Johnson's Russia List
#6405
15 August 2002
davidjohnson@erols.com
A CDI Project
www.cdi.org
[Contents:
1. Moscow Times: Victoria Lavrentieva, Whatever Happened To Those Vouchers?
2. AFP: Russian PM sees tax cuts after 2003 peak in debt repayments.
3. Interfax: Russia's handling of foreign debt successful.
4. Moskovsky Komsomolets: Elena Zvereva and Aleksei Borisov, WHAT DOES THE
COMING YEAR HOLD IN STORE? The government cares - that's something!
5. Gazeta: ANDREI RYABOV: PUTIN HAS A BRILLIANT OPPORTUNITY. Interview with
political analyst Andrei Ryabov.
6. Reuters: Top Russian oil firms plan port for exports to U.S.
7. pravda.ru: WHO TO PAY? RUSSIAN WORKERS OR FOREIGN CREDITORS.
8. Rossiyskaya Gazeta: Goskomstat Reassures Court Appeal Will Not Disrupt
All-Russia Population Census.
9. RFE/RL: Valentinas Mite, NATO: Russia Urges Baltic States To Join CFE
Treaty.
10. New York Times: Steven Lee Myers, Georgia Hearing Footsteps From
Russia's War in Chechnya.
11. Los Angeles Times: Maura Reynolds, Merger Outline Calls for Belarus to
Be Swallowed Up by Russia. Europe: But hours after announcing the plan with
Putin, Belarus' leader rejects it.
12. Reuters: Tajikistan back to gloom after moment in the sun.
13. Moscow Times: Larisa Naumenko, 'Antikiller' Makes Box Office Killing.
14. Slate.com: Anne Applebaum, The Gulag Argumento. Martin Amis swings at
Stalin and hits his own best friend instead.]
*******
#1
Moscow Times
August 15, 2002
Whatever Happened To Those Vouchers?
By Victoria Lavrentieva
Staff Writer
What a difference a decade makes.
It was 10 years ago Wednesday that Boris Yeltsin put his presidential pen
to paper to officially create the controversial privatization voucher, a
check representing a fraction of the nation's estimated value that
eventually would be distributed to every man, woman and child in the country.
The plan was the brainchild of Anatoly Chubais, who had joined
"shock-therapy" architect Yegor Gaidar's government as head of the State
Property Committee in January 1992.
The idea was simple: quickly transfer control of large sections of the
economy to private hands, initiating an irreversible process that would be
legally, economically and politically unassailable by those who disapproved
of privatization, namely communists.
But amassing vouchers in order to acquire enterprises and assets, by
whatever means, quickly became a national sport at which a small minority
excelled, contributing to an unprecedented rise in criminal activity and
laying the foundation for the rise of today's tycoons.
Each "privatization check" had a face value of 10,000 rubles (about $40 on
the black market), a figure Chubais derived from dividing the estimated
value of all state property (150 billion rubles), by the population of
roughly 150 million.
Chubais believed the real value of a single voucher was between 150,000 and
200,000 rubles. He assured the populace that they would be able to trade a
single voucher for the equivalent of two Volga sedans, the most expensive
car in the country at the time.
Those promises never came true. And Chubais, who was later widely viewed as
the "father of the oligarchs," is still resented by many Russians who
accuse of him of stealing state property and of selling his motherland for
nothing.
Ironically, Chubais, who continues to have a measure of control over the
public as the head of Unified Energy Systems, is still reaping the
dividends of the voucher program.
Together with 2 million other people, Chubais invested his voucher in the
First Voucher Fund, which was founded Sept. 30, 1992, by a group of
individuals. That voucher is now bringing Chubais and other investors a
dollar and a half a year.
"Chubais still remains our shareholder and receives dividends on his
voucher, like all our existing shareholders," said Andrei Uspensky, general
director with PioGlobal asset management in Russia, which owns a
controlling 50 percent plus one stake in the First Voucher Fund, now called
the PioGlobal Investment Fund.
PioGlobal is a subsidiary of the U.S. PioGlobal Group, one of the largest
pension and mutual fund managers in America. Unlike former foreign rivals
Credit Suisse and Templeton, it decided not to start its business in Russia
from scratch, entering the market by acquiring First Voucher Fund, one of
the largest at the time, in May 1995. Now, according to Uspensky, the fund
has roughly $100 million in assets.
The fund first paid a symbolic dividend to its shareholders in 1994, but
not again until 2000 because the company was struggling, said Uspensky. "We
paid $5.7 million in dividends in 2000, and about $3 million in 2001," he
said. "Of course, $1.50 per person is not enough to buy two Volgas, as
Chubais promised, but if one remembers how much vouchers were worth when
they were first invested, it would be hard to expect a larger payback."
No one is really sure how much Chubais made on the voucher program, but a
handful of entrepreneurs made a killing.
Aluminum king Oleg Deripaska, while still a student at Moscow State
University, could be seen shivering in the cold near the entrance to the
Sayansk aluminum plant in Siberia in early 1993 as he bought vouchers from
employees, according to Dengi magazine.
Two years later Deripaska was running the company.
Kakha Bendukidze, who now controls United Heavy Machineries, or OMZ,
transported in the trunk of his car the 130,000 vouchers he traded for 18
percent of the company at the end of 1992, the magazine reported.
OMZ now has annual revenues of several billion dollars.
Among the biggest beneficiaries of the voucher program were Alfa Group
chief Mikhail Fridman; Interros' Vladimir Potanin; Surgutneftegaz CEO
Vladimir Bogdanov; Renaissance Capital founder and current NTV head Boris
Jordan; and, of course, Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky, Russia's
two most famous "oligarchs in exile."
Berezovsky reportedly made part of his fortune on a scam to lure vouchers
into a fund to finance a project to create the "people's car," which his
All-Russia Automobile Alliance, or AVVA, orchestrated. The car was never
built and the fund eventually disappeared.
Now eight major Russian industrial holdings, whose birth certificates are
the voucher, account for more than 50 percent of gross domestic product.
According to Dmitry Vasilyev, former head of stock market watchdog the
Federal Securities Commission and one of the main organizers of voucher
auctions, of the 150 million vouchers, 25 percent were invested in
investment funds, 25 percent were sold and eventually accumulated by
institutional investors, and the rest were either traded by their owners
for stakes in state enterprises where they worked, or sold at closed
auctions for shares in other enterprises,
"In all, 95 to 96 percent of all vouchers found their intended use, which
is a very good result," Vasilyev wrote in the book, "Privatization: Russian
Style," which he co-authored with Chubais and three others, for an unheard
of total of $450,000 in honorarium before the book was even published.
Prosecutors looked into allegations that the fee was a bribe for rigging a
1997 auction for 25 percent of state telecoms holding Svyazinvest, but the
case was eventually dropped in 1998. But it cost several of the book's
co-authors their government posts.
According to the book, as a result of the voucher program, 70 percent of
state property went into private hands and more than 40 million Russians
became shareholders.
Svetlana Makovetskaya is one of the ordinary Russians who took advantage of
her family's vouchers, trading them for Gazprom shares that eventually
allowed her to fund and financially support the Agency of Support for Small
and Medium-Sized Enterprises in Perm.
"It was one of the last auctions in which we could use our vouchers, so I
was very nervous because the price was going up and down," Makovetskaya
recalled. "But in the end, I think we made a good investment, which also
allowed me to buy half of my flat," she said Wednesday.
*******
#2
Russian PM sees tax cuts after 2003 peak in debt repayments
August 15, 2002
AFP
Maintaining Russia's budget surplus would no longer be a priority after
next year's debt payment crunch, Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov said,
indicating future tax cuts.
"Achieving a budget surplus is not an aim in itself but a necessity for a
certain period of economic development," Kasyanov said in televised
remarks, as his government discussed the 2003 draft budget.
"Next year is a peak one (for debt repayments). As soon as we get past this
stage, we can stop redistributing revenues and cut the tax burden to give
the private sector the chance to finance spending previously covered by the
state," he added.
