw the tsar
ousted with little regret, a provisional government that Soviet history
books themselves described as the most democratic government in Europe, and
finally a nearly bloodless coup.
What, of course, is clear is that 7 November bears next to no resemblance
to the Soviet-era celebrations that forced millions onto the streets
carrying red flags, banners, and portraits of Marx, Engels, and Lenin in
order to demonstrate their faithfulness to “the ideals of October.”
Instead, what we had this November was a motley hybrid of ignorance,
indifference, irrelevance, and historical passion. For 41 percent of
Russians, newsru.com reported, this red-letter day is simply a day off.
Many ask: What accord? Reconciliation with whom?
You wouldn’t have been able to find the answers in the banners carried by
young sportsmen in Ulyanovsk: “Say No to Drugs” some read, while others
called for a new ice-hockey stadium and urged local authorities to play
hockey, not political games.
However, for 36 percent, 7 November remains the day of the October
Revolution--and a day to recall or battle over the Communist legacy.
Several prominent human rights organizations marked the revolution’s 85th
anniversary by releasing a CD-ROM carrying information about 640,000
victims of the Soviet terror. But to quote the head of the Presidential
Committee on Rehabilitation of Victims of the Political Repression,
Aleksandr Yakovlev (himself a prominent figure in Gorbachev’s
***perestroika***): “We somehow very quickly forgot that millions and
millions of people died as a result of state terror.”
In Moscow, a small group of Russian Orthodox priests and men in tsarist
military uniforms gathered to commemorate the Whites who defended “old
Russia” against the Reds.
It was, however, the Reds who were most apparent, of course. Some 25,000
people took part in the demonstrations in Moscow this year, carrying
banners reading “Capitalism Is War" and "Yes to Another Red October,”
calling for Putin to resign, and forecasting that Russia has no future.
Most were pensioners, but young radicals from the small but noisy National
Bolshevik Party were there too, marching in columns and wearing gas masks.
The reason, they said, was so they would not have to breathe the “foul air
of capitalism.”
In Ulyanovsk, similar slogans daubed on walls were scrubbed away by the
pro-Putin youth movement Walking Together. The demonstrations themselves
were similarly faint. Before 1991, Ulyanovsk enjoyed special status, with
celebrations in Lenin’s motherland always deserving a mention on the news
of the day. Now, though, there is nothing in this to distinguish Ulyanovsk
from other towns and cities in Russia. Two thousand people turned out to
demonstrate in the city that bears Lenin’s real surname and on the square
that carries his pseudonym. The local celebrations held every year on 22
April to mark Lenin's birthday are now relatively sparsely attended.
However, what has changed little is the Communist rhetoric. This year,
Communist Party leader Gennady Zuganov again declared on 7 November that
finding a way out of Russia’s crisis is “impossible without a new politics,
the ideals of Great October, and a revival of the Russian spirit.” And, as
in 1917, peace and land dominate the discussion. For the Communists, the
sale of agricultural land is perhaps an even greater issue this year than
in recent years, as their calls for a referendum have effectively been
stifled. As for peace, ordinary Russians’ concern is about the Kremlin’s
inability--or unwillingness--to end the protracted war in Chechnya.
There is one more thing that may not have changed significantly: Many
Russians continue to share something of “the ideals of October.” According
a survey conducted last month by the All-Russian Center for the Study of
Public Opinion (VTsIOM), 43 percent of Russians say they would actively
support or cooperate in some way with the Bolsheviks were the revolution to
occur today.
Despite appearances, something of Red October may therefore live on.
Lenin has weathered the past 10 years less well. The same polling company
found that his popularity is sinking. In 1990, 70 percent of Russians
“sympathized” with Lenin. In 2002, the number was down to 36 percent. He is
steadily being eclipsed by Stalin. In the same period, Stalin’s popularity
has risen from 8 to 22 percent.
