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#6
BBC Monitoring
Russian MP urges policy change on Chechnya after
hostage drama
Source: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Moscow, in Russian 29 Oct 02
Russia needs to change its policy on Chechnya so as to prevent the repetition of tragedies like the recent hostage siege, the deputy chairman of the State Duma Defence Committee, Aleksey Arbatov, has said in an article published by Russian newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta. The hostage-taking was "a consequence of the present policy, so this policy should be revised", argues Arbatov. He also says that while the threat of such terrorist attacks remains, the Russian authorities need to devise more robust and effective measures for dealing with them. The following is an excerpt from the report published by Nezavisimaya Gazeta on 29 October:
Following the dramatic and tragic events on 23-26 October, the Russian public is asking itself: "What caused the events: the weakness of secret services or the power of gunmen? Have the authorities really failed to learn the lesson hostage crises in Budennovsk and Kizlyar [in 1995] and apartment bombings, including in Moscow [in 1999]?"
Of course, this time the situation was quite new and more complicated than it was in Budennovsk or Kizlyar. There are two reasons. One is the continuing sluggish war in Chechnya, which is developing according to its own laws and which was not a reason for particular concerns here in Russia: The war continues, so let it continue. Everyone, including the authorities, has become accustomed to it. No precautions were taken, such as closing the administrative borders with Chechnya and searching more thoroughly whatever is transported from that region and the people leaving the republic.
On the other hand, the international experience shows that there is no cure-all for terrorist acts. It is simply impossible to foresee everything. Even such countries as Israel, where the power structures and population are permanently on the lookout for terrorist attacks, are not capable of this. But with a proper network of agents inside the armed opposition and terrorist organizations, it is possible to obtain information that could alert our services well in advance. However, we apparently do not have such agents or they do not work properly.
This is the first conclusion. After all, we did have, as it turned out, certain information on the crime and intercepted some conversations among the gunmen. What measures were taken about this? Or, was everything just taken into consideration?
The second point concerns the protection of all facilities against terrorist strikes. It is impossible to assign a special-purpose police detachment to every kindergarten, school, or hospital. In such cases, the properly prepared states protect themselves by quickly and adequately reacting to these kinds of situations. Unfortunately, this was not the case in our country.
I was in Dubrovka [district in Moscow where siege took place] in the first hours after the hostages were taken at the theatre centre. Unbelievable things were happening. The question is were we aware of the danger and, if we had experience of dealing with terrorist acts similar to the Budennovsk crisis, then why did the antiterrorist operation progress so slowly? Why did the course of events somehow resemble a adhoc gathering? Huge numbers of people were moving around the operation's crisis centre, and vehicles drove in and out. A real crisis centre must have military organization. It must have a single commander who is in charge of everyone. After all, an unprecedented large-scale emergency situation occurred, and that is why in the first hours of the hostage crisis I proposed introducing the law on state of emergency in Moscow for the period of this crisis. This law allows flexible use of specific measures necessary to maintain order and prevent panic and further terrorist acts, a danger which could not ruled out.
Who could guarantee that several dozen more bandits had not come to Moscow and were not waiting for a signal to make another strike that would definitely paralyse the whole of society?
I think that the Kremlin and the government are well protected but no heightened security measures were observed to have been taken at other facilities. Both on 24 and 25 October, there were the usual huge traffic jams on Moscow's streets. The traffic was not restricted either during the day or at night, and no special regime was introduced...
There is another obvious thing. The war in Chechnya cannot last forever. There can be no guarantee against more incidents like this one, which is why we need to examine all aspects of security. At the same time, the federal centre needs to pursue a more active policy in Chechnya. Let me repeat. Our authorities are simply drifting with the tide and the Kremlin has become immersed in self-complacency: We waged wars for decades in the past and we are going to conduct this one for as long. In the 19th century, however, there was no television and public opinion did not have so much influence on state policies.
The hostage crisis has shown that we do not have decades. The war must be stopped right now. If the situation is not under control over there, in Chechnya (and we see it is not), we should not hope that everything is about change soon. The conflict will escalate both horizontally, spreading to other regions, and vertically. They took 1,000 people hostage today and may do something even more horrible tomorrow. As it is a consequence of the present policy, this policy should be revised.
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