Russia has already slashed its projected 2003 budget surplus by two-thirds
because of a slowdown in economic growth and increased government spending,
to 72.1 billion rubles (2.3 billion dollars), or 0.6 percent of gross
domestic product (GDP).
The surplus of revenue over spending "indicates that the state is taking
out from the economy more than it needs," Kasyanov said.
The surplus is at a level seen in developed countries, but the question is
"whether we distribute this money effectively," he added.
With debt repayments reaching a peak this year and in 2003, when Russia
intends to repay some 17.5 billion dollars in foreign debt, public finances
are under extra scrutiny.
Russia's foreign debt stood at 128.3 billion dollars on April 1.
The Russian government is due to submit the budget package to parliament
for approval before August 26, and political parties in the State Duma
lower house have traditionally sought amendments to obtain increased spending.
According to economists, the recent move by the administration of President
Vladimir Putin to boost state wages and pensions is already leading to a
rise in expenditures, while tax receipts have been depressed by the slowing
economy.
Last week Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin sought to reassure the population
about the nation's ability to repay its foreign borrowings next year and
ruled out any default.
The government forecasts revenues of 2.4 trillion rubles and expenditures
of 2.33 trillion rubles in 2003, and 10-12 percent inflation.
The draft budget indicates that foreign debt will be reduced to 39.6
percent of GDP by the end of next year from 44.8 percent expected at the
end of 2002.
The government will make a principal payment of 10.8 billion dollars of the
foreign debt in 2003 -- four billion dollars more than this year.
To ensure debt repayment, the finance ministry hopes to raise 51 billion
rubles from government privatizations -- 16 billion rubles more than in 2002.
The planned 2003 sales include a 17 percent stake in the massive
Magnitogorsk steel mill.
Others included a small stake in the disputed Slavneft oil company and 25
percent, minus two shares, in the communications giant Svyazinvest that is
partially owned by financier George Soros.
Foreign borrowings will total 680 million US dollars.
The draft budget singles out national defense and security, judiciary
reform, science and education as the priority spending areas.
Spending on defense sector and law enforcement agencies is earmarked at 346
billion rubles and 245 billion rubles, respectively, representing 25.4
percent of the GDP. This is 1.9 percent points more than the 2002 allocation.
Judiciary reform will take up 25.5 billion rubles. The government plans to
earmark 39.9 billion rubles for science while education will receive 97.3
billion rubles.
*******
#3
Russia's handling of foreign debt successful
Interfax
Moscow, 14 August: The Russian Finance Ministry's management of the country's
foreign debt has made it possible to reduce the amount to be repaid in 2003
by as much as 3.6bn dollars, Deputy Minister Sergey Kolotukhin told Interfax
on Wednesday [14 Wednesday].
Next year's national budget provides for foreign debt payments totalling
17.3bn dollars, of which 10.8bn dollars covers the payment of the principal
debt and 6.5bn covers interest payments, he said.
"According to the worst-case scenarios that we prepared in 2000 and early
2001, a total of 20.9bn dollars would be paid," Kolotukhin said.
An amount of 14.5bn dollars will be paid in principal foreign debt and
interest payments in 2002, he said.
The Finance Ministry began actively managing the national debt back in 2000,
Kolotukhin said. "This does not imply that we purchased commitments on the
market. In numerous cases, such as the Soviet debt to the Czech Republic, the
debt was settled and written off. In other cases, we paid debts by supplying
goods or using other means," Kolotukhin said. Those activities were pursued
in line with the foreign debt management strategy, the draft of which was
approved by the Cabinet in 2001, he said.
Other elements of the strategy include the transfer of commercial functions
from Vneshekonombank to Vneshtorgbank and setting up an integrated and
comprehensive system to keep track of state debt commitments, Kolotukhin said.
The concept was useful because "a general understanding was achieved on how
the national debt management system could be improved".
"The Cabinet has asked us to clear the concept with other institutions,
particularly the State Duma and the presidential headquarters as well as
controlling agencies such as the Audit Chamber," Kolotukhin said.
*******
#4
Moskovsky Komsomolets
August 15, 2002
WHAT DOES THE COMING YEAR HOLD IN STORE?
The government cares - that's something!
Author: Elena Zvereva, Aleksei Borisov
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
THE CABINET WILL DISCUSS THE DRAFT BUDGET FOR 2003 TODAY. THE MAIN
ISSUES ARE INFLATION, THE EXCHANGE RATE, AND REDUCING POVERTY. THE
BANK INTEREST RATE IS PLANNED TO BECOME THE MAIN ECONOMIC TOOL INSTEAD
OF THE UNSTABLE RUBLE/DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATE. AND THE GOVERNMENT
PROMISES THAT LIFE EXPECTANCY WILL GROW.
Following the summer vacation, the Cabinet is back at work and
busy. Ministers spent half of yesterday debating next year's monetary
policy and forecasts for the nation's socioeconomic development.
Today, the Cabinet will consider the draft budget for 2003.
Last year there were plans to keep inflation for 2002 down to
12%. That level has been passed in August. Now, everyone is praying
that inflation will not exceed 14% by the end of the year. Besides,
many experts doubt even that figure, predicting 16% by December.
The government is sure that inflation can be kept down by
supporting the ruble. They say the exchange rate should be appropriate
to the economic situation. According to the draft budget for 2003, the
average exchange rate ought to be 34.80 rubles to the dollar. However,
the forecast of the Central Bank is more moderate: next year the rate
will be 33.70-34 rubles to the dollar.
Russia's monetary authorities have also recalled another
"support". The bank interest rate has been cleaned from rust. As in
all economically developed countries, they would like to make it the
main tool - instead of depending on the unstable exchange rate. The
Central Bank will try in some situations to make interest rates lower.
Perhaps it will be possible to stimulate Russia's economy in that way.
However, that is unlikely to happen within the next three years.
Now about the most urgent issues. The incomes of Russian citizens
will rise by an average of 5-6% next year, according to the
government. Following the improvement in living standards, the level
of poverty will decline. While around 27% of Russian citizens are now
living below the poverty line, this proportion will be 26% in 2003,
and 24% by 2005. According to a forecast from the Economic Development
and Trade Ministry, by 2005 real incomes will have risen by 56-61%
against figures for 2001. The poverty line will be rising, too; it
will reach 2,080 rubles a month in 2003 and 2,500 rubles a month by
2005.
Curiously enough, despite all attempts to improve life for
Russian citizens, the population will continue to decline. There are
143.6 million of us this year; but there will be 142.9 million next
year, and 141.6 million by 2005. The government is promising that life
expectancy will rise, however. Thus, Russians will live an average of
seven (!) months longer in 2003. For example, average life expectancy
for men in Russia will rise to 59.8 years in 2005 (it is now 58.6
years). Women usually live longer than men; by 2005 their average life
expectancy will be 73.6 years, against the present 72.1 years.
In addition, the government promises that next year tariffs will
rise by no more than 20% for gas and 14% for electricity. Rail tariffs
have not been voiced yet.
Striving to inspire some optimisim among ministers, Kasianov
encouraged them with his own certainty that there should be no
considerable disputes with the Duma over basic plans. "The quality of
forecasts for national economic development is improving every year,
and we have a solid draft budget today," said the prime minister.
All that is true, of course. There is one doubt, however: is the
government fully in control of the situation? Recent events indicate
otherwise. Numerous delayed reforms depend on the budget - housing and
utilities, the military, and so on. At any moment, they could require
extra money.
At the same time, state sector workers in many regions are once
again not being paid on schedule. The barter component in transactions
between companies is growing. And to tell the truth, there is no doubt
all this could be resolved with the right government decrees alone.
One thing is comforting, though. The government is at least
declaring intentions to improve life for the citizenry. That means it
does care - which is pleasing.