What’s more, Lenin’s birthplace could conceivably soon lose his name. That
depends on the fortunes of an amendment to the Russian constitution that is
currently being discussed that would give the Kremlin the right to rename
all “Communist” names without calling local referendums. Some of Putin’s
advisers are reportedly suggesting that Ulyanovsk revert to its imperial
name, Simbirsk.
In the tram, I heard two 13-year-old girls talking. “Do you know what
celebration is on 7 November?” “No, but I think it’s a big celebration,
because there will be three days off.”
It was a strange sensation for someone who went to a Soviet school. But
perhaps this is how Lenin’s revolution will truly end: with his popularity
waning, with no name on the map, and forgotten in his own birthplace.
*******
#11
Washington Post
November 19, 2002
Russian With a Western Way
By Anne Applebaum
The writer is a member of the editorial page staff.
Andrew Carnegie needed a lifetime; the Rockefellers required several
generations. And how long does it take nowadays to win respectability in
Washington? About two years. That, at any rate, is how long it took Mikhail
Khodorkovsky, CEO and main shareholder of the Russian oil company Yukos.
Two years -- and several billion dollars.
For those who don't know Khodorkovsky -- and his rise has been so rapid
that there's no reason anyone should -- he got his start in the late 1980s
when he used his contacts as a leader of the Soviet Communist youth
organization, the Komsomol, to move into the computer import business and
then a bank. By 1995 Khodorkovsky had generated enough money to buy 78
percent of the shares of Yukos, a state-owned company. There were
complaints at the time about the propriety of the sale, as well there might
have been. Khodorkovsky's company paid $300 million for a business that is
now thought to be worth more than $17 billion -- of which his personal
stake is worth $8 billion.
Khodorkovsky spent his first few years at Yukos defending lawsuits and
suing journalists, denying accusations of financial skulduggery and even
murder, before wising up -- and starting to think about how he might float
his company on the New York Stock Exchange. About two years ago, I got a
telephone call from the office of Prince Michael of Kent -- a member of the
British royal family who moonlights in public relations -- asking if I
wanted to join a party of journalists on an exclusive, all-expenses-paid
trip around Russia. I didn't, although it sounded tempting. All travel (by
corporate jet) from St. Petersburg to Siberia was to be paid for by an
unnamed tycoon, who was, it turned out, Khodorkovsky.
Good businessman that he is, Khodorkovsky has since thought of much smarter
ways to spend his money. Rather than waste time with freeloading
journalists, he started to bring Western standards of corporate governance
and financial transparency to Yukos, even to reveal who actually owns the
company's stock. He began improving his image with deeds instead of words,
funding schools and hospitals in the decrepit northern cities where Yukos
does its drilling, donating money to democratic politicians, and starting
the Open Russia Foundation, which really does fund exceptionally good
causes, among them Western-Russian exchanges, archaeological digs and (in
the Carnegie tradition) libraries.
Most of all, though, he appears to have figured out that the swiftest road
to respectability runs through the respectable. His company's international
chairman is now Lord David Owen, former British foreign minister and
Balkans negotiator. His foundation's board members include Henry Kissinger
and Sir Jacob Rothschild. James Billington, the librarian of Congress,
presided over the foundation's U.S. launch, during which James Wolfensohn
of the World Bank introduced Khodorkovsky. The British have an expression
that well describes the sort of person Khodorkovsky has befriended: the
Great and the Good.
Now, there isn't, in principle, anything wrong with Khodorkovsky's
behavior, nor is there any real reason why the Great and the Good shouldn't
embrace him as they have. As I say, the charities he supports are excellent
ones, and whenever I've run across him, he is invariably making a speech
promoting the Westernization of Russia, not a cause anyone wants to oppose.
There's no reason not to applaud when former oligarchs start to behave like
capitalist philanthropists -- as long as everyone understands what's at stake.
