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RAS 12 - JRL 6535
HISTORY: EARLY STALINISM
10. STAKHANOVISM: STALIN'S "GREAT LEAP FORWARD"
SOURCE. R. W. Davies and Oleg Khlevnyuk, "Stakhanovism and the Soviet
Economy," Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 54 No. 6, September 2002, pp. 867-904.
On September 1, 1935, Pravda reported that a Donbas miner named Stakhanov had
extracted 102 tons of coal in a six-hour shift, exceeding the norm more than
fivefold. Thus began the Stakhanovite "movement" -- a campaign urging
workers to emulate this and other alleged feats of super-productivity. (Stakhanov's
name was sometimes linked to that of Krivonos, a train driver who increased the
speed of his locomotive from 24 to 32 kilometers an hour.)
Professor Bob Davies (Centre for Russian and East European Studies,
University of Birmingham, UK -- my own alma mater) and Oleg Khlevnyuk (State
Archive of the Russian Federation) have mined newly accessible archives to
uncover the political and economic background to this campaign and assess its
impact.
Following the upheaval of forced-pace industrialization associated with the
first Five Year Plan (1928-33), the Soviet leadership shifted in 1934 and early
1935 to a policy of consolidation, with a more modest level of capital
investment and a stress on financial stabilization. However, by the summer of
1935 Stalin faced a quandary. While recognizing the need to keep total
investment within tolerable limits, he was loath to cut any specific investments
allocated to defense, upgrading rail transportation, building schools,
re-equipping light and heavy industry or the Moscow canal.
Thus there took shape the strategy of "substituting intensification for
investment" -- that is, squeezing more out of less -- even if that meant
pushing the capacity of both machines and workers up to and beyond their limits.
When Soviet workers master the new technology, Stalin declared on May 4, 1935,
they can and must "bring about miracles." The Stakhanovite movement
was a semi-orchestrated response from below to this call from above. It gave the
leadership a justification to revise workers' output norms upward at the
beginning of 1936. Those who warned of the dangers of ignoring objective limits
were prosecuted for sabotage.
The movement did not last very long. "Only 1936 can properly be
described as a 'Stakhanovite year'" -- and from July 1936 there was a shift
back to more balanced growth. In 1937 Stakhanovism (like much else) was
overwhelmed by the purges; in 1938 it was revived but on a low key. It appears
that Stalin came to the realization that Stakhanovism was not yielding the
hoped-for results and decided quietly to abandon it.
The authors' analysis suggests that Stakhanovism had no overall impact on
economic development, for good or ill. It was "merely a quarterly blip in
the general advance in productivity that had begun well before the
campaign." It did lead to significant improvements in various industrial
practices, but at the price of disrupting the planning and supply system,
damaging equipment, and sharply increasing the accident rate.
The parallel that came to my mind in reading this article was the "Great
Leap Forward" of 1958-61 in China. Like Stalin, Mao Zedong sought a short
cut to industrial development by driving people to "miraculous" feats.
Of course, Mao's insanity lasted longer and did incomparably more harm. Millions
of peasants, forced to neglect their crops and build useless backyard steel
furnaces, starved to death. Stalin by comparison was a paragon of reason.
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