(Translated by P. Pikhnovsky )
*******
#5
Gazeta
August 15, 2002
ANDREI RYABOV: PUTIN HAS A BRILLIANT OPPORTUNITY
Interview with political analyst Andrei Ryabov
Author: Olga Redichkina
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
THE PRESIDENT HAS SIGNED A BILL ON GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF
ADMINISTRATIVE CONDUCT FOR STATE EMPLOYEES. ANDREI RYABOV DESCRIBES
THIS AS PART OF A PRE-ELECTION PR CAMPAIGN. THE PRESIDENT'S REQUESTS
ARE UNLIKELY HAVE AN EFFECT. THEY WILL BE FORGOTTEN, AS MANY OTHER
GOOD REQUESTS HAVE BEEN.
THE PRESIDENT HAS SIGNED A BILL ON GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF
ADMINISTRATIVE CONDUCT FOR STATE EMPLOYEES. THUS, THE GOVERNMENT IS
REMINDING THE PUBLIC THAT IT HASN'T FORGOTTEN ABOUT THE ADMINISTRATIVE
REFORMS ANNOUNCED EARLIER.
Andrei Ryabov, from the Moscow office of the Carnegie Endowment
research council, discusses the reasons behind the timing of this
bill.
Question: The document doesn't commit state officials to
anything, and state employees won't be held accountable for violating
its provisions. Why?
Ryabov: Does this bill remind you of the concise code of a
builder of Communism: be reasonably good, accept no bribes and don't
say too much. Isn't this funny? Officials have always taken advantage
of their positions, and will continue doing that; even Prosecutor
General Vladimir Ustinov admitted as much. The president's requests
are unlikely have an effect. They will be forgotten, as many other
good requests have been.
Question: So why would the president want to embarrass himself by
issuing such orders?
Ryabov: This is an element of the PR campaign. It might be
assumed, however, that Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Director of the
Presidential Administration wants to take the initiative away from the
Union of Right Forces, in the lead-up to the Duma election campaign.
URF members submitted - and the Duma passed in the first reading - a
code of conduct for state officials, just as useless and declarative
as the bill signed by the president. Combating corruption and bribery
among officials is a popular issue, and it would do no harm to seize
the opportunity.
Question: The administrative reform, the necessity of which Putin
has repeatedly announced, seems to be underway. As a river, however,
it has been divided into three distributaries: Dmitry Kozak's
commission, dealing in partition of powers between the center and the
regions, the group under Dmitry Medvedev, working over a law package
on the system of state service and the group under Igor Shuvalov, to
which Kasianov ordered to prepare proposals related to the
administrative reform. Does the bill suit this picture?
Ryabov: In my opinion, the work of the committee under Dmitry
Kozak is more likely to be an attempt of the president's closest
circle, which is not integrated in the Moscow affairs, to propose
their view of the administrative reform. Quite naturally, the
committee's work caused countermeasures on the part of Kasianov, who
disagrees to have more than "fine tuning" of the apparatus. We are in
for the bureaucratic protraction of the administrative reform, the
latter to be of pure palliative and privy nature. This might continue
the debate between the president and the prime minister. The old
elites are uninterested in changing anything.
(...)
Question: Let's get back to the presidential bill. Why has it
appeared now?
Ryabov: The president is thus saying: "I haven't forgotten this
issue, among other significant events of our life." Putin now has a
brilliant opportunity to dispose of the teams which are competing to
run his election campaign: by appealing directly to public opinion.
However, such a notion as "public opinion" is akin with the "average
temperature in the hospital." Various messages are aimed at various
social strata. This bill is obviously the "message" for
traditionalists who love the "iron hand," rather than for the liberal
strata.
Question: To whom is the "message" in the form of Kozak's
committee directed?
Ryabov: Kozak's judiciary reform, separation of powers "under
Kozak" - all of this is for the liberal social strata. As a reminder:
"We will build a civil society, increase the role of local
governments. But not now. Probably over the course of Putin's second
term as president." The fact that civil society hasn't been forgotten
is reassuring. Kasianov and Shuvalov are signaling to those who are
"friendly": we won't change anything drastically.
Question: Does it mean that the bill and the administrative
reform are nothing more than a PR campaign?
Ryabov: I'd rather call them "double designation initiatives."
The reform is needed, which is undisputable, but it has been used for
propaganda purposes. The logic is totally correct within the framework
of the electoral process, which has already started.
(Translated by Andrei Ryabochkin)
*******
#6
Top Russian oil firms plan port for exports to U.S.
By Dmitry Zhdannikov
MOSCOW, Aug 14 (Reuters) - Russia's second largest oil firm YUKOS said on
Wednesday it may join top oil firm LUKOIL in building a major export terminal
in Murmansk on the Barents Sea, aimed at boosting supplies to the United
States.
The head of YUKOS, which made Russia's first direct shipment of crude to the
United States in June, said LUKOIL's plan could increase supplies across the
Atlantic and help ease the crowded Bosphorus straits, currently handling the
bulk of Russia's crude exports which are shipped from the Black Sea.
"We have asked our colleagues from LUKOIL to send us a Murmansk route
project, which we are currently studying. So far it does not seem an
unrealistic project," Mikhail Khodorkovsky, YUKOS's head and its major
shareholder, told reporters.
Russia currently exports up to three million barrels per day (bpd) of crude
to world markets. Its oil output is booming for the fourth consecutive year
and Moscow needs to build new export routes as its own domestic consumption
is barely increasing.
Russian oil firms, which traditionally ship their crude to Europe, have said
they are ready to supply more crude to the United States but need more deep
water ports and new logistics to bypass the crowded Bosphorus and the Danish
strait in the north.
The United States has said Russia's booming output could help cushion oil
markets against volatile supplies from OPEC producers in the politically
turbulent Middle East.
LUKOIL raised the idea of a one million barrels per day (bpd) terminal in
Murmansk, formerly a Soviet era military base, during Russia-U.S. summit in
May. But analysts questioned the plan saying the outlet would require
building a new huge pipeline.
Khodorkovsky's comments give the idea a significant boost since YUKOS is seen
by market analysts as one of Russia's most pragmatic and dynamic oil firms.
YUKOS, whose oil output is set to rise 20 percent this year to 1.4 million
bpd, plans to build a huge oil pipeline to China by 2005, but Khodorkovsky
said the two projects were not rivals.
"The Murmansk idea can partially be an alternative for the Black Sea but is
not in any way an alternative to our Chinese project," he said.
MORE LINKS TO EUROPE
YUKOS and state pipeline monopoly Transneft plan to ship up to 400,000 bpd to
China from 2005 and up to 600,000 bpd from 2010. Khodorkovsky said it was
time for other Russian oil firms to commit their volumes and funds to the
pipeline as after the link was build they would not be allowed to send crude
to China.
Khodorkovsky said Russia needed to upgrade existing pipelines and build new
smaller export routes while waiting for the completion of major projects.
He said it was important to boost the capacity in the oil port of Primorsk on
the Gulf of Finland to 360,000 bpd from current 240,000 bpd by 2003, and
finally start first Russian crude deliveries to the Croatian port of Omisalj
this year.
This also would help Russian crude to bypass the Black Sea. Another option to
do so would be to link Russia's pipelines to the planned BP-led Baku-Ceyhan
project, which envisages shipments of one million bpd of Azeri crude to the
Mediterranean Turkish coast.
However, Khordorkovsky played down Transneft's idea of building a $5-billion
link from Western and Eastern Siberia to the Pacific port of Nakhodka, saying
the link would lack crude.
"I'm not sure Russian firms are ready to commit one million bpd of crude for
this pipeline, and without those volumes it simply can not be profitable," he
said.
******
#7
pravda.ru
August 14, 2002
WHO TO PAY? RUSSIAN WORKERS OR FOREIGN CREDITORS
The Russian government is performing a balancing act between foreign
creditors and the Russian population
The issue of social maintenance and the standard of living of the Russian
people once again in the picture. President Putin has publicly criticized
Vice Prime Minister Valentina Matviyenko and Finance Minister Aleksey
Kudrin for salary and vacation debts owed to teachers. Minister for Labor
and Social Development Alexander Pochinok acknowledged the seriousness of
the problem in his interview to Rossiyskaya Gazeta newspaper.