Khodorkovsky has a direct financial interest in his own respectability. It
potentially raises the price of his stock: More than one potential investor
will feel better about a company with Lord Owen on the board. Khodorkovsky
also has a direct financial interest in what gets said and written about
Russia in the United States: If Russian business is perceived as cleaner
than it used to be (or than it is), that could raise the value of Yukos
too. He even has a direct interest in bringing Western values to Russia: He
might someday need support to prevent his company from being
re-nationalized. His civilized, modest presence at Washington soirees also
helps ease American fears about Yukos's purchase of the Lithuanian
petrochemical industry, as well as other planned investments in Poland and
Hungary. These aren't reasons to show Khodorkovsky the door -- quite the
contrary -- but they are something to bear in mind. Russian money is a new
force in the land of lawyers, lobbyists and think tanks, and we ought to
remember that it's there.
*******
#12
Rumored High-Level Political Connivance, Security Lapses in Moscow Hostage
Crisis Analyzed
Rossiyskaya Gazeta
15 November 2002
[translation for personal use only]
Article by Timofey Borisov: "Who Missed Barayev"
Who should be blamed now that 50 terrorists,
armed to the teeth, managed to seize hundreds of hostages in the center
of Moscow?
As the tragic events connected with the terrorist act on Dubrovka
recede into the past, we are more likely to discern previously vague
expectations: Will anyone be held responsible for those events? Who
is to blame for the fact that a whole gang of terrorists, including
individuals with faces familiar from "Wanted" posters, carried out this
criminal plan to take hundreds of people hostage in the center of Moscow?
Can anyone be assured that the same thing, or a similar tragedy, will
not happen again? These are far from idle questions in view of the fact
that the organizers of the terrorist act in the Russian capital, Aslan
Maskhadov and Shamil Basayev, are still at large, and so are potential
new suicide bombers from the ranks of their rebel forces.
The pages of our newspapers are full of conjecture, predicting which
of our high-level officials will be penalized, and which will be lucky to
keep their heads. As a rule, the predictions focus on two targets:
the police and the FSB [Federal Security Service]. They imply that the
former allowed a whole company of rebels with forged documents and in
full marching order to advance from the Chechen mountains to the capital,
establish a bridgehead here for the terrorist act, and bring in a whole
arsenal of weapons--and that the rebels managed to do all of this
absolutely unimpeded. The FBS knew nothing about the plans for a
terrorist act of this magnitude, although it is obligated to know these
things. Otherwise, what is the point of all the arguments about the
network of confidential agents, etc.? In short, they missed all of the
signs.
The newspapers do not appear to be alone in these opinions. A
difficult choice is being made in government offices on various levels:
Who should be blamed? It is possible that the middle-management link of
the police force will be the "whipping boy," especially in the GAI [State
Motor Vehicle Inspection Administration] and GIBDD [State Inspectorate
for Road Traffic Safety], because they failed to notice the evil rebels
behind the tinted windows of the foreign cars. Tackling personnel
issues has always been in fashion here, and it has always generated good
PR for the regime. We know from experience, however, that people who
were not in the wrong usually are blamed in these cases, while the real
culprits escape punishment. Where are they, and to what degree are they
actually to blame?
It is easy to slam the police, especially when everyone knows that
there is good reason for this. When the vehicle filled with explosives
was blown up near McDonalds in October, our top officials were quick to
assure the Muscovites that this was just another fight between Chechen
crime gangs. Rossiyskaya Gazeta ignored the official explanation and
immediately described the incident as a terrorist act. It bore too many
of the earmarks of the incidents that take place daily in Chechnya and
occasionally in other places. After the terrorist act on Dubrovka, MVD
officials essentially agreed with our conclusions. Does this mean that
journalists know more about the situation than the police do?
