#9 - JRL 6408
Transitions Online
www.tol.cz
August 26, 2002
Our Take
Russia’s Foreign Policy in a Tailspin
What’s clear this week is that Russia doesn’t like Bush’s notion of an “axis of evil.” What’s less clear is what axis its own foreign policy is spinning on.
First, it was a deal on the transfer of technical expertise to Iran. Then a week later (and a week ago), it was a deal to help repair Iraq’s dilapidated infrastructure (most importantly, its oil system). And then over the weekend came a meeting with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il. In the space of three weeks, Russia has stretched out its hand to the triumvirate of nations that make up Washington’s “axis of evil.” This warming friendliness with enemies of the United States seems so conspicuous as to be ostentatious, so contrarian as to be almost Cold War-like.
On top of that, television cameras have shown the victims of independently verified Russian bombings of Georgia, a small but critical state that seems an eternal playground for Russian interests and which at present is host to U.S. military trainers. And Russia has in recent months been willing to irritate China by welcoming the Dalai Lama (though it changed its stance this week). Russia, it seems, is ruffling everyone’s feathers and showing its willingness to strike at will.
Of course, the Kremlin appears less ostentatious and less contrarian at a second glance. A relationship with Iran is inevitable, as the two share a border. Their relationship is complex and in other areas--such as the Caspian--far from friendly. And Moscow is not alone in stretching out a hand to Iran: In June, the European Union opened talks on trade and cooperation that were gleefully described as a "landmark decision" by Tehran.
Nor, perhaps, is Russia breaking international ranks as far as Iraq is concerned. Rather it is Washington that appears in the minority in wanting to turn a generally felt antipathy towards Iran into military action. When those who should be most in the know--such as ex-U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and the head of the UN’s nuclear-inspection team--oppose Washington’s reading of Iraq’s threat, the Kremlin doesn’t need to explain too much why it might follow a different line from Washington. Similarly, given the New York Times revelations this week about the extent of U.S. support for Saddam Hussein in the 1980s, one should be chary about potentially hypocritical criticism at Russia’s pursuit of its own interests.
As for North Korea, while there are hundreds of thousands of starving people to testify to how loathsome the regime is, Russia could legitimately say that there is less proof that its interest in nuclear weapons has translated into support for international terrorism--or that its desire to be an international pain goes beyond a petulant interest in attacking South Korean boats during its southern neighbor’s finest hour, the World Cup.
And of course the context of Russia’s actions is as far from the Cold War as it has ever been. We have been told innumerable times that the Cold War is over and, more importantly, we have received compelling proof of that in an unparalleled improvement in relations between Russia and the United States, Europe, and the West’s institutions over the past year.
But, if not ostentatious, Russia’s desire to show that it will follow its own interests in its own way remains conspicuous. And unfortunately, “its own way” and “its own interests” in these cases are decidedly unattractive.
It is one thing to disagree with Bush’s notion of an “axis of evil” and to dislike his (intended) means of breaking it, but it is another thing to effectively offer support to a dictator in Iraq who gases his own people or to an anachronistic regime in North Korea that starves its citizens. It is bad enough to make war rather than talk peace in your own country, but when Russia unilaterally takes its Chechen conflict into Georgia, it is entirely inexcusable. So, of course, is its mendacity in consistently denying any violations of Georgian airspace or the bombings, despite independent verification. In 2001, Putin demanded to see “dead bodies” before he would confirm that there had been any bombardments in Georgia. Well, this time, there’s a body bag, and Russia’s still denying everything.
Which leads one to wonder what Russia wants, and what interests the Kremlin is promoting in all this. The rapid reshaping of relations with the West had suggested that Russian President Vladimir Putin had decided that Russia’s interests were integration into the international community and reform within Russia. The past month suggests the Kremlin may not be so interested in integration after all.
But if so, what does the Kremlin want from the West that it is not already getting? In the past year, Putin has made concessions that some did not want, such as allowing U.S. bases in Central Asia and accepting NATO enlargement. It has been at the receiving end of Bush’s lamentable “anti-dumping” tariffs, and it has had to stomach a nuclear agreement crafted by the Bush administration that was dressed up as historic but which was no more than a scrap of paper.
However, for its concessions, Russia has received plenty. It has a seat in NATO; it has enjoyed the (almost craven) silence of the West about its horrific campaign in Chechnya; the U.S.’s oil markets are now open; the G7 has been enlarged to become the G8; the EU and the United States have acknowledged that Russia is a “market economy,” paving the way for Russia’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO). There is probably little more that the West can give at present: there are now few international clubs to which Russia does not belong. But Russia could gain plenty from membership if it uses it properly.
But if there is more of what we have seen in recent weeks, Putin runs the risk of squandering that opportunity. Judging by the deal with Iran, it is willing to take the risk in order to capitalize on its nuclear expertise and, in Iraq’s case, its expertise in oil infrastructure. The decision to prevent the Dalai Lama’s trip, made just as Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov was about to visit China, may have a lot to do with Russia’s interest in boosting arms sales to China, which may have upped its defense budget to $20 billion (or even $80 billion as a U.S. Congress report published in August fears). And the bombing of Georgia merely translates into action the many warmongering noises made by the Russian military and senior politicians in recent months.
If the well-being of these three particular industries is determining Russian foreign policy, it appears short-sighted when reform at home and good ties with the West could bring so much more. Of course, Washington itself has risked a potentially fruitful new relationship with Russia by caving in to its own special-interest groups, such as the steel industry.
But more is at stake here for Russia, poor and only now dropping its stand-alone position in the world, than for the United States, so rich and so central to everything. Putin needs to make it clear now, as we enter the second post-11 September year, that it is he who is in charge of foreign policy, rather than the oilmen and military men.
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