The minister said that the problem with salary delays and the general level
of wages are becoming worse. While the Russian state is properly paying its
foreign debts, its debts to the Russian people are not being paid.
Unfortunately, in Russia, the government is forced to choose between one or
the other. That is why the optimism of the Russian government seems to be a
little premature and unreasonable.
Alexander Pochinok stated that state's debt to government workers is like
the visible part of an iceberg. The wages are basically not being paid by
commercial enterprises. Their share of the debt makes up 31 billion rubles,
whereas the state’s share is only four billion rubles. However, the speed
is rather impressive: three billion rubles of salary debt was owed by the
Ministry for Education and Ministry for Healthcare as of the middle of
July. The Russian government has tried to ignore the fact that commercial
companies have not been paying wages to their employees. It was suggested
that trade unions and citizens settle such matters in the courts. However,
the new Labor Code of Russia acknowledged the Russian people's right to
refuse to work if their salaries have not been paid for two months.
Alexander Pochinok is sure that the issue of debts owed to government
employees will be solved, as has repeatedly happened in the past. In
reality, it is not such a large sum. However, the government cannot keep
its commercial structures in check. The minister said that joint-stock
companies have not paid 30 billion rubles; the biggest portion of this sum
was delayed by the enterprises that were about to go bankrupt. In other
words, the employees of such companies will never see their paychecks,
regardless of whether or not their bosses go to jail. There were
businessmen who did their best to avoid criminal charges for delaying
paychecks. They realized that timely and full payment of wages under the
conditions of the Russian economy would inevitably ruin thousands of
enterprises.
Alexander Pochinok acknowledged that the gap between the salaries of Russia
and Western Europe is gigantic: “Its reduction or liquidation is currently
out of the question.” The Russian Ministry for Economic Development and
Trade projected that the income of the Russian population is likely to grow
by 56-61% by the year 2005. We have to say here that this forecast will
probably remain just a forecast due to many economic and political reasons.
The standard of living of the Russian people will be incomparable to those
in Europe even if this prediction is correct. The Russian government does
not have the money to satisfy everybody’s needs. Prime Minister Mikhail
Kasyanov’s first priority is to pay the foreign debt.
Deputy Finance Minister Bella Zlatkis said that the government had a choice
in 1998: either to pay its debts to the population or not to be elected.
That was the time of the huge budgetary deficit, and the government had to
raise loans on foreign markets in order to pay wages. Today, the situation
is different. However, the government was forced to increase the amount of
foreign loans. It was decided to borrow four times as much as was
originally planned. This resulted in defaults.
The same question (who is to be paid?) will soon become topical. The
government will surely prefer to pay foreign creditors. Nevertheless, the
parliamentary elections are coming up in Russia, and then there will be
presidential elections. By that time, the government might have another
point of view on the matter.
Dmitry Slobodyanyuk
PRAVDA.Ru
Translated by Dmitry Sudakov
*******
#8
Goskomstat Reassures Court Appeal Will Not Disrupt All-Russia Population
Census
Rossiyskaya Gazeta
13 Augut 2002
[translation for personal use only]
Report by Iraida Semenova: 'Census Will Be Taken in Any Weather"
Throughout the day yesterday [12 August] virtually
all the mass media reported the sensational news: The Moscow Court of
Arbitration appealed against the results of the tender to purchase
electronic systems for the population census, which should be taken a
month and one-half from now.
Many mass media rushed to report that the all-Russia population census
could be disrupted as a result. However specialists from the Goskomstat
[State Statistics Committee] who are responsible for taking the census do
not share those fears.
The tender "to develop and provide comprehensive technological solutions
for the scanning of documents and processing of information" was
announced by the Goskomstat back in January-February this year. Some 60
companies initially expressed their willingness to take part in the
tender. Only four contestants were left before the final stage, which
was completed on 11 February. Out of this number the tender commission
selected the winner, the company known as the developer of the "Election"
system and of the Pension Fund's large-scale electronic projects.
However, one of the loser companies, which incidentally is the designer
of very good systems that were used, in particular, during nationwide
school tests, was not happy with the tender procedure. The company that
lost a profitable state contract was outraged by the fact that when
financial terms were discussed, the envelope with only one participant's
bid was opened. The loser companies, which arrived at the conclusion
that the winner had not been selected based on competitive bidding, filed
a lawsuit. At the same time it rushed to report that it was going to
deliver the equipment for 41.2 million rubles [R], whereas the winner of
the tender evaluated its services at R51.5 million.
The result is as follows: Last Friday [9 August], the Moscow Court of
Arbitration passed a ruling invalidating the Goskomstat tender.
Observers hurriedly interpreted the ruling as disruption of the upcoming
all-Russia population census, for there is no time left to hold another
tender.
Is it really so? Your Rossiyskaya Gazeta correspondent asked Goskomstat
Deputy Chairman Sergey Kolesnikov to answer this question.
"The scandal was triggered by very harsh competition on the market of
electronic systems and products plus by the imperfections of legislation
on tenders," believes Sergey Vladimirovich. "The tender commission was
supposed to select the firm, which would fully meet the requirements,
meaning, would hold the license authorizing it to handle confidential
information, which people provide in their census questionnaires. It
turned out that only one company out of the four finalists met these
requirements. Therefore, only its envelope was opened." "Yes, a
formal mistake was probably made. Nevertheless, we are going to appeal
against the ruling, even if we have to approach the Supreme Court of
Arbitration," Sergey Kolesnikov stated.
At the same time, the deputy chairman assured your Rossiyskaya Gazeta
correspondent that the census would not be disrupted. It will be held
on 9-16 October 2002, as was initially planned. The court ruling is not
going to influence its dates, but can have an effect on the duration of
the period for the processing of results. However, the Goskomstat hopes
to solve the emerging problem: Either with the help of a court ruling
or by means of another tender.
Meanwhile, experts believe that the scale of the scandal that has broken
out exceeds the framework of corporate interests. It can have
far-reaching consequences, if, naturally the court does not revoke its
decision. In this case other companies can also make use of this
precedent. Incidentally, reports have been circulated about another
appeal of this kind: A company supplying office equipment is trying to
appeal against the results of yet another Goskomstat tender.
One way or another state organizations will now have to be more careful
while holding tenders.
*******
#9
NATO: Russia Urges Baltic States To Join CFE Treaty
By Valentinas Mite
Russia is concerned that the Baltic states' possible membership in NATO will
open them up to an unrestricted military buildup of NATO forces. The Baltic
states were still officially considered part of the Soviet Union when the
1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe was signed, limiting arms
buildup on the continent. They have yet to sign the treaty as independent
states, a lapse that has officials in Moscow nervous. For its part, Lithuania
says it will join the treaty in the future but considers the step premature
while its NATO status is still unclear.
Prague, 14 August 2002 (RFE/RL) -- Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov
last month held talks with his Lithuanian counterpart, Linas Linkevicius, to
urge that country to sign the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe,
or CFE Treaty.
The CFE Treaty -- signed by 22 members of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact at
the 1990 Paris Summit, then amended in 1999 -- aims to create parity in major
conventional forces between East and West. It sets limits on a country's
buildup of tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, and combat aircraft, and
restricts the concentration of a destabilizing military force in Europe.
At the time the treaty was signed, Lithuania was still officially part of the
Soviet Union and was denied formal representation at the Paris Summit by
Russia, despite the fact that it had already declared independence. Once its
independence was officially recognized, Lithuania refused to assume
commitments made by the former Soviet Union, and it still has yet to sign the
CFE Treaty.
Now, with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania likely to receive invitations to
join NATO at the military alliance's summit in Prague in November, Russia is
worried its Baltic neighbors will be open to unprecedented military buildup.
