#9 - JRL 6525
The Globe and Mail (Canada)
October 31, 2002
He's one lucky Russian
Out of the blue comes a tragedy that breathes new life into the fading Vladimir Putin heroic myth
By ANDREI PIONTKOVSKY

Vladimir Putin is a lucky politician. On Aug. 8, 1999, a hitherto obscure official was named prime minister, and then president Boris Yeltsin proclaimed him his successor. Mr. Yeltsin's final caprice aroused no indignation, only laughter.

The head of a well-known radio station tried all day to find at least one positive thing to say about the new appointment for the sake of balance. In the end, I helped out by saying that, despite all the constitutional absurdity of Mr. Yeltsin's desires to appoint a successor, at least his latest decision showed that he had finally abandoned hopes of running for a third term and that, in a year, we would have a different president. As for whether or not we elected the "successor," that depended on us.

But I turned out to be wrong. It depended not on us, but on a very small group of people that included Boris Berezovsky, Gleb Pavlovsky, Alexander Voloshin and perhaps a handful of others.

The Yeltsin "family's" spin doctors offered to voters not the modest Colonel Putin as an election product, but the heroic myth of an energetic young intelligence officer giving decisive instructions, sending regiments deep into the Caucasus and sowing fear and destruction among the enemies of Russia.

Shamil Basayev's raid on Dagestan and the bombings of apartment blocks in Moscow and Volgodonsk that coincided with the election campaign served as the ideal backdrop for the mythological action unfolding. And Russia's feminine soul, longing for the firm hand of a master, abandoned respectable Yevgeny Primakov for the young hero-lover.

Three years have passed. The authorities have felt their heads spin with their own public opinion successes. Everything and everyone, it would seem, are now fully manageable. But the more time passed, the more people began to sense that the authorities were not as authoritative as they seem. They have not solved a single serious problem in the economy, social sphere or in the fight against crime. The Chechen campaign has also run into a dead end, and the number of people calling for negotiations and an end to the war has increased sharply.

Mr. Putin's heroic myth was deflating rapidly. From within the depths of the oligarchy, there rose a new myth, that of the young, energetic anti-crisis nickel company manager who is so rich he no longer needs to steal. Mr. Putin's re-election, or rather reappointment, in 2004 no longer looked so certain.

But now another tragedy has come out of the blue to breathe new life into the fading Putin myth. A group of rebels armed with automatic rifles, grenade launchers and explosives burst into a Moscow theatre and took hundreds of people hostage. After three days of tense drama broadcast live on TV, Mr. Putin gave the order to storm the building. The operation was a brilliant success. The collateral damage fell within acceptable limits. Rising from its knees after so many defeats, the grateful nation begins uniting around its hero. The shining lights of the liberal intelligentsia make demands for a police state, unity of thought, respect for private property, the death penalty and a union with the Western democracies all at once.

Mr. Putin is unlikely to go as far as their hopes would have him go, but the hostage crisis will have a big influence on Russian political life.

Above all, it will see a tougher policy on Chechnya. Of course, it's difficult to toughen things in military terms; all types of weapons have already been tried. Moscow isn't about to use tactical nuclear weapons. Though, on Monday, Mr. Putin made a statement that theoretically allows for such a possibility: "In the event of the threat that terrorists will use means of destruction akin to weapons of mass destruction, Russia will make suitable strikes in the places these terrorists are located, and in the centres of their ideological and financial support."

In practical terms, the tougher policy will mean yet more abuses during "cleansing," and that will only swell the ranks of the rebels and potential kamikazes. The idea of negotiating with Aslan Maskhadov or with anyone among the people Russia is fighting in Chechnya will be rejected. The public had accepted the need for negotiations, but mass-scale propaganda will throw it back several years. Moscow eventually will be forced to return to the idea of negotiations, but, by then, years and thousands more lives will have been lost.

Toughening up domestic policy won't affect just Chechnya. The atmosphere of military hysteria and growing xenophobia will inevitably lead to an increased role for the security ministries. Pressure from them will lead to further restrictions against freedom of speech and human rights, which fits in with Mr. Putin's philosophy of managed democracy.

Meantime, the security ministries, whose hostage Mr. Putin is becoming, are unhappy with Russia's rapprochement with the West. At the same time, the idea that the war in Chechnya is part of the global war against terrorism is extremely important for Mr. Putin. He spent so much time convincing the West that this is so, he now he believes it himself. So if the West doesn't contradict his assertions, he is ready to take some steps in response, such as supporting the U.S. Security Council resolution on Iraq. Andrei Piontkovsky is director of the Centre of Strategic Research in Moscow.