Then there was the remark made by a general in a high-level job in
the capital, suggesting that he would evaluate the performance of his
agency according to the number of cases sent to court. We can imagine
how "delighted" the homeless were to hear this statement. Moscow's
street people already represent the best means of augmenting the
productivity of law enforcement agencies. Law enforcement personnel
"make points" by planting drugs and bullets on them, and after the
general announced his intentions, the number of cases against the
homeless rose dramatically, according to judges. The situation started
verging on the ludicrous. Mindful of these police tactics, the homeless
started sewing their pockets shut. After that, the vigilant guardians
of the law started finding drugs and bullets in ... their socks.
According to the vagrants, they started taking cover whenever they heard
about an upcoming police sweep in Moscow. A man named Yevstratov is on
trial now in one of the Moscow courts. Digging through a trash heap in
search of something to sell, this lame and frail man picked up a
polyethylene package. Before he had gone a hundred meters, they were
"binding his hands" because the package contained nunchakus. Now the
unfortunate wretch faces two years behind bars for carrying a concealed
weapon in violation of Subsection 4 of Section 222 of the RF Criminal
Code.
This can be a source of amusement and a cause for concern, but we do
not think the buck should stop with the police in the case of Barayev's
terrorist act.
The principal duty of the police is the maintenance of law and order.
The detection of an underground terrorist network is the job of other
agencies and the special services. It is tempting to blame the police
for failing to notice the rebels, but would this be fair? Despite all
of the reports and evidence of corruption in the police force and the
solicitation of bribes by police officers, we have to give them credit
where credit is due: They do so much to keep us safe and they prevent
so many crimes. Rossiyskaya Gazeta recently reported the work GIBDD
personnel did during that alarming time. On 25 October alone, they
searched vehicles in Moscow Oblast and impounded eight "Shmel" flame
throwers, eight mortars, one antiaircraft gun, and two freight containers
filled with 32 tonnes (!) of explosives, all of which were on their way
to Moscow. The next day they impounded a vehicle carrying camouflage
clothing and bladed weapons without any shipping documents. The driver
could not tell them anything about the origin of the freight. On 5
November, Highway Safety Inspector Shchedrin from Company 14 stopped a
GAZ 3307 vehicle carrying mercury. There were no shipping documents for
the 4 tonnes (!) of lethal metal.
These are just a few examples, but similar incidents occur almost
every day. This means that our police officers do their job, they do
arrest people, they do detect wrongdoing, and they do display courage and
intelligence. Furthermore, they risk their lives to do all of this for
a meager wage, to put it mildly. Furthermore, they are cleansing their
ranks. In that same GIBDD division in Moscow Oblast, disciplinary
action was taken against 363 officers in just 10 months this year
pursuant to the results of investigations by the Preventive Inspections
Division, and 17 were dismissed in disgrace. They were replaced by new
officers. Are all of them honest and decent individuals? No one can
determine this in advance. The police force, after all, is manned by
the same people we rub elbows with in our neighborhoods each day. This
is not a specially cultivated caste.
In the formal sense, the special services, and specifically their
undercover agents, missed Barayev, but this is not an incontestable fact
either. There are more questions than answers. According to the
terrorists, when they were making preparations for their terrorist act,
they were active in Moscow for two months, buying weapons, living in safe
houses, and attending a performance of "Nord-Ost." Were there no
information leaks whatsoever? Did the FSB hear nothing about this?
These are difficult questions....
I recently read a book by Nikolay Batyushin, one of the founding
fathers of the earlier, tsarist system of Russian military intelligence.