With this in mind, Russian officials like Ivanov have become increasingly
vocal in calling for the Baltic states to join the CFE Treaty.
Lithuanian Defense Minister Linkevicius told RFE/RL that while he understands
Russia's concern, there is no reason for the Baltic states to have signed the
treaty before now. "I can add nothing to this topic. There is no doubt that
new states have appeared on the map that did not exist before. This is not
only Lithuania, but also Latvia and Estonia, which did not exist as subjects
[when the treaty was signed] and were not able to predict the future,"
Linkevicius said.
Linkevicius said Lithuania will join the treaty in the future but that it is
not possible to take this step immediately. "For now, the treaty has not been
ratified by the countries that have signed it. That's why, technically, new
members cannot join it even if they want to. But Lithuania does not reject
the possibility and, on the contrary, plans to join the treaty," Linkevicius
said.
Linkevicius doubts the treaty will by ratified by any signatory states before
NATO's Prague summit this autumn. The defense chief added that his country
would sign the treaty once it is clear that doing so will not put its
national interests at risk. He gave no other details.
Aleksandr Pikaev is the editor of the "Nuclear Proliferation" journal
published by the Carnegie Moscow Center. He said the CFE Treaty is a
cornerstone of European security and it is observed by all members, even
those that have not ratified it, like Russia. The Russian State Duma has
refused to take that step until the Baltic states agree to sign on.
Pikaev said the question of whether the Baltic states join the CFE Treaty is
of crucial importance to future relations between Russia and NATO. "The way
this problem [of the Baltic states' joining the treaty] is tackled will very
much determine future relations between Russia and NATO after the Baltic
states join [the alliance], if this happens," Pikaev said.
Pikaev added that if Lithuania is invited to join NATO, the CFE issue may
become a problem for both the alliance and Lithuania. "There is a lot of talk
inside NATO that there should be no different security zones [for the members
of the alliance]. And in reality, an absurd situation could occur when, let's
say, Poland is a participant in the treaty but Lithuania is not. That would
mean precisely [what NATO is talking about]: The Baltic states will find
themselves in a different security zone from other NATO members," Pikaev
said.
Raimundas Lopata is the director of the Lithuanian Institute of Foreign
Relations. He told RFE/RL he has no doubts Lithuania will sign the CFE Treaty
in the future, but that it will not do so at Russia's command. He also
suggested that Russian politicians are using the CFE issue to try to meddle
in Lithuania's affairs ahead of its likely entry into NATO. "The most
important point of concern is the desire of Moscow officials to put its own
accents in the context of the treaty. It is very important to point out that
Lithuania will join the treaty when it decides to, and will not take this
step only because Moscow wants it to. It will sign it because doing so will
strengthen its own security," Lopata said.
Lopata admitted that the treaty has a direct bearing on Lithuania's future
role in NATO, which has yet to be determined. "There are many unknowns which
make it impossible to simply sit down and sign the treaty," Lopata said.
*******
#10
New York Times
August 15, 2002
Georgia Hearing Footsteps From Russia's War in Chechnya
By STEVEN LEE MYERS
GIREVI, Georgia, Aug. 14 — Russia's war in Chechnya is spilling into the
steep green gorges and snow-flecked mountains across its border with
Georgia, worsening already tense relations between the two countries.
Russian fighter jets and helicopters have repeatedly crossed into Georgian
territory in recent weeks, evidently in pursuit of Chechen fighters,
according to senior Georgian and European officials. At least twice this
month — on Aug. 3 and Aug. 5 — Russian aircraft bombed a gorge in Georgia
less than two miles from the remote border outpost here in Girevi, Georgian
officials said.
Russia has denied crossing into Georgia, but in increasingly pointed
remarks, senior Russian officials have accused Georgia of harboring rebels
fighting Russian forces in Chechnya, which shares with Georgia a rugged
50-mile mountain border cleaved by innumerable passes.
Moscow has demanded that Georgia, which has a force of just 6,000 to police
borders with the Black Sea, Turkey, Armenia and Russia, do more to root out
Chechen fighters using Georgian territory as a base.
Some Russians have suggested that Russia was prepared to launch strikes
even deeper in Georgia, citing the American war in Afghanistan and
President Bush's policy of pre-emptive attacks against terrorists.
"The international community has just crushed the nest of international
terrorism in Afghanistan," Russia's minister of defense, Sergei B. Ivanov,
said on Friday. "We must not forget about Georgia nearby, where a similar
nest has recently begun to emerge."
Tonight a senior Bush administration official acknowledged the Russians'
concerns: "What we keep saying is with a country like Georgia, you need to
have cooperation. That's why we're there in a training mission. You can't
just violate their sovereignty. You have to work with them. We certainly
understand the Russians' concerns, but we keep saying is you have to
understand the need to cooperate."
The Russian warnings have roiled tensions in Georgia, where President
Eduard A. Shevardnadze's government is already struggling to maintain order
in this increasingly fractured country. While officials discount the
possibility of a full-scale Russian operation in Georgia, they fear further
incursions or raids by Russian aircraft.
The tensions could also threaten the mission of American Special Operations
troops, who earlier this year began a $64 million program to train and
equip Georgian forces to combat lawlessness in the Pankisi Gorge, a region
in Georgia south of the Chechen border where at least dozens of Chechen and
Arab fighters are said to operate.
"We understand very well that the rebels in the Pankisi Gorge will never be
liquidated without Russia," Mr. Ivanov said during a visit to Russian
troops on the Chechen border with Georgia on Tuesday.
Senior officials here dismissed Russia's complaints, saying Georgia has
moved to block its mountainous border with Chechnya and, just in recent
weeks, forced out armed fighters that operated freely in Pankisi among
4,000 Chechen refugees who fled when Russia began its second war in
Chechnya in 1999.
"The Russians have many, many problems in Chechnya," Lt. Gen. Valery
Chkheidze, the chairman of Georgia's border defense force, said. "For sure,
it is not a problem coming from the Pankisi Gorge."
The Russian animosity toward Georgia appears rooted in Russia's frustration
over its inability to win the conflict in Chechnya, the republic where
rebels are fighting a war of secession. Although some 80,000 Russian police
and military forces claim to control most of the republic, they are subject
to almost daily attacks and mounting casualties.
However, Georgian officials detect darker intent, which they hint is rooted
in Russia's age-old desire to dominate Georgia.
"The goal is not a settlement of the situation in Chechnya," said Valerian
Khaburdzania, Georgia's minister of state security, "but the transfer of
its conflict to Georgia."
The latest tensions with Georgia flared on July 27 when 50 to 60 Chechen
fighters attacked Russian forces near Itum-Kale, roughly 15 miles north of
the Georgian border. Eight Russian border troops were reported killed in
the attack, which Russian officials said had been launched from inside
Georgia.
Georgia denied it, but on Aug. 3 and Aug. 5, the same days as the Russian
bombings, officials here reported that two groups of rebels — 13 survivors
of the fighting at Itum-Kale — had surrendered to Georgian border troops as
they made their way south from Chechnya.
Far from easing tensions, the detention of the fighters prompted new
recriminations. Russia's chief prosecutor, Vladimir V. Ustinov, flew to the
Georgian capital, Tbilisi, and demanded that the fighters be immediately
handed over. The Georgians rebuffed his request.
Eleven of the fighters remain in Tbilisi's main detention center, while two
others are being treated in military hospitals for battle wounds, pending a
Georgian investigation into whether or not they committed any crimes in
Russian territory that, under Georgia's Constitution, would warrant
extradition.
Georgian officials say the arrest of the fighters, who were carrying
automatic rifles, grenade launchers and other light weapons, was an
exception that proved their point. No more than several dozen armed
fighters operate here, they say, and most of them have been driven into
Georgia from Russian territory.
"How did these Chechen rebels come to Georgia?" General Chkheidze said.
"They were not from here. From the beginning, they were pushed into our
territory. We ourselves suffer from these crimes."
Even so, he and other Georgian officials say they have limited resources
and equipment to patrol the border effectively, despite American
assistance, including $10 million in aid the United States pledged last
month to this border post.
Georgia's short border with Chechnya stretches along the ridge of the
Caucasus Mountains, with peaks that reach 10,000 to 13,000 feet. A
helicopter tour of the border today showed little sign of fighters, but the
thick forests and deep gorges offered ample room to hide. There are 300
border troops in the region, camped in outposts on the frontier.
It was near the outpost at Girevi that Senior Lt. Manuchar Tskhelishivili's
company of two dozen troops captured the first group of seven Chechen
fighters. He said today that he had not encountered armed fighters before
in the area, which is closed by snow most of the year.
"They didn't fight," he said at his camp. "They simply surrendered. There
were wounded among them."
It was also in another gorge here that the Russian bombs fell. No one was
killed in the raids, though several bombs landed near a herder and his
flock of sheep, killing several of them. Despite Russia's denials, the
recent bombings were considered threatening enough that the office of the
United Nations high commissioner for refugees suspended its relief
operations in the Pankisi Gorge, which lies to the south.
"It's quite tense, of course," Lieutenant Tskhelishivili said. "These
incursions have often taken place, but they are more frequent now."
His unit recently received a solar generator, provided by the United
States, to power its communications, but for the most part it relies on
foot patrols on arduous terrain. "One has to love his motherland," he said,
"to patrol this area on foot."
*******
#11
Los Angeles Times
August 15, 2002
Merger Outline Calls for Belarus to Be Swallowed Up by Russia
Europe: But hours after announcing the plan with Putin, Belarus' leader
rejects it.
By MAURA REYNOLDS, TIMES STAFF WRITER
MOSCOW -- For the first time since Russia and Belarus signed a "union"
treaty six years ago, the presidents of the two countries outlined a merger
scenario Wednesday that would in effect allow Russia to absorb the smaller
country.
However, hours later the Belarussian leader appeared to back away from the
proposal, leaving its future in confusion.
Under the plan described by Russian President Vladimir V. Putin, Belarus'
six provinces would become members of the Russian Federation--which already
has 89 regions and provinces. Belarus would in effect cease to exist.
The idea, Putin said, was to create "a single state in the full meaning of
the word."
Belarussian President Alexander G. Lukashenko, a Soviet-style dictator
whose political and human rights abuses have made him a pariah in the West,
sat next to Putin as the Russian leader spoke. Although Lukashenko did not
openly express support for Putin's plan, his presence and defense of
Russian-Belarussian friendship seemed to imply some form of assent.
"Attempts have been made to create an atmosphere of misunderstanding and
mistrust," Lukashenko said. "But it is absolutely impossible to turn us
against each other."
However, once he returned to the Belarussian capital of Minsk late
Wednesday, he described the plan as "unacceptable."
"We will never agree to this," Lukashenko said, according to Russia's
Itar-Tass news agency. "I have already said several times that the union
cannot be built on the principles that destroy the sovereignty of Belarus
and Russia. It must be built on the principles of equality."
Putin's proposal puts Lukashenko in a tough spot, forcing him to either
accept a union with Russia that could remove him from power, or reject ties
with Russia, which have helped boost his popularity and keep his
anachronistic economy afloat.
"Russia is imposing humiliating conditions on Belarus and thus preparing to
bury our very statehood," Stanislav Shushkevich, who served as the first
president of independent Belarus and is now an opposition politician, said
in a telephone interview from his home in Minsk. "The time of hugs and
kisses is over for Lukashenko. He got what he asked for."
Forcing the issue, Putin laid out a timetable--referendums in both
countries in March 2003 and elections for a president in 2004. Russia
already has scheduled its elections for 2004, and most Russians assume
Putin will win easily.
Putin also said the unified country would use the Russian ruble and Russian
Constitution.
Lukashenko has pressed for the union for years. The idea is popular with
his compatriots, whose lives have been impoverished by independence and who
tend to be nostalgic for the Soviet Union. The existing union, though
ill-defined, has already brought Lukashenko economic benefits in the form
of reduced prices for oil and gas.
Analysts in both countries described Putin's move as calling Lukashenko's
bluff.
"Lukashenko used this game to get more popular support inside the country
and to continue getting cheap fuel and energy from Russia," said Alexander
Dobrovolsky, deputy chairman of the opposition United Civic Party of
Belarus. "This ultimatum puts both the sovereignty of Belarus and the
political future of Lukashenko himself on the line."
Former Russian President Boris N. Yeltsin announced plans for a
Russia-Belarus union during his reelection campaign in 1996, when he faced
a severe challenge by Communists who favored a return to Soviet ways.
Yeltsin signed the union treaty, apparently as a countermove to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization's expansion into Belarus' neighbor, Poland. It
said the two countries would integrate their economies and political
systems but retain sovereignty.
The question that has confounded the proposed union ever since is how such
a mismatch could work in practice. Belarus' population is just 6% the size
of Russia's. Its economy is hobbled by Soviet-style price controls long
abandoned by Moscow. Any political and economic union that preserved
Belarus' sovereignty, as Yeltsin promised, would give Belarus out-sized
power over Russia's economy, foreign policy and military.
Putin himself had previously expressed skepticism at the idea of a union.
"Our partners should make up their minds and decide what they want," he
said in June. "We often hear that something along the lines of the Soviet
Union would be desirable. But if it is to be along the lines of the Soviet
Union, then why write in the draft constitutional act that the states will
be sovereign, have territorial integrity and the right of veto on all
decisions?"
Putin was careful in his remarks to speak of equality, although not an
equality between Russia and Belarus. He stressed that under his proposal,
the citizens of Russia and Belarus would enjoy equal rights.
"I think what happened today is a positive event for Belarus," said
Shushkevich, the former president. "It is a moment of truth which I am sure
will help Belarus to cleanse itself of Lukashenko and his regime and move
faster toward Europe."
Sergei L. Loiko of The Times' Moscow Bureau contributed to this report.
*******
#12
FEATURE-Tajikistan back to gloom after moment in the sun
By Sebastian Alison
DUSHANBE, Aug 15 (Reuters) - For a few brief months last year, Tajikistan's
hot, dusty, sleepy capital found itself suddenly and unexpectedly on the map.
It stands at the gateway to northern Afghanistan, the only part of that
country accessible to foreigners until its radical Islamic Taliban rulers
fell late last year.
Afghanistan's opposition Northern Alliance controlled a small pocket on the
Afghan side of the Tajik border at the time of the September 11 attacks on
New York and Washington, and Tajikistan became a magnet for international
media trying to reach Afghanistan.
Hotels were packed, bars and restaurants throbbing, and prices rising
everywhere as well-heeled news organisations sought taxis, trucks,
helicopters or whatever could take them and their equipment across the border.
"Those were good days," said Suleimon Rashidov, responsible for accrediting
journalists at the foreign ministry, and always ready with green tea and a
bear-hug for his "regulars" in an office where the pace of life is now
extremely relaxed.
Between September 11 and the end of last year, he said, the ministry
accredited 2,346 new journalists.
But the interest has faded fast, and Tajikistan finds itself where it was
before: largely forgotten and struggling with a transition from Soviet rule
during which civil war and a dramatic economic decline have turned it into
the first former Soviet state to experience real poverty.
And while other ex-Soviet Central Asian states, notably Uzbekistan and
Kyrgyzstan, have seen high-spending U.S. troops setting up bases, the
Afghan campaign has brought little help to Tajikistan, already reeling from
a 1992-1997 civil war.
"Before 1997 Tajikistan was a regional hot spot and we didn't expect
serious investment," Foreign Minister Talbak Nazarov, an economist by
training, told Reuters in an interview.
"Now we have peace and stability, but investment hasn't flowed in. We are
still viewed as a hot spot because of Afghanistan," he said.