I was most amazed by the now inconceivable sums of money the tsarist
government allocated for its confidential agents in just the Warsaw
Military District before and during World War I. We can safely assume
that there was no extra money in the country at that difficult time, but
the government believed that this work was worth the cost. It was
better to spend large amounts of money on informants and learn in advance
what the enemy was planning than to suffer heavy losses in battle, to
bury soldiers and officers, and to lose costly military equipment. Is
the fight against terrorism not the same kind of deadly warfare? For
this reason, before we ask questions about the failure of the
confidential agent network, we have to find our how much money was
allocated for this work--and not just the work of the agents, but the
work of the special services in general. It would be extremely naive to
assume that someone in Moscow, not to mention someone in Chechnya, would
risk his life to tell security agencies about the plans for a crime
without good reason. I once witnessed this kind of incident in
Chechnya. The operatives of the grouping were worn out from carrying
all of the ammunition and weapons out of a secret cache. They had
carried out about a thousand demolition charges. This was the biggest
weapons cache they had found since the start of the second Chechen
campaign. The Chechen who had taken revenge against Maskhadov by
telling them about the cache asked for 3,000 rubles to pay one of his
friends, who knew of two other comparable caches. Just 3,000 rubles to
prevent hundreds of possible explosions. When I left Chechnya a month
later, the money still had not been paid.
Give this state of affairs, how can anything surprise us? As soon as
the senators responded to the tragic events on Dubrovka by resolving to
allocate more money for security, some newspapers came out with headlines
warning that the special services were getting more money again, and that
the KGB was being revived. In the last 12 years, our special services
were "reformed" so zealously (Sergey Stepashin, who became the head of
the FSB after the latest phase of this process, called the reform a
castration), that they simply cannot be expected to maintain the
excellent network of confidential agents that took decades to build.
The few remaining former professionals at Lubyanka say that the former
dissidents were particularly active in demolishing the services making up
the KGB (which included much more than just the directorate prosecuting
anti-Soviet activity). In the beginning of the 1990s, they freely raced
through the corridors of Lubyanka and spitefully committed unforgivable
acts, destroying the agent files, while that notorious hysterical woman,
who was a member of the KGB Personnel Commission, judged the suitability
of candidates for positions in the state security network on her own.
Judging by all indications, the realization that someone reluctant to
feed his own soldiers would soon be feeding others was slow in arriving.
Thank God, they now understand at least this.
There is another aspect of the tragic events on Dubrovka. Many of
the professionals I spoke with are convinced that this could not have
happened without the help of high-level patrons. Basayev and Maskhadov,
they assert, were incapable of carrying out this kind of operation on
their own. I heard the same thing from a highly informed Chechen
source, once a close friend of Maskhadov. He asked me a seemingly
simple question: Could armed Chechens capable of paying out a million
dollars in bribes get all the way to Moscow? Remembering what we had
heard about the terrorist act in Budennovsk, I confidently replied that
they certainly could. The Chechen, however, said the answer was an
unequivocal no. "You have to realize," he said, "that I am stopped five
times a day by the police in Moscow. Believe me, if I were a wanted
man, nothing would help. Even if I had a million dollars, they would
simply take it away from me, and then they would also 'make points' by
arresting me. The same thing would have happened to the rebels if they
had tried to get to Moscow on their own, using the 'infiltration' method.
Miracles do not happen. The terrorist act on Dubrovka was directed
and backed by extremely high-ranking individuals in Moscow and abroad."
How credible is this opinion? I will not try to answer that
question, but I could not come up with any arguments to disagree with
him, or to agree with him. If we assume that this was the case,
however, many of the details that seem so peculiar would sound more
logical, particularly in connection with the sweep and scope of the
terrorist act. We have to wonder what else could happen: After all,
50 butchers, armed to the teeth, could seize not only a theater, but also
the State Duma, for example, while it is in session. A couple of police
officers at the door could not stop them.
The "Nord-Ost" tragedy became possible because we kept criticizing
everything of our own and praising everything Western for the last 10
years, destroying our own home and using the remainder principle to
finance the services responsible for our safety and our lives. Later,
as soon as tragedy struck, we demanded to know: Where were the police
and the special services? Perhaps we finally should stop begrudging the
expenditures on our own security and find, metaphorically speaking, those
3,000 rubles, so that no more of our buildings will be blown up, and so
that the foreign special services will stop lording it over us here in
Russia.
*******
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