CATASTROPHIC SLUMP
Nazarov said that by the end of the civil war, between a pro-Moscow
government and an Islamic opposition which was latterly funded and
supported by the Taliban, Tajikistan's gross domestic product had slumped
to 30 percent of its 1990 level.
Now, he says, after a few years of gradual improvement, it is 41 percent of
the 1990 level. He expects growth, but says the country cannot expect much
change in the near term.
"In Europe a change of half a percent in gross domestic product can change
the whole situation. Here a change of 10 percent is insignificant because
the base is so low."
He put direct losses from the civil war at $7 billion, and identified
investment, rather than foreign aid, most of which comes from the United
States, as the key to the future.
"Without serious investment we can't change the level of unemployment, and
we can't change the numbers of people who leave to work in Russia and other
countries," he said.
With the average wage in Tajikistan less than $10 a month, seasonal
labourers are forced abroad every year, mainly seeking work in agriculture
in Russia.
A recent flight from Moscow to Dushanbe was half empty, but the daily
flight back to Moscow is booked up weeks in advance in the summer. There is
also a long wait for train tickets for the sweltering three-day journey.
Abdujabbor Shirinov, First Deputy President of the Central Bank of
Tajikistan, agreed that the Afghan campaign had reinforced the view that
Tajikistan was unstable.
He said the country had lost $237 million in anticipated investment, mainly
in agriculture and especially cotton, the most important cash crop, since
September 11.
LITTLE BENEFIT FROM AFGHAN WAR
In fact he saw few benefits at all from the campaign, unlike neighbouring
Kyrgyzstan, which sees huge scope for exporting such basic goods as glass,
bricks and cement to Afghanistan.
"Unfortunately there's no glass industry in Tajikistan," he told Reuters.
"There's big demand for bricks on the domestic market, but our cement
production has problems."
He said there was some transit of goods such as timber and grain across
Tajikistan to Afghanistan, providing a few jobs.
There was also some possibility of exporting electricity, generated cheaply
from hydroelectric plants in the soaring Pamir mountains, across the
border. But precious little else.
U.S. ambassador Franklin Huddle agreed that investment was vital but
expressed surprise at Shirinov's estimate that $237 million had been lost,
saying no large scale U.S. investment had been planned.
Asked if the United States could be doing more to encourage investment in
the poverty-stricken country, rather than just supplying aid, his reply was
a simple "No."
AID "A DISGRACE"
The level of aid from the United States, which says it must help prevent
other poor countries with desperate populations from going the way of
Afghanistan, does not satisfy everyone.
Abdurahmon Azimov, head of Tajikistan's border guards, complained that the
United States had pledged $8 million in aid to the guards but had delivered
just 60 pairs of binoculars.
"It's a disgrace," he told Reuters. The U.S. embassy confirmed the
binoculars had been handed over, but had no word on when the rest of the
assistance would be given.
Dushanbe is calm these days, with families out walking and children playing
on the street late into the evening, a far cry from just a year or two ago
when most were afraid to venture out after dark in a city still awash with
weapons.
But Tajikistan remains desperately poor, and desperately weak, with 11,000
Russian border guards still there to help defend the 1,340 km (832 miles)
Afghan border as the Tajiks cannot do it all themselves.
It is also crime-ridden, with up to 85 percent of all narcotics produced in
Afghanistan crossing Tajikistan on their way to the lucrative markets of
Russia and Europe. On August 9 a former deputy defence minister was jailed
for using a military helicopter to smuggle drugs.
While other Afghan neighbours have seen some major benefits flowing their
way as the world's attention focused on the region, Tajikistan has little
to be grateful for. Its own unnoticed tragedy is far from over.
*******
#13
Moscow Times
August 15, 2002
'Antikiller' Makes Box Office Killing
By Larisa Naumenko
Staff Writer
A Russian film has squeezed its way into the last spot of the country's top
10 box office openings for 2002, which are dominated by Hollywood
blockbusters.
"Antikiller" earned some $340,000 in its first weekend and $611,000 in its
first 10 days since opening on Aug. 1, said Central Partnership, the film's
distributor.
Producer Yusup Bakhshiyev said "Antikiller" was successful primarily
because of a widespread advertising campaign ahead of its opening.
"The second reason is that the film is good," he said by telephone.
Other films in the list of top 10 openings include American smash hits such
as "The Lord of the Rings: The Fellowship of the Ring," "Harry Potter and
the Philosopher's Stone," "Men in Black II" and "Star Wars: Episode II --
Attack of the Clones."
Some 260,000 tickets have been sold so far for the film, which is being
shown in 42 theaters nationwide, Central Partnership said. Shows reportedly
have sold out in Moscow.
"We decided to open the film in Moscow and the regions simultaneously so
that as many people as possible could see it in the theaters before pirated
copies were released," Bakhshiyev said.
"Antikiller" is based on a novel by Daniil Koretsky, a former police
colonel whose detective stories set in modern Russia are among the
country's bestselling books. The book tells the story of a former policeman
who goes to prison on false charges and when released takes revenge on his
enemies in the criminal world.
"Antikiller" is the first film by director Yegor Konchalovsky, son of
acclaimed director Andron Konchalovsky. The film stars Gosha Kutsenko,
Mikhail Ulyanov, Sergei Shakurov, Yevgeny Sidikhin and Alexander Baluyev.
Licensed videos are to be released in three months, said Bakhshiyev, who
added that he was pleased to hear both positive and negative reviews of
"Antikiller."
"If there are such different opinions, it means the film touches people,"
he said. "If people can be irritated, it means it is a good movie. Bad
things don't irritate. It's extraordinary things that irritate."
Film distributors compared the opening of "Antikiller" to earlier Russian
hits "The Barber of Siberia" and "Brat-2." "The Barber of Siberia,"
directed by Nikita Mikhalkov, Yegor Konchalovsky's uncle, cost more than
$40 million to make. The film, an epic about a military officer in tsarist
Russia, was released in 1998.
"Brat-2" is an action movie by Alexei Balabanov, whose latest film "War"
earned $351,000 in its first 10 days in March, said Inter-Cinema, the
film's distributor.
*******
#14
Slate.com
The Gulag Argumento
Martin Amis swings at Stalin and hits his own best friend instead.
By Anne Applebaum
August 13, 2002,
Judging by the reviews, Martin Amis' new book, Koba the Dread: Laughter and
the Twenty Million, will produce an unusually wide range of reactions—but
that is hardly surprising. Although Amis is best known as a novelist, Koba
the Dread is a truly unique, not to say peculiar, work of nonfiction: a
potted history of Stalin's reign ("Koba" was Stalin's nickname), plus a few
random, mostly trivial vignettes from Amis' own life, plus some less
trivial but out-of-context ruminations on the deaths of Amis' father and
sister. Michiko Kakatuni in the New York Times called Koba the Dread "the
narcissistic musings of a spoiled, upper-middle class litterateur who has
never known the kind of real suffering Stalin's victims did." By contrast,
Paul Berman, in the Sunday New York Times, thought it a "very curiously
tinted book, idiosyncratic in the extreme," which nevertheless "carries a
punch, artfully delivered."
Still, most reviewers seem to agree that whatever the book's faults—and
however odd its digressions into subjects like the Bolsheviks'
"politicization of sleep"—Amis has at least done us all a favor by bringing
attention to a neglected subject. Kakutani writes that the book "does a
credible job of conveying just how Stalin went about 'breaking the truth.'
" Andrew Stuttaford, in the National Review, compliments Amis on the
grounds that he offers readers a "brief, competent introduction to the
Stalin years." And now Christopher Hitchens, writing in this month's issue
of the Atlantic, applauds Amis because he "makes us wince again at things
we already 'knew.' "
This compliment is not, however, why most people will remember Hitchens'
review. For in this context, Hitchens is no ordinary book reviewer. Rather,
he is both Martin Amis' best friend and—strange though it sounds—the
anti-hero of Koba the Dread. In the course of the book, Amis effectively
accuses Hitchens, a youthful Trotskyite (who will still call himself a
Trotskyite, if asked), of covering up the truth about communism and links
him to the socialist fellow-travelers of the past: H.G. Wells, Beatrice and
Sidney Webb, George Bernard Shaw. In the final pages of the book, Amis
addresses his friend as "Comrade Hitchens," and solemnly lectures him about
the "formula of dead freedom, lies and violence" with which the Bolsheviks
ran revolutionary Russia.
As might be expected of one of the most acerbic writers of contemporary
English prose, Hitchens responds in kind. After dispensing with the
introductory compliments, he goes on to quote George Orwell's remark that
terrible things happened during the Spanish Civil War, and "they did not
happen any the less because the Daily Telegraph found out about them five
years too late." Amis, he writes, can just about be excused for coming
across Vorkuta and Kolyma (names of Soviet concentration camps) or Yezhov
and Dzierzhinsky (names of Soviet secret police bosses) rather late in
life, "but he cannot hope to get away with accusing others of keeping these
facts and names from him, or from themselves."
The subsequent insults are a delight to read. Hitchens accuses Amis of
"solipsism" and of "mushy secondhand observations," and quotes some
satisfyingly silly bits of Amis prose. Among other things, we learn in Koba
the Dread that Amis has nicknamed his baby daughter "Butyrka," on the
grounds that her nocturnal screams "would not have been out of place in the
deepest cellars of the Butyrki Prison in Moscow during the Great Terror."
We have moved, writes Hitchens, "from darkness at noon to …lightness at
midnight."
Few things are more amusing than the sight of fashionable literati
insulting one another in print. Yet one finishes the review feeling that
Hitchens isn't trying very hard. Of course Christopher Hitchens, a man who
has publicly attacked Mother Teresa, can bat away a book that contains
sentences like "I didn't read The Great Terror [Robert Conquest's classic
account of the purge years] in 1968 … but I spent an hour with it" without
blinking an eye. More to the point—and contrary to the reviews—Koba the
Dread is not, in fact, a competent account of Stalin's reign but rather a
muddled misrendering of both Soviet and Western intellectual history. For
that reason, the deeper points Amis seems to have been trying to make about
the Western relationship to Soviet terror are lost on Hitchens and will
probably be lost on everyone else as well.
Here I will resist the pedantic temptation to list Amis' many small errors
of fact and emphasis (declaration of interest: I've spent the past five
years writing a history of the Soviet Gulag). Suffice to say that while
Amis has read perhaps a dozen-odd books about Soviet communism and the
Russian revolution, he has done no original research; has hardly availed
himself of any of the new, archive-based scholarship; and appears never to
have met an actual camp survivor. If he has been to Russia, he doesn't tell
us.
As a result, his account of the Soviet camps is skewed toward the
sensational—the most extreme camps, the most horrific tortures—and fails to
convey either the dull, gray, repetitiveness of daily life in the Gulag or
the size and variety of the camp system, which had branches in virtually
every region of the USSR and participated in virtually every industry. He
also masks the true nature of the vast secret police bureaucracy, which was
far likelier to arrest, sentence, and forget about people for a decade or
two than to gouge their eyes out. For the most part, the "meat-grinder," as
Solzhenitsyn called the system of Soviet repression, was not intended to
kill or torture people but to reduce them to the status of cattle, who were
worth feeding only as long as they could help boost production figures. For
the most part, the horror of Soviet camp guards lay not in their sadism but
in their total indifference to prisoners' fate.
Misleadingly, Amis also focuses at least a third of this book on the
ghoulish personality of Stalin. While it is perfectly true that recent
archival research has vindicated Conquest, an Amis family friend, in his
long-held belief that Stalin himself was the main author of Soviet terror,
Stalin didn't kill and imprison millions of his countrymen by himself. On
the contrary—as archival documents show—Stalin issued orders commanding his
secret policemen to execute precise numbers of people, and they wrote back,
asking if they might possibly be allowed to execute even more. Amis writes
that "since 1929 the Soviet Union had been a reflection of Stalin's
mind"—but totalitarianism did not function, as the novelist seems to
imagine, like a magic beam of light that emanated from a single brain. It
was the product of institutions, of bureaucracies, and above all individual
choices and decisions of millions of people. This is supposed to be a book
about evil, in other words, but it doesn't even attempt to describe the
base, nasty, and small-minded forms of evil of which even the most ordinary
human beings are easily capable, given a base and nasty form of government.
Reading Amis' tale of horrors, tortures, and the human monster at the heart
of it all, one would not know that ordinary people were involved at all. By
the same token, it is impossible even to guess at what conceivable appeal
the Soviet Union could ever have had to its many Western sympathizers and
fellow-travelers. The only logical explanation is extreme stupidity, which
is perhaps why even Hitchens comes off seeming idiotic in Amis' account.
Yet while plenty of fellow-travelers were quite stupid (the Webbs come to
mind here), far more found the slogans and the language of totalitarianism
genuinely appealing. The masses, the struggle, the proletariat, the
exploiters and exploited, the ownership of the means of production—these
were all terms close to the hearts of the Western left, too.
But it wasn't even necessary to sympathize in order to be taken in. Henry
Wallace, Roosevelt's vice president, actually visited Kolyma in 1944 and
left without realizing that the healthy, well-fed workers he had seen were
apparatchiks dressed up in miners' clothes for the day, or that the fine
"amateur choir" he heard was composed entirely of prisoners, including many
arrested musicians. The lesson here is not that Wallace was stupid, but
that even people of average intelligence usually ask the wrong questions,
usually find it hard to recognize horror when it doesn't look like a horror
movie (or a paragraph from an Amis book)—and are therefore quite easily
fooled.
But then, Martin Amis, who we must presume to possess at least average
intelligence, is also capable of asking the wrong questions. Indeed, if
we're talking about misunderstanding history, Amis' decision to focus his
diatribe against the Western left on Hitchens, the self-confessed
Trotskyite, was rather strange. While Trotskyites may not have emerged from
the debris of the 20th century covered in glory, it is perfectly true that
if anybody knew or cared about Stalinist terror, then it was they. Not only
did Stalin murder all identifiable Soviet Trotskyites, after all, he also
ordered one of his minions to use the sharp end of an ice pick on Trotsky
himself.
By picking on his friend, in other words, Amis has also avoided—and allowed
Hitchens to avoid—the larger and more important questions. Trotsky's
extremist band of Stalin-obsessed followers aside, why did so many Western
liberals fail to absorb the full horror of Stalinism while it was
happening? Arguments among the comrades on the far left notwithstanding,
why does Stalinism still not inspire anywhere near the same kind of horror
as Nazism today? Hitchens writes that Amis occasionally makes us wince at
things we "already know"—but who really does already know them? And who
really cares? Certainly they aren't part of what one would call popular
knowledge, or popular culture, or public debate. Certainly the people
Martin Amis has been meeting at cocktail parties for the last few
decades—with the possible exception of Hitchens—don't talk about them. Amis
himself didn't have the slightest interest in the Soviet Union for most of
his life, except to oppose the missiles that were aimed at it; that's part
of why he's so enthusiastically telling us all about it now.
I long to hear Hitchens answer these points. Instead, he gets away with
defending himself, George Orwell, and the small slice of the Western left
that did know about, and did fight against, Stalinism. Which is perfectly
legitimate but much too easy. What about everybody else?
In the end, one puts down Koba the Dread and wonders why it was written.
Yes, indeed, Martin Amis appears to be very angry about something. Perhaps
he is very angry about his father's death. Perhaps he is very angry about
being a fiftysomething novelist who has run out of things to write about.
Yet by inexplicably funneling his displaced anger into a poorly conceived,
improbably hysterical diatribe against Stalinism, he has neither revealed
anything new, nor retold old stories in an interesting way, nor done any
victims any favors. Amis poses, at the start of the book, a legitimate
question: Why do we think it is OK to make jokes about Stalinism, to laugh
at a political system that killed millions of people? By the end of the
book, we no longer want to know the answer.
********
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